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To Joel Fein, 
Who seems to have made it.

Preface
This book is likely to be misunderstood.  With the Culture 
Wars in full cry, many readers are more apt to be concerned with 
defending their own beliefs than with reevaluating why they 
hold them.
Nowadays, liberalism is in crisis.  Whereas conservatism suf-
fered a profound meltdown during the Great Depression, today 
it is liberals who must confront the disconfirmation of many of 
their cherished beliefs.  Sometimes, it seems as if a few are behav-
ing like teenaged rebels, trying to prove that they will not buckle 
under adult hypocrisies.  Yet, despite refusing to conform, they 
reflexively align themselves with the symbols of their sedition. 
Festooned with tattoos, body piercings, and spiky green hair-
dos, they insist they have arrived at these fashions independent-
ly.  Liberals similarly take positions without acknowledging that 
these derive from groupthink.  Like the journalists described in 
Myrna Blyth’s Spin Sisters, they chatter about political issues as 
vacuously as if they were sitting in a high school cafeteria.  Aware 
that the unspoken price of communal status is an acceptance of 
the consensus positions on abortion or affirmative action, they 
comply.   Brent Bozell experienced a similar political conformity 
when he appeared on a television talk show.  After its techni-
cians inadvertently failed to turn off his earpiece, he was treat-
ed to the show’s directors hooting about his conservative views 
while he was on the air.  Much like a pack of fraternity brothers, 
these erstwhile professionals reveled in making sophomoric jokes 
about opinions they did not share.  Impartially evaluating op-
posing views was not part of their intellectual repertoire.
The same, I fear, may be in store for the unorthodox 
observations that follow.  Because they are different, they are 
apt to be dismissed by both sides of the Culture Wars.  This 
is unfortunate, for if I am right, they offer a third path out of 
the ideological morass into which the Middle-Class Revolution 
has led us.  Secular, but not collectivist, these views offer a 
decentralized and professionalized solution to the inevitable 
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paradoxes of hierarchical power.  A century ago, Max Weber 
worried that modernization would trap humankind in a 
bureaucratic “iron cage,” but there may be another possibility. 
Individuals who are both well-informed and emotionally mature 
may be able to make personal and social decisions that redound 
to their individual and joint benefit.  While not perfect, this is a 
superior alternative to the socialist Big Brotherism or laissez-faire 
Social Darwinism that has hitherto been prevalent.
Many sociologists have, nevertheless, virtually ignored the 
middle class.  Trapped in a leftwing ideological ghetto, they have 
been distinctly unsympathetic to the middling orders.  More 
fascinated with the upper and lower reaches of society, they 
concentrate on exposing the defects of social elites.  It is the 
poor for whom they feel sympathy.  Those perceived as weak are 
identified as their natural allies, and an effort is made to promote 
an egalitarian utopia deemed beneficial to them.  The extent of this 
allegiance is revealed in how the American Sociology Association 
reviews professional books.  Contemporary Sociology, the 
organization’s flagship journal for reviews, organizes its entries 
under a number of headings.  The first of these is “Inequalities.” 
Though the editors might have referred to “social stratification” 
or “social hierarchies,” they preferred an inherently tendentious 
classification.  Inequality, of course, implies a moral judgment. 
It suggests that equality is the normal human condition and that 
anything other is abnormal.  This implies Marxist assumptions, 
but these are not admitted.  Nor is the collectivist purpose of 
including a subheading such as “Social Movements.”  Because 
many sociologists having been reared on the belief that capitalism 
is unjust, they conceive of their mission as assisting in its demise. 
As a result, they consider themselves “movement people,” with 
the movement to which they are dedicated being the impending 
overthrow of market-based selfishness.
Since its inception, sociology has been in rebellion against 
modernism, which means it also has been in rebellion against 
middle-class influence.  The discipline began as a collectivist 
reaction to the Industrial Revolution, and to this day most of 
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its practitioners believe that evidence of human sociality proves 
their natural state is a version of socialism.  (Indeed, research 
shows that only four percent of sociologists identify themselves as 
conservative.)  As a consequence, they see no point in objectively 
studying the nature of social hierarchies or of morality.  Wrenching 
these topics out of context, it is assumed that all that needs to be 
known about them is already known.  The goal is instead to get 
down to the business of improving the human condition.  Even 
though Marx himself put forward an historical account of the 
evolution of human society, they see no reason to examine this 
in further detail.  The current circumstance of the middle class is 
therefore left dangling.  Treated as a didactic fable, its emergence 
is never dissected with scientific rigor.
Both on the left and the right, the fashion has become to 
lament how society has developed.  On the right, the primary 
complaint is that tradition has been violated.  Its Cassandras 
mourn the advent of decadence and a decline in personal 
responsibility.  On the left, the lament is about stymied progress. 
Here the forces of reaction are said to be selfishly preventing 
utopian solutions.  Both sides, however, share a moralistic point 
of view.  More concerned with making evaluative judgments 
than with understanding what has been happening, they ignore 
plainly visible trends.  With even social scientists caught in this 
snare, they don’t ask “why?” but rather “what should we do?” 
No wonder so little has been written about the millennia long 
processes that have eventuated in the emergence of a middle-
class society.  What follows is an attempt at a corrective.  The 
object is to bring a colossal historic spectacle into better focus, to 
help us understand the social crisis entailed by the middle-class 
revolution and the potential of professionalization.  Premised 
on the need to apply more “head” than “heart,” it seeks to 
substitute mature reflection for passionate reaction.  Too much 
of what has been written in the name of progress has been self-
indulgent.   Rather than exemplify genuine compassion, it has 
sought to comfort the purportedly afflicted.  With the best 
of intentions, intelligent observers have allowed this to take 
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precedence over disquieting facts.  Sadly, this is self-defeating. 
The post-modernists notwithstanding, the truth is the truth, and 
unless it is assessed with an unjaundiced eye, our roadmap to the 
future is likely to promote many a wrong turn.  Although even 
an accurate understanding of our social situation cannot protect 
us from every pitfall, it can at least make for a less bumpy ride.
Melvyn L. Fein
Kennesaw, GA
Acknowledgments
 For the past twenty-five years Betty Siegel has been presi-
dent of Kennesaw State University. The first female president of 
a Georgia state senior college, she has overseen the institution’s 
growth from a fledgling four-year school to a regional university 
just about to begin offering doctorate degrees.  For all this, she 
deserves enormous credit, but for the moment I wish to single 
out her role in launching the KSU Press.  Determined to leave 
behind a first-rate academic tradition, it was she who conceived 
of the press and she who insisted that it be created. As one of its 
first authors, I therefore salute her prescience.
I must also salute the unflagging efforts of the Press’s 
founding editor, Laura Dabundo.  Presented with an enormous 
challenge, she has held up particularly well under the stress.  As 
importantly, she has infused a vision and energy into this mission 
that bodes well for the project’s future.  She has also devoted 
her personal attention to this project.  Perennially flexible and 
possessed of solid common sense, the following work is much 
improved thanks to her efforts. 
Shirley Cordell, the press’s secretary, and Holly Miller, 
its illustrator, also deserve my thanks for their cheerful 
cooperation.
Over all, teaching at KSU has been a fortunate experience. 
Living and working in the Atlanta area, at a growing university 
that allows for a diversity of opinion, has allowed me to pursue 
academic interests that might have been quashed elsewhere.  I 
have also benefitted from interactions with colleagues, many 
of whom have been enormously supportive.  To begin with, I 
must acknowledge members of my own department.  Coming 
from an assortment of disciplines ranging from sociology 
through anthropology, geography, and criminal justice, they 
have contributed their diversity of thought and knowledge to my 
own education.  As beneficially, their sustained collegiality has 
been an ongoing inspiration. In particular, but not to minimize 
their intellectual inputs, both our former chair Lana Wachniak 
xii    Acknowledgments
and our current chair Samuel Abaidoo have offered sustained 
encouragement and continuous administrative indulgence (both 
of which I have needed).  They have allowed me to do what I 
have done.  Among the many to whom I am also grateful are 
Vasilis Economopoulos, Barbara Karcher, Jonathan Freedman, 
Judy Allen, Sutham Cheurprakobkit, Harry Trendell, Wayne 
Van Horne, Miriam Boeri, Michele Emerson, Ed Clack, Becky 
Petersen, Tino LaRosa, Mark Patterson, Garrett Smith, Donna 
Walls, and Cathy Farrow.
Other members of the KSU team to whom I am especially 
indebted are Fred Roach, Akanmu Adebayo, and Tom Scott of 
our History department; Kerwin Swint and Nuru Akinyemi of 
Political Science; Anne Hicks-Coolick of Human Services, and 
Dean Tim Mescon of the Coles Business College.  Finally I must 
also acknowledge my students. Without the opportunity to teach 
them, I would not have been able to formulate my ideas nearly 
as cogently.
Contents
Greedy Conformists? 
Rodney Dangerfields 1
Dominance 6
The New Middle Class 13
A Stealth Revolution 22
Social Class 
Hierarchies 33
A Range of Options 38
Fundamentals 45
Sources of Power 52
Forms of Alliances 58
Middle Class Powers 65
A Way of Life 
What Do You Want to Be? 77
Self Direction 84
People Skills 90
Technical Skills 96
Emotional Maturity 99
Middle Class Values and Virtues 105
Origins 
Waves of Change 119
The Monetary Nexus 122
The Medieval Revival 131
The Renaissance 136
The Enlightenment 145
xiv    The Great Middle Class Revolution
Industrialization 
The Industrial Revolution 163
The Victorians 172
The Proud Tower 185
Reprise and Collapse 193
The Tipping Point 
The Middle Class Ascendancy 209
An Occupational Survey 213
The Eisenhower Consolidation 225
The Hippie Eruption 233
The Reaction 
The Reform Impulse 249
The Reforms 255
The Great Disruption 269
The Culture Wars 278
Bobos in Limbo 
Bobos 295
The Liberal Hegemony 301
Contradictions of Liberalism 313
Sources of Power 323
Temples of Liberalism 
Cultural Institutions 345
Progressive Education 350
Higher Education 358
Journalists 365
Entertainment 373
Lawyers and Social Workers 377
The Working Class Counterattack 380
Contents   xv
The Family 
A Bridge to the Future 391
The Post-Liberal Way of Life 396
Feminist (etc.) Lessons 406
Voluntary Intimacy 414
The Children 419
Toward a Professionalized Society 
A Professionalized Humanism 433
The Division of Labor Revisited 440
Role Negotiations and Role Scripts 449
Critical Relativism 455
The Professionalized Self 462

Chapter 1
Greedy Conformists?
Little boxes on the hillside,
Little boxes made of ticky-tack. (1950s folk song)
Greed is good! Greed it right! Greed works! Greed will save 
the U.S.A.!  (Oliver Stone, Screenplay for Wall Street)
Society everywhere is in conspiracy against the manhood 
of everyone of its members… The virtue in most request 
is conformity.  (Ralph Waldo Emerson, Essays, First 
Series)
Rodney Dangerfields
The picture is not arresting.  Little houses, boxy houses, lined 
up one after another on a California hillside, each one exactly like 
the one beside it.  The folk song from which the image is derived 
has mostly been forgotten, whereas the sentiment behind it has not. 
According to the lyric, the residences all look alike, but what is worse, 
the people inside are also virtually identical.  Conformist clones, they 
are archetypes of the tawdry emptiness that has overtaken modern 
America.  The song bemoans the cheapness of West Coast social 
climbers, but might as well have assailed the barren life of Long Island’s 
Levittowners.1  Among the earliest of the postwar suburbanites, for 
many years their inexpensive, stand-alone, suburban redoubts were 
the epitome of tasteless conventionality.  Indistinguishable inside 
and out, they were renowned for a lack of distinction.
Despite the fact that the United States has become the first 
truly middle-class country in the history of the world and despite 
the fact that its middle class has become socially dominant, those 
who occupy this status receive little respect.2  They have become the 
Rodney Dangerfields of social stratification.  Who, with a modicum 
of sense, aspires to become one of their number?3  Ordinary men 
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and women may wish to grow rich or famous or socially prominent; 
they may long for a bigger house, a fancier car, or more opulent 
vacations, but they do not yearn to become a part of the middling 
orders.  Asked to which class they belong, almost 90% claim that 
this is already where they fit in.  While they may fantasize about 
being elected president or making a landmark scientific discovery or 
building a major corporation, they do not pine for a vulgar suburban 
orthodoxy.4  In their eyes, being middle class is tantamount to being 
mediocre.  It is to be average, that is, to be like everyone else.  And who 
would want that?  Worse still, who would wish it on their children? 
Although the American Dream5 is honored as the quintessence of 
the good life, to equate it with being average is to condemn it as 
routine.  This would mean to abjure rising to a more stellar status, 
to settle for the ordinary, for being part of the common ruck.  Those 
in the lower middle classes may secretly dream of the perquisites of 
the upper middle class, especially the respect accorded to doctors, 
lawyers, and their ilk, but otherwise, being middle class is universally 
spurned as trite, boring, and undistinguished.  Occupation within 
its precincts is reserved for the other guy; the one reconciled to being 
second rate.
A half-century ago, just at the middle classes were emerging to 
preeminence, the sociologist C. Wright Mills articulated what was to 
become the conventional wisdom.  Casting a jaundiced eye on the 
transformations of the modern world, he perceived what seemed to 
be a precipitous decline.  Most people might be growing richer, but 
their moral standing was deteriorating.  In his introduction to White 
Collar,6 he writes that “the uneasiness, the malaise of our time is 
due to this root fact: in our politics and economy, in family life and 
religion—in practically every sphere of our existence—the certainties 
of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries have disintegrated or been 
destroyed and, at the same time, no new sanctions or justifications 
for the new routines we live, and must live, have taken hold.” 
Who, he inquires, is to blame for this impasse?  The answer, not 
surprisingly, is none other than the middle classes.  “Among [these] 
white collar people, the malaise is deep-rooted; for the absence of any 
order or belief has left them morally defenseless as individuals and 
politically impotent as a group.”  Alienated at work and at home, 
they have been transported into a Kafkaesque realm of insane rules 
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and impotent wheel-spinning.  As salaried employees, middle-class 
workers do not make anything.  Unable to contemplate the pleasures 
of craftsmanship, they go “year after year through the same paper 
routine[s]” with their leisure time ever more dedicated to the “ersatz 
diversion” and the “synthetic excitement.”  No wonder they are 
“bored at work and restless at play, and [that] this terrible alternation 
wears [them] out.”
But that is not all. Mills’ indictment goes deeper: “In his work 
[the middle-class person] often clashes with customer and superior, 
and must almost always be the standardized loser: he must smile 
and be personable, standing behind the counter, or waiting in the 
outer office.”   Virtually incapable of fighting back, these “new little 
Machiavellians, [practice] their personable crafts for hire and the 
profit of others, according to rules laid down by those above them.” 
Ultimately, “the calculating hierarchies of the department store and 
industrial corporation, of rationalized office and government bureau, 
lay out the gray ways of work and stereotype the permitted initiatives. 
And in all this bureaucratic usurpation of freedom and of rationality, 
the white collar people are the interchangeable parts of the big chains 
of authority that bind the society together.”  Evidently ineffectual 
ciphers, they cooperate in their own demise, either from cowardice 
or greed.  For Mills the small-scale salesperson is the quintessence 
of white-collar vapidity.  He/she is said to live a life dedicated to 
appearance, all in the service of purveying someone else’s inferior 
products.  Know-nothings by choice, such individuals do not even 
seek to comprehend their situation.  Because genuine knowledge 
would interfere with the synthetic skills for which they are famed, 
they keep their blinders firmly in place.
The noninspirational characteristics of the middle classes are 
alleged to be legion.  Mediocre Babbitts7 at best, like Sinclair Lewis’s 
fictional hero, they congratulate themselves on their successes, all 
the while having sold their souls for messes of flavorless pottage. 
Seduced by their bosses into a vacant materialism, they have become 
little more than the lapdogs of capitalism.  Pawns of the rich, they 
do what they are told, a Hallelujah Chorus intent on imagining 
that this conformity was self-selected.  In Karl Marx’s8 universe, the 
nineteenth-century bourgeoisie was pitted against the proletarians 
in a life-and-death struggle for supremacy.  The middle classes were 
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said to be marginal to this social warfare, but in occupying the front 
offices of the corporations, they identified with their bosses.  As 
industrial bookkeepers and foremen, they were not in charge of what 
went on, but nevertheless they emulated the portly indolence of their 
superiors.  This was why they wore the white shirts of which they 
were so proud.  These symbolized liberation from the dirty labor 
of the proletarians.  This was also why they saved their money to 
buy suburban houses loosely modeled on those of the higher-ups. 
Although others perceived them as little more than impoverished 
mimics, they remained oblivious to this state of affairs.  Believing 
themselves intrinsic to the authority of their betters, they strutted 
with a bloated self-importance belied by their deeply ingrained 
subservience.
This lack of insight is supposedly recapitulated in the dull, 
plodding realities of today’s middle-class existence.  As Mills says, 
these cogs in an industrial/commercial matrix continue to prop up 
the institutions that enforce their obedience.  In order to achieve this, 
however, they must impose a debilitating blindness on themselves. 
Insensitive to their condition, they are also oblivious to good taste and 
social decency.   As early as the 1920s, Lewis bemoaned the vulgarity 
of the nouveau riche.  Once it acquired more money than its parents, 
the glitter left its members so dazzled that they enthusiastically 
supported a pointless boosterism.  Genuinely in awe of the inflated 
language they used to praise their own accomplishments, they did not 
realize its shallowness. This ignorance was expressed in the garishness 
of their purchases.  Unable to distinguish quality from trash, they 
flaunted the mass-produced symbols of their vulgarity with all the 
smugness of the supercilious.  Huge automobiles, cookie-cutter art, 
and bouffant hairdos revealed their lack of depth.  What mattered to 
them was facade rather than substance.  Flash-and-dash was sufficient 
to those who never peeked beneath the exterior manifestations of 
their ersatz Hollywood lifestyles.
Alleged to be noncreative, these middle-class nonentities are 
excoriated for mindlessly pushing paper and counting beans.  Because 
a more subtle comprehension of their environment might interfere 
with the slavishness intrinsic to their occupations, they make certain 
to keep their scholarship within predictable bounds.  Anti-intellectual 
to the core, they never ferret out root causes but instead accept 
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conventional shibboleths.  What their neighbors spout is what they 
believe.  If they read books, they are escapist novels; if they turn on the 
Internet, it is for amusement or stress-free shopping.  Were a neutral 
observer to eavesdrop on their conversations, one would hear talk 
dominated by sports and celebrity gossip.  Barry Bond’s latest home-
run count or Pamela Anderson’s most recent husband consume their 
chatter.  Fine-grained conversations dedicated to genuine problem 
solving are, on the other hand, as rare as hen’s teeth.
Nor do their dialogues sparkle with the compassion of delicately 
tuned intellects.  Insecure and selfish, members of the middle classes 
inadvertently reveal themselves as phony philanthropists.  Although 
they trumpet a concern for their less fortunate fellows, their attentions 
are really directed toward social climbing.  Giving to charity is part 
of their routine, but they are actually more worried about seeming 
to be generous than with the outcomes of their liberality.  Insincere 
to the marrow, they smile and mouth the socially correct words, but 
they care no more about the welfare of others.  Broad grins go with 
the territory; they do not bespeak an interior kindness.  More akin to 
Willy Loman, they are dedicated to selling themselves as much as to 
marketing their wares.
Television-watching bigots, rather than altruistic citizens, 
denizens of the middle class pass their callous self-involvement on 
to their children. These nonentities-in-training are also encouraged 
to become empty fortresses dedicated to safeguarding a purposeless 
existence.   Appearing to be well connected, that is, to being part of 
the in-crowd, is the height of their aspirations.  The music lessons 
and soccer tournaments of their youth are, in fact, aimed at getting 
a good job and marrying well, not at becoming insightful adults. 
Honed in their vacuity by being given automobiles when aged 
sixteen and credit cards at eighteen, they are experts in conspicuous 
consumption.  Aspiring jocks or journeymen mallrats, they are well 
schooled in purchasing the material objects that substitute for inner 
strength.  Quickly learning that new BMWs have more cachet than 
second-hand Chevys and that the logos of prominent designers 
are more highly regarded than is good taste, they eagerly display 
advertisements of their conformity.  Eventually, they, too, become 
accomplished hangers-on, more infatuated with personal visibility 
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than earned merit.  For them, seeming to be important counts for 
more than actually being important.
Dominance
In reality, the scurrilous allegations lodged against the middle 
classes are green-eyed libels.9  Their crass conformity and materialist 
vacuity are more a figment of their critic’s imaginations than a 
portrait of their actual circumstances.  Marx had it as wrong as do 
the balladeers who sing laments about ticky-tack hillsides.  A drive 
through today’s Levittown should disabuse the intellectually honest 
of the community’s obsessive sameness.  When originally built, its 
houses were indeed dreary in their uniformity.  Erected with industrial 
efficiency, standardization was a means of keeping costs down and 
of making home-ownership available to the less affluent.  But once 
the proprietors of these dwellings acquired the means, they raced to 
individualize them.  Far from being conformists at heart, they made 
additions reflective of their diverse tastes and needs.  Most even went 
out of their way to landscape their domains to suggest a pleasing 
pastoralism.   Flowers, trees, and imitation waterfalls sprouted almost 
as quickly as did the homes themselves.
Marx vilified the few white-collar workers who populated the 
proprietor-owned businesses with which he was familiar.  For him, 
they were inconsequential drones, who, in their stiffly laundered 
shirts, paraded an authority they did not possess and a prosperity 
they would never attain.  Marx’s universe was dominated by 
egotistical entrepreneurs whom he predicted would one day succeed 
in impoverishing almost everyone but themselves.  In allowing their 
workers little more than subsistence wages, they would amass wealth 
beyond the dreams of Croesus.  Conversely, their employees would 
struggle in torn garments and seedy tenements, nourished solely 
by crusts of dry bread.  This image of degraded poverty has been 
enshrined in the concept of exploitation.  To this day, class warriors 
generate cheers by invoking the alleged penury of working men and 
women.  Supposedly imposed by the powerful, this underprivileged 
condition is in theory nearly universal.  The trouble, of course, is 
that it obviously is not.  Social predictions are frequently difficult 
to evaluate.  Because they tend to be subtle, interpretations differ. 
Marx’s prophecy, however, does not fall within this sphere; it is 
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demonstrably wrong.  The majority of people today are anything 
but poor.  Their possessions may not measure up to those of a Bill 
Gates, but they too own houses, cars, and even stock portfolios.  In 
what has become the most prosperous era ever, they are emphatically 
not starving.  If anything, their midsections reveal an overindulgence 
in calories.  Neither are they mere drones.  Better educated and 
more active than previous generations, their interests are deeper 
and broader than those of their parents.  They have become the true 
monarchs of the contemporary scene.
In an historical revolution that is notable for its invisibility, the 
middle classes appropriated the management of the modern world 
unto themselves.10  Dating from not long after the Second World 
War, the United States experienced a unique tipping point.  Before 
any other nation, it came to be dominated by its median elements. 
Although still individually deferential to those in the upper stratum, 
these persons collectively assumed the leadership role.  The middle 
classes now set the social standards for all others.  Their tastes and 
manners pervade the habits of those both above and below them. 
Their goals became the nation’s goals; their behavioral patterns 
the country’s patterns.   In short, they became society’s designated 
organizers.  First, they calculated what needed to be done; then they 
implemented the most important projects.  Where once the country’s 
key judgments descended from on high, they now emerged from 
these intermediate sources.  Ordinary people across the land took 
jurisdiction over their destinies and those of their contemporaries. 
If power can be calibrated by who gets to make essential decisions, 
then those who had previously been the helpmeets of the elite have 
now usurped their prerogatives.  They have arrogated to themselves 
the responsibility for what happens and what does not.
The nature of this change can be discerned in what occurred 
within the military.  There was a time when warfare was an aristocratic 
prerogative.  In medieval Europe, kings, earls, counts, dukes, barons, 
and knights controlled the business of combat.  From childhood, 
they trained in the martial arts, and when battle was in the air, they 
surged to the forefront.  Indeed, the term “duke” is derived from a 
term meaning “war leader.”  Ordinary people, that is, the infantry, 
were not allowed the armor or the warhorses of their chiefs.  They 
had to make do with farm implements and padded blouses.  When 
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battle came, they were a rabble fit only to be slaughtered by their 
betters.  This distinction was later codified in the division between 
commissioned and noncommissioned officers.  The former came 
from the nobility, albeit its lesser ranks, whereas the sergeants and 
corporals came from the lower stratum.  While the officers were in 
the army for life or until they resigned their commissions, those to 
whom they gave orders served for specified periods after which they 
were required to reenlist.  No matter how competent the latter were 
as front line fighters, they were not permitted to assume command on 
the battlefield.  This was the privilege of the aristocrats, irrespective of 
training or experience.  In theory, since only commissioned officers 
served at the pleasure of the sovereign, only they could share in his 
authority.
The resultant disregard for military competence extended almost 
into the modern era.  Reverberations of it were still present during 
the American Civil War.11  Many of its generals, such as Grant and 
Lee, were graduates of West Point, but many were not.  Of these 
latter, more than a few were political generals who received their 
commissions because they could provide crucial support at the polls. 
One of these, Benjamin (Beast) Butler, scandalized New Orleans 
with his unprofessional insults to the femininity of its gentle ladies. 
Some, to be sure, were gifted amateurs.  An obvious example would 
be Nathan Bedford Forrest, perhaps the South’s best cavalry officer, 
who obtained his command by funding a company from his personal 
fortune.  Many others merely muddled through.  The point is that 
professionalism was not then decisive.  Most people still thought 
bravery and social prominence were all that was necessary.
A mere half century later this was unacceptable.  By World War 
I, the American Expeditionary Force was much better trained.  It 
was not sent overseas until thoroughly indoctrinated in the new 
tactics and even then not assigned to the front lines without further 
preparations in France. Harry Truman could serve as a lower-level 
field officer, but more responsible roles went to career officers.  By the 
time of the Second World War, former civilians were still receiving 
commissions but only after undergoing standardized schooling for 
their future commands.  These ninety-day wonders were not widely 
respected, but they were a far cry from the Duke of Medina-Sedona 
who was appointed to command the Spanish Armada that Philip II 
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sent against Elizabethan England.  Medina-Sedona’s credentials were 
limited to the circumstances of his birth, as became apparent when 
his fleet encountered the enemy’s race-built galleons.  American 
officers had at least to be college graduates before they were accepted 
for instruction.
After the middle-class tipping point, a nonhereditary 
professionalism became more prevalent.  No longer were aristocratic 
pedigrees or political connections sufficient.  Military competence 
became mandatory for those who expected to receive an appointment 
or a promotion.  The Gulf War and the subsequent Iraq War 
confirmed the ascendancy of professional skill over social position. 
Middle-class criteria of merit had irrevocably supplanted standards 
of family prominence or extraneous power.  Those who witnessed 
the crushing efficiency of the American military must be impressed 
with the effects of this preparation.  Professionalism had become the 
norm up and down the line.  Run of the mill soldiers spent years in 
training for their specialties, while their leaders devoted even more 
time to planning for the myriad contingencies of the battlefield.  In 
the event of combat, officers and men alike were so well practiced 
that they could adjust to unexpected emergencies on the spot.   Even 
enlisted personnel formerly consigned to unquestioning obedience 
could calmly organize flexible responses under withering fire.
Intimations of this coming middle-class ascendancy can be 
seen in Colonial America.  Despite the disrespect characteristic of 
contemporary commentators on class, many of the nation’s earliest 
heroes foreshadowed its coming bourgeois virtues.  Perhaps the 
most prominent of these are Benjamin Franklin and John Adams. 
Although personally and temperamentally at odds, each epitomizes 
the individualism and integrity that has come to signify the best 
of middle-class achievement.  Both were self-made men, and both 
exulted in personal accomplishment.  Vain in distinct ways, they 
nevertheless had a great deal to be vain about.  Expert in different 
skills, each was motivated to make his mark, and as such participated 
in decisions of lasting impact.  They were precursors of a modern 
middle class that explicitly extolled the values that later facilitated a 
comparable professionalism.
Let us begin with Adams,12 even though he was the younger man. 
He started life as the son of an ordinary New England farmer.  Sent 
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to Harvard to become a Congregationalist minister, he gravitated to 
the law instead.  Not priggishly religious, he nevertheless inculcated 
enough of his puritanical Calvinist roots to fret about doing good, 
not merely making good.  In his case, this was demonstrated by a 
devotion to duty that enabled him to become both a patriot and 
the defense attorney for a British soldier accused of murder during 
the Boston Massacre.13  Ultimately, he was celebrated as the Atlas 
of Independency.  Without his tenacity and persuasive skills, it is 
doubtful that the Declaration of Independence would have come 
to be.  Thomas Jefferson is frequently accorded the credit for 
writing it, but it was Adams’s individualism and ambition that led 
to its adoption.  Like the middle class leaders who were to follow, 
he exhibited a confidence in his abilities and his right to assert 
them.  Adams believed in merit and responsibility.  Undeterred by 
his inauspicious origins, he assumed that he was entitled to rise as 
high as his talents could carry him.  Beyond this, he argued that his 
countrymen possessed the same birthright.  Though he has been long 
celebrated for his forthrightness and integrity, only recently have his 
other superior qualities been fully recognized.
Even more endearing is Franklin.14  Remembered for the twinkle 
in his eye and the amusing stories on his lips, he is the friendly 
founder.  Beginning less auspiciously than Adams as the son of 
a candle maker, by the age of seventeen he had run away from a 
Boston apprenticeship at his brother’s print shop to an uncertain 
future in Philadelphia.  Utterly self-educated, he became the colonial 
equivalent of a publishing magnate.  His Poor Richard’s Almanac,15 
as well as the fruits of his talents as a self-promoter and business 
franchiser, enabled him to accumulate the resources to retire while 
still in his forties.  As one of the leather-apron crowd, he appreciated 
those who each day earned their own livings while simultaneously 
seeking to better themselves.  Proud to be one of the middling sorts, 
he was to become their prophet.  Throughout most of his career 
as a politician and an author, he penned influential paeans to hard 
work and ingenuity.  An independent-minded do-gooder, he wanted 
everyone to be the same.
Among Poor Richard’s middle-class aphorisms are the following: 
“Early to bed, early to rise, makes a man healthy, wealthy, and wise”; 
“Don’t throw stones at your neighbors, if your windows are of glass”; 
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“Nothing can be said to be certain except death and taxes”; “Time 
is money”; “A used key is always bright”; and “God helps them that 
help themselves.”  Franklin believed all this.  Almost always busy, he 
honored initiative over conformity.  Unlike Mills’s hidebound losers, 
he led a life filled with activity and enterprise.  Not for Franklin was a 
passive reliance on instructions from above.  Continuously aboil with 
ingenious schemes, he became the archetypical networker.  While 
still in his early twenties, he organized a Junta of like-minded artisans 
dedicated to improving their skills and to sharing opportunities. 
This soon became the launching pad for civic improvements such as 
a lending library, several volunteer firefighting companies, a hospital, 
and what was to become the University of Pennsylvania.  Ultimately 
he was to participate in writing the Declaration of Independence, the 
Treaty of Paris, and the American Constitution.  Along the way, he 
even had time to invent the lightening rod, investigate the properties 
of electricity, examine the nature of the Gulf Stream, and speculate 
about the meteorology of Nor’easter storms.  No one could call 
Franklin boring or vacuous.  In his day, Europe’s most sophisticated 
philosophers and scientists considered him a peer.
Yet Franklin attributed his success to classic middle-class virtues. 
During his formative years, he developed what he called a “moral 
perfection project.”   First, he compiled a list of desirable qualities, 
and then he kept track of how well he exemplified them.  Among 
these virtues were temperance, order, resolution, frugality, industry, 
sincerity, justice, and moderation.  In other words, he would be 
sober, hard working, and honest.  He later added humility as a goal, 
but this was never to be more than a public-relations ploy.  Unlisted 
entirely was the virtue of tolerance, yet this was an attribute he was to 
exemplify until his dying day.  Completely without religious bias and 
in his later years an abolitionist, he reveled in interdenominational 
observances.  Above all, he took satisfaction in being what he unself-
consciously described as mediocre.  In America, said Franklin, “People 
do not enquire of a stranger, ‘What is he?’ but, ‘What can he do?’ 
Achievement, not nobility of birth, was, by his lights, the correct 
measure of merit.  Thus he was able to proclaim, “The almost general 
mediocrity of fortune that prevails in America, obliging its people 
to follow some business for subsistence, those vices that usually 
arise from idleness are in a great measure prevented.”  Recently, the 
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historian Gordon Wood16 has observed of Franklin’s contemporaries 
that “by absorbing the gentility of the aristocracy and the work 
of the working class, the middling sorts gained a powerful moral 
hegemony over the whole society.”  And as Franklin’s biographer 
Walter Isaacson17 further notes, no one deserves this sort of accolade 
more than Franklin himself, for, “he represented and helped to make 
[these values] integral to the new nation’s character.”
Paradoxically, Franklin was not able to make these virtues integral 
to the lives of his immediate posterity.  The attractions of aristocratic 
privilege were to remain potent for many years to come, even within 
his own family.  Largely thanks to Franklin’s efforts, his son William 
was appointed the Royal Governor of New Jersey.  Nevertheless, 
though surrounded by examples of middle-class self-sufficiency, 
when the American Revolution came and sides were chosen, William 
decided to stand with his monarch rather than his father.  In the end, 
he lived out his final years in England, trying to ape its aristocracy, 
albeit without much success.  His son, Temple, too would opt for 
the life of a dandy.  Despite being set up on an American farm by 
his grandfather, he preferred to chase women and opulence on the 
Continent.  
What compounds this paradox is that two centuries later even 
the British royal family has been infected by Franklin’s middle-class 
virtues.  So dominant have these become that the mother country’s 
Prince Charles learned, to his chagrin, that he was expected to live 
according to these standards and not his ancient regal prerogatives. 
Thus, in his marriage to Diana, Princess of Wales he was expected 
to uphold a conventional fidelity.  Although millions of American 
women fantasized about the magic of being a princess, they 
demanded a modernized version of the Cinderella fable.  For them 
and their British counterparts, happily ever after means a mom and 
dad and two kids in a single household, even if opulent.  Princess 
Di appeared to keep up her end of this bargain.  Besides dressing 
well, she made regular excursions in support of solid middle-class 
causes.  Better still, when her marriage began to crumble, she went 
before the television cameras tearfully to indulge in the same sort of 
psychobabble spoken by any betrayed housewife.  Charles was less 
astute.  When he first met Camilla Parker-Bowles on a polo field, she 
reminded him that her great-grandmother had been the mistress of 
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his great-great-grandfather, Edward VII. Edward was able to engage 
in this sort of liaison without reproach, but his descendant could 
not.  Charles was to be hounded by the press as an unfaithful cad. 
Even his private telephone conversations were tapped and publicized 
to demonstrate his disloyalty.  Although his attachment to Camilla 
demonstrated a genuine love, this was trumped by his flouting of 
middle-class marital ideals.
Today, middle-class values and middle-class decision-making 
have become the norm.  From top to bottom, the people Mills 
dismisses as compliant drones govern society.  Far from being 
empty-headed conformists, they have been transmuted into the 
seat of its expertise and energy.  Still, their social dominance is not 
always visible nor always celebrated.  Human communities live by 
symbols, but these can be out of joint with underlying realities.  This 
is our current situation.  The sort of life that Franklin recommended 
and that Adams embodied has triumphed.  No doubt this victory 
has been incomplete and is fraught with difficulties, but it is also 
more substantial than its critics allow.  The middle-class nature of 
our contemporary world is not sufficiently appreciated, in large 
part because it has become so ordinary.  People do not notice the 
ubiquitous background noise of their daily rounds.  Nor do they 
treasure the constraints that personally bind them.  Forced to respect 
middle-class sensibilities, they bridle at requirements that often feel 
onerous.  Mills is but one of many voices chafing at the restrictions 
current in our present society.  “No rules; just right,” boasts a popular 
restaurant chain.  “Think outside the box,” goes the advertising refrain 
of another.  People hate being imprisoned by middle-class dictates, 
and they say so.  The theme is clear: they want this hegemony to be 
challenged.  They long to be free to be whatever they wish.  What is 
not investigated, however, is what are their actual options.  Is there an 
alternative to middle-class domination?  Can contemporary society 
function without their supremacy?  Can people survive the conflicts 
brought on by their own uncertainties?  We shall see.
The New Middle Class
“Eighty years ago, there were three quarters of a million middle 
class employees; by 1940, there were over twelve and a half million.” 
Thus wrote Mills before the middle class revolution reached its crest. 
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In fact, he begins his chapter on the new middle class by observing 
that “in the early nineteenth century, although there are no exact 
figures, probably four-fifths of the occupied population were self-
employed enterprisers.”18  Most of these, of course, were farmers 
and independent artisans.  Part of what made the United States’s 
labor force different from that of Europe was the freedom it enjoyed. 
Journeying across a broad ocean to take possession of a continent 
bereft of an indigenous population—thanks to the depredations 
of European diseases—a bold set of adventurers had either fanned 
out to carve homesteads from the wilderness or remained behind 
in coastal cities to pioneer newfangled varieties of commerce.  In 
both cases, they had been liberated from the oppressive traditions 
of aristocratic supervision.  Caucasian Americans were never serfs 
in America.  Some may have begun their careers as indentured 
servants, but they were not required to stifle their ambitions to suit 
the needs of hereditary ruling class—this despite the best efforts of 
their royal governors.  The resultant sense of autonomy not only 
laid the foundations for a successful political revolution, but once 
the Industrial Revolution took hold, it facilitated an explosion in 
middle-class occupations.
Mills distinguished between an old and a new middle class.  The 
chief differences between these were a diminution of the percentage 
of farmers and an increase in salaried professionals, salespeople, and 
office workers.  By his calculations, 62% of the old middle class 
consisted of farmers, whereas, by 1940, this proportion was reduced 
to 23%.  The shift had clearly been toward commercial employment. 
People were no longer producing for their own consumption or that 
of their immediate neighbors.  More likely to be market-oriented 
than subsistence farmers and factory workers rather than shopkeepers, 
their profit-making orientation had become broader.  Even within 
the manufacturing sphere, employment swung toward the needs of 
the marketplace.  Thus, according to Mills, whereas, in 1870, 77% of 
workers were directly engaged in production, by 1940, scarcely 46% 
were thus engaged.  The growth areas had switched into service jobs, 
which went from 13% to 20% of the total; into distributing jobs, 
which went from 7% to 23%; and into coordinating jobs, which 
went from 3% to 11%.  There had clearly been a reallocation of 
effort from making goods to getting them to the customer.
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By the beginning of the new millennium, the changes were even 
more dramatic.  An elaboration of the details of this development 
will await a later chapter, but for the moment it may be adequate 
to observe that managerial and professional employment has gone 
through the roof, while entrepreneurial efforts have held their 
own.  The economists Herbert Stein and Murray Foss19 calculate 
that, between 1958 and 1998, blue-collar employment declined 
from almost 40 % to just under 25 %.  Meanwhile white-collar 
employment jumped from just over 40% to almost 60%.  This said, 
rather than beginning our survey of what happened at the high end 
of the occupational continuum, it makes more sense to start at the 
opposite end of the spectrum, where jobs were lost and from whence 
a transformed workforce arose.
When England was establishing its North American dominions, 
its promoters expected their raw materials to keep the mother country’s 
manufactories humming.  Initially, this seemed the case.  Even Ben 
Franklin assured British opinion makers that they had nothing to 
fear regarding cross-Atlantic competition.  There was simply so much 
land available that the vast majority of his fellow subjects would be 
attracted into agriculture for the indefinite future.  No one could 
foresee that within little more than two centuries the percentage of 
farmers would decline to less than 2 % of the population.  Ironically, 
because of advances in technology, the quantity of foodstuffs was 
greater than ever.  Indeed, so efficient has productivity become that, 
by 1992, the Census Bureau calculated that there were fewer than 
100,000 farm enterprises, with barely more than a half-million farm 
workers toiling on them.  Johnny had long since deserted his rural 
home for the more opulent accommodations of the city or, better 
yet, for the more comfortable habitations of the suburbs.
Similar trends have been visible in manufacturing.  At the height 
of the Industrial Revolution, it was assumed that, as the young people 
left the farms, they would automatically swell the ranks of factory 
workers.  By the 1930s, the unions were so confident of this trend 
that they believed these growing numbers would inexorably enhance 
their influence.  This prophecy, too, was doomed to failure as union 
membership soon sank to below 15%.  As might be expected, the 
proportion of those engaged in production fell as well.  By 2001, the 
U.S. Department of Labor’s Bureau of Labor Statistics20 estimated 
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that, out of almost 130 million workers, slightly more than 11 
million were directly involved in production, whereas approximately 
9 million were engaged in transporting the handiwork of the factory 
to other locations.  More than this, over 13 million were engaged 
in sales, and another 23 million were office workers.  Many years 
earlier, Karl Marx had derided individuals not occupied in physical 
production as parasites.  His labor theory of value argued that wealth 
was created by the act of fashioning objects for material use.  All 
other employments were subsidiary, he declared.  Because capitalists 
and their lackeys exploited the efforts of real workers, they deserved 
to be relegated to the ash heap of history.  As if to spite him, however, 
during the intervening decades, the vampires who sucked the blood 
of the honest proletarians multiplied disproportionately to their 
contributions.  Although Marx had speculated that the bourgeoisie 
would decline in numbers as they concentrated material assets in 
their own hands, this has not happened.  Not only was there not a 
revolution of the downtrodden, but the lap dogs of the affluent have 
proliferated into a conquering army.
Mills, in his analysis, was fascinated by increases in the clerical and 
sales forces, yet the upsurge in numbers of managers and professionals 
has been even more spectacular.  Management occupations now 
top over seven million, and closely related business and financial 
occupations are approaching five million.  Professional occupations 
are more difficult to assess and are broader in scope, but if these are 
taken to include computer and mathematical occupations at almost 
three million; architecture and engineering occupations at nearly two 
and a half million; life, physical, and social-science occupations at a 
million; community and social service occupations at a million and 
a half; legal occupations at almost a million; educational occupations 
at seven and a half million; health-care practitioners at over six 
million; and art and entertainment occupations at another million 
and a half, the total is impressive.  These figures may be misleading 
in that they include paraprofessionals, but they still give a good idea 
of the range of professionalization.  Moreover, they do not include 
some traditionally blue-collar occupations, such as that of police 
officer, that have also been professionalizing.  Nor do they include 
service occupations that work in tandem with professionals, such 
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as health-care support workers (e.g., medical assistants) or personal-
care workers, such as cosmetologists and child-care workers.  
Also missing from this compendium is the list of contemporary 
entrepreneurs.  According to the 1997 census,21 over fifteen million 
American companies had no employees.  These were evidently 
enterprises of self-employed persons ranging from independent 
professionals to dogwalkers.  Another six million plus establishments 
had  employees and, therefore, presumably, autonomous bosses. 
These would range from the owners of family-held corporations to 
the partners in stand-alone medical offices and law firms.  Some of 
these persons might even parallel the success of a Steve Jobs, who has 
successively been the moving force behind Apple Computers, Next 
Computers, and Pixar Animation.  More than mere drones, these 
venture specialists focus on introducing and implementing new ideas 
and new products.
Now that professionals, managers, and entrepreneurs 
have captured the most important leadership positions of our 
postindustrial age, their skills, rather than the honorable sweat of 
traditional laborers, have proven to be the key to obtaining power. 
Occupational sociologists have long made a distinction between jobs 
that entail working with people versus those that entail working with 
data or with things.  The modern middle classes specialize in dealing 
with the former two, whereas the historic proletarians were occupied 
with the last.  As commercial activities have proliferated, an ability 
to deal with customers or to coordinate battalions of workers has 
assumed greater importance, whereas dealing with machines has 
declined in significance.  Likewise, a competence in engineering new 
products or in organizing their distribution has taken precedence 
over physically manipulating materials in an increasingly automated 
environment.  All of this has made a difference.  The emergence of 
complex technologies and of mass marketing placed a premium on 
coping with sophisticated conceptions and unpredictable situations. 
Long gone is the repetitive manual toil of the chandler.  Ben Franklin’s 
father was by all accounts a hard worker, but the skills to be mastered 
in manipulating tallow were relatively few, even when compared 
with those of his son.  In the elder Franklin’s day, an independent 
productiveness could make a man a pillar of his community, 
including of his church.  Today’s assembly-line worker, albeit turning 
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out far more candles per day, earns little respect.  Compared with the 
decision-makers guiding his output, his contributions are regarded 
of lesser value.
Contemporary factory workers learn that it is not effort but 
the relative complexity of one’s employment that produces social 
esteem and, therefore, influence.  In contrast to their own tedious 
jobs, professionals are generally experts in their fields of endeavor. 
Trained to unprecedented levels of proficiency, they know things 
that others do not.  It is for this reason that they receive deference. 
Likewise, managers must be knowledgeable about human relations. 
They receive more respect for their people-handling skills than for 
their affluence.  Though sometimes disparaged, good management 
takes a courage and perceptiveness that is not universal.  Years of 
experience and nowadays of college preparation contribute to an 
ability to organize the tasks of others.  Lastly, entrepreneurs receive 
esteem, in part, because they wield the power of a boss; in part, 
from controlling the resources derived from economic success; and, 
in part, from the courage and knowledge implied by being able to 
organize a business from scratch.  Evidences of successful risk-taking 
are their tickets to a higher status.
The increased complexity attaching to high-status occupations 
is manifest in the growing emphasis on formal education.22  It has 
become a cliché that social success is linked to years of schooling. 
At present, to be illiterate is virtually to be a social outcast.  Parents, 
teachers, and even politicians obsessively warn children that being 
a dropout is tantamount to being a failure.  The result has been the 
longest schooled, if not the best educated, society in the history of 
the world.  
Times have manifestly changed.  Although New England 
Puritans encouraged literacy in order to promote Bible reading, even 
states like Massachusetts could not boast a significant high-school 
population until the end of the nineteenth century.  Indeed, college 
attendance did not become commonplace until after World War 
II, when implementation of the GI Bill of Rights opened college 
to millions with working-class backgrounds.  If we look back to 
1869-70, that is, to just after the Civil War, barely more than fifty 
thousand students were studying at all of the nation’s institutions of 
higher learning combined.  By 1899-1900, this figure had risen to 
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something over 237,000.  By 1939-40, the period to which Mills 
refers, the total enrollment was 1,494,203.  By 1999-2000, this had 
multiplied ten fold to 14,791,224.  True, the national population 
also increased substantially, but the adjusted five fold gain was still 
dramatic.  Put another way, soon more than half the country will 
possess college degrees, including formerly excluded women.  As of 
now, 24% of those over 25 do so.  Already about half of all recent 
high-school graduates receive some college education.  Moreover, in 
1998, a whopping 83% of Americans over the age of twenty-five 
were high-school graduates.  This is especially impressive when one 
considers that the figure includes the very old, as well as immigrants 
from Third World countries where secondary education has been out 
of the question.  
As might be expected, greater education is correlated with greater 
occupational success.  Not only do college-educated individuals 
make more money, but they encounter a larger market for their 
talents.  Contemporary employers frequently seek those with degrees 
even when the tasks at hand do not require the sort of knowledge 
acquired at a university.  What is desired is something different; it is 
evidence of being self-directed.  Being able to cope with the demands 
of a postsecondary education provides an indication of personal 
discipline.  Thanks to this quality, those who obtain a degree are 
assumed to be able to master workplace uncertainties without close 
supervision.  As a result, they are trusted to be self-starters and reliable 
finishers.  Indeed, being self-directed and capable of managing 
uncertainty is the hallmark of the middle classes.  The sine qua non of 
their leadership, it provides the stratum it mandates.  It is, therefore, 
not surprising that they should endorse the delegation of authority 
that a superior education underwrites.
The rewards for education and occupational authority are equally 
evident.  It is often taken for granted that wealth is equivalent to 
power.  Those who are obscenely rich are believed to be potent to the 
same degree that they have been able to amass possessions.  When Bill 
Gates can accumulate a personal fortune approaching one hundred 
billion dollars, some conclude that he must be a million times more 
dominant than an engineer earning fifty thousand per annum. 
But this is misleading.  Undoubtedly Gates is more dominant. 
Undoubtedly, too, most members of the upper classes are individually 
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more powerful than members of the middle class.  But millions of 
times more powerful?  This is absurd.  Collectively, the middle classes 
are, in fact, more influential than the 2% to 3% of our society who 
belong to the upper classes.  Even on a personal level, some of the 
former have more impact on events than do the wealthy.  Arguably, 
the researchers who developed Post-it notes™ (not to mention the 
transistor) fit into this category.  Their contributions influence our 
daily lives more profoundly than the frolics of jetsetters.
This collective clout is also reflected in the material prosperity 
of the middle classes.  Marx predicted that most workers would be 
reduced to subsistence, but this too did not happen.  Though on 
paper less well off than the privileged few in terms of their personal 
comfort, professionals more than hold their own.  In terms of what 
they possess and the activities in which they can engage, they are 
richer than medieval princes.  Whether we are talking about indoor 
plumbing or vacations in the Caribbean, they can do things of which 
Henry VIII never dreamt.  
Let us consider the houses in which they live.  In 1997, two 
thirds of all Americans owned their own homes.23  In a nation of 
about 280 million, over 65 million were owners as opposed to 34 
million who were renters. This compares with about half of all 
families that were owners in 1900.  The real change, however, has 
been in the size of dwelling per resident.  In the 1960s, the average 
house was 1400 square feet.  By the end of the century, this had 
increased to 2100 square feet.  Since family sizes had simultaneously 
declined, the number of persons per room had gone from well over 
one per room to less than one per every two rooms.   This gave 
the average American almost four times as much living space as the 
average Russian.  
But comfortable housing is not the only advantage of middle-
class opulence.24  Americans no longer walk.  Nor are they confined 
to trolleys or subway cars.  In 1997, there were a total of 776 internal-
combustion vehicles per 1000 of the population.  That is almost one 
vehicle per person, including children.  As is well known, middle-
class houses are now routinely built with two-car garages, and of 
the machines these accommodate, one is apt to be a sports utility 
vehicle.  Once Americans fretted about gas consumption, but today 
their concern is with demonstrating that they can drive up Pikes 
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Peak if they so desire.  Even teenagers are no longer satisfied with the 
jalopies of previous generations.  These days, they believe new BMWs 
are their rightful legacies.  Of course, this is not the only indicator 
of middle-class affluence.  There is also the fact that almost every 
household has multiple television sets, with most of these hooked up 
to cable or satellite dishes.  Increasingly, home entertainment centers 
boast flat screens and rear-projection monstrosities.  Then, too, there 
are the computers, the DVDs, and the cellphones.   All in all, the 
middle classes have invented a mobile, creature-comfort-rich, style 
of life that is best characterized as suburban.  Both academics and 
public intellectuals hate the suburbs, but these are the fastest-growing 
sections of the country.  Once they earn a sufficient income, people 
have been voting with their feet or more properly, with their cars. 
The suburbs are scorned as sprawl, but they enable people to engage 
in the sorts of activities that accompany affluent decision making. 
Living longer, healthier, more varied lives, the new middle classes 
tend to be self-satisfied.  They do not perceive themselves as mediocre 
Babbitts or, as Mills opined, in the thrall of a deep-rooted malaise due 
to “the absence of any order or belief [which] has left them morally 
defenseless as individuals and politically impotent as a group.” 
Members of the middle class tend to feel good about themselves, 
their families, their friends, and their jobs.  Still, they are also aware 
that as group they are not respected, ergo their verbal unwillingness 
to aspire to be that which in their daily lives they clearly value.  This 
disconnect is exacerbated by circumstances of which they relatively 
unaware.  Having been carried along by a vast wave of change, they 
do not discern how they got where they are.  Although troubled by 
a disdain for the middle classes, Mills was on to something when 
he observed that “the certainties of the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries have disintegrated or been destroyed and, at the same time, 
no new sanctions or justifications for the new routines we live, and 
must live, have taken hold.”  
This rumination is best understood in light of  William 
Ogburn’s25 concept of “cultural lag.”  Introduced in the 1920s, 
this insight pointed to the fact that as technological innovations 
accelerated, people had difficulty adjusting to the new realities. 
Older generations continued to prefer horses to automobiles or, 
more recently, desk-bound instruments to cellphones.  Yet cultural 
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lag is also applicable to personal attitudes and social institutions. 
Ways of behaving and methods of organizing appropriate to a blue-
collar world that are no longer useful in a professionally dominated 
environment are nevertheless preserved.  Many people, who by 
occupation are undoubtedly middle class, mentally and behaviorally 
reproduce patterns from their lower-status childhoods.  They cling to 
the familiar and comfortable, not because it works, but because it is 
what they understand. 
Clearly related to this problem are the depredations of the 
Culture Wars.26  People who do not understand the source of their 
dissatisfaction nevertheless crave solutions.  Moreover, be they 
liberal or conservative, they believe they recognize how things can 
be improved.  Yet, because they are operating from a platform of 
ignorance, they become adamant in assertions they cannot validate. 
Ideologues rather than pragmatists, they maintain that their way is 
the only way.  Each side of what has become a polarized battle is 
certain of its virtues and, therefore, of the merit of destroying the 
opposition.  As self-appointed guardians of the keys of the kingdom, 
they insist upon being allowed to open the door.
This unrequited culture gap is a much larger problem than is 
generally recognized.  Because the middle-class revolution has been 
so extensive, millions of people have been swept into positions for 
which they were neither emotionally nor intellectually prepared.  Also 
significantly, society itself has been unprepared for the dislocations 
thrust upon it.  Because no one could have perceived where events 
were leading, no one could groom himself or herself to accommodate 
them.  Worse still, because none had practice in an untried future, 
none could predict the innovations it would demand.  Although 
many have engaged in prognostications, most of their guesses have 
been wrong; hence, attempts to implement them have often made 
things worse.  Instead of fixing what went awry, they introduced 
new, and sometimes unnecessary, problems.
A Stealth Revolution
To put this in perspective, the contemporary Middle Class 
Revolution is embedded in a more comprehensive series of changes. 
If we are to recognize the gravity of what has transpired, it is necessary 
to appreciate that human societies have undergone several magisterial 
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transformations.  These may be respectively designated the Symbolic 
Revolution, the Agricultural Revolution, and the Commercial 
Revolution.  The first of these megatransformations began when 
Homo sapiens moved out of Africa.27  Some sixty thousand years 
ago, our ancestors were clustered in several thousand foraging bands 
around East Africa’s Rift Valley.28  Perilously close to extinction 
following the nuclear- winter-inducing eruption of Sumatra’s Tuva 
caldera, something happened to trigger an exodus that took our 
species to every corner of the globe, not excluding the ferociously 
inhospitable Antarctica.  Opinions differ on whether this was a 
cultural or a biological advance, but the available evidence suggests 
that our symbolizing abilities took a quantum leap forward.  
Anthropologists’ find indications of novel art objects at 
approximately the same time as the earliest of these migrations. 
People began crafting beads and almost concurrently drawing pictures 
on rocks.  Contemporaneous evidence also suggests technological 
advances, such as spear throwing, which dramatically expanded 
hunting options.  Paleontologists have even found remnants of 
sewed clothing and musical instruments (i.e., flutes).  All of this 
has been interpreted as signaling a greater capacity to manipulate 
mental symbols, especially linguistic ones.29  This expanded human 
aptitude for communicating about things and events not present in 
the immediate environment transfigured our ancestors’ abilities to 
coordinate social activities.30  People could now plan their activities 
with unprecedented subtlety.  Whether as hunters or gatherers, they 
found the efficiency of their actions improved sufficiently to provide 
an edge over competing carnivores.31  Unlike, let us say, lions, our 
forefathers could now plan ambushes of unsurpassed refinement.  In 
any event, this Symbolic Revolution saw better-equipped and better-
provisioned human beings march across Asia into Australia, Europe, 
and, ultimately the Americas.  With their lifestyles profoundly 
altered, within a few short millennia, they had multiplied to several 
million globetrotting souls.
This advance continued until the oscillations of the Ice Age 
placed stress on their mounting populations, most notably in the 
Middle East.32  As previously well-watered areas became desiccated, 
the inhabitants turned to expanding the acreage devoted to local 
cereal crops.  By some ten to twelve thousand years ago, this strategy 
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had evolved into protoagriculture.  First embodied in a digging-
stick horticulture, within a few thousand years, irrigated cultivation 
launched the Agricultural Revolution.33  Instead of depending upon 
the bounty of untrammeled nature, farmers could manipulate plants 
and animals to increase the available foodstuffs.  This quickly initiated 
a spectacular growth in population densities.  More than this, it 
changed how humans were distributed.  Where before virtually 
everyone was nomadic, a majority now settled down to tend their 
crops.  Farmsteads almost immediately evolved into villages, thence 
into towns, and, in due course, into cities.  Soon enough, village 
headmen developed into kings and emperors.  As a result, there were 
not only more people, but they were consolidated into larger political 
entities.  They also acquired greater wealth.  Wandering bands can 
accumulate little property.  Because they must physically carry 
whatever they possess, these objects cannot be unduly burdensome. 
Village dwellers, in contrast, can own houses, some of which can 
be impressive brick edifices.  Moreover, they can supply these with 
furniture, hanging decorations, and extensive wardrobes.  They are 
able, in short, to acquire extensive goods that others may come to 
covet and wish to appropriate for themselves.34  This transforms 
clashes between foraging bands over hunting territories into piratical 
warfare in quest of booty.  Villages raid other villages and kingships 
conquer other kingships.  In a sense, this is the origin of history as 
we know it,35 with protonations contesting with one another to see 
which could extend its sway over the largest and most prosperous 
areas.
Thomas Hobbes36 in his pioneering social speculations imagined 
a state of nature in which a war of all against all was endemic.  This 
could be said to describe the earliest political entities in that these 
appropriated what superior martial strength enabled them to seize. 
But, as Hobbes made clear, this is a tenuous way to improve one’s 
material condition.  Rather than risk the losses endemic to brigandage, 
people soon developed mechanisms of trade.  They would now 
exchange the goods they produced with others who possessed objects 
they desired.  This was safer and became widespread.  Indeed, trade 
existed long before agricultural prosperity enhanced its attractions. 
Archeological digs make it plain that pre-sapien hominids engaged 
in long-distance transactions.  Scarce, yet highly coveted, resources 
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such as flint for tool making or seashells for necklaces have been found 
far from their point of origin.  What the Agricultural Revolution 
accomplished was to swell these contacts in terms of the volumes 
traded, the types of materials exchanged, and the distances covered.
Finally, this trade became so extensive that it triggered a change in 
kind.  The exact cause of this transformation is difficult to pinpoint, 
but the advent of money seems the likeliest cause.  What transpired 
may be designated the Commercial Mega-Revolution.  Like its 
predecessors, it initiated huge modifications over an extended period 
of time.  Neither its Symbolic, nor Agricultural, antecedent achieved 
its ends within tens or even hundreds of years; each literally took 
millennia to unfold.  The same is true of the Commercial upheaval.  It 
began over six hundred years before the Common Era and continues 
to wreak massive alterations in how people subsist.  Some trace the 
starting point of this progression to the invention of literacy.37  They 
suggest that as agricultural production rose, it became necessary to 
keep track of inventories.  Taxing agencies, such as the pharaoh’s 
temples, needed to identify who had paid them what, how much 
was on hand, and how much of this was to be distributed where. 
Symbols that mutated from the spoken word to scratches in mud 
or dyes on parchment served the trick.  Soon, it became apparent 
that this technology could amplify commerce by facilitating long-
distance communication and by reducing misunderstandings.  In the 
long run, without writing, the bookkeeping attendant to large-scale 
economic operations would not have been possible.
Nevertheless, the invention of coinage seems to have been 
more crucial.  Before there was a standardized medium of exchange, 
merchants depended upon barter.  They would swap an agreed 
upon volume of olive oil for a specified amount of grain.  This was 
inconvenient in that it was difficult to determine commensurate 
value.  Even more upsetting was that fact that what one person had 
for exchange might not be what the other desired.  Money solved 
this problem by providing an instrument that could be exchanged 
at a later date for a third product from a third party.  The result 
was an inducement to business that has not subsided in over two 
thousand years.  Where once the possession of land and its riches, 
and before that of a hunting territory and its bounty, made for social 
power, the treasures of the marketplace became paramount.  These 
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now dominate our world and have converted our species into the 
masters of a planet.
Karl Marx, in what is still the dominant interpretation of social 
evolution,38 attributed the shape of human societies to economic 
matters.  In priding himself on being a hardheaded materialist, he 
asserted that those who controlled the means of economic production 
dominated succeeding civilizations.  Where once aristocrats were 
supreme because they owned the land from which agricultural 
wealth was derived, capitalists replaced them by monopolizing the 
machinery from which industrial affluence arose.  To many, this 
reading of events has seemed unduly mechanistic.  They protest 
against its antihuman quality and insist that spiritual and emotional 
factors also be considered.  Although it may sound as if in talking 
about agricultural and commercial revolutions, Marx’s materialism is 
merely being updated, this would be a mistake.  Economics matters, 
but it is not the whole story.  True, how people produce and distribute 
goods influences lifestyles, but this does not occur in a vacuum.  For 
starters, economics is not, as it were, the prime mover of all events. 
Production and distribution also have their causes.  The Agricultural 
Revolution, for instance, might never have occurred had not climatic 
changes forced hungry Middle Easterners to look elsewhere for food. 
Nor would they have been able to find the precursors to the wheat 
and barley that saved them from starvation had not the aridity of 
their region favored the biological evolution of large-seeded grains. 
Second, economics has influences that redound to alter its own 
conditions.  The way people earn livings can modify their social, 
political, medical, technological, and religious situations such that 
their economic institutions are themselves profoundly affected.  It 
is, therefore, as essential to understand their dynamics as those of 
the economy.  There is such an interplay among them that one who 
is only concerned with economics can never understand the large 
picture.
From the foregoing discussion, we can begin to examine the Great 
Middle-Class Revolution.  As we shall soon see, this has been a social 
revolution, not merely an economic one.  In recent decades, there has 
been increased interest in social change in general.  The conditions 
of modern existence have transmuted so rapidly that ordinary people 
cannot but notice the consequences.  Forced to adjust to unexpected 
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experiences, they wonder from whence these derive and, as important, 
where they are headed.  Will progress continue or does a new Dark 
Age impend?  Anxieties about a nuclear winter, global warming, and 
the cultural wars jostle with dreams about technological wizardry, 
egalitarian democracy, and a Methuselah-like old age.  Although 
futurists bombard us with their predictions, the range of divergent 
explanations makes it difficult to determine which is correct.
Most of the revolutions to which contemporary prophets refer 
are grounded in technological change, and the reason is plain.  Who 
can deny that recent advances in manufacturing and engineering 
have been impressive?  The plethora of automobiles, jet planes, and 
electronic gadgets with which we are surrounded is nothing short 
of magical compared with the standard equipment of our forebears. 
A St. Thomas Aquinas could scarcely have imagined transmitting 
his image via electromagnetic waves.  Nor could he have fathomed 
earthmovers that gulp tons of rock in a single operation.  That this 
physical power might be under the control of one man would have 
seemed an illusion foisted upon him by the devil.  It is, therefore, fitting 
that we bracket the accumulation of these wonders under the rubric 
of the Industrial Revolution.39  The enormous progress in our ability 
to manipulate the environment, beginning with James Watt’s steam 
engine deserves to be celebrated.  So do more recent developments in 
science, automation, and communications.  Commemorating these 
by designating specific eras the Atomic Age, the Age of Automation, 
or the Information Age makes sense.  Computers, in particular, 
have clearly inaugurated a tremendous difference.  They have made 
it possible to manage unprecedented volumes of data and to apply 
them to controlling vast agglomerations of machinery—virtually 
without error.  The problem with this emphasis, however, is that 
it minimizes the human element.  People are portrayed as having 
to adjust to novel technologies, not as having undergone enormous 
changes in how they organize themselves.  Yet the resulting social 
changes too have been vast.
Social scientists have not been totally oblivious to this conundrum. 
In consequence, many have described contemporary developments 
under such rubrics as modernism and postmodernism.40  These 
concepts, like the more sociologically technical term Gesellschaft,41 
are related to the emergence of mass societies in which, although 
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they are interdependent, most people are strangers to one another. 
They may live in massive urban agglomerations, jostle one another 
on crowded sidewalks and highways, and partake of the same plastic-
wrapped consumer products without ever taking note of one another’s 
existence.  The difficulty is that most of us would be hard pressed to 
define these concepts.  What exactly is modernism and how does it 
differ from postmodernism?  Beyond the fact that these are somehow 
related to what presently exists, to what do they refer? 
References to a Middle Class Revolution do not suffer from 
this difficulty.  Social Class is obviously social in its orientation.  It 
refers directly to a crucial aspect of human relationships.  People 
are hierarchical animals.  They naturally rank themselves in terms of 
relative power.  This has been true of every society, beginning with 
those of our remote hunter-gatherer ancestors.  It is even more the 
case with the mass societies with which we are familiar.  Nevertheless 
the patterns through which social stratification are expressed have 
varied with time and place.  Social class is not the only way that 
people have ranked themselves.  They have also constructed caste- 
and estate-based civilizations.  Indeed, the prominence of social class 
can be traced directly to the Commercial Revolution.  Absent the 
economic dominance of market-based relationships, people could 
not make the distinctions between upper, middle, and lower classes 
that they do.  Nor, of course, could they discuss a Middle-Class 
Revolution.
This reordering of social connections has, in turn, produced 
a myriad of related changes.  In order for the middle classes to 
function in their appointed tasks, there have been modifications 
to other social institutions.  Not just how economic transactions 
are conducted, but family relationships, politics, education, and 
morality have undergone striking transformations.  Nowadays, we 
have grown accustomed to the resultant cultural dislocations.  The 
media are filled with illustrations of liberals and conservatives battling 
each other over the proper way to reorganize a society they both 
bemoan as out of joint.  The liberals declare a preference for progress, 
whereas the conservatives are alleged to be slaves to tradition.  Each 
year the particulars of their disputes change, but their themes remain 
constant.  Liberals generally clamor for more equality.  They insist 
that women, minorities, and gays deserve the same rights as everyone 
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else.  This, they declare, can be achieved by increasing the role of the 
federal government in enforcing fairness.  To this, conservatives reply 
by demanding more freedom.  They hate government interventions, 
especially when these impinge on family values.  Their central concern 
is with merit and untrammeled competition.
So vociferous have these counterclaims become that few seem 
concerned about their roots.  People identify with one side or the other, 
then direct their energies toward winning, not toward understanding 
what is happening.  A systematic exploration of a Great Middle-
Class Revolution can cut through this Gordian knot.  It can explain 
how this heated opposition evolved.  More particularly, it can clarify 
how a cultural lag has contributed to misunderstandings and false 
projections.  According to this view, the central problem confronting 
us is that those who have not fully embraced what it means to be 
middle class continue to cling to idealizations that have no hope of 
fruition.  Both on the left and the right, individuals and associations 
harboring imperfectly internalized middle-class attitudes defend 
these with fantasies grounded in jejune hopes rather than careful 
evaluations.  When members of the middle classes are characterized 
as greedy conformists, often by elements of their own stratum, our 
overall understanding of the operative machinery is distorted.  Yes, 
some people are selfish and monotonously conventional, but others 
are commensurately clever, perceptive, and selfless.  Crass censure of 
the middle classes per se attacks surface behaviors rather than analyzes 
underlying dynamics.  This is a mistake the following chapters aim to 
correct.  They will begin by taking a hard look at the nature of social 
class.  Before achieving an accurate impression of what the middle 
classes have become, or are likely to develop into, it is essential to 
determine the parameters of what is taking place.  This cannot be 
attained without first appreciating how people rank themselves.
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Chapter 2
Social Class
The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of 
class struggles.  Freeman and slave, patrician and plebian, 
lord and serf, guild master and journeyman, in a word, 
oppressor and oppressed stood in constant opposition to 
each other, carried on an uninterrupted, now hidden, 
now open fight, a fight that each time ended, either in a 
revolutionary reconstitution of society at large, or in the 
common ruin of the contending classes.  (Karl Marx and 
Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto)
From each according to his abilities, to each according to his 
needs.  (Karl Marx, Critique of the Gotha Program)
I am more and more convinced that man is a dangerous 
creature and that power, whether vest in many or a few, 
is ever grasping, and like the grave, cries “Give, give!”  
(Abigail Adams, Letter to John Adams)
Hierarchies
Karl Marx had a dream.1  He imagined a world of perfect 
egalitarianism.  The spirit of competition instilled by capitalism 
would be erased once communism took effect.  First personal 
property would be abolished.  As long as people vied to determine 
who could acquire the most wealth, they would inflict injuries to 
maintain their advantages.  Once everything was owned in common, 
the motivation to obtain a bigger portion of the pie would vanish. 
After this, government itself would wither away.  Since its primary 
function was to protect the property of the rich, it would lose its 
raison d’etre and become an anachronism.  As a consequence, people 
would gain control over their own destinies.  Choosing whether to 
go fishing in the morning or to amble down to the factory in the 
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afternoon, would be at their discretion.  No one would be anyone 
else’s master; hence, not only would everyone be equal, all would be 
free.
The problem with this vision is that it is utterly fanciful.  No 
human society has ever been totally without property or totally 
emancipated from competition.  Nor has any large-scale society been 
able to subsist without a government.  Capitalism did not cause these 
things; hence ridding ourselves of the marketplace cannot save us 
from them.  To repeat a truism affirmed in Chapter 1, we human 
beings are hierarchical animals.  We are biologically evolved to rank 
ourselves against one another.  An accumulation of property is one of 
the standards used to establish relative position, but it is not the only 
one.  Nor is property a recent, or arbitrary, invention.  The rudiments 
of personal ownership go back to before there were modern human 
beings.  Even monkeys hoard bananas.  For that matter, monkeys 
also have hierarchies.  They, too, make distinctions between what 
ethologists designate as alpha, beta, and gamma animals.
Even so, Americans have been peculiarly vulnerable to egalitarian 
appeals.  As early as the 1830s, the young French visitor, Alexis de 
Tocqueville,2 was impressed with how equal everyday relationships 
seemed to be.  Ordinary workers, that is, those of Ben Franklin’ 
apron-wearing class, would approach him on terms of absolute 
parity.  As a member of his own nation’s minor nobility, he was at 
first taken aback.  At home, none of the peasants in the village for 
which his family was named would have dared grab his hand and 
shake it the way these ex-colonials did.  So far as Americans were 
concerned, everyone was created equal, with no one inherently 
superior to anyone else.  Some, to be sure, were wealthier, but this 
was deemed a temporary condition.  As Tocqueville also observed, 
even the lowliest citizens seemed to have an eye for the main chance. 
They were all sure that some day one of their speculations would 
pay off.  Their land holdings in the West would sell at an enormous 
profit, or the small business they were about to start would flourish 
on a scale comparable to Franklin’s.  Then, it would their turn to be 
honored as self-made men.
Tocqueville was ambivalent about this.  Although he had come 
to the United States to study why its democracy, as opposed to 
France’s, had taken root, he continued to believe that aristocratic 
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privilege was the surest guarantee of civilization.  That a barely literate 
backwoodsman such as Davy Crockett could get elected to Congress 
struck him as folly.  Americans might have a greater opportunity to 
get ahead, but “the democratic sentiment of envy was expressed in 
a thousand different ways.”  Because they were convinced that they 
could succeed, undistinguished provincials resented others who got 
there before them.  But, herein lay a paradox.  Americans might 
deny the inequalities in their midst, overtly acting as if these did 
not exist, but they nevertheless pursued personal advantage with 
gusto.  From the lowest to the highest, they admired, yet resented, 
the accomplishments of John Jacob Astor.3  Who was he to grow 
rich on the fur trade while they were plodding along in comparative 
obscurity?
One of the odd contradictions that has persisted into modern 
times is the presence of social climbing cheek by jowl with an 
antipathy toward it.  Marx assumed that people would one day be 
motivated by generosity rather than covetousness.  This, however, 
has not been the New World experience.  Many publishers have filled 
their coffers by purveying books that simultaneously celebrate success 
while ridiculing its excesses.  Henry James4 did this in his novels; 
Vance Packard5 did it in his nonfictional The Status Seekers; and Paul 
Fussell6 accomplished it in Class: A Guide Through the American 
Status System.  Each of these works clucks about the absurdity of 
trying to be better than the next guy but in its very details reveals 
an obsession with the trivia of social stratification.  More recently 
in a book the Los Angeles Times called the best of the year, Joseph 
Epstein7 dissected the ins and outs of snobbery.  His subject (i.e., 
the symbols that people flaunt in order to demonstrate their pre-
eminence) was sufficiently fascinating to make the book a bestseller.
The games that people play to increase, or appear to increase, 
their status are legion.  If Epstein is to be believed, more ingenuity is 
expended in the pursuit of invidious prominence than on attaining 
substantive achievements.  Snobs, as he makes plain, are people who 
engage in social climbing by means of the external manifestations 
of success.  They hold themselves a cut above others because they 
can distinguish a rare wine from vin ordinaire or a Bentley from a 
Rolls Royce.  Where they live, the schools their children attend, and 
the clubs to which they belong take on a life-and-death significance. 
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God forbid they wear a sharkskin suit; someone might suspect them 
of being a Mafioso.  Theirs is a world filled with awards, pointless 
philanthropies, and mind-numbing cocktail parties.  It is also one 
permeated by superficial relationships chosen for their networking 
opportunities rather than their emotional depth.  And yet, these 
people are doing what feels important.  Even their phony status 
seems of inestimable worth.  Were they to inhabit a Marxist utopia, 
they might take consolation in being able to do the giving to others 
in need on the assumption that liberality garners status points.
This mania with social standing is not exclusively human.  Many 
social animals are hierarchical.  They too spend inordinate amounts 
of time seeking and defending status, as opposed to food or sex. 
The primatologist Frans de Waal8 has documented this propensity 
for a variety of species.  One of these is the Rhesus monkey.  De 
Waal begins a chapter on ranking systems among these primates 
by apologizing for drawing an analogy with social-class behavior, 
but this comparison is altogether apropos.  These creatures, too, 
develop biologically linked orders that determine with whom they 
will socialize and how well they will prosper.  According to de 
Waal, “being on top of the social ladder is not merely a pleasant, 
comfortable position for a wild monkey: it determines her life span 
and reproduction.”  A dominant female will get to eat better than 
her lesser-ranking peers, while her babies will stand a better chance 
of surviving into adulthood.  Engaging in fights to determine who 
is more powerful, is not due to meanness of temper or momentary 
boredom.  She may not consciously understand what is at stake, 
but evolution has provided the motivation to seek victories in such 
conflicts.  Indeed, those she defeats are similarly motivated; hence 
when they lose, they are dismayed.
Thanks to Newt Gingrich, de Waal is best known for his 
observations of chimpanzee hierarchies.  Gingrich recommended 
Chimpanzee Politics9 as instructive about what happens among 
human beings; as indeed it is.  Our nearest relatives were once thought 
of as cute circus entertainers, but this was because most people were 
exposed only to juvenile animals trained to give such performances. 
Adult chimps were not used because they are too large, too strong, 
and too aggressive.  On their own, they can be lethal to human beings 
and to troop mates.  As a result, it was not until the last half century 
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that their natural behaviors became known.  Careful surveillance in 
the wild and in naturalistic zoo settings made it plain that they were 
not merely endearing; they could also be assertive and obstinate.  De 
Waal did his initial studies at the Netherlands’ Arnhem Zoo where he 
quickly discovered that male animals, in particular, were preoccupied 
with asserting dominance.
These dominant males seemed to take joy in violent displays 
of power.  They would race around their enclosure with their fur 
standing on end to magnify their size, screaming as loudly as they 
could and throwing loose items in the direction of bystanders. 
Intimidation was the obvious aim of the exercise.  Lesser-ranking 
males and females were given to understand who was in charge, with 
fear the best way to instill this knowledge.  But isolated outbursts 
were insufficient.  No male, no matter how strong, could stand up 
against the united fury of the entire band.  What was essential to 
maintain control was alliances.  Two or three males in concert could 
defeat most challenges from below.  As a consequence, the males 
were continuously jockeying for position amongst themselves.  If 
two of them established what seemed to be a firm coalition, a third 
might plot to disrupt their comity.  If he succeeded, the one who was 
displaced would scheme on how to return the favor.  Sometimes, 
even the females entered these doings.  When an especially oppressive 
male obtained control, the females might insert themselves into the 
fray to remove the bully from his perch.  So serious were the shifting 
tides of these conflicts that death might end the reign of a hitherto 
unchallengeable ruler.
Among people, too, contending for dominance is more than a 
game.  Human struggles for hierarchical paramountcy can sometimes 
be deadly, as in the case of warfare.  But they are also a sport, something 
literally pursued for fun.  Despite their denials of ambition, even the 
most democratic human beings hate to lose.  They love the idea of 
winning so much that they invent opportunities for victory over and 
above those generated by contests for actual social power.  Why else 
do people play baseball or football?  Why else do they exult when 
someone on the home team hits a home run or crosses the goal line 
to score a touchdown?  These objectives are utterly arbitrary, but, 
as markers of success, they make people feel good.  Beyond this, 
symbolically stomping an opponent into the ground is experienced 
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as joyful.  Indeed, there is so much delight in figuratively climbing 
to the top of the heap that mere fans chant in excitement when their 
team is number one.  In this respect, if none other, they feel dominant 
and will taunt the losers for their comparative weakness.
Women, as well as men, take pleasure in victory.  In this age of 
feminist rhetoric, political correctness demands that cooperation be 
valued above competition.  We are all supposed to contribute to the 
same team and, following Marxism, are forbidden to assume that 
we are better than anyone else; but this is theory.  Even feminists 
like to win, and when they do not, as when Clarence Thomas was 
appointed to the Supreme Court, they hold a grudge.  Like one of de 
Waal’s chimpanzees, they conspire for the day they can depose their 
tormentors.  Nor do women bestow their favors on men who are 
complaisant.  Although avant-garde women boast of seeking sensitive 
partners, they never crow about their being losers.  If anything, in 
their self-righteous posturing, these feminists position themselves as 
morally superior to their less enlightened rivals.  In short, hierarchical 
aspirations are universal.  How they are expressed may differ from 
person to person and society to society, but the underlying objective 
is similar.  In contemporary America, the most noteworthy venue for 
these longings is social class.  Such yearnings may be disparaged, yet 
they are enormously consequential.  Paradoxically, they are also a vast 
improvement over conceivable alternatives.  Social-class ambitions 
are thought of as malicious and vapid but only in comparison with 
more idealistic vanities.  The middle classes, as silly and nasty as they 
occasionally are, have contributed immensely to the triumph of 
human comfort and achievement.  Their relatively gentle dominance 
has paid off handsomely, not just for them, but for mankind in 
general.
A Range of Options
 Human hierarchies take many forms.10  Some social scientists 
have denied their existence because they are so variable.  They say 
that people can organize themselves anyway they please, including in 
complete parity.  According to this view, since all human behaviors 
are learned, if parents raise their children to be egalitarian, the next 
generation will be classless.  This was the objective of the Soviets 
in promoting indoctrination to create the communist man.11 
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Contemporary feminists have a similar goal.  They seek to instill 
androgynous attitudes wherein the genders are absolutely equal.12 
Despite this, human variability does not correspond to such a 
thoroughgoing plasticity.  There is a broad range of possibilities 
wherein people operate, but this is far from infinite.  The parameters 
within which specific pecking orders evolve are bounded by biological, 
environmental, and social imperatives.  These limitations may not be 
obvious to those engaged in scuffling for social advantage but can 
be discerned by examining their scope.  Moreover, it is critical to 
do so because what is unique about class systems, and particularly 
about the middle classes, cannot be appreciated without perceiving 
them in context.  It is easy to disparage the drawbacks of their social 
arrangements when perceived in isolation.  When measured against 
the shortcomings of competing schemas, however, they become 
attractive.
In sociology, it is rarely possible to do experiments.  Societies 
hardly ever present themselves for objective manipulation.  Frequently, 
the best that can be done is to analyze naturally occurring test cases. 
Fortunately, recorded history has been kind.  Diverse civilizations 
have come and gone leaving sufficient residues for us to speculate 
about why they might have differed.13  And they have differed 
often amazingly so!  If we start with the smallest of communities, 
namely hunter-gatherer bands, we discover a way of life that has 
largely disappeared but that was nevertheless the one from which 
we evolved.  Even today, people limit themselves to small numbers 
of close friends, very much in accord with the conditions of these 
earlier groups.  Up until a mere ten thousand years ago, all human 
beings functioned as foragers.   Yet, the demise of this way of life has 
been so complete that we are forced to speculate about preliterate 
social arrangements.  True, there are contemporary hunter-gatherers, 
but they are marginalized exceptions.  Thrust by more powerful 
civilizations into challenging environments such as the Arctic Circle 
or the Kalahari Desert, their relatively egalitarian dealings may be 
a product of having lost clashes with their more successful cousins. 
The Inuit and the Khoisan must of necessity travel in undersized, 
super-cooperative units precisely because their homelands provide 
few resources and many dangers.  When a meager several millennia 
ago foraging was the norm, our forebears journeyed through more 
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generous landscapes, the social specifics of which must per force 
remain unknown.
The sort of small-scale society then extant has been called 
Gemeinschaft.14  Most wandering groups probably never topped 
one hundred and fifty before they split into rival communities.  The 
reason was simple.  Foragers need space to find sufficient provisions 
to keep them alive.  Because any given territory will contain a 
limited supply of prey animals and edible plants, survival depends 
on population control.  As Thomas Malthus15 conjectured, this 
could be accomplished through famine, disease, or warfare.  In any 
event, people got to know each other intimately.  Having grown up 
together, faced hardships together, and overcome adversity together, 
these early humans formed  relationships that were intensely personal. 
Daily engaged in face-to-face activities, they encountered ongoing 
opportunities to take each other’s measure.  This enabled them to 
become familiar with one another’s weaknesses and to take these into 
account when determining rank.
Although modern collectivists like to imagine an idyllic past 
during which everyone was completely equal, hunting bands—
especially when they survived by killing large game--- probably could 
not have managed this way.  We know from their middens that our 
remote ancestors were capable of bringing down mammoths.  Yet, 
it is impossible to imagine their doing so without tightly controlled 
hierarchies.  Someone had to be in charge of the chase, and this 
person had to be obeyed.  The alternative of freelancing would have 
entailed starvation or, more probably, a gory death.  To further their 
joint plans, the participants probably turned to a prominent hunter 
for guidance and discipline.16  Nor would discovering who was best 
suited for command have been difficult.  Direct observation would 
have exposed hunting skills, personal magnetism, and comparative 
knowledge.  Until old age slowed him down, one of the elders would 
likely have assumed this role.  In a world without written records, a 
hunter with years of experience would have proven a fund of wisdom. 
No one else would be as familiar with the habits of the game animals, 
no one else as acquainted with the tricks of the chase.
Similar considerations applied to the gatherers, that is, to the 
women.  The circumstances of their contributions differed, but they 
too would have valued insight and skill.17  Almost surely, an older 
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woman with personal charisma and years of expertise in uncovering 
suitable vegetation would achieve prominence.  Given that gathering 
requires less coordination, she might have exercised a control over 
the group that would not have been as strict as that of her male 
counterpart, but she would unquestionably have been treated as 
possessing superior powers.  She might also have benefited from 
distinctive skills such as those of midwife or arbiter of domestic 
disputes.  In any event, not everyone would be considered equal. 
Furthermore, the attendant respect would spontaneously have 
translated into social control.  This hegemony might not be absolute, 
but it would have provided material and psychological advantages.
Once the Agricultural Revolution kicked into gear, the need for 
hierarchy intensified, whereas the criteria for attaining prominence 
changed.  Larger populations, more settled living conditions, and 
altered economic circumstances placed the emphasis on other 
qualities.  One of the first forms of distinction that took root was 
that of the big man.  As today can be perceived in the highlands 
of New Guinea,18 village-centered horticulturalists trust their 
leadership to men who display unique interpersonal talents.  Almost 
always articulate and productive, these persons gain status by being 
role models and social intermediaries.  Their associates respect them 
for how they manage their gardens but, more important, for their 
energy and skill in settling communal disputes.  Big men tend to be 
community-minded.  They tirelessly develop schemes from which 
others benefit while contemporaneously reducing the tensions that 
arise when individuals work in close proximity.  More socially astute 
than their fellows, they demonstrate sufficient self-control to mediate 
among antagonists who are less perceptive.  Not surprisingly, this 
translates into respect and influence.
Eventually, agricultural communities grow.  This makes superior 
status yet more problematic.  With more people to know, fewer of 
them can be known well.  This, however, coincides with greater needs 
for social discipline.  Specifically, as prosperity increases, people 
acquire more property.  This gives rise to covetousness and a plethora 
of disputes.  Agriculturalists principally need ways to resolve issues 
over land ownership.  As a result, chieftainships evolve.  Big men 
societies depend on the spontaneous manifestation of individuals 
of superior talents, but larger communities require a more reliable 
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source of leadership.  This is often achieved by making the position 
of supreme authority elective or hereditary.  The village may unite 
to appoint a headman, or it may develop a tradition that the child 
of the deceased headman (usually the eldest son) takes over.  Here, 
the trappings are a bit less personal.  The qualities of the chief also 
become more mystical.  Less subject to direct observation, they are 
as likely to be projected as perceived.
This tendency is exacerbated as agricultural communities burgeon 
in size.  Under these conditions, chieftains metamorphose into kings 
and eventually into emperors.  Small settlements amalgamate into 
large towns, and the paramount leadership role becomes more 
remote from ordinary villagers.  Especially when irrigation becomes 
prominent, there may develop what has been called hydraulic society. 
Irrigation both enlarges the volume of production and creates the 
need to cooperate in developing public works.  The villagers must 
somehow arrive at an agreement on how to divide the water supply 
and the means of distributing the edible products of their labor. 
This increases the desirability of powerful leadership.  Under these 
circumstances, a king must have the leverage to enforce his will. 
Understandably, this emerging disparity in authority is apt to amplify 
the monarch’s taste for command.  Eventually, his power becomes 
so immense that he is perceived as superhuman.  Now perhaps 
considered a god, he demands the perquisites of a deity and receives 
them.  Kingdoms and empires are hierarchies where the distance 
between the top and the bottom has enormously expanded in scope. 
Especially within empires, which are traditionally composed of 
unrelated peoples, the leader may have little in common with those 
who are led and may cease even considering them human.  Under 
these conditions, supremacy tends to be coercively enforced.  Not 
only are relationships no longer face to face, but, from the perspective 
of the participants, they may appear impervious to challenge.  The 
comparative superiority of some seems a fact of nature one that 
may be regretted but is nevertheless deemed impossible to revise. 
Indeed, it may not even be regretted but be celebrated as the best of 
all conceivable arrangements.
If we switch our focus from the top of the pecking order to 
the next segment down, we come to the aristocracy.  In kingships, 
membership in the nobility is as likely to be perceived as hereditary 
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as the top spot.  Often biologically related to the monarch, these 
individuals too may have powers conceived as divine.  This sort of 
hierarchy, which is widespread in agriculturally based societies, is 
frequently designated an estate system. As recently as the beginning 
of the French Revolution,19 France was divided into three such 
estates.  The clergy was theoretically on top, then came the nobility, 
and finally the third estate, the commoners.  Different societies 
have divided these orders in distinctive ways (e.g., the Romans were 
famously partitioned between the patricians and the plebeians). 
What these arrangements have in common is that their alignments 
are supposedly fixed.  If a person is born into one of these estates, he 
will theoretically die in it.  Aristocrats are always noble, even if they 
fall on hard times, whereas merchants are always ignoble, despite the 
riches they may acquire.  The rationales for these distinctions differ, 
but they are generally interpreted as natural.  Thus, a noble station 
will sometimes be attributed to better blood or superior breeding 
and at other times to Divine Right.  Either way, everyone within the 
hierarchy is expected to accept his/her fate.
Closely related to estate systems are caste systems.20  The difference 
between these is that the latter are more rigid.  Usually drawing their 
legitimacy from religious sanctions, their paradigm is found in India. 
Under Hinduism, it has been believed that souls migrate from one 
lifetime to another, in each incarnation being reborn in line with 
the karma accumulated in the previous materialization.  Those who 
were righteous might return as a Brahmin, with all the privileges 
due this priesthood, whereas those who were evil would return as 
Sudras, that is, as lower status peasants.  (The intermediate castes 
were the warrior Kshatriyas and the merchant Vaishas.)  Changing 
one’s status was, therefore, impossible.  It would be tantamount to 
a zebra wanting to be a horse or a horse a human being.  Analogous 
to caste systems are slave systems.  These too offer less mobility than 
estate societies.  In the latter case, merchants sometimes cross the line 
to become squires, but slaves are regarded as property.  They cannot 
rise any more than a walking stick can strike out on an independent 
journey.   Classified by no less an authority than Aristotle as naturally 
inferior, they are thought not to possess the abilities to manage 
autonomously.  Biologically closer to the beasts than human beings, 
they are obviously destined to be owned by their betters.  Since their 
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inadequacies are indelible, even manumission cannot remove the 
stains of their births.
All of this contrasts markedly with social-class systems, which are 
associated not with agriculture but commerce.  They are the legacy 
of an expanding marketplace and are characterized by greater social 
mobility.  Class systems, too, have an upper, a middle, and a lower 
designation, but these are neither predetermined nor permanent. 
Relative status within them can change, particularly when wealth 
changes.  A person born a peasant, if he becomes a prosperous 
merchant, thereby elevates his standing within the community. 
People may remember his roots but will be dazzled by his later 
munificence.  It is even possible for him to mount to the summit of 
such a society.  To cite an obvious illustration, John D. Rockefeller21 
began life in obscurity yet ultimately climbed to be the equivalent of 
royalty.   During his lifetime, he and his ilk were disparaged as robber 
barons.  Though not literally aristocrats, they lived as opulently and 
with as much influence as their medieval counterparts.  
Also characteristic of social class is a decentralization of power. 
Decision-making is less concentrated on the top, with people lower 
in rank having greater control over their own fates.  Generally, they 
too get to determine local issues, such as where to live or what job 
to perform, frequently in an idiosyncratic fashion.  Moreover, class-
oriented societies are characterized by their anonymity.  Because they 
are massive agglomerations, such societies are populated by people 
who do not personally know each other.  Their relationships are not 
face-to-face; hence, even though they depend on one another for 
their daily sustenance, they cannot directly judge relative power. 
Under these conditions money becomes a surrogate for power, albeit 
an imperfect one.
Social class could not exist outside market-oriented communities. 
The requisite mobility and anonymity are not possible without the 
flexibility inherent in large-scale commerce.  To begin with, trading 
property provides opportunities for an accumulation of wealth that 
are not available in agricultural societies.  By the same token, the 
sorts of power that facilitate social prominence are market related. 
Many, such as a talent for numbers, are directly connected with what 
is needed to flourish in commercial ventures.  Of special relevance 
to the Middle Class Revolution is that such capabilities become 
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increasingly concentrated in the middle classes.  To an unprecedented 
degree, members of this stratum monopolize the skills needed to 
organize a modern economy.  As a result, their impact and control 
rise.  And with control comes respect and enhanced status.
Still, the middle classes have been reluctant to assume the mantle 
of their success.  Many among them deny their prominence and 
continue to think of the upper classes as in charge.  The inevitable 
question is Why?  Why they are not as proud of their preeminence 
as were their predecessors?  The answer lies in the circumstances of 
its achievement.  Because their positions are inherently mobile and 
anonymous, they are individually bedeviled by insecurities.  Never 
quite sure of where they stand or how long they will stand there, 
they adopt a defensive modesty or, conversely, a defensive snobbery.22 
Either they hope to be camouflaged by being unassuming in their 
claims or they attempt to be intimidating by professing unsupported 
ones.  Theirs is an ambivalence born of uncertainty.  This is why 
contemporary Americans display a discomfort in acknowledging 
the reality of inequality side by side with their fascination with its 
manifestations.  While this may seem strange, a closer examination 
of the nature of hierarchies should dispel the apparent contradiction. 
Perhaps, it might even make this protective ignorance less necessary 
by reducing the need for the destructive romanticism in which social 
class has so often been cloaked.
Fundamentals
Hierarchy is a puzzling phenomenon.23  Instead of examining 
how ranking systems are created and maintained, even social scientists 
tend to be concerned with the way power is distributed.  They want to 
know who ranks higher and lower rather than why.  More than this, 
they are often intrigued with the possibility of rearranging these ranks. 
Themselves human and, therefore, part of the status game, they play 
it with enthusiasm.  Usually scions of lower-status families, they have 
sympathized traditionally with the underdogs.  As a consequence, 
rather than study social class per se, they become absorbed with 
exploring the social movements they believe will promote a more just 
allocation of influence.  This has attracted their attention to larger 
social arrangements rather than to the smaller processes of which 
they are composed.  As a result, scholars have missed the fundamental 
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mechanisms through which status is negotiated.  Nevertheless, these 
instruments are not particularly strange nor difficult to understand. 
Indeed, they will be instantly recognizable to most readers.  Nor 
are they unique.  Although they differ in detail from some other 
hierarchical mechanisms found within the animal kingdom, they are 
continuous with them.  The central machinery is essentially the same 
distinguished among humans primarily by a greater complexity and 
greater dependence on the intricacies of symbolic communication.
The most important building block of hierarchies is the test of 
strength.24  Individuals determine where they stand in the scheme of 
things in concrete clashes whereby they compare their power with 
specific others.  They literally face off in activities designed to exhibit 
their relative vigor.  Just as rams butt heads to settle who is physically 
more powerful, people engage in analogous matches.  They match up, 
perhaps in a fistfight, to see who will win.  After this combat is over, 
one is acknowledged the victor and the other the loser.  Typically the 
loser breaks off the engagement by signaling deference to his now 
determined superior.  Among sheep and other animals, this victory 
is rewarded by access to fertile females; among humans, the forms of 
compensation are more extensive.  Reproductive benefits may follow, 
but so does access to greater resources and superior authority within 
group activities.
One of the major differences among humans and other animals 
is that our tests of strength cover a greater range of powers than 
do theirs.  With rams, the arena is biologically determined.  The 
battle will be horn against horn, the triumph going to the physically 
more potent.  Among people, there are similar contests, with the 
laurels going to the better wrestler or the more skilled rifle shooter. 
Nonetheless, what counts as stronger can widely vary.  Because we 
use tools to augment our muscle power, success can depend as much 
on the skillful manipulation of a weapon as on brute force.  More 
than this, because we are social creatures, the person who prevails 
may be the one with better social skills.  As we shall shortly see, 
alliances matter; hence, the person who can demonstrate superior 
communicative abilities may prevail over the one who has spent years 
working out in a gymnasium.  Good talkers frequently outmaneuver 
the heavy-fisted in a manner that no male sheep could emulate.
Social Class    
The test of strength, however, is but the starting point of 
hierarchical supremacy.  Winning one changes the conditions 
under which the players operate.  Of crucial significance is the 
transformation in their reputations.25  Owing to human cognitive 
abilities, the combatants will note what has occurred and modify 
their behaviors accordingly.  To begin with, the victor obtains a 
reputation for being more powerful, which discourages the loser from 
challenging the outcome.  Correspondingly, the loser is judged less 
powerful and, therefore, easier to defeat.  These beliefs stabilize their 
relationship such that the victor is recognized as stronger and his 
position is not challenged—that is, until the circumstances appear to 
have changed.  By the same token, bystanders will be impressed by 
these events.  They, too, will reckon the victor stronger and the loser, 
weaker.  This will then influence their own hierarchical standing in 
that it may decide whom they attempt to challenge.  Clearly, they 
will shy away from confronting those with commanding reputations 
but will be undeterred by those with weaker ones.  In the end, this 
results in a comprehensive ranking system without every participant 
having to engage in a test of strength with every other participant. 
Because power is deemed transitive, the players tend not to dispute 
those who appear to be stronger.
As suggested above, people also differ from other social animals 
to the degree that their tests are collective events.  Humans derive 
their potency not merely from tool use but from the social methods 
used to exploit these implements.  Experience has demonstrated 
that cohesive hunting parties are more effective than lone operators. 
The same applies within social groups.  Cohesive alliances can 
defeat individual opponents in tests of strength irrespective of the 
abilities of the isolated person.  In almost every case, numbers matter. 
This places a premium on assembling and maintaining coalitions. 
Individuals with an aptitude for doing so thereby acquire a reputation 
commensurate with the powers of their supporters.  Being articulate, 
that is, being persuasive, is, therefore, reckoned an advantage, as is 
skill at log-rolling or horse-trading.  As important, those who know 
how to distribute rewards so as to collect pledges of loyalty have their 
personal clout multiplied by the span of these promises.  All of this 
is encompassed under the rubric of politics.  As the art of coalition 
formation and management, it is at the heart of human stratification. 
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More broadly, so too are intergroup relationships.  Because a person’s 
reputation may depend upon the group (or groups) with which he/
she is identified, the corporation for which he works,26 as well as the 
ethnic community to which he/she belongs, can establish how he/
she will be treated.  This may not be fair, but it is how things are.
Already it should be apparent that hierarchy formation is quite 
complex.  But things get worse.  Human mental abilities being what 
they are, people devote their intellects to scheming for hierarchical 
advantage.  When they lose a test of strength, they do not simply 
quit; they plan ahead for an opportunity to reverse the decision. 
The horizon for this preparation can cover a lifetime, and beyond. 
Politics, after all, is a devious game.  Prospective leaders spend years 
laying the groundwork for a run at the top.  They even dedicate 
Herculean efforts to building political capital for the ideologies 
to which they are committed.  Though this may not allow them 
personally to rise in status, they will have the satisfaction of believing 
their party will.  What is more, the ingenuity occasioned by these 
plans can be awe-inspiring.  Subtle ruses, abstract theories, and 
multistage conspiracies all contribute to their fruition, so may an 
ability to think on one’s feet.  Since victory does not always go to the 
best-designed strategy, one adjusted to unexpected contingencies can 
fare best.  Flexibility of thought, not raw intelligence or effort, thus 
becomes the determining factor.
To all this must be added a further layer of complexity which 
applies specifically to social-class systems.  In the hierarchies 
characteristic of hunter-gatherers, all of the players know one 
another.  Their reputations for power are personal reputations 
and their alliances are finite combinations.  Because the number 
of players is small, all are observable to all.  This capacity vanishes 
once a community’s size passes a certain threshold.  In societies in 
which social class operates, the limit has long since been surpassed. 
The anonymity of these communities has already been noted, but 
its implications have not.  In a world of strangers, it is impossible 
for everyone to be familiar with everyone else.  It is, therefore, also 
impossible for them to compare their personal strengths directly.  They 
depend instead upon appearances.  Symbols of strength substitute 
for demonstrations of potency, as may symbols of party affiliation for 
visible attachments.  In creatures with as finely tuned communicative 
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skills as ourselves, refinements of language, variations in fashion, and 
the material opportunities of wealth are adapted to send messages 
about relative positions.  As we know, the accents with which a 
person speaks, the labels on a shirt collar, and the horsepower of an 
automobile can all declare the social stratum to which one belongs. 
Yet, as we also know, these symbols can lie.  They may be used to 
indicate powers and associations that do not exist.  Is this not what 
snobbery is about?  It exists because an ability to put on airs makes it 
difficult to establish the correct rankings.  Nevertheless, this sort of 
manipulation is part of the game.  Nature imposes no rules against 
deceit or impression management in establishing status.  Indeed, it 
provides the instruments for doing so.
It must also be noted that symbols are related to signs.  Some 
social theorists suggest that the symbols of rank are arbitrary.27 
They complain that the upper classes routinely invent indicators of 
supremacy in order to lord it over their subordinates.  This, however, 
reverses the order of appearance.  Most symbols of power arise from 
signs of power.  That which is associated with strength—sometimes 
even causative of it—can be confounded with power itself.  To be 
more concrete, during the Middle Ages, members of the aristocracy 
owed their positions largely to a monopoly on military leadership. 
Born to be warriors, they often made their rounds armed with the 
tools of their trade.  These were eventually transmuted into symbols 
of status.  Wearing a sword, which began as a sign of one’s noble 
occupation, transmuted into a symbol of membership in the upper 
class.  When merchants ultimately acquired the means to aspire to 
titles, they, too, took to girding themselves in swords.  It mattered 
not that these were irrelevant to their trade; they made a statement 
nonetheless.  Even less directly associated with power were epaulets. 
These shoulder boards were originally used as protection against 
sword strokes.  As such, they too were a sign of military connections. 
When, however, they came to symbolize power, the affectation spread 
far beyond its initial rationale.
Another common error is depicting emblems of power as 
symbols of violence.   Critics of status are offended by the implied 
coercion, yet this is an overreaching.  Being able to quote Shakespeare 
might convey the message that one is culturally sophisticated, and, 
ergo, of higher status, but it is not intended to inflict physical injury. 
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The central goal is to intimidate, not destroy.  Symbols of power 
are designed to produce victory in tests of strength.  If an opponent 
can be convinced that the way one speaks betokens aptitudes and 
alliances that cannot be surmounted, he may back down without 
resorting to a confrontation.  The idea is to avoid violence.  If the 
loser feels injured after such a clash, this pain remains less than would 
be that of the alternative.  Indeed, many animals use symbols of 
strength to limit the need for jarring battles.  Baboons, for instance, 
show off their formidable canine teeth before they sink them into an 
opponent’s flesh.  Better for all concerned if the loser decides to back 
off from this alone.
The strengths that decide status, and their symbolic manipulations, 
have varied with the historical period.  Clearly, neither swords nor 
epaulets wield the powers they once did.  The underlying notion of 
relative power has not changed, but how this is expressed has been 
dramatically modified.  Some authorities insist that status is socially 
constructed and from this they erroneously draw the conclusion that 
it can be reconstructed any way they wish.  In the sense that tests 
of strength create realities that did not exist before them, they are 
correct.  But in the sense that they can independently  and arbitrarily 
alter the results of these contests, they are not.  As theorists, they 
imagine that they stand outside the fray directing traffic within it, 
but they cannot.  Like anyone else, they are able to revise hierarchies 
to the extent that they are contingent upon the powers brought 
to bear.  If these are inferior to those who oppose them, the odds 
are they will fail.  Nor can they redefine the symbols of power to 
accommodate their personal whims.  Merely declaring these to 
have been “reconstructed” does not impose new meanings.  Actual 
historical contexts are responsible for such amendments. 
The question that must now be considered is what constitutes 
strength in a society dominated by the middle classes.  Clearly, 
what predominates in an industrial society will not be the same as 
what did among hunter-gatherers.  Neither will what constitutes 
power be identical within every segment of such a society.  That 
which earns status among professional baseball players is not what 
produces respect among college professors.28  Complex societies, 
including social-class societies, are composed of multiple overlapping 
hierarchies.  In fact, people can simultaneously belong to many 
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different ranked communities.  Thus, one might be a person of great 
consequence among one’s lodge brothers but of little moment on 
the loading dock.  Power is not indivisible; hence neither is relative 
power.  Someone can be influential in one area but not in another. 
This may be confusing, but it provides opportunities to rescue one’s 
self-respect from defeat in one area by compensating with a victory 
elsewhere.
What this means is that there is a fundamental indeterminacy 
in the ranking systems of large-scale societies.  Even an omniscient 
observer could not precisely locate every participant.  Despite this, 
there is a tendency to crave exactness in a way that is only superficially 
possible.  Because people want to know where they—and others—
stand, they make arbitrary divisions that are at best approximations. 
Social class is, in reality, a dynamic continuum.  People may be 
higher or lower in specific respects at selected moments, but there 
are no official barriers separating their statuses.  Individuals talk 
of there being just two classes (the rich and everyone else) or of 
three classes (the upper, the middle, and the lower), but these are 
provisional political demarcations.  A Marxist might prefer to defend 
the twofold division since it implies that almost everyone can be 
recruited to overthrow the capitalists.   Someone proud of personal 
accomplishments might, on the other hand, insist on a middle rank 
to which that individual can belong.  As has often been remarked, 
the way things look depends upon where one stands.  But it can also 
depend on one’s objectives.  Republicans and Democrats see things 
differently, in part, because their incomes differ but more so because 
they view voting patterns differently.  Since each side wants to win 
and doing so depends on assembling far-reaching coalitions, they 
perceive these potential assemblages through polarized prisms.  They 
figuratively divide the territory they observe based on their hopes 
not merely on their personal resources, the one party discerning 
a nation of haves and have-nots, the other decrying class warfare. 
In any event, the underlying continuities of social class should not 
be forgotten.  Their ambiguities will have an impact irrespective of 
whether these are acknowledged.
    The Great Middle Class Revolution
Sources of Power
The sources of hierarchical strength have modified over time, 
but their outlines are fairly clear.  Primary among these is military 
strength.  People hate the idea that might makes right, but there 
is a sense in which it does.  Those who can compel others to do 
their bidding also exercise control over how they think and feel.  The 
respect they extract surrounds them with an aura that makes them 
appear righteous no matter how much pain they inflict.  Hitler29 
was genuinely loved before his Wehrmacht was dismantled.  So was 
Stalin,30 even as his policies starved millions of Kulaks to death.  It 
has become a cliché that the victors rewrite history in their favor, 
but their advantage kicks in long before that.  Their raw ability to 
threaten harm draws admiration from those forced to look up at 
them.  This may at first be grudging, but in the end it is often whole-
hearted. 
Power is the ability to get people to behave in specified ways even 
if they wish to do otherwise.  It can be exercised gently, as through 
persuasion, but when the crunch comes, it can be brutal.   If coercion 
is possible, and nothing else works, it is likely to be employed.  Tests of 
strength may not be about violence, yet, when all else fails, aggression 
is frequently the only source of intimidation at hand.  The problem 
with physical force, of course, is that it can be met with countervailing 
force.  People get hurt when someone decides to impose his will no 
matter what the cost.  The victim of violence may be its target, but 
it can also be the assailant.  Initiating a battle does not inoculate an 
attacker against defeat.  Nor are innocent bystanders guaranteed free 
passes.  Violence has a way of spilling over in every direction.  In fact, 
it may intentionally be focused on the innocent in the expectation 
that their defeat will send a signal to one’s competitors.   Despite 
their prospective damage, military confrontations are a constant. 
As far as it is possible to tell, belligerent skirmishes long preceded 
the advent of recorded history.  Death and destruction were the fall 
back position in tests of strength, even when inflicted by spears and 
arrows.
Physical strength continues to be a fact of everyday life.  People 
judge one another on their apparent ability to trounce others. 
Feminists are fond of pointing out that, in a mechanized world, 
muscle power is not as indispensable as it once was.  This may be true, 
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but it is still a sign of power to which people react.  Tall people are 
at first glance assumed to be stronger and smarter than more petite 
colleagues.  Should the long and the short walk into a room side by 
side, it is the long that invites attention.  Yet, experience can reverse 
this judgment, as occurred with the Civil War’s Phil Sheridan.31 
No more than five foot, four inches in height, Sheridan was not 
initially perceived as officer material by President Lincoln. However, 
after Sheridan’s dashing cavalry victories in the Shenandoah Valley, 
Lincoln opined that he was just the right size.  Actual physical success 
impresses people.  This is so much the case that during the Middle 
Ages legal disputes were sometimes settled in trials by combat.  He 
who could best an opponent in a test of military skill was assumed to 
have earned a divine imprimatur.
Before the arrival of agriculture, a community’s best fighter might 
be regarded as a hero and rewarded with leadership in battle and 
deference afterwards.  Even later, as recorded in the Bible, pastoral 
peoples regarded their champions as special, hence the tale of David 
and Goliath.  Still retold with admiration, this chronicle of how a 
boy felled a giant exemplifies the bravery that is a steppingstone to 
kingship.  Unfortunately for the cult of the lone Hercules, more 
organized military prowess soon gained hegemony.  Because personal 
power pales in comparison with the armed energies of a community, 
organized warfare became the standard of hierarchical superiority. 
The Greeks32 could regard themselves as a natural aristocracy after 
inflicting decisive defeats on the Persians at Salamis and Platea. 
Their phalanxes and fleet operations proved capable of repelling far 
greater numbers.33  More impressive yet were the conquests of Julius 
Caesar.34  Caesar was able to overcome Celtic hordes despite their 
large personal size and imposing broad swords.  His legions, armed 
as they were with the shorter gladius, could prevail on the battlefield 
thanks to superior discipline.  Well trained and intelligently led, they 
could cooperate to a degree their more individualized foes could 
not.  Blue war paint and ferocious demeanor did not compensate 
for shields stubbornly held alongside one another, especially when 
accompanied by sword thrusts from below.  This ability to bring 
dependable alliances to the battlefield made the Romans masters 
of Europe and Caesar the dictator of an empire.  It even produced 
a month of the year named after him.  In this case, collaborative 
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military prowess elevated the Italics to cultural dominance over a 
continent and their commander-in-chief to dominance over the state 
and historical imaginations. 
Later, the Romans would fall to the resurgent barbarians.  No 
longer able to impose coercion over now better-organized antagonists, 
they fell victim to alliances more potent than their own.  Notably, 
the military power of these invaders constituted the foundation of 
later European nobility.  The descendants of these adventurers might 
attribute their ascendancy to divine favor or bluerblood than their 
villeins, but their actual supremacy was won in a more sanguine 
manner.  Indeed, they could not have maintained their paramount 
status were they unable to sally forth from their castles to cut down 
peasants foolhardy enough to challenge them.
Another source of individual and collective power is religion.35 
Stalin may have inquired of his Western allies how many divisions 
the Pope commanded, but this grossly underestimated the strength 
of shared beliefs.  Compared with the vast expanse of nature, human 
beings are puny.  Small and weak measured against with the forces 
of a hurricane, we are worse because we are aware of the disparity. 
Ironically, superior cognitive abilities have the drawback of alerting 
us to our inferiority.  Much as we hate it, sooner or later, everyone 
learns that he cannot dictate to destiny.  Things happen—often quite 
terrible things—that we cannot forestall.  Loved ones die; famines 
devastate entire nations; and dreams crumble to dust.  At such 
moments, we look for help from those who stood by us in the past, 
but often they too prove frail.  Our parents cannot protect us from 
the death of child; our spouses cannot forestall layoffs in an industry 
in decline; and trusted politicians cannot forecast a secret attack on 
Pearl Harbor.  Surrounded by such reverses, we long for a powerful 
defender.  We want someone who can rescue us as our parents once 
did when we were small.
This someone is typically personified as a deity.  God (or the 
gods) is conceived as supernaturally powerful.  Whether depicted 
anthropomorphically or not, He/she is imagined to be strong enough 
to intimidate any potential foe.  Able even to call forth miracles, 
this deity possesses such power that no ordinary rival can withstand 
his/her might.  An individual with God as an ally is, therefore, a 
formidable adversary in a test of strength.  As a result, he/she can 
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attain status by terrifying others into submission.  When particular 
persons are perceived to be on good terms with heaven, these favored 
few may thereby claim social precedence.  Priests and prophets, not 
just kings, can demand subservience on this basis.  In promising to 
visit the wrath of a hidden world on obdurate opponents, they compel 
believers to do as they desire.  Rather than go to hell, these others 
kneel before the bishop, bequeath their riches to his church, and 
sacrifice their lives in a crusade aimed at liberating their holy land. 
Lest it escape notice, a theological ability to command obedience 
is readily convertible into military power.  The pope may not lead 
organized legions, but he can inspire sanguine battles.  Stalin’s 
successors discovered this when a Polish pope motivated resistance 
among communist Eastern European vassals.  So did Saladin when 
he sought to evict the Franks from the Levant.  The knights with 
whom he jousted wore crosses on their chests, but they were inspired 
by faith in their hearts.  Though ultimately forced to retreat, these 
champions put up a stout resistance that was only overcome by 
warriors motivated by a counterbelief.  
Beyond the physical power that is thought to cling to the 
supernatural, there is the potency of the normative.36  Religion is 
not just about gods, it is also about moral imperatives.  While still 
at their mothers’ knees, children are taught that some behaviors 
are unacceptable.  They learn that eternal punishments await them 
for violating these crucial rules.  Such prescriptions then become 
internalized to guide subsequent actions.  Do not tell a lie is 
transformed from an external command into a personal commitment. 
Guilt subsequently arises at the mere thought of telling a falsehood 
and prevents one from yielding to temptation.  Because morality, 
even when detached from religion, creates standardized obligations, 
it can also create anonymous alliances.  Individuals become more 
powerful than their personal assets warrant when they can depend 
on others to back them.  This is precisely what happens in the case 
of morally inculcated norms.  The wife who has been betrayed by an 
unfaithful husband can count upon members of her community to 
frown upon a man who violates the commandment against adultery. 
She will be considered the good one and (historically, at least) receive 
the greater honor.  The same applies to theft, where the power of the 
group can come to bear in defeating the machinations of the crook. 
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Indeed, a moral consensus can even provide the impetus to combat. 
The Japanese learned to their sorrow that attacking the United States 
before declaring war was regarded as an immoral stab in the back that 
cried for retaliation.  They also discovered that in losing this conflict 
they could no longer maintain the pretense of being a master race.
Lastly, economic potency lends itself to prevailing in tests of 
strength.  As with physical and religiomoral potency, it can persuade 
an opponent to accept defeat.  In the days of the hunter-gatherers, the 
more successful hunter garnered kudos for bringing home more meat 
than his fellows.  He was respected for his prowess and sought after 
as good provider.  When matched against his rivals, he cowed them 
with a competence they could not match.  Oddly enough, expertise, 
too, is intimidating.  When people go head-to-head over a skill, the 
one who is more proficient demonstrates a strength that can be as 
frightening as muscle power.  It is disconcerting to be confronted 
with an aptitude that makes one look weak, which is why people 
hate to play tennis with someone who is better at the game and it is 
why the poor feel uncomfortable being friends with the rich.
Human beings have become our planet’s dominant species, not 
because we are physically stronger than other animals, but because 
we can overpower them with our skills.  Intelligent tool use is our 
hallmark.  It is the means through which we acquire the resources 
to survive.  Demonstrable economic prowess is thus a sign of this 
supremacy.37  It is of value for what it can produce but also because of 
the respect it commands.  In any event, the economically successful 
have surplus resources with which to influence the behaviors of others. 
In a direct confrontation over power, the economically superior 
can bribe their opponents to desist.  These poorer others may be 
offered goods as an incentive to break off challenges and rewards for 
assisting in rebuffing third parties.  In a sense, even formerly neutral 
bystanders can become mercenaries in the incessant battles over 
status.  This is what happens to the employees of a corporation when, 
in consideration for a paycheck, they find themselves defending the 
interests of their bosses.
Nor should economic power be considered divorced from 
military power.  Dwight D. Eisenhower38 warned of the dangers of 
a military-industrial complex.  On departing office, he explained 
that businessmen could control government decisions by bribing 
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generals to favor their plans.  This is nothing new.  The bankers who 
lent them the wherewithal to pay for their armies thereby exercised 
influence over medieval monarchs.  Then, as now, soldiers sometimes 
fought because a charismatic hero inspired them, sometimes from 
a transcendent spiritual cause, but often because they received 
compensation for doing so.  On occasion, the rewards came from 
confiscating the property of the enemy; nevertheless, more dependable 
benefits derived from paymasters with the means to afford their 
services.   As Red Barber might have said, this put the economically 
successful in the catbird’s seat.  The wealthy, to be blunt, can buy 
military power.  To this day, they finance the weapons upon which 
battle depends.  In the Middle Ages, these resources allowed kings to 
purchase the cannons necessary to reduce the castles of recalcitrant 
barons; in contemporary times, they have allowed the United States 
to become the world’s dominant superpower.
To sum up, human power has many bases.  As we will shortly 
see, even military, religious, and economic potencies themselves have 
numerous starting points.  Today it has become commonplace to 
refer to social capital.39  Some people, or groups, are said to get ahead 
because they possess more of this mysterious something.  Economic 
capital, in contrast, is easy enough to understand.  This concept 
has been in use long enough for us recognize the machinery, the 
technologies, and the financial resources to which it refers.  Social 
capital, however, is more opaque.  It seems to have something to 
do with the democratic principles that enable modern nation states 
to function and also with the educational assets that enable persons 
to prosper within them.  The problem is that the requisite norms 
and skills, and indeed the social networks, to which it refers, are not 
specified.  No doubt there are some conditions that allow individuals 
and communities to rise above others to permit them to function 
at higher levels.  In a sense, talk of social capital is functionalism 
for nonfunctionalists.  It enables critics of capitalism who wish to 
deny it success to admit that some qualities facilitate social and 
personal survival without having to acknowledge that the winners 
might somehow be better.  They can thus be egalitarian in their 
pronouncements while admitting competition to their pantheon 
under another name.  What follows will be more direct.  The specific 
talents that have enabled the middle classes to become dominant will 
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be identified for what they are.  Moreover, how economic power gets 
transmuted into hierarchical supremacy will be examined in detail, 
for unless these issues are confronted head on, their mysteries will 
remain.
Forms of Alliances
Over the course of history, the types of alliances that have fostered 
hierarchical success have succeeded one another with a dizzying but, in 
retrospect, is a predictable regularity.  What has constituted military, 
religious, and economic power has been modified according to the 
kinds of coalitions that have been brought to bear.  Not surprisingly, 
as the ways people have lived were transformed, what determined 
who was likely to associate with whom did likewise.  Specifically, as 
social, environmental, and economic conditions evolved, so did the 
sorts of bonds that made a difference.  People were thrown together 
in diverse circumstances where they discovered that what enabled 
them to do well in tests of strength had correspondingly changed.
In the beginning was the family.  Evolutionary psychologists 
have made a fetish of explaining how genetic bonds influence 
altruistic behavior.40  Fascinated with the metaphor of selfish genes 
that are dedicated to perpetuating themselves, they argue that a 
relative helping another relative to survive is almost the same as 
perpetuating one’s own chromosomes.  On these grounds, the closer 
the genetic relationship, the greater the DNA overlap and, therefore, 
the stronger the motivation to be of assistance.  Although this sounds 
fairly mechanical, elementary observations confirm a tendency to 
family solidarity.  Those who share parents and grandparents may 
fight like cats and dogs, but when an outsider threatens a member 
of the clan, they close ranks.  In moments of danger, they function 
as allies.41  Personal relationships based on kinship thus channel 
individuals into coalitions that enable them to overcome threats 
from other coalitions.  The bonds based on these connections can 
also set preemptive strikes in motion.  Individuals who trust one 
another based on shared biological roots can collaborate in asserting 
dominance over others.  In combination they can claim, and defend, 
hierarchical priority.
Family relationships would seem to have been a prime source 
of status in hunter-gatherer societies.  Who was whose son and who 
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married whom helped determine who rose to a dominant position. 
This was so within the local band, where the prestige of a parent might 
rub off on a child or the support of one’s brothers could overawe a 
rival who had only sisters.  This was also so between bands, in which 
primitive politics could establish interfamily alliances capable of 
defending favorable territories.  Family connections were so important 
within small-scale communities that the details of kinship became 
highly formalized.  Anthropologists have discovered that preliterate 
societies have more complex classifications than do technologically 
advanced ones.  Given their greater political, economic, and social 
import, this makes perfect sense.
 But family relationships do not lose their value as societies 
increase in scope.  They are also crucial within estate systems.  In 
societies such as medieval Europe,42 the elite stratum was controlled 
by family lineages.  Who was related to whom determined who 
inherited what lands and which titles.  The isolated individual was 
as good as vanquished in a world where the primary duty was to 
blood.  Even more so than in less elaborate communities, alliances 
consummated by marriage were the rule.  Kings gave their daughters 
to the sons of other kings on the principle that this would unite 
their houses.  In due course, a conjoined genetic destiny created a 
larger political agglomeration that assisted in dominating less astute 
lineages.  By the same token, within one’s own lands, a fertile union 
could enable one’s house to keep unruly barons from usurping the 
prerogatives of their betters.  This logic was so compelling that it was 
replicated down the social ladder.  Perhaps the best known example 
is the vendettas of Southern Italy.43  Not only did the leading families 
build towers to fend off the attacks of competing dynasties, peasants 
too engaged in bitter feuds over apparently minuscule plots of land 
and seemingly trivial questions of honor.  Nor was this propensity 
confined to the Old World.  Americans well into the twentieth century 
were transfixed by the feuds of the Hatfields and the McCoys.  Cut 
off from the larger society in the remote borderlands of Kentucky 
and West Virginia, the families were featured in lurid accounts of 
how they slew each other over profit and jealousy.  Neither has this 
tendency been restricted to the poor; equally mesmerizing was the 
nepotism of Camelot.  The nation followed the rise and fall of the 
Kennedy44 clan not only because a glamorous young president headed 
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this procession but because he was accompanied by a multitude of 
siblings and, eventually, nieces and nephews.  Cloistered in their 
private compounds with their magic only intermittently on display, 
they could bestow honors on one another almost at will, be it as 
Attorney General or as Senator.
Closely allied to coalitions based on family are those grounded 
in comradeship.  Going back almost as far as genetic bonds are those 
related to the hunt.  Men who together pursued large game developed 
durable allegiances.  Compelled by circumstances to trust their 
safety to one another, they became as close as brothers.  Emotionally 
prepared to sacrifice all for the survival of the team, outsiders had best 
beware.  Since these hunting bands were frequently interchangeable 
with military bands, the same loyalties applied to raiding parties. 
Fighting as a unit against a determined enemy further solidified the 
partnership.  This, too, as with the family, enabled the parties to 
promote their separate positions.  Their relationships constituted 
a bulwark available to individual tests of strength.  In the case of 
European nobility, warriors who fought together became comrades 
in arms in defending their superiority over those they conquered. 
Even after the initial occupation receded into a mythical past and 
members of the aristocracy were no longer personal friends, a 
communal fealty, that is, a pledge of honor, bound them in a network 
of shared interest.
Indeed, this sort of military comradeship was the forerunner 
of what evolved into government.  Stabilized groups of individuals 
prepared to impose their will, ultimately through physical coercion, 
were at the heart of the territorial state.  Machiavelli45 prudently 
advised his prince that it was better to be feared than loved on 
the assumption that someday he might need to terrify recalcitrant 
citizens into submission.  In practical terms, this required loyal 
fighters prepared to jeopardize their lives in order to perpetuate his 
ascendancy.  Generals have long been aware that rock-solid discipline 
is decisive on the battlefield.  Experience taught that the army that 
can maintain orderliness in the teeth of danger is apt to triumph. 
Rulers are, therefore, dependent upon military élan for power. 
Equally vital to maintaining a government’s integrity is the political 
solidarity that guides the actions of its soldiers (or constabulary).  In 
analyzing the sources of social stratification, Max Weber46 highlighted 
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the significance of party.  He theorized that political alliances were 
often the key to social control.  James Madison47 implied as much 
when he warned that political factions rise up as naturally as weeds 
and need to be controlled if tyranny is to be avoided.  Personal 
relationships among political activists are, therefore, fundamental to 
attaining and perpetuating social superiority.  These must possess a 
constancy of discipline, especially in an environment where alliances 
shift with the alacrity of television commercials.  Because political 
combinations need not be grounded in biology, factors that cultivate 
remote loyalties are essential.  This glue may be based on personal 
interest, tradition, greed, or passionately held beliefs; the options are 
legion, but they are indispensable.
For this reason an entirely different source of social solidarity 
can become paramount.  Alliances that create interpersonal strength 
derive not only from personal relationships but also from impersonal 
commitments.  Indeed, moral and religious duties often take 
precedence over family or private political ties.  They provide the 
impetus for coalitions of greater breadth than those that depend on 
individual attachments.  When people have internalized particular 
rules, beliefs, or rituals, they thereby acquire a loyalty that transcends 
time and place.  Such mental allegiances may even feel eternal. 
Depending as they do on emotional, cognitive, and volitional 
factors that are inherently conservative, they persist long after 
people consciously decide to jettison them.  Violating a deeply held 
conviction can be experienced as a betrayal of one’s very existence; 
hence it occurs less often than treachery toward friends or relatives. 
This makes moral and religious convictions an appealing source 
of social coordination.  If people believe the same things, they can 
dependably collaborate on the same projects—even if they dislike 
each other, even if they do not know each other.
Just as governments and kinship systems formalize coalitions 
based on personal relationships, churches and ideologies do the 
same for moralities and cosmologies.  They specify the places where 
members of the same denomination can assemble, and they stipulate 
the procedures through which they can affirm their solidarity.  For 
many people, religion is their central identity.  They would happily 
sacrifice their welfare for the spiritual community to which they 
belong.  Perhaps convinced of a heavenly reward for their piety, they 
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may also be motivated by a sense of doing what is right.  Either way, 
established creeds identify what is true and what is good.  Established 
churches provide designated prayer leaders, agreed upon scriptures, 
and inspirational places of worship.  In so doing, they furnish formal 
procedures that instill emotional and communal assurances of faith. 
The effectiveness of these can be seen in the sweeping reach of Al 
Qaeda.  From the mountains of Morocco to the rice paddies of 
Indonesia, millions of Muslims root for its victory over the Great 
Satan.  Utter strangers to one another, as communicants of Islam,48 
they are united against outsiders who do not pray as they do.  Believers 
in the Koran, they are prepared to assist in killing foreigners who are 
not.
An equivalent cohesion has underwritten theological states such 
as Iran.  Its ayatollahs command military allegiance from volunteers 
intent on preserving the one true faith.  Many tens of thousands 
of recruits charged into Iraqi machine gun emplacements with the 
words of the Prophet on their lips.  More spectacular still was the 
religious enthusiasm that fueled Islam’s initial conquests.  What 
to the losers of these encounters would have been experienced as 
unprincipled aggression furnished the victors with proof of a divine 
sanction.  Whereas the nonbelievers perceived such convictions as 
fanatical conformity, the believers viewed them as portal salvation.
Many secular individuals find this incomprehensible, yet 
they place their faith in political ideologies that are every bit as 
conventionalized.  An ideology is a formalized belief system that 
tells its adherents how the world works and specifies what needs 
to be done to correct its shortcomings.  The Communist Party, 
just as might a church, has functioned as such a quasitheological 
communion.  Its faith, namely communism, explained that the evils 
of the world owed not to the devil but to the oppressive machinations 
of capitalists.  It similarly promised that all this could be undone, not 
by being transported to paradise after death, but by constructing 
a heaven on earth after instigating a sweeping revolution.  Arthur 
Koestler condemned this movement as a “God that failed,” and it is 
more than a metaphor.49  The Communist Party has had its prayer 
leaders, sacred texts, and spiritual shrines every bit as much as have 
the Roman Catholics.  Civic morality too can be formalized.  In the 
United States, obeisances are paid to democratic values with as much 
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fervor as the encomia once offered to Lenin.  Even the free-market 
system has been the object of moralized tributes.  Libertarians, 
for example, are fond of extravagant praise of unrestrained market 
activities.  The entrepreneurial heroes of Ayn Rand50 have been as 
lavishly glorified as any Christian saint.   Weber described this sort 
of hierarchical priority as status which operates by elevating people 
for demonstrating deeply admired qualities.  Moral champions 
thus receive prestige for embodying the principles to which their 
communities are committed.  They are respected and, therefore, 
obeyed.  Such power comes not from coercing those below them 
but from eliciting their voluntary compliance.  Moral exemplars, as 
it were, tap into internalized springs of motivation. They draw upon 
deeply inculcated drives.  As a consequence, people can become 
social winners if they hit upon ways to instill these impulses.  As 
counterintuitive as it may appear, the divine messenger and the 
brilliant social forecaster can hold as much sway as the conquering 
general.
Which brings us to the economic aspects of alliances.  People 
can agree to follow a leader, not merely from fear or inspiration, but 
for instrumental reasons.  If they believe they can profit from joining 
the winning side, merging with it may indeed tip the balance in its 
favor.  When hunting was the primary source of wealth, the skilled 
hunter could gain power by distributing his surplus to those who 
offered support in exchange.  When agriculture took over, control 
of land became more important than mastery of a weapon.51  Those 
individuals who could bestow acreage upon which crops could be 
grown were rewarded with gratitude and fealty.  The same applied to 
those who could protect the harvest from raiders or who could increase 
the yield by organizing irrigation projects.  In each of these cases, a 
magnate could offer patronage that encouraged loyal adherents.  On 
one level, allegiance was being traded for a straightforward reward, 
but, on another, this devotion was to become traditional.  The squire 
was the squire, not necessarily because he conferred a benefit but 
because he and his father had always been squires.  His ownership 
of the land and, therefore, his ability to legitimize a peasant’s control 
over his portion of it was unquestioned.  It emanated not from a 
demonstrated ability to protect or distribute property but from a 
widespread perception that it was his to allocate.  To those born into 
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such a system, it would seem natural.  They may even have attributed 
it to divine providence.
Once the commercial revolution began to accelerate, settled 
relationships based on land tenure came under challenge.  Profits 
drawn from doing business could be used to purchase estates from 
an impoverished gentry.  Here, too, patronage could come into 
play, but the benefits to be dispersed derived from commercial 
opportunities.  Merchants whose wealth and connections enabled 
them to dominate the marketplace could exchange their goodwill 
for devoted submission.  Those with fewer assets conformed for 
the privilege of sharing in the reflected glory of such a benefactor. 
Ultimately, clients became employees whose fate was closely attached 
to the person who paid their wages.  This world of the entrepreneur 
and his associated workforce was the one Marx knew.  The goal, as 
a result, was to disrupt the attachments that provided the boss his 
social clout.  Without compliant subordinates, he would merely be 
a bloated imposter who could not hold his own in a brawl with the 
lowliest laborer.
Marx came on the scene just as the Industrial Era was picking 
up steam.  Large-scale factories were coming into existence, but 
their implications remained uncertain.  A growing impersonality 
was beginning to have a disquieting effect, yet the consequences of 
mass production and technological progress could not be predicted. 
That these would change the relationships between bosses and their 
workers, and hence the shape of their social alliances, was not evident. 
Amazingly, Marx could not discern the impending preeminence of 
the middle classes.52  They, too, seemed to be low-level employees 
open to as much exploitation as any machine operator.  He could 
not perceive that a dependence on their expertise would change the 
conditions of their association with their bosses.  As far as he was 
concerned, they remained relatively weak, whereas, in truth, they 
were accumulating the strengths to alter the balance of power with 
their superiors.
The alliances of the marketplace were to be further destabilized by 
the advent of a postindustrial economy.  By the time of its arrival, the 
volume of commerce had expanded to such an extent that keeping its 
arteries flowing required additional expertise.  Complex professional 
skills,53 not merely a knack for bookkeeping, were now in demand. 
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This often put the putative employee in control of the enterprise. 
Out of touch with what needed to be done to keep their coffers full, 
bosses depended upon knowledgeable subordinates to direct their 
businesses.  Many of the old alliances remained intact but not on 
the same terms.  The emergence of the middle classes dramatically 
altered the contours of social dominance.  There was still an upper 
class, but its writ did not extend as far as it had.  Weber, like Marx, 
was aware that class was a crucial determinate of social stratification; 
nevertheless, he too missed these developments.  Focused on the 
advent of bureaucratic organizations, he perceived these as fashioning 
an iron cage that would hold employees immobile.  The formalized 
regulations constraining their jobs would prevent them from 
exercising initiative.  But this was not how things turned out.  The 
arrival of extensive professionalization54 would once again change 
the ground rules.  It would offer freedom and creativity on a scale 
perhaps dreamt of but never before realized.  A self-directed expertise 
would guide the development of coalitions that literally remade the 
world.  Hierarchy would not disappear,55 but power would be more 
broadly diffused than ever, that is, at least since hunter-gatherer 
times.  Despite a rising chorus complaining about oppression, the 
opposite was more nearly true.
Middle Class Powers
In the entrepreneurial universe that Mills suggests preceded 
the nation’s descent into a white-collar nightmare, individual 
proprietors controlled private businesses.  They owned their tools, 
places of employment, and profits.  Ben Franklin was a prototype 
of this sort of businessperson.  Starting from nothing, he accrued 
the funds to purchase a printing press and to finance its operation. 
A few journeymen and apprentices worked for him, but he was in 
control of the enterprise.  Franklin believed in hard work.   Because 
the fruits of his labor were exclusively within his control, what he 
did was for himself and his family.  Though notoriously thrifty, 
through perseverance he acquired the resources to achieve a stout 
independence.  In his world, ownership spurred initiative.  It 
motivated him to do well because he was in charge of his exertions 
and was the chief beneficiary of performing them well.  On top of his 
own little mountain, he ruled his domain to suit himself.
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This was all well and good several hundred years ago, but how can 
responsible authority endure in today’s less personalized world?  In an 
industrial and now post-industrial economy, is it possible to motivate 
leaders to do competent jobs when they do not own their companies? 
Given the emergence of huge impersonal agglomerations in which 
ownership is detached from management, why do people not slough 
off?  If acquisitive proprietors do not directly supervise them, why do 
they not cover their tracks by doing just enough to escape blame?  In 
fact, most do not.  Productivity is higher in the modern world than 
it has ever been.  The solution to this paradox is found in the progress 
of the middle classes.  Their power derives largely from an ability to 
be self-motivated.  Not only do they know what they are doing, but 
they can be trusted to do it without close supervision.  Important 
social decisions have been delegated to them because they make good 
choices followed up by sound implementation.56  But why is this so? 
Why, if they are not proprietors, do they care?
First, let us consider today’s managers.  For the most part not 
proprietors, they regard themselves as professional administrators.57 
Corporations organized as bureaucracies hire them to occupy these 
positions.  They do so in the conviction that they are self-starters who 
will pursue the organization’s interests with as much dedication as 
would its titleholders.  In this, their superiors are rarely disappointed. 
For the most part, modern executives pride themselves on producing 
healthy bottom lines and growing market shares.  Although the 
majority is scions of the middle and working classes, they spend 
years grooming themselves for the responsibilities of command. 
Having, often from childhood, dreamt of becoming successes, 
they are unwilling to wreck their opportunities through neglect or 
ineptitude.
Particularly revealing is how prospective supervisory personnel 
prepare for their roles.  Even those who attain their positions through 
family connections are likely to have been formally instructed in their 
duties.  Contemporary managers are generally the product of college 
educations.  Many boast not just bachelor’s degrees, but a masters 
in business administration.  Working one’s way up to the executive 
suite from an apprenticeship on the shop floor was once the stuff 
of romantic legend, but no more.  A mania for professionalism has 
swept into the front office, as it has in most seats of power.  Fredrick 
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Taylor’s58 Scientific Management is today accepted gospel.  A century 
ago it may have been necessary to proselytize on its behalf; nowadays, 
it is assumed that leadership requires an expertise analogous to that 
of an electronic engineer.
The paradigm of the professional is the physician.59  Medical 
doctors habitually rank toward the top of surveys of occupational 
prestige.  They are admired and trusted so greatly that stereotypical 
mothers routinely urge their children to study hard enough to get 
into medical school.  Physicians actually occupy one of the first jobs 
designated a profession.  The concept comes from the notion that 
theirs was a calling.  God instilled the motivation to help mankind 
into their souls, and they responded to his command.  As a result 
of this divine mandate, they could be counted upon to devote their 
abilities and energies to doing their best.  When one went to the 
doctor, one did not have to worry that the level of service would be 
commensurate with the fee paid.  Though one was feeling vulnerable 
from disease, the doctor voluntarily risked his life rather than do 
harm.  One did not need to fear that he/she would depart in the 
middle of an operation on a beautiful day for golf.
This sort of dedication was implanted via an extended period of 
socialization.  To begin with, physicians underwent an extraordinary 
technical education.  The knowledge needed to become a competent 
healer was so all embracing and so demanding that it took years of 
devoted study to acquire.  In its current manifestation this entails four 
years of college, four years of medical school, and perhaps another 
four years of training in a board-certified specialty.  Even afterwards, 
the learning continues.  Physicians are expected to read professional 
journals, to attend seminars in new techniques, and to participate in 
conferences of like-minded practitioners.  Many also contribute to 
advances in medical knowledge by engaging in research.  They are 
not allowed to rest on their laurels but must remain on the cutting 
edge of science. 
More than this, the discomfort of their education is so great 
as to constitute rites of passage.  Years of arduous scholarship and 
long hours of stressful practice are not for the faint of heart.  Only 
the most committed persist in the quest, and, when they complete 
it, they discover that their personal identity has been transformed. 
Much as the rigors of an initiation ceremony convert college 
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freshmen into steadfast members of fraternities, so having survived 
the harsh demands of medical training modifies a person’s mindset. 
Emotionally and intellectually reoriented, the newly minted physician 
feels the part.  He/she has internalized the goals of the profession 
and now pursues them as a matter of course.  A failure to do so 
would henceforth violate his/her sense of self and be perceived as an 
intolerable breakdown.  This newfound motivation is what enables 
physicians to be trusted.  Technical skills, without the commitment 
to apply them conscientiously, are useless.  Alone they would not 
warrant the authority bestowed on professionals.
Other professionals partake of a similar, if less painstaking, 
socialization.60  They too develop technical competence and 
internalized motivation.  Lawyers, college professors, and mechanical 
engineers are all allowed to operate independently on the assumption 
that they are prepared to make the decisions within their span of 
control.  To be concrete, engineers are relied upon to make the 
mathematical calculations regarding whether a bridge can endure the 
stresses to which it will be subjected.  Having studied how materials 
such as steel stand up to wind and weight, they are expected to 
come up with the correct answer.  This they generally do because 
they were thoroughly indoctrinated in their specialties and because 
they are loath to surrender their reputations to momentary lapses in 
judgment.
Professionals are also participants in professional communities; 
a primary source of social support comes from members of their 
vocation.  These peers are the best adjudicators of their competence 
and the most strongly motivated to provide solidarity.  In the same 
boat, they have an interest in guarding hard-won prerogatives. 
Principally through professional associations, they maintain the 
contacts that enable them to coordinate the defense of their separate 
and joint welfare.  Natural allies, their individual powers, when linked 
in a common cause, can be fearsome.  Should their goals coalesce in 
the same direction, they possess the power to make their wills felt 
throughout society.  Indeed, they generally have the clout to make 
their desires felt within the local organizations in which they are 
increasingly embedded.  The bureaucrats who are their official bosses 
tend to listen.  Whether in hospitals, HMOs, colleges, or law firms, 
they have considerable influence over their daily routines.  Despite 
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legitimate complaints over a loss of autonomy, their voices are more 
persuasive than those of nonprofessionals.  All of this translates into 
muscle that elevates their status over those who cannot compete with 
their authority.  
To return to managers, as noted above, their middle-class power 
also benefits from professionalization.  The point of becoming better 
educated is to acquire a comparable expertise and a similar reputation 
for reliability.  Having more or less achieved this, executives are as 
likely to identify with their fellow professionals as with old-line 
entrepreneurs.  This increases middle-class influence overall.  Even 
the salespersons that Mills so casually dismissed benefit from these 
trends.  He portrays them as shallow ciphers, but fewer of them are 
clerks in charge of ringing up retail transactions.  Merchandising, 
especially on the industrial level, has become a specialty operation. 
Its practitioners not only need an expertise in their products but skill 
in communicating with potential customers.  They must have the 
sophistication to understand others’ goals and the patience to deal 
with their psychological quirks.  This is not easy.  It involves far more 
than smiling vacantly and repeating a sales pitch transmitted from 
a distant proprietor.  Getting a liberal college education goes a long 
way to producing the personal flexibility necessary to cope with the 
uncertainties of face-to-face commerce with strangers.
Ironically even entrepreneurs have been professionalizing.  They, 
too, understand that they must operate within a middle-class milieu. 
This requires that they sometimes play the games of those upon 
whose services they depend.  If they somehow escaped exposure to 
the language and ethos of the Middle Class Revolution, they would 
soon find themselves adrift in a sea of consumers whose needs they 
could not fathom and of production assistants whose skills remained 
a mystery.  Under these conditions, how would they make money? 
Who would buy what they manufactured or operate the machines 
that assemble their products?  As a result, they, too, get college 
educations or, failing this, rely on their family ties to socialize them in 
middle-class mores.  Bill Gates61 famously dropped out of Harvard, 
but his compulsive envelopment in a computer culture, plus a father 
who was a successful lawyer, provided what was necessary to launch 
Microsoft.  Better educated, but part of the same community of 
influence, were the founders of Federal Express and Amazon.com. 
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They too exercised middle-class powers honed in academic settings 
to rise to the top.
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Chapter 3
A Way of Life
You could not step twice into the same rivers, for other 
waters are forever flowing in to you.  (Heraclitus, On 
the Universe)
Socrates: A Simple thing enough; just what is commonly 
said, that a man should be temperate and master of 
himself, the ruler of his own pleasures and passions.  
(Plato, The Gorgias)
A decent boldness ever meets with friends.  (Homer, 
The Odyssey)
What Do You Want to Be?
The choices used to be simple.  When asked what they wanted 
to be when they grew up, children would answer a policeman, 
a cowboy, or a mommy.  Later on were added the options of an 
astronaut, an athlete, a rock star, or the first woman president. 
Adults, of course, knew that this menu was too short.   Having been 
forced to make a concrete selection, they learned firsthand how 
broad the span of potential employments is.  They also discovered 
that most of the available selections were not visible from their earlier 
vantage points.  When they were children, a few of the most salient 
professions attracted their attention.  The simple, the dramatic, and 
the newsworthy got noticed despite limited experience, whereas most 
of the positions they would one day occupy were not so much as 
suspected.  Only as they grew older did they ascertain their existence 
of these new roles or their attributes.
Ours is a world filled with hundreds of thousands of distinct 
occupations.  Indeed, the federal register, The Dictionary of 
Occupational Titles,1 is the size of a phone book.  Many thousands 
of distinct trades crowd its pages and boggle the mind with 
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surprising details.  This multiplicity began to attract attention years 
ago.  As sociology was becoming a separate discipline, pioneers such 
as Herbert Spencer2 and Emile Durkheim3 discerned the degree to 
which modernization had swollen the number of specialties.  Spencer 
even theorized that this was a driving force behind emerging forms of 
social organization.  He explained that newfangled spheres of expertise 
required more sophisticated means of integration, which, in turn, 
changed the nature of how people lived.  Durkheim elaborated upon 
this insight by discussing the implications of a convoluted division 
of labor.  He insisted that vocational interdependence altered the way 
that people networked.  They now cooperated with each other not 
merely because they were similarly motivated but because what they 
contributed to the whole was dependent upon what their peers added 
to the mix.  Without an awareness of, and a respect for, this mutual 
dependence, all would suffer.  Like a large multicelled animal, society 
was composed of separate organs each of which collaborated with the 
others so that the entire organism could survive.  Farmers refusing to 
feed city folk or city folk declining to assemble tractors, would be as 
if the heart refused to pump blood to the lungs or the lungs declined 
to aerate the blood for the heart.
The extent of this mutual reliance can be determined from 
an overview of the health professions.  Ensconced in one of the 
fastest growing segments of the economy, these have proliferated in 
manifold directions.  Increasingly, technologically advanced, they 
reveal a pattern of integration replicated many times over in other 
occupations.  Among the pursuits enumerated by the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics4 under the heading of Healthcare Practitioners are
Chiropractors, dentists, dieticians and nutritionists, 
optometrists, pharmacists, anesthesiologists, family 
and general practitioners, internists, obstetricians and 
gynecologists, pediatricians, psychiatrists, surgeons, physician 
assistants, registered nurses, audiologists, occupational 
therapists, radiation therapists, recreational therapists, 
respiratory therapists, speech-language pathologists, 
veterinarians, medical and clinical laboratory technologists, 
medical and clinical laboratory technicians, dental 
hygienists, cardiovascular technologists and technicians, 
diagnostic medical sonographers, nuclear medicine 
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technologists, radiological technologists and technicians, 
emergency medical technicians and paramedics, dietetic 
technicians, pharmacy technicians, psychiatric technicians, 
respiratory therapy technicians, surgical technologists, 
veterinary technologists and technicians, licensed practical 
and licensed vocational nurses, medical records and health 
information technicians, dispensing opticians, orthotists 
and prosthetists, occupational health and safety specialists 
and technicians, and athletic trainers.
As extensive as this inventory is, it does not include personnel such 
as nursing aides.  These are listed elsewhere under healthcare support 
occupations.  Nor does it itemize the jealously guarded subspecialties 
found among internists and laboratory technologists.  Podiatrists, 
sports doctors, dermatologists, plastic surgeons, or serologists are not 
among these enumerated.  Nor does this compendium indicate the 
vigor with which distinct turfs are defended.  A tour of any psychiatric 
hospital would reveal that psychiatrists insist on maintaining a separate 
identity from psychologists and that psychologists grow huffy when 
confused with social workers.  For that matter, diagnostic specialists 
are as adamant about distinguishing themselves from clinicians 
as PhDs are from EdDs.  Those unfamiliar with this minefield of 
distinctions can set off skirmishes by trampling on the sensibilities of 
competitors intent on protecting the dignities of their own terrains.
This endless expansion of specialties has several consequences. 
One is that the occupants of each niche become expert in their 
domain of operation.  Individuals whose attentions are concentrated 
within a narrow scope can become quite skilled.  They have the time 
and the energies to uncover obscure facts that might escape the notice 
of others.  They also have the space to become proficient in their 
applications.  A full-time cardiovascular surgeon is sufficiently intimate 
with the architecture of the heart to achieve the dexterity to replace 
a defective valve.  In order to maintain control over their domains, 
these specialists are also motivated to stay ahead of potential rivals. 
New knowledge and skills are developed to insure that chiropractors 
or hypnotists do not encroach on medical territories with their 
nonsurgical techniques.  Specialization, in other words, provides the 
impetus to professionalization.  An ever-elaborating division of labor 
is a spur to increased expertise and superior performance.
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Another consequence of more finely divided occupational 
territories is the need to harmonize activities among adjacent 
specialties.  The surgeon who does not know how to join forces with 
an anesthesiologist is likely to be incompetent.  This means that the 
players must possess rudimentary knowledge about one another’s 
contributions.  As role partners,5 they learn that this is the only way 
to be responsive to one another’s tasks.  Moreover, with knowledge 
goes respect, and this respect goes a long way toward fostering good 
will.  Those who are too provincial in their interests tend to become 
isolated and ineffective.  Put another way, a professionalized world is 
of necessity a cosmopolitan one.
Besides enhanced expertise and improved cooperation, a 
highly developed division of labor tends to produce internalized 
motivation.  Because the participants are engaged in tasks that 
few others comprehend, they must be their own supervisors.  If 
the manufacturers do not care about turning out quality products, 
they would lack the impetus to do so would be lacking, and the 
entire social edifice might collapse.  As a result, the incentive to 
internalize personal determination is very strong.  Society as a whole 
has an interest in ensuring that practitioners such as physicians are 
individually driven to serve their patients hence the comprehensive 
training demanded of them.  Hence also social licensure, which can 
be subject to withdrawal in cases of demonstrable ineptitude.  Not 
all occupations are sensitive to personal incompetence, but even 
the motormen who operate subway trains need to be alert to their 
duties.  If they do not care enough to refrain from substance abuse, 
the potential for carnage is acute.  As a consequence, individuals 
are vetted to determine their private habits before they are hired for 
these positions.
With so many jobs subject to elaboration, the modern world 
is ablaze with change.  So great is the turnover that it has become a 
cliché to bemoan its instability.  At the beginning of the Commercial 
Revolution, the Greek sophist Heraclitus taught that one could not 
step in the same river twice.  Before one had an opportunity to lift 
one’s leg, the water rushed past and could not be brought back.  In 
this, he was warning of a social environment in constant flux.  As 
a wise man for hire, he had a job to teach clients to cope with the 
requirements of emerging democracies.  Since many of them, as 
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citizens, would be obliged to plead cases before courts composed of 
their fellow citizens, they needed to understand things from their 
judges’ perspectives.  Were they inflexible, they might offend the very 
people upon whom their fate depended.
Commerce and competition having progressed far beyond 
that of Ancient Greece, and the scale of change has grown apace.6 
Technologies and merchandizing techniques mutate before our 
eyes.  No sooner has one become accustomed to soft cream cheese 
than it is flavored with onions and chives.  Merchandisers are ever 
intent upon moving the fruits and vegetables around the produce 
section of the supermarket.  They have discovered that if they shift 
their locations, customers are forced to pay closer attention and, 
in the process, alight on items they had not intended to purchase. 
All this unrest, amazingly, is for relatively unchangeable products. 
Other commodities have the added fillip of themselves mutating. 
With electronics, the rate of discovery produces innovations almost 
hourly.  Virtually everyone old enough to vote can remember when 
mobile phones were a novelty, yet each year they keep getting smaller. 
These days many cell phones boast the ability to transmit voice and 
pictures, a capacity beyond Dick Tracy’s once magical wrist radio.  So 
common have these contraptions become that they have modified 
how people conduct business.  Salespersons, for instance, can have 
instant communications with their front offices even while driving, 
so can mothers with their children and wives with their husbands. 
Spouses are now effortlessly instructed to pick up Chinese takeout 
on their ways home from work.
All this turmoil has placed a premium on being able to adjust. 
There was a time when every son knew he would grow up to be a 
farmer and every daughter that she would raise children and keep 
house.  More recently, factory workers understood that once hired by 
U.S. Steel, they would enjoy steady employment for the rest of their 
careers.  On the home front, they correspondingly recognized that 
marriage was for life. Expected to be loyal both to their companies 
and to their spouses, they expected reciprocal loyalty.  Today, of 
course, corporations relocate to foreign climes, and love lasts as long 
as it takes one of the partners to crave self-discovery.  Those who 
cannot distinguish when the earth has moved beneath their feet 
or who lack the suppleness to move with it find these dislocations 
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painful.  Unwavering in their resolve to live by the rules of their 
childhood, they may, as a result, descend into poverty and isolation.
Another kind of change derives from the omnipresence of 
diversity.  Society has become a patchwork quilt of disparate cultures, 
ethnicities, and races.   Those conversant with history will be aware 
of previous eras when ethnic migrations changed the composition 
of Europe.  The collapse of the Roman Empire7 signaled a period of 
unrest during which Germanic tribes, such as the Lombards, Vandals, 
and Visigoths, removed from homelands adjacent to Scandinavia and 
took up residence in Italy, Spain, and Tunisia.8  This passage is still 
recorded in place names such as Lombardy and Andalusia.   Ours is 
an era of even greater transience.  More people are moving than ever 
before.  They are going longer distances and staying put for shorter 
durations.  The difference now is that they are moving as individuals 
and families rather than as tribal units.
In a world in which the demands of commerce have improved 
transportation and communication to previously unrecognizable 
levels, emigration has become normal.  People not only move from 
one country to another but also within the same one.  Clearly, 
the African diaspora altered the complexion of the New World, as 
did a European diaspora before it.9  These brought Negroids and 
Caucasoids to a continent formerly inhabited solely by Mongoloids. 
Today, Hispanics are moving north from Mexico and South America, 
and Asians are traveling east from India and China.  Americans 
have grown accustomed to migrants crossing their borders, but so 
have the Spanish, Germans, and British.  Where once it was French 
colonialists who overran Algeria, and British sahibs who lorded it 
over Indians, the direction of traffic has reversed.  Nor is the volume 
of resettlement declining.  Mestizos continue to be smuggled over 
the Mexican border, and Muslims persist in entering Christian 
strongholds.
Yet, internal migrations dwarf this international traffic.10  At the 
time of the American Revolution, New York City had a population 
of barely twenty thousand.11  Its numbers were soon swamped by a 
comparable number of invading British troops.  Today’s overflowing 
urbanism is a gift of the Industrial Revolution.  This upheaval 
prompted an urban stampede that has now been replaced by suburban 
sprawl.  Rural populations have long since decamped for places where 
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there were jobs.  To illustrate, between World War II and the end of 
the twentieth century, the sleepy depot town of Atlanta grew more 
than ten times in size.  Because of its location at a transportation 
hub, as commerce increased, so did the need for those who managed 
the traffic.  This transformed the North Georgia mountains from 
an Appalachian backwater into a supplier of human capital.  More 
than this, once it became customary to move from the farm to the 
city, it became acceptable to move from one city to another in search 
of a better job.  These days, Atlanta is inhabited by hordes of damn 
Yankees who have transformed its ambience.  Likewise, throngs of 
former Southerners have emigrated to Los Angeles to return the 
favor.  The United States has become a nation of gypsies who, on 
average, move every seven years, often going much farther afield than 
from one neighborhood to an adjacent, more affluent one.
The resultant diversity has placed a strain on those comfortable 
only with their ancestral environments.  Contemporary Americans 
require a more expansive view.  Living and doing business with people 
who were formerly strangers demands flexibility.  Fortunately, the 
qualities needed to adjust to a multitude of intersecting occupations 
are useful in accommodating a swarm of exotic neighbors.  People 
talk of becoming tolerant when they really mean they are becoming 
ecumenical.  Southerners now understand that Northerners can be 
decent people, and vice versa.  Nor do Mexicans, despite linguistic 
differences, seem subhuman.  Just as a greater division of labor 
prompted broader horizons, so has the mixing of populations. 
Bigotry is universally condemned, but its comparative rarity is not 
fully appreciated.  Nor is it recognized that middle class dominance 
has contributed to this achievement.  People who are concerned 
with amassing money and power cannot afford to reject potential 
customers, or coworkers, merely because they are superficially 
different.
To sum up, the modern world is astonishingly more complex and 
varied than its predecessors.12  Filled with surprises and uncertainties, 
it exemplifies the fact that that which can instantly change presents 
significant challenges.  Under these circumstances, people are often 
compelled to act without knowing what is best.  Those who would 
be their leaders are, therefore, hard-pressed to provide reliably 
constructive plans and coordination.  Yet, to do less would risk injury 
    The Great Middle Class Revolution
to themselves and to those dependent upon them.  This is the social 
emergency the middle class way of life has evolved to meet.  The 
skills, attitudes, and values it promotes were adopted within this 
diversified, ever-mutating milieu.13  Furthermore, were its members 
unable to cope with these complexities, they could not sustain their 
own status.  Power derived from competent marketplace stewardship 
would vanish were it overwhelmed by unpredictable exigencies. 
What then are the capacities required to survive such difficulties? 
Though these are varied, central among them is an ability to be self-
directed.14  Those who would specialize in contemporary leadership 
must be able to make independent determinations even when they 
are not certain of what is optimal.  To do so, they must be confident 
and competent; but above all, they must be their own people.  Each 
must possess an internal compass and the emotional and intellectual 
resources to follow it.
Self Direction
Mark Twain is reported to have declared that golf is a good 
walk ruined.  He could not understand why anyone would want to 
contaminate the beauty of a park like setting by indulging in one of 
the most frustrating pursuits ever invented.  Nevertheless golf has 
become the favorite diversion of American presidents.  Even duffers 
like Lyndon Baines Johnson felt compelled to take to the links, if for 
no other reason than to heighten the perception of the presidential 
qualities.  Certainly, since Dwight Eisenhower, it has been recognized 
that golf is the quintessential middle-class activity.  Unlike bowling, 
which has more plebian connotations, golf is indelibly associated with 
the country-club set and the informal business meeting.  Somehow, 
the sorts of behavior called forth by hitting a small sphere down a 
well-manicured lawn is regarded as an indicator of status.  It appears 
to bespeak a decorum that goes well with power.
This is in stark contrast with how things were during the 
Middle Ages.15  The kings of yore felt obliged to demonstrate their 
credentials by periodically participating in joust.  They would don 
richly embellished plate armor and enter the lists, as might any self-
respecting member of the aristocracy.  So enticing was the prospect 
of demonstrating military prowess that they risked death to achieve 
it.  Some, in fact, died in the process.  This was the fate of Henry II 
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of France, who perished when a lance pierced his helm and lodged 
a splinter in his brain.  These days, this sort of bravery is no longer 
honored.  Presidents do not have to prove their military courage. 
They may be commanders-in-chief of the armed forces, but they are 
not expected to lead from front lines.  Instead required to exercise 
sound judgment, these must show the nerve to look danger squarely 
in the eye; that is what is venerated.  That is what brings victory 
now.
Golf is associated with these qualities because it requires 
internalized controls.  Just as Twain intimated, it can be an 
enormously frustrating endeavor.  Hitting the little ball exactly right 
takes both skill and an ability to maintain one’s equilibrium.  Even 
becoming slightly flustered can result in an errant shot.  Moreover, 
one must be patient.  One shot may be followed by another, but 
only after an interval of catching up to its predecessor.  This leaves 
plenty of time to think and plenty of time to second-guess.  Bowling, 
in contrast, offers instant gratification.  This working class pastime 
allows its players the satisfaction of sending wooden pins careening 
into a backstop.  It also offers the pleasing sound of plastic on wood 
contact and an almost tangible feel of power.  Bowling, while it 
requires personal control, does not do so for nearly as long or under 
as exasperating conditions.  It is golf that tests the mettle of the man 
or woman; golf that pushes self-control to its limits.
Some years ago Melvin Kohn16 conducted a series of studies 
relating work and personality.  These began as inquiries into the sorts 
of values parents expected of their children.  He wanted to know if 
the kind of demands varied with social class.  It happens that they do. 
His investigations uncovered consistent, internationally corroborated 
correlations.  The world around mothers and fathers seeks to instill 
the same sorts of attitudes that they possess, that is, depending upon 
their occupational status.  Roughly speaking, those in the upper-
middle classes favor self-direction, whereas those in the working 
classes prefer conformity.  In diametric opposition to the speculations 
of C. Wright Mills,17 Kohn showed that the middling sorts selected 
innovation over conventionality and personal autonomy over blind 
obedience.
What Kohn found was that higher status respondents wanted 
their children to be considerate of others, to be interested in how 
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and why things happened, and to exercise self-control.  Lower 
status parents, however, placed more emphasis on children who 
had good manners, were neat and clean, and obeyed their parents. 
Because the former occupied jobs that demanded an understanding 
of what they did, they groomed their young to deal with similar 
pressures.  The latter, in contrast, found themselves subservient to 
bosses who demanded compliance, and they unconsciously passed 
this requirement onto their offspring.  While they would never have 
admitted to promoting conformity, their personal frustrations drove 
them to issue preemptory commands within the confines of their 
families.
Let us consider the working conditions of a physician.  Kohn 
describes occupations such as this one as involving substantive 
complexity and hence intellectual flexibility.  On most days, a medical 
doctor cannot know what problems he/she will encounter.  Patients 
come in with an assortment of complaints that must be diagnosed on 
the spot.  To achieve this, the physician must internalize encyclopedic 
knowledge about the body and the maladies to which it is prone. 
This can never be complete, but it must be sufficient to know where 
to search should further information be needed.  Surgeons are under 
even more stress.  Beyond specialized knowledge, they must also 
possess the manual dexterity to wield scalpels.  There may be other 
specialists in the room to assist in operations, but what is to be cut is at 
the surgeon’s discretion.  A surgeon cannot call time out or suddenly 
plead for a supervisor to take over.  In short, surgeons must be 
personally competent.  They may engage in consultations with other 
surgeons, and those with whom they confer are also professionals. 
A mere hierarchical superior would be an inappropriate source of 
advice.  What, indeed, could a hospital administrator contribute to 
an anatomical procedure?
At home, these same surgeons want the best for their children. 
They understand that professional success depends on developing 
individualized competence.  Because they recognize that discrete 
credentials allow entry to particular employments, they emphasize 
getting a good education.  But it is also understood that a professional 
must perform proficiently once on the job.  These professionals have 
learned that being interested in how and why things happen instills a 
curiosity that pays off in a comprehension of facts that may some day 
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be useful in deciding what to do when the answers are not obvious. 
Clearly, the more complex the task, the greater the uncertainties; 
whereas the more knowledgeable the practitioner, the more diverse 
the options from which to choose.  Higher status jobs also require 
complex interactions with other human beings.  One’s role partners 
may be peers or subordinates, but in either case successful coordination 
is apt to depend on understanding them.  Recognizing their motives 
and capacities facilitates cooperation.  Being considerate is thus not 
merely a matter of respect.  Taking account of who people are when 
soliciting their assistance is crucial.  This is, therefore, the sort of 
psychosocial sophistication middle class parents encourage.
Self-control is also essential for applying knowledge to people 
and things.  A middle class organizer must be suitably self-contained 
so as to think when thinking is appropriate and to be considerate 
when consideration is demanded.  Going off half-cocked was 
problematic when this phrase referred to flintlock rifles; it is more 
so amidst knotty social situations.  Kohn, for that reason, suggests 
that middle class parents support sound judgment, responsibility, 
and an ability to face facts.  They want their progeny to survive 
under pressure.  If a military hegemony celebrated physical courage, 
middle class endeavors favor social courage.  In this case, grace under 
pressure means keeping one’s wits despite the possibility of being 
blamed should things go wrong.  A contemporary leader must be 
able to look someone in the eye without panicking, irrespective of 
encircling confusions.  This courage with people is not about being 
physically fearless but about being able to function even when others 
are upset.  Indeed, tests of this facility occur daily within commercial 
spheres.  Under these conditions, individuals who freeze when their 
authority is questioned cannot be effective planners.
Working class occupations occur under markedly different 
circumstances.  As representative, let us consider an ordinary machine 
operator.  His job may be to stamp out automobile fenders on a huge 
hydraulic press.  Unlike the physician, when he comes to work, he is 
not in control of his activities.  Others, namely his bosses, tell him 
how many units are required.  They also inspect the quality of his work 
and make suggestions about improving his techniques.  Although he 
may have years of experience, a fresh-faced engineer straight out of 
college can countermand his decisions.  As might be imagined, this 
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is rarely appreciated.  It makes a person feel not respected.  But what 
is someone located toward the bottom of the pecking order to do? 
The answer is very little.  He may seethe internally, but this venom 
cannot be directed above without serious ramifications.  As a result, 
it tends to be displaced downward.  Lest it escape notice, downward 
are to be found his spouse and children.  They are subordinate to 
the man who has endured eight hours of enforced inferiority.  Kohn 
describes the feeling as alienation, but it is also humiliation.  No one 
likes to be on the bottom; no one enjoys feeling like a loser.  It is 
these frustrations that are unleashed upon the family.
The workman who is required to obey a boss all day naturally 
wants his child to obey him.  It would be degrading to feel subordinate 
to one’s offspring.  As a consequence, the son or daughter who is 
too independent is reined in.  Doing what one is told, when one is 
told to do it, is the order of the day, every day.  Insolence, even the 
appearance of insolence, is insufferable; hence the vigor with which 
impudence is punished.  Conformity is inculcated, not for its own 
sake, but as a means of enforcing deference.  Ironically, those who 
are subservient on the job hate to conform.  They do not consciously 
wish this on their children either, but they impose it, as it were, in 
self-defense.  By the same token, they enforce good manners and 
neatness and cleanliness, not because they love etiquette, but because 
they want their youngsters to display the symbols of higher status. 
Good manners and cleanliness are associated with white- , not blue-
collar, jobs.   Strangely, middle-class parents are less concerned with 
these matters, not from a tolerance of filth, but because they expect 
them to be learned automatically.  It is those with dirty jobs and surly 
coworkers who hope to reverse their destinies.
Surprisingly, Kohn also found lower-status parents more 
committed to teaching respectability, truthfulness, and success.  In 
addition, they want their children to perform many tasks well.  As 
counterintuitive as this seems, this too is a consequence of relative 
failure.  Those who are not respected crave deference; those surrounded 
by defensive lies seek truth (from others); those trapped by limited 
success lust after more; and those constrained by a narrow expertise 
value an all-encompassing adroitness.  They fantasize, as it were, 
being James Bonds who are at ease in any potential crisis. The trouble 
is that it is the appearance of these things that is desired.  Just as the 
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poor dream of large houses and fancy cars, it is the external signs of 
success, rather than its internal proficiencies, that are treasured.  This 
is confirmed by the self-conceptions of the respective classes.  Those 
toward the top of the scale exude self-confidence, do not engage 
in self-deprecation, and are not fatalistic, anxious, or conformist. 
Meanwhile, those toward the bottom, in marked contrast, do not 
feel in control.  Troubled by self-doubts and haunted by a sense of 
impotence, they try to compensate by affecting the accoutrements of 
success at least for external consumption.
Within the privacy of their homes, the self-confidence of social 
winners is communicated to their young whereas in the houses of 
losers doubts are transmitted to their progeny.  The mechanisms 
through which this occurs are too numerous to recount, but a sample 
should do.  The middle-class parent, when asked a difficult question, 
patiently attempts a logical answer couched in terms appropriate 
to a child’s age.  The working-class parent, when confronted with 
a similar query, is more likely to dismiss it as impertinent.  In this 
case, the child is either ignored or attacked for placing his parent in 
an awkward position.  Similarly, the middle-class parent punishes a 
misdeed by requiring a child to retreat into his/her room to ruminate 
about it.  Told not to come out until she understands why she has 
been disciplined, she is concurrently being taught how to introspect. 
The working class parent, in comparison, is apt to resort to a heavier 
hand.  Her child will be struck across a sensitive body part and 
ordered to desist.  He probably will do so, but the resentment will 
linger.  A desire for revenge, rather an understanding of what went 
wrong, results.  The upshot is that the middle-class child internalizes 
a desire to comply, whereas his inferior is primed to be rebellious. 
Paradoxically, an education in conformity instills an oppositionalism 
that makes for mutinous employees.  An excessive demand for 
obedience breeds not leaders but rebels without a cause.  Yet, none of 
this is planned.  Neither middle- nor working-class parents are fully 
conscious of the long-term effects of their actions.  They simply react 
as their life circumstances have prepared them to react.
The self-direction of the middle-classes has the effect of 
sustaining the decentralization implicit in a social class system. 
Decision making could not be broadly distributed without a 
large proportion of the population prepared to make competent, 
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independent determinations.  Moreover, many skills and attitudes 
must be inculcated in childhood if they are to be reliable.  Only 
deeply ingrained orientations provide the steadfast motivations and 
spontaneous expertise upon which proficiency depends.  This applies 
particularly to emotional and moral dispositions.   These may seem 
trivial, yet without them, the flexibility essential to an advanced 
commercial society is not possible.  What is involved in moral and 
emotional maturity requires a closer look.  But, first, some more 
general skills must be examined.  The question of how the various 
skills that underwrite middle-class dominance arise must also be 
resolved.
People Skills
During his travels through the United States, Alexis de 
Tocqueville18 was fascinated by the tendency of Americans to be 
joiners.  Unlike in France, here ordinary people spontaneously 
gathered together to perform acts intended for the common good. 
Without a government official to order their participation, they 
might decide to build a school because they collectively concluded 
one was needed.  This was the sort of volunteerism for which Ben 
Franklin was renowned.   Not alone in organizing libraries and fire 
companies, he exemplified civic initiatives that bespoke the virtual 
mania for self-help that gripped the nation.  De Tocqueville thought 
this significant.  He speculated that these associations were seedbeds 
of democracy in that they provided opportunities for average people 
to practice the skills of interpersonal compromise.  Communal 
endeavors demanded that conflicting positions be negotiated, and a 
knack for this could be transferred to governmental operations where 
it could allow a wider distribution of authority.
The political scientist Robert Putnam,19 in studying democratic 
reforms in Italy, came to the conclusion that the provinces that 
adapted them most readily were the ones with a tradition of civic 
involvement.  Tuscany, which had long enjoyed self-rule, surged ahead 
of Sicily, a region that had suffered under despotic aristocrats.  Tuscan 
citizens were better versed in individual initiative and, therefore, more 
effective in creating grass roots institutions.  Turning his attention to 
his homeland, Putnam20 argued that a history of civic associations 
indeed had the effects de Tocqueville theorized.  The problem, as 
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Putnam saw it, was that these habits were eroding.  As society grew in 
size, people were less inclined to join communal projects.  The nation 
was being transformed into an agglomeration of strangers, which 
boded ill for its democratic foundations.  Emblematic of this decline 
was what seemed to be happening to bowling.  Bowling leagues 
were falling on hard times and he concluded that more people were 
bowling alone.  Instead of coming together with regular associates, 
they indulged in private pleasures.
In investigating this phenomenon, Putnam speculated that 
this was a generalized occurrence that everything from religious 
attendance to participation in the PTA was contracting.  For a 
while, the scholarly debate was heated.  In time, however, other 
investigators found not an absence of civic participation but a shift in 
its focus.21  Bowling leagues might have declined in enrollment, but 
the number of children participating in soccer leagues was increasing. 
Similarly, main-line churches might be losing their adherents, but 
evangelical congregations were flourishing.  Even the PTA figures 
were deceptive.  This organization turned out to have been captured 
by the teachers’ union; hence, many parents organized competing 
PA associations that were expanding.  The swing seemed to be not 
so much moving away from combining with others toward going 
it alone as moving toward associating in ways more appropriate to 
changed circumstances.  One of these circumstances was none other 
than the burgeoning of the middle classes.
Members of the middle classes remain joiners.  They belong 
to professional organizations, political parties, chambers of 
commerce, book clubs, sports clubs, neighborhood associations, 
social clubs, ethnic societies, labor unions, veterans groups, public 
interest organizations, the Boy and Girl Scouts, and local churches. 
Volunteering and charitable giving are up, not down.  The most 
popular collaborative efforts no longer back teetotalers or suffragettes 
but have migrated to the Sierra Club and the American Association 
of Retired Persons.  If bowling went down and soccer went up, it was 
because soccer was more congenial to a middle class ethos.  People 
also continue to participate in local government.  They go to zoning 
board meetings and vote for school bonds in record numbers.  They 
even run for and were elected to grass-roots institutions such as local 
school boards.
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Civic associations, it must be observed, are noncoercive alliances. 
People enlist in them not from compulsion, but from personal desire. 
In so doing, they augment their personal strength in quest of goals 
they find mutually significant.  Nevertheless, they can win struggles 
of supremacy with competing associations, associations that may 
have different objectives, only by maintaining cohesion.  What 
makes this solidarity problematic is that these alliances are largely 
among strangers.  Where once hunter-gatherers stood shoulder to 
shoulder because they were like-minded relatives, modern Americans 
need to cooperate with people with whom they only share interests. 
In a mass-market society most affiliations are perforce with relatively 
unknown associates.  Unless these people can find common ground 
under these conditions, they are destined to fragment.  Instead of 
achieving their goals, they will split into smaller units whose energies 
will be dissipated in fruitless squabbling.
Francis Fukuyama,22 another political scientist of note, has 
emphasized the role of interpersonal trust in these affairs.  He argues 
that in countries like the United States people exhibit a high degree 
of trust in strangers,23 whereas in more traditional societies, such as 
China, they do not.  The Chinese, and for that matter the Sicilians, 
place their confidence in their families.  Unfortunately, this interferes 
with doing business in a market-oriented economy.  If people are 
only willing to engage in commercial transactions with those whom 
they have known for decades, the scope of their operations will 
be limited.  In this setting, the mass production of an industrial 
society is impossible.  Happily, people with social-class-dominated 
civilizations routinely make purchases in supermarkets from others 
with whom they are only casually acquainted.  They know that they 
may occasionally be cheated when a sale price has not been entered 
into the store’s computer, but they also know that these errors are 
relatively trivial.  For the same reason, they are prepared to deposit 
their paychecks over the Internet.  Were they reluctant to do so, the 
financial infrastructure of the economies on which they rely would 
unravel, and they would soon find themselves out of work.
What are some of the interpersonal skills that enable people to 
collaborate in a world full of strangers?  One is relatively simple.  If 
they are to organize and inspire one another, they must be able to 
communicate with each other.  In the highlands of New Guinea, tribes 
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living within miles of one another are mutually suspicious, in part, 
because they speak incomprehensible languages.24  Multiculturalists 
dismiss the utility of a lingua franca, but those who would be social 
mobile must be able to converse with a larger community.  Absent 
a common idiom, they can not make their opinions known beyond 
their home territory.  They definitely can not be persuasive before 
audiences unable decipher their messages.  But from a middle-class 
perspective, even this is not enough.  Those who hope to lead broad 
coalitions must be articulate.  They must command a vocabulary and 
a clarity of expression that renders them credible.  To be well spoken 
is to be admired, and to be admired is to be influential.
It has become commonplace to refer to ours as an Information 
Age.  But, since most data are transmitted by means of language, 
information implies competence with words.  Furthermore, language 
is disseminated through channels of communication.  One reason 
information is characterized as central to modernity is that it is 
conveyed more widely, and effortlessly, than before.25  The telegraph, 
the telephone, the radio, the television, and the computer provide 
instant, worldwide connections.  Those who command these can, 
therefore, commandeer a larger constituency than was previously 
available.  This has thrust the media into the forefront of alliance 
formation.  Those who have access to its channels and are skilled 
in their manipulation, become opinion leaders.  They can persuade 
strangers to unite behind a popular war or to undermine the 
prosecution of an unpopular one.  It was through these channels that 
pre-existing commitments to democratic values were appropriated 
to turn feminism into an intoxicating juggernaut.  It was also 
journalists that convinced millions of viewers that diversity26 is 
distinct from affirmative action.27  Less well appreciated is the fact 
that the skills to perform this sort of magic is, in large part, cultural 
skills.  They depend on a familiarity not merely with language but 
with conventionally credible symbols.  And as we shall later see, an 
acquaintance with the subtle connotations of culture is intimately 
tied with educational and entertainment institutions.
But people skills are also intimate.  Individuals become proficient 
at influencing others when they know where they are coming from. 
In sociology, this ability is called role taking.28  Role partners typically 
coordinate their activities by imaginatively placing themselves in one 
    The Great Middle Class Revolution
another’s shoes.  Thus, a husband who knows that his wife hates to 
peel onions can do this for her before she asks, thereby gaining her 
gratitude.  Likewise a teacher who detects a student’s confusion over 
algebra can facilitate the learning process by intervening at a critical 
moment.  This roletaking, in turn, depends on a bevy of skills.  In 
order to be responsive to another’s intentions, one must first be able to 
perceive them.  To provide a simple example, everyday conversations 
would be impossible without turn taking.29  Lest they step on each 
other’s words, speakers must be able to recognize when the other 
party is about to relinquish the floor.  Yet, discerning this depends 
on having a sense of what the other is saying, in other words, on 
seeing things from another’s perspective. This standpoint cannot be 
a complete mystery if one’s response is to exhibit good timing or a 
semblance of relevance.
But responsiveness itself is a complex skill one that begins with 
self-knowledge.  Before a person can decode another, he/she must 
possess insights into the human heart.  This, however, commences 
with self-awareness.30  Young children tend to be selfish because they 
act on impulse.  If they want something, they want it now, irrespective 
of the desires of others.  Many parents teach them to overcome this 
egotism by asking how it feels when someone takes a cookie from 
them.  Once children recognize their own potential chagrin, they 
can be queried about how another child would feel were this is done 
to them.  Obviously the older we get, the more we learn about our 
own psychodynamics and thereby about the dynamics of those with 
whom we interact.  Some, of course, are better at introspection than 
others, which gives them a subtle entry into the worlds of their role 
partners.  Long ago, at the beginning of the Commercial Revolution, 
Socrates recommended self-knowledge to those who would be wise. 
Even then he understood the value of personal awareness in social 
relationships.
But, in a world of strangers, self-knowledge is not enough.  There 
are ways in which all humans are alike, but others in which they 
differ.  The more extended the community, the more likely individual 
motives will vary.31  Multiculturalists insist on the need to respect 
diversity, and in this they have a point.32  They also recommend 
that people be nonjudgmental, but they take this too far.  People 
need standards.  They cannot refuse to make distinctions, for to 
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do so is tantamount to being amoral.  Nevertheless, understanding 
that cultures can be at odds is crucial.  Individuals have competing 
religious beliefs, diverse family arrangements, and conflicting 
values.  One may not agree with a neighbor’s love of shish kebab, 
but a failure to recognize this preference can inevitably result in 
squabbles.  Even the personal circumstances of another’s life can 
produce incomprehensible responses when perceived out of context. 
A friend’s hatred of being confined in tight spaces might appear 
irrational if it were understood that in growing up he was punished 
by being confined to a closet.  Recognizing these factors permits us to 
allow for idiosyncrasies.  Indeed, one of the more salient differences 
between adults and children is that the former have a broader range 
of experiences from which to draw nuanced interpretations.
This subtlety comes in handy in the complex negotiations33 
that permeate contemporary social relations.  With so many 
people pursuing divergent agendas, finding common ground takes 
extraordinary competence.  Engaging in these mediations requires 
both flexibility and problem solving.  If two people are to join in 
collaborative efforts, they must somehow agree on a unified plan 
that may vary from what either at first contemplated.  Personal 
flexibility allows for these adjustments.  Only if a person’s cognitive 
understandings and emotional commitments are malleable can that 
person make the requisite compromises.  This suppleness permits 
the person to perceive another’s requirements and make appropriate 
concessions.  In the end, people cooperate because they derive 
something from the deal.  Flexibility allows them to recognize that 
what is relinquished is compensated for by what is gained.
Closely related to this plasticity is a problem-solving orientation. 
Individuals who enter a negotiation intent on resolving emerging 
difficulties have a greater opportunity to work things out.  Those 
who insist that their demands are nonnegotiable not only put their 
adversaries on the defensive, but they close their eyes to potential 
solutions.  They cease looking for unanticipated options and can 
precipitate a contagious rigidity.  As it happens, people who feel like 
winners are less likely to insist on total victories.  Confident in their 
ability to elicit respect, they do not need to destroy their opponents. 
The result is a willingness to cede a portion of the pot to others. 
This, in turn, educes good will and cooperation.  As a consequence, 
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a combined effort can contribute to a larger pot from which all can 
draw.  In short, competent negotiations launch spirals of success.  For 
this reason, they are integral to middle-class dominance.  They are 
also derivative of it.  Success generates the confidence that permits 
the flexible bargaining that produces further success.
Technical Skills
People skills are clearly germane in an environment dependent on 
social alliances.  But, this does not mean that technical skills should 
be slighted.  They, too, are pertinent in a society dominated by the 
middle classes.  As professionals, or professionalizers, their members 
obtain much of their power from their technical proficiency.  Our 
civilization has produced technological wizardry that could not be 
sustained without scientifically and methodologically proficient 
personnel.  People must be able to operate the wondrous machines 
upon which they depend and to fix them when they break down. 
They must also make sure that the transportation links keeping their 
bounty flowing are in good repair.  As the sociologist Michel Crozier34 
has demonstrated, an important source of interpersonal power is an 
ability to control these uncertainties.  Those who understand how to 
keep the goose laying its golden eggs receive deference in exchange 
for the benefits they confer.  Once more, the middle classes emerge 
as the guardians of our collective prosperity and, therefore, as virtual 
titans in the battle for social prestige.
Among the economic sectors dependent on technological 
expertise are manufacturing, marketing, agriculture, entertainment, 
communications, transportation, government, health maintenance, 
and science.  Millions of people would starve to death if fertilizers 
and pesticides did not get to the farms.  Many millions more would 
perish if the harvest did not arrive at customers’ door.  Disease, too, 
would be rampant without modern medicine; poverty, unendurable 
without well-administered welfare programs, and daily life, infinitely 
more stressful without labor-saving machinery.  Even our daily 
routines would be pallid without readily accessible amusements.  The 
ordinary person may not know the difference between alternating 
and direct current, but someone must if the television set is to turn 
on when the button on the remote is pressed.
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The density of what must be known is apparent in the case of 
medicine.35  It was not until about the time of World War I that going 
to the doctor improved one’s chances of recovering from an illness, 
but, since then, the quality of life has improved enormously.  Today, 
people take it for granted that infants will survive to a span of almost 
four score years.  They also expect that these will be active years, free 
of debilitating disorders.  The physician is expected to insure this. 
If not, a malpractice suit may well ensue.  To preclude this, doctors 
are required to endure a rigorous technical training before they are 
licensed.  Just how demanding this is can be confirmed by anyone 
who has taken courses in organic chemistry, anatomy, or physiology. 
So much must be committed to memory, and so much of this is 
contingent upon superior analytical skills, that doctors are renowned 
for their intelligence.
Yet, the extent of technological expertise is better demonstrated 
by what has happened to policing.  Historically, the police were of 
blue-collar origin.  They were expected to be burly men who, when 
placed out on the street, dressed in uniforms equipped with guns and 
nightsticks, could keep social order.  Being physically intimidating 
and reasonably honest were about the only job requirements.  Today, 
this definition would be considered laughable.  Although most law-
enforcement agents are still of working-class origin, they are rapidly 
professionalizing.  More and more, they are expected to obtain college 
educations.  Criminal justice has graduated into a quasi-science.36 
As with business-school graduates, criminology majors aim to 
acquire a rationalized approach to their jobs.  Future police officers 
are instructed in the rudiments of criminal procedures, forensic 
sciences, abnormal psychology, substance abuse, domestic violence, 
comparative legal systems, criminal law, profiling techniques, sexual 
deviance, white collar and Internet crime, and community policing. 
They are required to know what constitutes a legal arrest, how to 
testify in court, and the best ways to deal with a diverse public.  Those 
who cannot exercise personal control or think on their feet are not 
deemed good candidates.  They are less likely to benefit from the sort 
of education now considered mandatory across the board.37
This is apparent in the explosion of formal education.  Only 
recently have politicians taken to promising a college education 
for almost everyone.38  Slogans such as “leave no child behind” 
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have extended to providing bachelors degrees to some of the least 
academically adept pupils.  Based on the premises that everyone 
should be equal and that no one can compete without advanced 
schooling, the goal is to turn everyone into an expert.  Ironically, 
this has produced little more than grade inflation.  The notion that 
supplying everyone with an express elevator to the top can eliminate 
social ranking is discredited by differences in personal aptitude. 
Some are simply better learners than others, hence when the time 
comes to contend for precedence in the real world, they can invoke 
the know-how to prevail.  One of the qualities of the members of the 
middle classes is that they tend to be disciplined learners.  They make 
the effort to read assigned materials and to study for impending tests. 
They are also lifelong learners.  When experience indicates that they 
need additional information, they go out to get it.  In essence, they do 
their homework.  In contrast, those who fall behind frequently come 
from backgrounds where going through the motions is regarded as 
sufficient.  They do not understand that expertise requires not an 
appearance of proficiency but the real thing.
Needless to say, technological expertise is also conditional on 
scientific competence.  The insights provided by a disciplined search 
for knowledge are essential to what has been achieved.  Without 
the discoveries of physics, chemistry, and biology, industrialization 
could not have occurred.  There would have been no steam engine, 
no television sets, no antibiotics, no CDs, and no rockets to the 
moon.  Yet the ascendancy of science emerged from a hard won 
struggle.  During the medieval period, human dissections were not 
permitted; hence, it was not known that the heart is a pump rather 
than a furnace.  Similarly, during the Renaissance, the Church was 
scandalized that the earth might revolve around the sun; so it refused 
to allow Galileo39 to publish The Starry Messenger.  Accepted truth, 
that is, truth based on faith or authority, was not to be challenged. 
As a consequence, it could not be disconfirmed.  But as Karl Popper40 
has taught, unless an assertion can in principle be shown to be false, 
it does not convey truth-value.  It is, in essence, a tautology.  Science 
is, therefore, concerned with carefully testing truths, even when they 
are unpopular.  This takes courage, not only because scientists can be 
censured, but because they can be wrong.  
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Here, too, status plays a role.  First, in being the custodians of the 
truth, the middle classes acquire an edge in tests of strength.  By using 
science to make it less likely that these assertions will be disproved, 
their assertiveness is thereby enhanced.  Second, the clout that comes 
with status enables them to defend the very enterprises from which 
they obtain legitimacy.  Though others may wish to forbid scientific 
investigations that might prove embarrassing to their pretentions, 
these naysayers can be overruled, and progress proceeds.  As an 
example, feminist ideologues were not able to prevent psychologists 
from confirming biologically based gender differences.  Despite their 
strenuous objections, they could not outlaw the neurological studies 
they feared.  The scientists, those who funded their inquiries, and the 
universities that employed them would have none of this.  Their own 
reputations were dependent on breaking new intellectual ground; 
hence, they persevered despite the opposition.
Emotional Maturity
So far, the middle class way of life has been associated with 
both interpersonal and technical skills.  Nowadays, part of attaining 
higher rank clearly depends upon learning to deal with people and 
with obtaining good practical educations.  Yet, there is something 
more fundamental to success.  This is personal discipline.  Those 
who cannot control their impulses are not able to concentrate their 
assets on the fitnesses needed to work in these other areas.  They 
cannot acquire the necessary skills nor apply them appropriately.  As 
a consequence, they are not capable of exercising the internalized 
restraints upon which decentralized societies rely.  Unqualified to 
make good decisions without supervision, they are not given the 
leeway to do so.
Yet personal discipline is itself dependent upon emotional 
maturity.41  Unless a person can control his or her strong feelings, 
that person is vulnerable to rash actions.  Instead of thinking 
through the best way to cooperate with role partners, a person will 
allow intemperate desires to take over.  Rather than concentrate on 
acquiring difficult skills, an individual takes the easy way out and 
settles for shortcuts.  The emotionally immature are like children; 
they want what they want when they want it.  Theirs is not a world 
of resolution or determination.  When they are hurt, they cry; 
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when they are frightened, they run; when they are angry, they try 
to get even.  As a result, little gets done, certainly little that must be 
done cooperatively.  Not surprisingly, those who exhibit emotional 
incompetence are not respected.  They are not sought out as allies 
nor held in awe as adversaries whose enmity is to be dreaded.
Several decades ago Edmund Muskie was expected to be a 
shoo-in for the Democratic nomination for president.  As Hubert 
Humphrey’s running mate four years earlier, he had made so solid an 
impression that the respect lingered.  Then, one inopportune day, he 
mounted a soapbox in front of the offices of the Manchester, New 
Hampshire, Union-Leader and decried its editor’s attack upon his 
wife’s integrity.  Affirming that although he had not been personally 
injured, he considered it his duty to defend her honor, he proceeded 
to unleash a tirade.  So far, his words were unobjectionable, but 
then Muskie broke down and cried.  His voice choked up, and tears 
streamed down his face.  Until that moment, he had exuded an aura 
of craggy manhood, but suddenly he was revealed to be a crybaby. 
The nation gave a collective shudder and came to the conclusion 
that this man was too delicate to be entrusted with the stresses of 
its highest office.  Almost immediately, his approval ratings sank, 
and within weeks he was forced to withdraw his candidacy.  He 
had demonstrated emotional incompetence, which was judged 
incompatible with the strength needed in a paramount leader. 
Decades later, Governor Howard Dean of Vermont, addressing his 
supporters at a campaign rally after losing the Iowa caucuses, made 
a comparable blunder.  Intending to fire up his troops, he gave what 
came to be called the “I have a scream” speech.  Delivered with such 
fire that it confirmed the worst fears about his inability to control his 
temper, his speech also drove his candidacy out of contention.
An analogous fate had earlier befallen Joseph McCarthy.42  After 
several years as the scourge of Communist agents in government 
employ, the senator was cornered by his enemies during what came 
to be called the Army-McCarthy hearings.  His chief interlocutor, 
Joseph Welch, was the Army’s counsel.  A folksy New Englander, 
he came loaded for bear.  But this experienced attorney confronted 
a lawmaker who had already been unnerved.  Long denounced as 
an unprincipled fascist, McCarthy had grown unsure of his ground. 
In an effort to manage his doubts, he had taken to drink.  That 
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morning, evidently suffering from a hangover, he was relentlessly 
quizzed about the names of a gaggle of alleged Communists.  Finally 
driven to respond, he informed Welch that one of his own younger 
colleagues had such ties.  To this came the famous rejoinder, “Sir, at 
long last have you no decency.”  Thrown back on his heels, McCarthy 
could offer nothing but a whiny denial.  The contrast could not have 
been more stark.  On one side sat a genial, grandfatherly defender 
of justice, and on the other, a shrill bully intent on destroying the 
career of an innocent.  Welch was obviously a sensitive adult, whereas 
McCarthy was an emotional cripple.  That, alone, would be sufficient 
to decide the issue.  An emotional weakling could not be allowed to 
set the nation’s agenda.  Within years, a media vendetta crumpled 
tail-gunner Joe into a pathetic shadow of his former self, and he was 
soon dead, too.
Emotions matter.  They are at the heart of tests of strength. 
These contests are, after all, usually won by means of intimidation. 
Accordingly, feelings are vital to attaining interpersonal, and even 
technical, skills.   Over the last several decades psychologists and 
educators have come to recognize this.  One popular concept to 
emerge from this ferment has been that of EQ.  A coinage of Daniel 
Goleman’s,43 it refers, imitating the intelligence quotient or IQ, to a 
postulated Emotional Quotient.  Drawing upon theories of multiple 
intelligences, it suggests that possessing emotional competence is 
equivalent to being smart.  Although there is no accepted measure of 
this faculty, Goleman alleges that without it, a person may get hired 
but will have difficulty keeping a job.  On paper a person might have 
the qualifications to do what is required, but, in practice, a prickly 
personality would prevent participation in a team.
The crucial element in this, one that is confirmed in actual 
relationships, is emotional maturity.44  Just as human beings are 
born with a capacity to learn languages, they come equipped 
with an aptitude to experience a wide range of emotions.  But, as 
with language, the ability to apply these develops over time.  For 
competent speech, there is a vocabulary to be learned and a syntax to 
be mastered.  For emotions, there are communication and motivation 
factors to be managed.  Feelings must be socialized.  Children must 
learn how and when to express them.  More importantly, they need 
to discover how to apply them to achieve desired goals.  The passions 
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that send convulsions coursing through infantile frames are primitive 
in operation.  They are stereotyped and virtually automatic.  Thus, 
when angry, a baby issues an aggravated cry.  The face screws up, and 
a bitter hoarseness conveys displeasure.  In most cases, the mother 
recognizes this irritation and tries to assuage it.  Yet, were an adult 
to be as inarticulate, the confusion would be general.  A mature 
person is expected to verbalize sources of displeasure and, in the best 
circumstances, to indicate what would diminish them.
Primitive, childish emotions simply erupt.  They are what they 
are.  The very young do not control them because they have not yet 
learned how to control them.  The problem is that many adults do 
not master them either.  Especially when feelings become intense, 
they overstep their boundaries.  In this situation, anger becomes 
rage, and fear becomes panic.  Even love can become obsessive.  Yet, 
chronological maturity does not guarantee that someone will have 
discovered how to suppress what is inappropriate.  Under these 
conditions, an individual’s influence will shrink.  Impulsively berating 
the wrong person, at the wrong moment, is a sure ticket to defeat. 
Uncontrolled passions reveal an internal defect that is interpreted as 
weakness, and weakness, of course, invites attack.  It is a sign that a 
person is a loser who will buckle under pressure.  Thus adults who 
are given to temper tantrums are regarded as puerile.  The louder 
they become, the more they are ignored.  Though their histrionics 
at first gain attention, this soon degenerates into farce.  Controlled 
emotions, in contrast, are effective and powerful. They induce others 
to act as one hopes.
One of the most dependable indicators of interpersonal strength 
is emotional courage.  Physical courage is appropriate in a militarized 
society, but an ability to deal with emotional confrontations is 
more functional in a commercial one.  Both in the marketplace 
and the political arena, people seek to intimidate others through 
expressive displays.  They issue protests, make demands, and 
convey disappointment, all in an attempt to motivate compliance. 
Those who are sufficiently self-confident can withstand such face-
to-face coercion, whereas those who are not either back off or 
overreact.  In so doing, they signal a relative frailty, with predictable 
consequences.  A renewal of affective attacks then serves to reduce 
their confidence further.  In the end, people sort themselves out 
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according to their emotional reserves with the tougher going to 
the top and the hypersensitive bottoming out.  To compound the 
trouble of the emotionally fragile, anxious about interpersonal 
confrontations, they hang back when in quest of people or technical 
skills.  Intuitively aware that acquiring these competences might 
expose them to further emotional tests, they fail to apply themselves 
adequately.  Particularly with respect to people skills, they shy away 
from developing the capacities that might discredit their excuses for 
not asserting themselves.  Deliberately, if not intentionally, they fail 
to learn about themselves or others, expecting that they need not 
employ what they do not understand.  This, sad to say, has been one 
of the factors holding back progress among African Americans who 
refuse to study Euro-American customs on the grounds that these are 
irrelevant to their personal experience.
In any event, emotional socialization45 is not evenly distributed. 
Though it is the sine qua non of self-direction, members of upper 
social classes are much more adept at inculcating these disciplines 
than are those in lower orders.  Themselves under control, as parents, 
they both model and enforce affective restraint.  Winners tend to 
beget winners.  Because they are less frustrated than losers, they can 
afford to be more deliberate.  On the assumption that they are in 
good shape, they take their time before reacting.  By the same token, 
higher-status parents are more patient with their children.  When 
the latter lose control, they understand that this can be a temporary 
condition.  Having personally experienced control, they know it 
is possible.  They also know how valuable it is.  They, therefore, 
expend considerable effort to teach self-discipline.  In so doing, they 
explain what is needed, provide opportunities for timeouts, and 
exert moderate, albeit persistent, pressures to maintain composure. 
Even the pastimes they favor support emotional control.  Reading 
novels, listening to classical music, and playing golf all promote self-
restraint.  Take golf; it does not reward the intemperate.  Those who 
throw tantrums on the links find it difficult to stand quietly over 
their ball as they adjust their swings.  By the same token, players who 
learn how not only lower their scores also find it easy to cope with 
change and with difficult people.  Having discerned the secret of 
mastering uncomfortable emotions, they inadvertently discover how 
to manage external uncertainties.  In essence, having discovered how 
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to remain calm under stress, they possess an advantage over those 
who have not.
Those from the lowest quarter of the social spectrum find 
powerful feelings problematic.  Years of enduring failures leave them 
not nearly as optimistic as the more fortunate.  Often frustrated to 
the point of distraction, they fear the worst and chafe at the prospect 
of repeated impotence.  Their tendency is to react immediately and, 
therefore, impulsively.  Primitive emotions rise to the surface and 
spew forth indiscriminately.  An obstreperous child becomes an 
occasion for rage; a bad report card, from a teacher an occasion for 
panic; a disappointed spouse, an indicator of betrayal.  Instead of 
focusing on what their children need to learn, they convert them 
into objects of corporeal punishment.  A parent’s need for emotional 
release supersedes all else, and this is the lesson which is transmitted. 
To compound the difficulty, the child who must endure the back 
of a father’s hand becomes further enraged.  His goal will now 
be to get revenge, whether or not this entails additional violence. 
Ultimately, such training produces an adult who is suspicious of 
almost everyone’s intentions.  No one seems capable of control, and, 
therefore, all must be kept at bay, often with preemptive strikes.  This, 
of course, intensifies the internecine warfare among friends, relatives, 
and coworkers, and with it the anger and fear of those trapped in 
such hostilities.  Powerful emotions are more likely to be expressed in 
primitive forms and, consequently, to reinforce a cycle of defeat.  The 
end product is that losing begets more losing.  It produces offspring 
who are uncomfortable with change, with confusing subtleties, and 
with unfamiliar role partners.  In short, it grooms them to be future 
members of the lower classes.
None of this should be construed as indicating that higher status 
individuals are less emotional than those below them.  Emotions, 
including intense ones, are universal.  The primary hierarchical 
distinction is in how they are expressed.  The emotionally mature 
can be simultaneously passionate and intelligent.  They learn to 
turn down the heat before they act so that when they do, they can 
calculate the best strategies for success.  By directing their feelings 
where they will do the most good, they derive added power from 
them.  Thus they may vent their displeasure at a subordinate, while 
concealing it from a superior, knowing full well where it will have 
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the desired impact.  The immature, in contrast, are liable to explode 
when touched off.  If not, they simmer with impotent rage.  In a 
sense, they embody the sound and fury warned in the play, Macbeth, 
as signifying nothing.  Unguided missiles frequently land in their 
own backyards.  Nowadays, it is conventional to assert that crime, 
including violent crime, is distributed evenly throughout society, but 
the truth is that its ferocity is concentrated at the lower end.  It is 
there that violence is most destructive.
Middle Class Values and Virtues
So far we have discussed the means through which the middle classes 
exercise their dominance.  Emotional controls, interpersonal skills, 
and technical competence all contribute to superior performances. 
They enable people to best others by being more effective in activities 
that matter.  Yet, which goals claim their attention?  What are they 
aiming to achieve?  The means people employ are important, but so 
are the ends to which these are harnessed.  Of special significance are 
the generalized ends called values.  A value is a moral objective.46  It 
is an end state deemed particularly worthy of consummation.  Some 
goals may seem unconditional, but they, in fact, evolve over time. 
The sorts of values that animated theocratic or militaristic societies 
are different from those that permeate commercial ones.  More 
specifically, middle-class values dominate contemporary societies. 
Moral objectives, such as honesty and freedom, having been found 
essential within market-oriented environments, become everyone’s 
standards.  Closely related to these are middle class virtues.  A virtue is 
an internalized disposition to seek particular goals.  In moral terms, a 
virtuous person is inclined to pursue what is good, not because others 
demand it, but because the motivation to do so is deeply ingrained. 
Middle-class virtues include such familiar qualities as responsibility, 
individualism, and tolerance.47
Among the ancient Greeks who gathered beneath the walls 
of Troy to avenge Helen’s abduction, a different set of appraisals 
governed.48  Theirs was largely a pre-commercial society.  Trading 
did occur among the Mycenaeans and Minoans, but it was small 
scale compared with what followed.  Indeed, the distinction between 
a merchant and a pirate was still evolving.  Theirs was a world of 
adventurous souls who took to their small wooden vessels in search 
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of profit or booty.  Often at the mercy of dangerous seas, when they 
came to call on a foreign port, they could not expect commodious 
accommodations.  Since hotels had not yet been invented, these 
people depended upon the hospitality of the natives, and since a 
welcome would be extended only if it were reciprocated, hospitality 
became highly valued.  Those who provided it were respected, 
whereas those who did not were reviled.  Today, with commercial 
establishments available everywhere, this attitude seems quaint. 
Nevertheless, within its own context, it was the height of ethical 
behavior.  Hospitality was a sacred goal, and those who provided it 
were men of virtue.  Correspondingly, those who accepted it were 
bound not to abuse this goodwill by kidnapping their host’s wife.
Cheek by jowl with this protocommercial outlook subsisted 
a military tradition that prided itself on courage.  The hero was a 
man who exhibited unusual physical bravery.   He charged, unafraid, 
into battle and cut a swath of destruction in his path.  During the 
epoch preceding the development of the Greek phalanx, individual 
valor counted most.  Muscle power and skill with weaponry won 
the day and hence, were admired.  To back down from a challenge 
was considered cowardly and would ruin a warrior’s reputation.  The 
quality valued above all others was honor.  A man, to be a man, 
had to be honorable.  Much as a Star Trek Klingon would rather 
be dead than display weakness in battle, so might ancient Greeks. 
They would rather perish than live as dishonored nobodies.  This 
attitude survived up to the first days of the American experiment. 
Alexander Hamilton49 preferred to face death in a duel than refuse 
to accept Aaron Burr’s challenge.  The middle-class dominance of 
the contemporary frame of mind is no better demonstrated than by 
the puzzlement nowadays registered at this decision.  Contemporary 
Americans cannot understand why honor would demand such a 
course of action.  Because their values do not contain a similar code 
of conduct, they find it incomprehensible.
The values to which people subscribe are tested in the crucible 
of their experiences.  Although social goals change over time, their 
origins can be ascertained and their ramifications charted.  We are, 
in point of fact, in the midst of a period of turmoil regarding social 
standards.  Over the preceding decades, there has been much talk 
of culture wars.  Conservatives have been pitted against liberals in 
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symbolically sanguine battles over what is best.  Each side describes 
itself as defending truth and decency and condemns the other for 
fomenting what is opposed.  So pregnant is this with social-class 
implications that the nature of this struggle deserves close attention. 
As we shall see, much of this controversy can be interpreted as a 
consequence of cultural lag, which merits a full analysis.  In the 
meantime, the core values and virtues of the commercial middle 
classes can be examined.  Most of these are familiar, but their 
repercussions may be less so.
One might assume that wealth would hold the place of honor 
within a commercial society, yet paradoxically it does not.  People do 
aim to get rich, and they admire those who excel in this quest, but 
this admiration is grudging, with exceptional wealth often equated 
with greed.  Acquisitiveness per se is not deemed a moral quality.  It is, 
if anything, associated with the upper classes, especially the nouveau 
riche.  Thus, it is considered gauche and frequently disguised with a 
patina of middle class respectability.  One buys a Bentley, not a Rolls 
Royce, because one intends to be appropriately modest.  The truly 
wealthy are even expected to give away a substantial portion of their 
assets.  Unless they are avid philanthropists, they are dismissed as 
social parasites.
A more solidly middle-class virtue is responsibility.  If Alan 
Wolfe50 is to be believed, most Americans hold this attribute to be 
almost sacred.  In his national survey of values, he found almost total 
agreement that this quality is highly valued.  Why it should be is not 
a mystery in a society in which most people aspire to make important 
decisions.  They understand that being entrusted with this assignment 
is contingent upon making first-rate choices.  They also realize that 
responsible people are committed to such choices.  Prepared to accept 
the blame when things go wrong, they stick by the efforts they put 
into deciding them well.  If a decentralized system is to work, that is, 
if leadership is to be widely dispersed, a professionalized dedication to 
accountability is essential.  Were decision makers casually to slough 
this duty off onto others or automatically to shift the blame in times 
of trouble, the community would be plagued by incompetence. 
Those who seemed to be leaders would melt into the scenery, and the 
nation would be without direction.
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Going hand in hand with responsibility is a dedication to merit. 
In a market-oriented society, individuals compete for preeminence. 
On the most basic level, they vie to see who can produce the most 
desirable products.  Some goods are reckoned to be better than others, 
and some producers are superior to others; otherwise such struggles 
would make no sense.  The winners meet the higher standards.  To be 
sure, critics of capitalism complain that this is a fraud.  They contend 
that merchants seek to defraud their customers and, therefore, their 
alleged merit is a sham.  Obviously, this is sometimes true.  But were 
it the norm, the technical improvements that so clearly tower over 
the current landscape would never have emerged.  Max Weber’s51 
analysis comes close to the truth.  Rationality, which he considered 
the central characteristic of modernity, is essentially a means of 
pursuing merit.  It utilizes careful calculations in an attempt to 
achieve designated aims efficiently.  Part of this process is obviously 
a commitment to science.  Its deliberate efforts to unravel nature’s 
secrets are integral to the enterprise.  The point of science is to 
focus empiricism, accumulated knowledge, and a careful logic on 
determining what is best.  As with merit, were it not assumed that 
there is a best (or at least a better), it would make no sense to rank 
the competent over the less able.  Nor would it make sense to value 
responsibility if its outputs were indistinguishable from those of the 
bungling.
In the United States, the pursuit of merit has intimate ties to 
pragmatism.  For centuries its citizens have taken pride in a practical 
know-how.  Across the land, a tinkerer mentality hatched battalions of 
home-schooled inventors.  Utilizing what they would have described 
as common sense, they sought what worked, not what academics 
considered valid.  Before William James or John Dewey52 lent their 
prestige to this philosophy, Thomas Edison, more proud of his 
perspiration than his inspiration, tested hundreds of materials to find 
a suitable filament for an electric light.  Contemporaneously, John 
Roebling set his sights on straddling New York City’s East River.  His 
Brooklyn Bridge became the world’s longest suspension span because 
he and his son Washington dared to adjust their methods as they went 
along.  Experience also mattered to the Wright brothers.  They could 
never have flown at Kitty Hawk had they not previously built a wind 
tunnel to explore the best wing shape.  Even American politicians 
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have joined the bandwagon.  John Kennedy was celebrated for his 
pragmatic approach to dealing with such problems as the race issue.
All of this has lent an ambivalence to American attitudes toward 
education.  More highly prized than ever, education still leaves most 
Americans uncertain about intellectualism.  The benefits of suitable 
credentials are obvious to all, but individuals too dedicated to 
scholarship are dismissed as nerds.  Ordinary people are suspicious 
of a lack of practicality and apparent narrow interests.  Nonetheless, 
middle-class parents encourage their children to become accomplished 
learners.  Parents want their children to be intellectually nimble 
enough to grasp what is needed to in order to move ahead.  Emotional 
maturity, providing clear heads, accompanies an orientation toward 
reading and inquisitiveness.
Another virtue linked to responsibility and merit is individualism. 
Middle class Americans like to think of themselves as sturdy loners. 
As with the cowboys to whom Henry Kissinger compared them, they 
perceive themselves as self-reliant non-conformists.  Out riding the 
range on their own, they make unaided decisions for which they 
are happy to take the credit or blame.  This, say Robert Bellah53 
and his associates, has characterized them since frontier days.  When 
the continent was an expanse of under-populated forest and plain 
and one’s next-door neighbor could be miles away, one had to 
fend for oneself.  Carried into a corporate context, this orientation 
continues to allow for innovation and idiosyncrasy.  Novelty persists 
in the marketplace because many individuals remain unafraid to be 
different.  Asked why they go their own way, most refer to a legacy 
of freedom.  Freedom is probably the master American value.  It was 
written into the nation’s founding documents and lingers on the lips 
of children at play.  Jealously guarded by volunteer armies over the 
centuries, the liberty to say what one thinks, to pray as one desires, 
and to vote as one pleases is taken for granted.  The country has never 
had internal passports or I.D. cards, enforced occupations, or noble 
privilege.  What this adds up to is social mobility.  People have an 
opportunity to select their own pathways, including those that result 
in increased chances for success.  Equality, on the other hand, is less 
valued.  Class warfare may have been imported from Europe, but it 
never got too far.  Americans like the prospect of standing out from 
the crowd.  As long as the game is not rigged in favor of particular 
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players, they are prepared to live with the outcome.  The equality 
they endorse is Jeffersonian.  It sanctions an equality of rights, not 
of conclusions.  Jefferson54 himself supported an aristocracy of merit 
and was not contradicted by his fellow citizens.  If anything, most of 
them decry class jealousies as petty.
This, however, does not mean that the middle classes approve of 
oppression.  They wish to protect the underdog.  To do less would be to 
become a bully.  Still, theirs is not a dedication based on equivalence; 
rather it is grounded on tolerance.  As Wolfe indicates, they believe 
in a live-and-let-live attitude almost as much as in responsibility.  If 
people wish to be different, as long as this does not interfere with the 
rights of their neighbors, they do not mind.  Originally associated with 
religious forbearance, as in George Washington’s55 recommendation 
that each be allowed to pray under his own fig tree, the attitude has 
expanded to include ethnic differences in the wake of massive foreign 
immigration.  It has also come to encompass racial variation.  The 
Civil Rights Movement may not have brought complete integration, 
but it did lift a yoke of de jure segregation from the necks of African-
Americans.  They are now believed to have a right to social mobility. 
If they choose not to associate with European-Americans, this is 
considered their choice.
Not long ago, most Americans left the doors of their homes 
unlocked.56  They assumed that their neighbors were trustworthy.  In 
this, they were usually justified.  Even today when surveys indicate 
that dishonesty is expected of politicians, most people presume 
something better from of their personal acquaintances.  As important, 
they generally offer something better themselves.  Fukuyama’s counsel 
that trust is essential to civic cohesion is heeded in action, if not 
belief.  Most people still attempt to be respectable.  They may bend 
the truth when advertising a new product or occasionally cheat on a 
college term paper, but they usually keep their promises.  Strangers 
still approach one another to ask directions and are rarely led astray. 
Similarly, members of the opposite sex go on unescorted dates, with 
few terminating in rape.  Drivers sometimes drive too fast, but the 
overwhelming majority stops for traffic lights.  Despite Cassandras, 
the sky has not fallen.  People still step outside without fear of being 
mugged and do business without fear of being cheated.  Riots do not 
break out when the electric grid fails or when a hurricane devastates 
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the coast. Trust and integrity have not disappeared; they have merely 
undergone a cultural assault.
The middle classes have also maintained a tenacious hold on 
family values.  Divorce might have escalated passes levels once thought 
imaginable, but romance and personal loyalty are still respected. 
People want to fall in love and stay in love.  They want to have children 
with faithful spouses and to raise their youngsters to be responsible 
adults.  Irrespective of media clucking about multicultural families, 
old traditions have been remarkably resilient.  The heterosexual 
nuclear family is still the norm and promises to remain so.  Even if, 
with tolerance, variations are allowed, the old standbys are privately 
encouraged.  Those who are able to remain faithful are prized for 
their examples.  When some succumb to something less, this is seen 
as failure.  It is not the paradigm but an uncomfortable reality.  Only 
the determinedly postmodern would demur.
In recounting its ideal type, Weber57 described bureaucracy 
as overcoming the limitations of earlier forms of organization.  Its 
motto was, he declared, sine ira et studio.  Usually translated into 
English as “without fear or favor,” the expression declares that a 
rational system would not sanction coercion or favoritism.  To 
be more precise, it would not enforce coordinated action via the 
terror of military regimes nor the partiality of family based ones. 
Competent personnel needed to be enlisted and motivated by the 
reasonableness of working efficiently together for the benefit of all. 
Because this coordination would be to their advantage, it would 
suppress centrifugal tendencies.  In the end, expertise would rise to 
fill the positions that only expertise could manage.  Unlike previous 
systems, terror or genetic ties would not distort assessments of who 
was best.  Such alliances that developed would be based on calculated 
gain, not the accidents of birth or physical aggression.
Adam Bellow58 has recently suggested that this is wrong.  The 
son of the novelist Saul Bellow, he argues that nepotism has always 
contributed to social welfare that, in point of fact, favoring one’s 
family need not entail favoring the incompetent.  Yet, he makes 
a distinction between new and old nepotism.  In the prejudicial 
variety, relatives are hired irrespective of their abilities, whereas in 
the new version one’s children are groomed for success because they 
are one’s children.  Without a doubt, the offspring of the successful 
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have an unearned advantage over the progeny of the unsuccessful. 
Their status does tend to be inherited.  Nevertheless, whereas status 
was once directly bestowed in terms of a job, property, or wealth, it is 
now bequeathed through social training.  Higher-status children get 
a better education for the demands of the marketplace than do their 
more deprived peers.  They are, therefore, better prepared to prevail 
in the tests that await them.  This is not so much a consequence 
of going to better schools as of having ingested superior habits and 
values.  They are more likely to acquire the assets of a good education, 
self-discipline, and personal responsibility.  Thereby prepared by 
precept and example to be competent learners and leaders, they 
perceive themselves as their own loci of control.  The opposite of 
fatalists, they eventually assert themselves to good effect.  Justifiably 
more confidant than their competitors, they take risks that pay off. 
The practice of parents preparing their children for independent 
success should, in fairness, be distinguished from nepotism.  This 
propensity is, as Bellow acknowledges, a biological legacy.  Not only 
is it natural, it is essential to a social-class system.  Stable social strata 
could not exist were social mobility chaotic.  The fact that the odds 
are stacked in favor of the offspring of the middle classes prevents 
anarchy.  It encourages the perpetuation of the qualities necessary 
for social survival.  Instead of merit emerging willy-nilly, it surfaces 
within a social network prepared to shepherd it to where it is needed. 
Few would argue that society suffers when Bobby Bonds or Ken 
Griffey, Jr., profit from having a father who was a talented baseball 
player.  The example and sponsorship that came from within their 
families helped their careers, but they would have meant nothing if 
these players had not been able to stand on their own feet.  Then, 
again, keeping operational control within the family has probably 
hurt the New York Times.  Pinch Sulzberger turned out to be much 
more ideological than his father Punch.  Under his stewardship, what 
was once the nation’s newspaper of record has arguably become a 
partisan broadsheet.  Insulated from competing opinions, he has 
been able to dilute the quality of a once proud journal.
The campaign against nepotism is in many ways a movement in 
favor of weak as opposed to strong social ties.  Family relationships 
do not preclude effective alliances, but if these were exclusive, they 
might rule out others.  In a commercial society, so much talent is 
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required that it must come from diverse sources.  The point of a 
social class, such as the middle class, is that it has many members and 
room for many more.  Most of these do not know each other; they are 
certainly not family.  Nevertheless, they may be associates.  They are 
affiliated in networks of acquaintances.  Because these linkages are far 
more ramified than family ties, they provide a broader venue from 
which to draw talent.  When contemporary members of the middle 
class declare that the job should go to the best qualified, not to the 
best connected, they are asking for more open competition, not an 
absolute one.  They recognize that not everyone can be considered 
for every position; hence they accede to some narrowing of the pool 
so long as merit is a significant factor in hiring.  In discouraging 
nepotism, they in essence promote weak ties, not because these 
always provide superior candidates, but because the strong might 
otherwise swamp the weak.  Norms of fairness are just that.  If they 
are stacked against favoritism, it is because favoritism can take care 
of itself.  A modern economy must, in essence, protect against a bias 
toward family preferences.
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Chapter 4
Origins
To be ignorant of what occurred before you were born is to 
remain always a child.  For what is the worth of human 
life, unless it is woven into the life of our ancestors by the 
records of history?  (Cicero, Orations)
They [the Greeks] were the first Westerners; the spirit of the 
West; the modern spirit, is a Greek discovery and the place 
of the Greeks is in the modern world.  (Edith Hamilton, 
The Greek Way)
I know of no safe depository of the ultimate powers of the 
society but the people themselves; and if we think them 
not enlightened enough to exercise their control with a 
wholesome discretion, the remedy is not to take it from 
them, but to inform their discretion.  (Thomas Jefferson, 
“Letter to William Charles Jarvis”)
Waves of Change
The expression that one cannot see the forest for the trees has 
become a commonplace because distinguishing the whole from the 
part is difficult to do.  Distracted by what is immediately before 
them, people often miss the context in favor of the particular.  This 
is especially so with respect to historic trends.1  Grounded in the 
present, people are apt to regard the past as irrelevant.  That our 
ancestors lived differently from how we do seems impossible.  That 
these differences might have been a prelude to what now appear to be 
eternal verities sounds ridiculous.  Nevertheless, that which is could 
not have been without that which went before.  This is as true of 
middle-class dominance as anything else.  It could not have come to 
fruition had not earlier achievements preceded it.  The consequences 
of these steppingstones cannot, however, be perceived if they are 
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not viewed in perspective.  A long-term outlook, literally over many 
millennia, is necessary to appreciate what has happened and why. 
As significant, such a view is crucial if we are to see where we are 
going.
The current status of the middle classes did not arrive fully formed 
resembling, as it were, some conventional Venus on a clamshell.  Their 
prominence has been part of an incoming commercial tide, but this tide 
was itself comprised of a series of waves.  Advances have occurred and 
been challenged and consolidated, then swept away in an undertow 
of reaction.  These periodic reversals of fortune have been temporary 
but compelling.  Still, time and again, however deep the trough, the 
ineluctable power of the marketplace has reasserted itself and in so 
doing reinforced the power of the middling orders.  The very utility 
of social class mobility and decentralized decision making eventually 
contributed to a commercial eminence.  As a result, the value of 
their services thrust self-directed doers into leadership positions, and 
in the process, transformed the foundations of social power.  Where 
family and military alliances, then religious associations, were in 
their turn supreme, relatively impersonal economic forces ultimately 
moved to the fore.  Hierarchy has remained crucial throughout, but 
its outlines metamorphosed beyond what would once have been 
considered possible.
By the same token, the skills and attitudes underlying the Middle 
Class Revolution have evolved more slowly and inexorably than many 
social critics care to contemplate.  Political reformers, in particular, 
tend to be oriented toward ideas.  They develop a mental conception 
of what society should be and then assume that if they can convince 
others to adopt it, their ideal will swiftly emerge.  Nineteenth-century 
anarchists, to cite one instance, truly believed that murdering heads 
of state would bring about total, government-free, equality.  These 
deeds, as they called them, would be all the impetus needed to 
restructure society.  Yet actual social circumstances proved otherwise. 
Real life entails relationships too complex to be fully fathomed and 
too unyielding to command instant compliance.  Indeed, much of 
what happens can only be comprehended in retrospect.  Even then, 
the human mind is too blunt an instrument to assimilate all of its 
contradictory elements.
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Especially confusing are conflicts over supremacy.  Human tests 
of strength are, of course, ubiquitous, as are the shifting alliances 
of the combatants.  Despite episodes of apparent stability, rebellion 
and strife always lurk just below the surface.  These insurgencies 
are, in fact, the stuff of history.  So multifaceted are their political 
crosscurrents that historians continuously reevaluate their details 
to ascertain what really happened.  Nevertheless, because most of 
these skirmishes are shrouded in a haze of obfuscation, the truth is 
elusive.  The players lie to themselves and to others as an integral part 
of their stratagems for success.  Even the scholars who assess these 
matters are enmeshed in webs of lies.  Because they too are human, 
they cannot be completely disinterested observers.  Biased by their 
own political, personal, and moral commitments, they frequently 
misperceive what they see.  History is then reinterpreted because the 
inconsistent preconceptions of its chroniclers impel them to uncover 
additional evidence to bolster their favored explanations.  Since no 
one is free of these limitations, what is momentarily asserted must, in 
consequence, be taken as tentative, including what follows.
Social progress, if that is the appropriate term, generally comes 
by way of unconscious experiments.2  Individuals try out new ideas, 
not in the controlled manner of laboratory trials, but helter-skelter 
as the mood and opportunities take them.  It is not that they do not 
think things through so much as that their narrow viewpoints prevent 
them from perceiving the shape of things to come.  What occurs is, 
therefore, a naturalistic separation of the wheat from the chaff.  Some 
things work, and others do not.  Some developments fill in the gaps 
left by previous experiments, while others float like orphans until 
time passes them by.  The innovators, some of whom are not even 
aware that they are innovating, rarely do this from altruism.  More 
usual, they perceive a problem within their own lifespace, and they 
attempt to correct it.  The results are frequently beneficial, that is, 
with respect to those innovations that are perpetuated, but this is 
not the motivating force.  A cultural survival of the fittest ultimately 
crafts a structure made of many incremental advances, which only in 
retrospect appear intentional.
During their own eras, players may overextend their victories, 
engage in irrational oppositionalism, and pursue collective fantasies. 
They habitually imagine that they understand what they are doing, 
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even as they are hopelessly out of touch with reality.  W.I. Thomas3 
cautioned that what people perceive to be real can be real in its 
consequences.  Even the most outrageous visions, if they are believed, 
influence what individuals do.  Nonetheless, identifiable mechanisms 
do seem to underlie what is at work.  The nature of human hierarchies, 
the facts of the physical and biological environment, and the laws of 
economic transactions are a given.  They are the substantial sculptors 
of events, whether or not this influence is recognized.  The question 
is how do these work in practice.  The potential permutations are 
so vast that no supercomputer is capable of working them through; 
hence the best that can be done is to achieve a rough impression 
through a rearview mirror.
Another word of caution is in order.  The account presented 
below is largely drawn from a Western perspective.4  The same sorts 
of pressures that influenced European developments also affected the 
Middle East,5 India,6 and China7 but with disparate implications. 
Similar patterns can be discerned across their spectra, but diverse 
conditions produced diverse outcomes.  In China, for instance, the 
Tang and Sung dynasties fashioned something comparable to the 
West’s Industrial Revolution.  Nevertheless, this did not terminate 
with the ascendancy of commercial interests.  The power of a 
centralized agricultural state could apparently countermand the 
aspirations of uppity merchants however great their temporary 
successes.  The European experience and its subsequent American 
extension do not indicate what was inevitable but what was possible. 
All the same, they are germane to the Middle Class Revolution 
because this upheaval was an outcome of what happened there.  Like 
it or not, the supremacy of the West is fundamental to the triumph 
of the contemporary professional class.  Northern Europe and the 
United States were not merely where this journey began but also 
where it reached its apex.  It was here, especially in the United States, 
that the middle classes took a lead they have thus far refused to 
relinquish.
The Monetary Nexus
Money matters.8  This has been said many times before, but it 
remains true.  Cash may be crass, but it has been a potent force since 
its inception.  In the West, the starting point was approximately 650 
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B.C.9  Coinage was invented in Asia Minor and quickly spread to 
the Mediterranean littoral zone.10  Croesus may have been renowned 
for his wealth, but it was the Greeks who were first infected by the 
displacements inherent in a rampant commercialism.  Inhabitants 
of a rocky and agriculturally stingy terrain, they abutted a great sea 
that beckoned as a highway for traders.  Blessed with good harbors, 
they could sail their cargo-laden vessels from the far reaches of 
the Black Sea to beyond the Pillars of Hercules.  Very quickly, it 
became apparent that reliably weighted pieces of gold, silver, and 
electrum could make these ventures more flexible and, therefore, 
more profitable.  Citystates quickly began to flourish because urban 
areas were the natural abodes of commerce.  Their concentrated 
populations facilitated business by allowing merchants to engage in 
the face-to-face exchanges then necessary to close deals.  Thus was 
born the agora that became the heart of the Greek civilization.11
Nourished by this upsurge in traffic were the previously tiny 
outposts of Athens, Corinth, and the Ionian Islands.  In retrospect, 
Athens has become emblematic of this transformation.  As business 
increased, the town’s human density soared, and the nature of 
its economy was made over.12  Subsistence farming declined in 
importance to be replaced by commercial olive farming, silver 
mining, pottery making, and shipping.  Merchants flocked to cities 
in search of riches and excitement.  The settlements changed their 
complexions, becoming far more cosmopolitan.  Not only did 
strange Greeks come to call, but so did visitors from other nations. 
Moreover, the Athenians themselves ventured forth.  Their worldview 
grew immensely larger as they sought potential markets.  Forced to 
explore unfamiliar shores, they were also compelled to interact with 
unfamiliar cultures.
Commerce is frequently depicted as philistine, that is, as 
insensitive and money-grubbing.  Its practitioners are considered 
uncultured boors, who, in their materialism, overlook the finer 
things of life.  The irony is that it is commerce that made cultural 
advances possible.  Traders must, of necessity, cease being provincial.13 
Because they deal with strangers, they need to accommodate them. 
They cannot afford to be shocked when they encounter alien 
languages or exotic religions.  Were they to reject what is different 
out of hand, they would also close the door to profits.  They must, 
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instead, tolerate perplexing differences.  More than this, they need to 
understand them.  Merchants tend to be most successful when they 
are familiar with their customers.  If they recognize their sensitivities 
and perceive their needs, they can furnish what is desired without 
offending their sensibilities.
Nevertheless, the human mind is uncomfortable with 
contradictions.  As Leon Festinger14 has pointed out, people dislike 
cognitive dissonance and attempt to resolve it.  This is what happened 
as commerce burgeoned.  What was strange provoked attempts to 
come to terms with it.  People were forced to think about things 
previously taken for granted.  What was the nature of the gods? 
Which was the most satisfactory way to live?  Most basic of all, Why 
was the world the way it was?  All this provoked introspection and 
a questioning of conventional wisdom.  The marketplace became 
alive with conversations regarding these pressing issues.  Socrates15 
was but one of many who indulged in this enterprise.  The simple 
answers, such as the idea that the gods were the same albeit with 
different names in different places, were soon found wanting.  In 
due course, this ferment produced a sophistication that even now 
inspires admiration.  The classical culture studied in contemporary 
universities was taking shape, not as a means of confusing future 
generations, but of satisfying its own.
In the arts, in philosophy, and in the sciences16 a recognizable 
modernity emerged.  The plays that entertained the ancient Greeks 
continue to entertain us.  Aeschylus, Euripides, Sophocles, and 
Aristophanes touch our hearts just as they did those of their times. 
Because the characters these plays portray are recognizably human 
and their dilemmas timeless, they remain instructive.  Having 
engaged in an honest examination of the human condition for 
audiences also interested in this subject, playwrights were able to 
analyze predicaments in a way that is useful for another community 
also absorbed in developing interpersonal skills.  Greek philosophers 
were likewise studying what made humans unique.  Best known 
today are Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle,17 but they were preceded 
by the Sophists,18 who also were philosophers.  These itinerant 
scholars were much in demand as tutors.  Well versed in a myriad 
of subjects, including rhetoric, they are remembered for preaching 
that man is the measure of all things.  In other words, their attention 
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had transferred from the divine to the mundane.  Emboldened by 
the worldly achievements that made their profession possible, they 
conceived of themselves not only as understanding their environment 
but as modifying its shape.  Less dependent on religion and more on 
their own efforts, they reflected a middle class hubris.
The contemporaneous scientists, including physicians and 
astronomers, correspondingly assumed they could encompass all of 
creation.  Archimedes even speculated about his ability to move the 
earth if given a lever long enough and a place to stand.  Theories 
abounded about the elements composing matter and the structure 
of the celestial spheres.  Aristotle, well known for having proclaimed 
that men are rational animals, was a compulsive systematizer. 
Everything needed to be labeled and assigned its place by a scholar 
shrewd enough to comprehend them.  Earth, air, fire, and water, and 
in some circles, atoms, could be reconfigured to produce all things 
in heaven and on earth.  Crude observations also taught that objects 
moved in straight lines and went up and down in search of their 
proper places in the firmament.  Hippocrates19 took science a step 
further and applied it to the human body.  He taught that people 
became diseased when critical elements were out of balance.  As long 
as blood, phlegm, yellow bile, and black bile were in equilibrium all 
would be well.  When they were not, treatments such as bloodletting 
were required.
Also, historians came to prominence.  Herodotus20 and 
Thucydides21 are read to this day for their accounts of the Amazons 
and the Peloponnesian wars.  Their interest in these events was no 
doubt sparked by the upsurge in political activity in which they 
partook.  One of the reasons the Greek experience has remained 
relevant is that it is acknowledged as the source of Western 
democracy.22  Athens, in particular, is recognized as a font of this 
ideal.  But this form of government did not come to prominence 
until the Commercial Revolution upset preexisting arrangements. 
One of the first changes is attributed to Solon, who in 594 B.C. 
(after the introduction of coinage), freed the serfs.  Almost a century 
later in 506 B.C., Cleisthenes23 established the city’s first democracy. 
During the preceding period, the economy had expanded so rapidly 
that ordinary artisans achieved prosperity.  It was their unhappiness 
at living under a tyranny that contributed to a successful political 
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revolt.  This was then ratified by extending the franchise.  The power 
a former rabble possessed simply became too great to ignore, even by 
the aristocratic class. 
In modern terms, an elite still ran Athens.24  Neither women 
nor slaves nor foreigners could vote, but the political class had 
enormously increased.  Because the city was small compared with 
today’s metropolises, it was possible for the citizens to gather together 
in a single place to decide significant issues.  They could also be 
assembled in huge juries of many hundreds to determine the fate of 
individuals under arrest such as Socrates.25  The broad consent this 
allowed permitted them to support Pericles’26 policies.  His building 
program during the height of Athenian power turned temporal 
success into stone monuments.  The elegance of the city’s Acropolis 
and Parthenon are attributable to these communal decisions.   So, too, 
is the humanism of their sculptures.  Previous to the works of such 
artists as Phidias, who was commissioned to create a representation 
of Athena, statues had a stiffly artificial mien.  After the democratic 
reforms, people were portrayed as people, and gods were, too.  They 
might be idealized, but they were unmistakable likeness of individuals 
who were proud of themselves and their accomplishments.
As important was the effect that commercial prosperity and 
democracy had on warfare.  The initial defeat of the Persians at 
Marathon was owed to the valor of the Athenian phalanx.  Ordinary 
Athenians, that is, their version of the middle classes, trained to fight 
in concert in armored ranks of spearmen.  The effectiveness of this 
tactic depended upon physically conditioned combatants who were 
sufficiently disciplined to hold their place in line.  This was insured, 
first, by citizens who voluntarily participated in gymnastics to keep 
fit and, second, by their motivation to cooperate.  Were they less 
committed or less able to exercise personal control, their lines would 
have wavered, and they would have been put to flight.  As it was, 
they were able to destroy the cohesion of a larger enemy’s coercively 
recruited troops.  
Victor Davis Hanson27 provides an even better example of this 
democratic solidarity in his discussion of the evolution of Western 
military power.  The battle of Salamis, which decisively crushed 
Persian sea power in its second, more extensive excursion to conquer 
Greece, was impressive.  Before this decisive encounter, opinions had 
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been divided.  Some Athenians wanted to fight the invaders in the 
city, while others wanted to withdraw to the safety of the Corinthian 
isthmus.   Themistocles wanted to gamble all on a naval ambush.  As 
the military commander of this enterprise, he was able to convince 
his fellow citizens that trapping a numerically superior fleet within 
the confines of a narrow channel would throw the odds in their favor. 
Upon agreeing to this plan, the men abandoned the city and took 
to their boats.  Despite their earlier disputes, the fact that they had 
en masse participated in determining the strategy stimulated them 
to heroic exertions.  Citizens who felt that they controlled their own 
destinies were able to inflict one of the most fateful defeats on record. 
At the close of the day, tens of thousands of Persians had drowned 
off their coast, and Athenians had affirmed that they were their own 
masters.
In sum, a commercial people had asserted its individualism 
and worth.  Having been trained in making decisions as merchants 
and artisans, these people acquired the skills to make cooperative 
determinations and to carry them out with vigor.  Not so much 
bound by family or religious ties as by an awareness that their 
liberties and achievements depended upon voluntary collaboration, 
they had triumphed.  Able to think independently and to value this 
accomplishment, they were able to overcome daunting odds.  In this, 
they set the stage for what was to come.
What came immediately thereafter were the Romans.  The Greeks 
had learned to harness their individualism in the arts, the sciences, 
and the battlefield but not in the disputes among rival city states. 
Notoriously fractious, as revealed in the fragile inter-communal 
alliances of the Peloponnesian Wars, a pride in their own polities 
prevented them from joining with their neighbors.  In essence, 
their middle-class mentality had narrow boundaries.  They might 
tolerate foreigners, but they were not about to meld into a single 
extended community.  Nor could they do so and maintain their 
democratic institutions.  Since common consent depended upon 
gathering together at a defined location, this would be impossible 
when multiple locations were involved.  In the end, the Hellenes 
were overthrown by a mini-nation state, Macedonia.  Subsequently, 
a mighty empire, Rome, would swallow both.
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Rome too began as a city-state.28  Indeed, its initial source of 
prosperity was agriculture, and an aristocracy dominated its youthful 
political structure.  Yet, in the early stages to becoming a continental 
superpower, it was fortunate to absorb lessons from the more 
commercial Greeks and Etruscans.   Afterwards, it was to surpass 
them both in its genius for the eclectic.  Assembling bits and pieces 
of what was available, it created a composite civilization that lasted 
several hundred years.  The first Romans lived under a king, but 
these rugged farmers did not begin to prosper until they emulated 
their enemies by collaborating in well-disciplined legions.  These 
citizen soldiers, much to their own surprise, were able to throw off 
the suzerainty of the Gauls, the Greeks, and the Etruscans.  Under 
a republican constitution, they collectively defended, then enlarged, 
what they perceived to be their own nation.  Like the Athenians 
before them, they also moved to a more commercial economy by 
taking advantage of their Mediterranean location to dominate its 
marine trade.  Initially out-competed by the Carthaginians, after 
trouncing them in the Punic Wars, they became the undisputed 
masters of an essentially maritime empire.
One of the peculiarities of this domain, at least from a 
modern perspective, was its reliance on slave labor.29  A side 
effect of commercialization was an increased demand for material 
products and, in a society based on muscle power, the necessary 
industrialization depended on human beasts of burden.  In their 
marches and counter-marches across Europe, North Africa, and the 
Middle East, the Roman armies converted many of their humbled 
foes into bondsmen.30  The Roman attitude was that those who 
were defeated in battle essentially forfeited their lives.  Slavery was, 
in Roman minds, more humane than summary executions.  These 
captives could then be put to any sort of employment their owners 
found profitable.  The movies have taught us that many became 
household servants and gladiators, but they also worked in the mines, 
as longshoremen, in the brothels, and in industries such as the linen 
trade.  Bondsmen were even a primary source of tutors for the rich 
and scriveners for the government bureaucracy.
Status was quite important among the Romans.31  Slaves were on 
the bottom of the heap, whereas the aristocracy remained on top.  On 
the one hand, becoming entrepreneurs, in imitation of the Greeks, 
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these patricians augmented their wealth by dominating business. 
On the other, they politically dominated first the Republic, then the 
Empire.  Able to buy elections, only they could serve in the Senate 
or hope to rise as high as a consulship.  Nevertheless, there were local 
elections that were open to participation by other citizens.  More 
than this, citizenship was extended to conquered peoples as they were 
assimilated.  In acquiring the common language of Latin, they could 
interact with the centers of power, albeit as provincials.  This allowed 
for wide public involvement, notwithstanding at unequal levels. 
One of the tensions that plagued the system was the ambition of the 
lowly to rise.  Freedmen, in particular, were considered troublesome. 
These former slaves, once liberated, could take advantage of the 
marketplace to make money and afterward aspire above their station. 
Much of the literature of Rome is concerned with keeping these 
parvenus in their place.
Concomitant with this was the development of Roman law.  The 
courts and lawsuits flourished in an environment where commercial 
regulation became more specific.  The Greeks too had rules for doing 
business, but these guidelines became both more institutionalized 
and more rationalized under the Romans.  In hindsight, the Romans 
seem more practical and the Greeks more creative.  The former were, 
in fact, pragmatic systematizers, more technologically sophisticated 
than artistic.  They, too, had their authors, philosophers, and 
scientists, but these were largely derivative.  Terrence, Ovid, and 
Horace were talented, but less universally focused or applicable 
than their predecessors.  Virgil’s Aeneid likewise, some might say, 
is a pale reflection of the Iliad.  The same applies to historians such 
as Livy, Tacitus, and Plutarch,32 and to philosophical movements, 
as exemplified by Marcus Aurelius’s Stoicism.  The Romans were 
builders rather than visionaries.  They constructed roads to facilitate 
the movement of their troops, but these also facilitated trade.  They 
erected aqueducts to bring water to their cities, which enabled 
them to grow larger.  They invented concrete to aid in all sorts of 
construction, which permitted them to construct domes as impressive 
as the Pantheon’s.
Yet the greatest Roman achievement was maintaining political 
dominance for so long.  This was contingent on a variety of social 
adhesives.  Some of these were family oriented, as with the continuing 
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influence of the aristocratic clans, but others depended on military 
fraternity.  Once the state grew too large for quasidemocratic 
institutions, the Empire reverted to legionary authority.  Augustus,33 
the first Emperor, was the adopted son of Julius Caesar, but he won 
his own ascendancy on the battlefield.  Styled both a Caesar in honor 
of his family connections and an Emperor in recognition of his 
military leadership, he was able to bequeath his position to less able 
descendants largely through skillful political manipulations.  But 
this did not last.  Once the Praetorian Guard discovered the power 
of assassination, the generals realized they could seize the throne 
through force of arms.  With no established middle class to resist and 
a tamed aristocracy willing to play this power game, there seemed no 
alternative.  Bribery and cronyism became the order of the day, with 
pitched battles among rival claimants often deciding the matter.  In 
time, the commander best loved by his troops or more accomplished 
on the battlefield came to the forefront.  Observers might bewail the 
chaos, but they could not dispel it.
One of these contestants, Constantine,34 found another avenue 
to success.  Almost accidentally, he alighted upon religion as a 
source of anonymous allies.  He discovered that his soldiers were 
better disciplined as Christians than as pagans.  For some time, the 
old Gods had gradually been losing their legitimacy as contending 
faiths from the periphery sought to invade Rome.  Cults of Isis and 
the Gnostics and followers of Jesus all claimed to be best.  What 
the Christians had going for them was their monotheism and 
their promises of redemption.  A single god could be a universal 
god and a redemptive divinity could offer peace in an empire riven 
by dissension.  Constantine’s innovation was in harnessing this 
hopefulness to the interests of the state.  Believers in a single religion, 
convinced of its efficacy, could work in harmony against skeptical 
heretics.  Determined to solidify these nonpersonal alliances for his 
own purposes, he convened the Counsel of Nicaea to endorse a shared 
orthodoxy.  Out of this came the doctrine of the trinity, and shortly 
to follow was a standardized Bible.  Together these constituted the 
foundations of a Church that was to outlast the Empire.
Unfortunately for the Romans, their nation was afflicted 
with terminal arteriosclerosis.  Its successful militarism had been 
underwritten by circumstances that were eroded by this very success. 
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Conquests that became too large to be managed by the existing 
administrative instruments became burdens.  Distant borders had 
to be guarded by legionnaires who needed to be paid for their 
services as more patriotic motives evaporated.  But now by abutting 
deserts, impenetrable forests, and competing empires, opportunities 
for expansion had disappeared.  This meant that as the supply of 
slaves dried up, so did fresh lands with which to reward the troops. 
Long gone were the citizen soldiers of the Republic, now replaced by 
barbarian auxiliaries.  So too was the robust commercialism of the 
early Empire.  It had been driven to its knees by taxation.  In desperate 
need of funds for their mercenaries, the emperors froze the economy 
and squeezed it to its limits.  This made entrepreneurship impractical 
and encouraged a reversion to local subsistence.  Eventually the 
turmoil of barbarian incursions thoroughly interrupted commerce 
and sent city dwellers scurrying for the protection of the latafundia.
For all its magnificence, Rome never evolved an independent 
middle class.  With business and government dependent on 
chains of patronage, that is, with quasifamilial alliances, a self-
sufficient professionalism never came to the surface.  Ultimately, the 
parochialism of this familism, battered by an increasingly unstable 
militarism, sounded the death knell of a vibrant marketplace.  The 
bonds of religion were able to forestall this decline for a while, but in 
the West this was not very long.  With the arrival of the Germanic 
hordes, the first great flowering of the Commercial Revolution was 
at an end.  Soon to follow were Dark Ages during which wealth and 
learning were in retreat throughout most of Europe.
The Medieval Revival
The second wave of the Commercial Revolution took centuries to 
gather.  When the continent’s new masters arrived on the scene, they 
were a combination of agriculturists and pastoralists.35  Seminomadic 
tribesmen, they knew almost nothing of the ways of merchants. 
Despite their skills as metalworkers, their primary orientation was to 
the land and secondarily to battle.  As a result, while they stood in 
awe of Roman technical accomplishments, they did not comprehend 
them.  Neither literate nor bound in complex political federations, 
they could not emulate the achievements of a faltering empire. 
What attracted them most was the opulence of the Roman estates.36 
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Never themselves urbanites, they saw no point in moving to centers 
of commerce.  But large manor houses surrounded by productive 
fields were another matter.  These remnants of the latafundia could 
be converted into the beginnings of medieval fiefdoms.  On these 
intensely local establishments, the natives who had previously sought 
rural protection could be turned into serfs37, thenceforward tied to the 
land and dedicated to serving their overlords.  The emerging nobility 
meanwhile depended upon family ties and pledges of military fealty 
to maintain their advantage over those they had come to rule.
What did not persist was long distance trade.38  The roads fell into 
disrepair, ships were no longer built; and money was driven out of 
circulation.  Gold was used for decoration rather than for exchange, 
with much of it bequeathed to the Church as a sign of devotion. 
Literacy and technology skills also declined.  Few large buildings were 
attempted, and only churchmen kept the art of reading alive.  Beyond 
this, with no central authority to maintain order, brigandage became 
endemic.  Even if there had been merchants who wished to maintain 
trade, their goods would have been looted by the highwaymen who 
infested the few tracks that remained open between now isolated 
communities.  If there was a source of large-scale cohesion, it came 
from the Church.  With the invaders themselves converted to 
Christianity, a common faith became the lingua franca.  In a literal 
sense, it was the Latin kept in circulation by clerics that enabled the 
nobility to communicate with distant brethren.
Into this disarray, impulses toward power and order continued 
to arise.  The kings, though they were often reduced to the level 
of local warlords, pressed ahead in quest of supremacy, and, in the 
case of Charlemagne,39 achieved considerable success.  So too did the 
Church, initially in the form of monasticism.  For a while, however, 
all this was put in peril by external invasions that a decentralized 
nobility was hard pressed to repel.  Vikings from the north, Magyars 
from the east,40 and Muslims from the south penetrated to the heart 
of the continent.  Eventually a wave of castle building provided 
a parochial bulwark against these aggressors.41  This created the 
image of feudalism with which most modern people are familiar. 
With armored knights ensconced in fortifications from which they 
could sally forth to maintain control over the adjacent lands, the 
fortunes of the elite were affected by isolation.  The stability thereby 
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established convinced even the Northmen to settle down and become 
traders instead of raiders.  Small hamlets began to huddle together 
for protection under the castle walls and from these grew vigorous 
commercial entities.  Unplanned from above, urbanism and long 
distance exchange gradually revived to become counterweights to the 
powers of the aristocracy.
Part of this progression was owed to the Church.42  In its effort 
to survive the commotions of the darkest periods, it invested in 
monasticism.  Establishments such as those of the Benedictine, and 
later those of Cluny became self-sufficient reservoirs of economic 
activity.43  Eventually the Cistercians would consolidate these efforts in 
a commercialized agriculture, thereby helping to generate the capital 
from which more secular efforts would benefit.  Also implicated in 
this revival were fairs such as those near centrally located Champagne. 
Once or twice a year each of these drew merchants from the north 
and the south, the east and the west.  Ultimately all of this stimulated 
a dynamic urbanism that in time spurred what has been called the 
medieval Industrial Revolution.  In places like Flanders, towns such 
as Bruges sprouted to importance.  Dominated by merchant guilds, 
they grew rich from businesses that included the textile trade.  During 
this period it was proudly said that city air made one free.  Serfs 
who escaped from rural servitude could find employment and self-
governance in these enclaves.  If they did sufficiently well, they could 
even become the masters of their own shops, employing journeymen 
and apprentices to magnify their personal efforts.  As the towns 
grew, the newly prosperous might move to neighborhoods created 
by extending the municipality walls outward.  These so-called bourgs 
became the home of the bourgeoisie; which by this means produced 
the title of infamy future members of the middle-class would bear.44 
Simultaneous with these developments was a restoration of 
coinage.45  Money was as necessary under the evolving conditions as 
it had been for classical commerce.  Arts too began to flourish, with 
the newfound affluence channeled into guildhalls, town halls, and 
cathedrals.  Gothic elegance replaced Romanesque heaviness, both 
in architecture and sculpture.  Part of this owed to developments 
in technology.  As during the earlier wave of commercialism, 
an increased demand led to efforts to provide what was desired. 
Although the Middle Ages is generally considered to be backward 
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times, it boasted many advances over what the Romans46 wrought. 
This was the period when waterwheels and windmills came into 
their own and, therefore, the first period when mechanical energy 
made a significant contribution to production.  This was also a time 
when small improvements such as the pocket and the button made 
their appearance, and likewise when the wheelbarrow, the crane, and 
mechanical clock47 entered construction sites.  It was, in addition, 
the historical moment when universities were started.  First dedicated 
to training the clergy for a resurgent church, the university quickly 
became a place where scholars and lawyers could prepare for their 
callings.  This was consequently when the liberal arts came to the fore 
and established the rudiments of what it meant to be an educated 
person—even if one were a layman.
One of the unique aspects of the medieval revival was the degree 
to which military, religious, and commercial forms of organization 
interpenetrated one another.48  Family/military alliances49 remained 
active throughout the period, grounded in agriculture but borrowing 
funds from newly affluent commoners.  The Church too prospered 
under these conditions.  Still benefiting from contributions from 
parishioners who were genuine believers, it also drew recruits from the 
younger sons of the nobility.  With secular inheritances preserved by 
devices such as primogeniture, the disinherited members of aristocratic 
lineages could nevertheless receive appointments as bishops and 
abbots.  This connection culminated in the Crusades.50  Popes could 
rouse their devoted to shunt an unruly young generation of warriors 
into attempts to conquer Jerusalem.  The most universal institution of 
the era, the Roman Catholic Church, thereby generated cooperation 
among individuals more usually dedicated to usurping one another’s 
prerogatives.  Then, too, even the merchants were believers.  They 
were happy to contribute to the endeavor.  As aficionados of the 
Robin Hood saga will realize, it was they who supplied the ransom 
to rescue Richard the Lion-hearted from captivity on his way home 
from the Holy Land.
Proud though this presocial class world was, its heyday was 
short-lived.  During its expansion, it recruited trading towns as 
far east as Poland under the umbrella of the Hanseatic League, but 
this association seems51 to have been in defense of an impending 
retrenchment.  For reasons not completely understood, this period 
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saw a weakening so profound that Barbara Tuchman52 dubbed 
it “the calamitous 14th century.”  One source of the collapse was 
probably overexpansion.  Then as now, businessmen were prone to 
overoptimism.  In creating supplies greater than what the market 
could absorb, they may have undermined their own prosperity.  There 
was also the disaster of the Black Death.  During the middle of this 
interlude of curtailment, the bubonic plague entered the continent, 
probably disembarked from a trading ship arrived from the Black 
Sea, and promptly propelled rings of despair rippling north.  Within 
a decade, perhaps a third of the population was wiped out—especially 
in the towns.  Utterly unaware of the germ theory of illness, their 
inhabitants had no way of knowing that this disaster was spread by 
rats infested with diseased fleas.  To many, the devastation seemed 
divine retribution for the sin of pride.
Also practically invisible to the afflicted were the tribulations 
instigated by the Little Ice Age.  Unbeknownst to all, the weather 
had taken a turn for the worse.  For several centuries, the snow belt 
had drifted south with catastrophic consequences for agriculture. 
Crops failed, and people starved for reasons that could not be 
apparent to those innocent of meteorology.   What they could see 
was the generalized conflicts that accompanied these calamities. 
England and France entered a war that lasted, on and off, for over a 
hundred years, and Italy, thanks to its internecine conflicts, invented 
the condottiere.  These were mercenaries who, when released from 
employment, took to freebooting.  For the better part of a century, 
they visited destruction so widespread as to make commerce too 
hazardous to maintain at its previous levels.  Even the Church was 
not exempt from these disorders.  In order to escape the wrath of 
the Roman mob,53 a French-born Pope removed the papacy to 
Avignon.  This Babylonian Captivity eventuated in a Great Schism, 
with a Pope and an Anti-Pope—one in France and the other back 
in Rome—competing for the allegiance of the faithful.  This low 
point in prestige reduced the Church to virtual irrelevance.  It also 
constitutes a convenient marker for the end of the second wave of 
the Commercial Revolution.
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The Renaissance
The third phase of the Commercial Revolution is traditionally 
called the Renaissance, which means rebirth.54  In many ways, it 
was.  Daniel Bell55 traces the beginning of capitalism to this period. 
He points to the development of Italian financial institutions as 
the origin of the accumulation of resources that enabled large 
investments in new enterprises.  Another hallmark of this epoch 
was the invention of printing.  In the middle of the 15th century, 
Johann Guttenberg developed movable type and a press that could 
turn out reams of materials for outrageously low prices.  Prior to 
this, books were laboriously copied by hand, which meant that 
only the rich could afford them and that only the most sacred texts 
would be reproduced.  Printing meant not only cheap bibles, but an 
unprecedented diffusion of knowledge.  This advance was associated 
with humanism.56  Scholars discovered in the ancient classics, as 
reproduced by entrepreneurial ventures such as Venice’s Aldine Press, 
a dedication to secular, as opposed to purely religious, knowledge.57 
Works newly imported from a collapsed Byzantine Empire58 and 
a reconquered Spain also expanded acquaintance with Greek and 
Roman sources.  No longer was Aristotle the limit of awareness.  The 
old myths about the Olympian gods and the emotional subtleties 
of the Athenian playwrights came to attention with a profound 
effect on consciousness.  Educated people now began looking 
toward themselves in the present, rather than focusing merely on 
the afterlife.
Fundamental to these innovations, beginning first in Italy, was a 
remarkable resurgence of commerce.  Cities such as Amalfi, Florence, 
Venice, and Genoa became beehives of mercantile activity.59  Located 
hard by the Mediterranean, as had been their classical predecessors, 
they too were sovereign urban entities.  Unfettered by the suzerainty 
of a monarch or an emperor, they controlled their own affairs, as 
had the Athenians before them.  Sandwiched between a reviving 
continent and the opulence of the Muslim Levant, they served 
as a conduit for goods that originated farther east.  Moreover, 
this increased activity acted as a spur to improvements in trading 
technology.  Foremost among these was the invention of banking. 
The Italians learned how to manage credit.  Although the Church 
forbade usury, these merchants made profits by charging interest on 
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paper transactions.  While they did not know it at the time, present-
day economists could have told them that credit expands the money 
supply.  Because multiple loans can be based on the same collateral, 
the effect is as if more coins have been put in circulation.  And since 
additional currency means a greater ease in commercial dealings, the 
volume of trade can swell.  So advantageous were the Italian money-
management skills that they were able to set up remote outposts as 
far afield as London.  To this day, Lombard Street commemorates 
the time when Northern Italians dominated the city’s banking.  With 
this extra trade, of course, came greater wealth.  And with wealth 
came power.
Among the chief beneficiaries of this munificence were the 
Italian merchant princes.  The Medici of Florence and the families 
that dominated the council in Venice were exemplars of how 
business success could be converted into political domination. 
Operating in compact territories, they translated their assets into 
military power ample to maintain status.  Influential beyond their 
borders, they served as models for the magnates of Genoa60 and the 
Fuggars61 of southern Germany who were to grow so rich that they 
eventually became indispensable creditors to nation states.  Within 
their own boundaries, the Italian commercial princes were affluent 
enough to emulate the sumptuousness of these monarchies.  Despite 
their diminutive size, they eagerly participated in international 
diplomacy.  Florence was soon to fall to the more numerous French 
and Spanish, but tiny Venice, thanks to the navy it acquired for its 
trading interests, was able to ally with Spain to defeat the Turks at the 
battle of Lepanto.62  Indeed, for a while, the city was able to defend 
holdings, such as the island of Crete, against this formidable foe.
So wealthy were the Italian city-states that they were able 
to patronize the artists and scholars that made the Renaissance 
synonymous with culture.  Beginning with Dante Alighieri’s Divine 
Comedy,63 a growing self-assurance enabled them to sponsor literature 
in the vernacular.  Previous to this, the languages of the ordinary 
people did not have a sufficient audience to merit artistic use.  Hopes 
for the favor of his ruler also encouraged Nicolo Machiavelli64 to 
jump start political science by writing a how-to guide for princes. 
Often mistakenly thought of as a craven opportunist, this skilled 
diplomat intended to promote Italian unification by assessing how 
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power was actually wielded.  More congenial today, of course, are 
the achievements of the painters and the sculptors.  Together with 
the humanism that epitomized the period came a pictorial realism 
that echoed the achievements of the classical period.  Thus a 
Michelangelo65 could both paint and sculpt people that looked like 
actual human beings, rather than stylized tributes to biblical stories. 
Deeply immersed in the use of perspective, Renaissance masters 
placed their heroes in a physical world that modeled the one they 
saw outside their windows.  They could also emulate the autonomy 
of their patrons.  Although dependent upon the rich and powerful 
for commissions, they became recognizable figures in their own 
right, celebrated in a way that the architects of the Gothic cathedrals 
were not.  Michelangelo, for instance, was able to wrangle with Pope 
Julius II about how to render the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel.  In 
this we see the glimmerings of the bohemian sensibilities that were to 
drive Victorian sponsors to distraction.  Both groups of artists were 
cultural specialists whose talents enabled them to exercise power over 
their own endeavors.
Also associated with Renaissance commercialism was a plethora 
of mundane technologies.   Not tangible per se but readily convertible 
into income was double-entry bookkeeping.  One of the imports 
from the East had been Arabic numbers.66  This Hindu invention 
made it possible to calculate profits and losses more precisely than 
Roman numerals allowed.  So cumbersome were Roman numerals 
that during the medieval revival national budgets were worked out 
by manipulating piles of coins on checkerboards.  The rationalization 
of financial computations subsequently made it possible to evaluate 
investments more efficiently.  Also crucial to mercantile effectiveness 
was a dependable system of laws.  Trade inevitably entails conflicts, 
the frictions of which, unless they are resolved, interrupt business. 
This stimulated a further evolution of Roman based jurisprudence. 
Not only were classical regulations and procedures reintroduced, but 
they were extended to meet emerging conditions.
On a more tangible level, the technological advances were 
epitomized by the advent of the mechanical clock and the vacuum 
pump.  Now commonplace, the clock then seemed miraculous.  Its 
numerous finely machined gears, meshing as closely as they did, 
came to seem an analog for the universe itself.  The instrument’s 
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introduction not only prompted a rash of mechanical toys, but the 
more precise scheduling of business transactions.  Once people could 
coordinate their meetings by consulting a shared apparatus, they 
did not need to waste time unproductively.  The pump meanwhile 
became the model for how blood circulates through the body.  Were 
it unavailable as a paradigm, William Harvey might never have 
conceived of the heart as impelling a liquid through tubes.  Progress 
also came through medical dissections.  Only after secular power 
was sufficient to challenge the Church’s supremacy were restrictions 
against cutting into the body loosened.  This made anatomy possible 
and eventually a rationalized surgery.  Even the invention of spectacles, 
which helped reading, was to play a part in the establishment of 
modern science.  Experience in grinding lenses was furthermore 
to lead to the invention of both the telescope and the microscope, 
which in their turn opened unimagined vistas to closer observation.67 
Nor should the achievements of Leonardo da Vinci68 be neglected. 
Although most of his inventions remained unbuilt speculations, 
much of his reputation rested on the military devices he did construct 
for ambitious lay rulers.  His paintings deserve the acclaim they have 
received, but his output in this area was too small to have warranted 
his contemporary repute.  Copernicus, too, deserves a mention.69 
Though a Polish cleric, he was infected by the temper of the times. 
Were it not for the concurrent upsurge in scholarship, it is doubtful 
that he would have hypothesized a heliocentric universe.
Competing with this commercially based turmoil was the 
emergence of the nation state.  If a rekindled expansion of trade 
enhanced social coordination via marketplace relations, political 
power grounded in agricultural domination and military alliances 
had not disappeared.  In larger continental territories such as France70 
and Spain, the kinds of relationships that prevailed in city-states 
could not succeed.  Neither communication and transportation nor 
the political institutions of representative democracy were adequately 
advanced to foster cohesion over long distances.  It was instead 
necessary to impose order by the sword.  Only the sorts of coalition 
capable of dictating their desires on the battlefield could command 
the obedience of far-flung barons.   Yet because the parochial remnants 
of the Germanic invasions continued to hold sway over remote 
counties, they could still launch challenges to their overlords.  These 
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had to be met, and only leaders capable of commanding personal 
respect could get the job done.
Nation building did not begin during the Renaissance, but it 
reached a milestone at this time.71  In the midst of the medieval 
revival, the primary underpinnings of later unification were already 
perceptible.  Foremost among these was the appearance of military 
and judicial dominance.  On the military side, kings and emperors 
had long been able to assert periodic dominance.  The example of 
Charlemagne lingered within the memories of those who wore the 
crown; hence, they too hungered for the glory of extending their 
territory.  The problem was that what could be won in battle could as 
easily be lost in it.  Nevertheless, some regal victories foreshadowed 
the national entities to follow.  In France, for instance, Philip 
Augustus was able to revive the fortunes of his domains by defeating 
the Plantagenet challenge.72  For a time it appeared that Henry II, 
though based in Anjou, Acquitaine, and England would be able to 
displace his legal sovereign.  To the surprise of most, with the aid of 
Henry’s sons, most of what afterward became France was recovered. 
Somewhat later, Philip the Fair would further strengthen the throne 
by increasing its revenues and asserting its power over the Church.  It 
was he who was able to tame the Pope by offering him the protection 
of an Avignon residence.
Later still, and more decisively, Charles VII reasserted national 
integrity by expelling the English from the northern part of his territory. 
Assisted by the inspirational Joan of Arc, he became the embodiment 
of the state.  One of the reasons the English lost this struggle was that 
their Burgundian allies deserted them.73  This prosperous tributary 
of France sought a separate identity by assembling the provinces 
from Italy in the south to the Netherlands in the north into an 
independent state.  Were this to have come to fruition, it might have 
been one of the more potent states in Europe, for it would have join 
the most important commercial centers of the continent and would 
have possessed the resources to finance its powers.  Unfortunately, 
its king, Charles the Bold, was humbled by Louis XI of France74 and 
then undone at the hands of the Swiss.  In one of his campaigns for 
territorial aggrandizement, he ran into their halberds and lost his life. 
The Swiss, who had hitherto been considered unsophisticated yokels, 
in defending their independence from the Austrians discovered the 
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value of disciplined battle formations.  Like their Greek antecedents, 
they could hold off more heavily armored foes by maintaining the 
integrity of lines of spear points.  
The importance of military discipline had earlier been 
demonstrated by the English in their startling victory over the 
French at Agincourt.  Henry V was able to defeat a much larger 
force via control of his archers.  These yeomen were renowned for 
their skill with the longbow.  But what made them more than the 
match of fully armored French knights was the latter’s disorder on a 
narrowing battlefield made treacherous by acres of mud.   As a result, 
a handful of commoners cut down the flower of an unruly nobility by 
the thousands. Strangely, no other army emulated this achievement 
because the training requirements were too stringent.  What could 
be copied, and this was the embryo of the national army, was hiring 
qualified specialists loyal to a king who paid them.  Because his 
national treasury was larger than that of his rivals, he could employ a 
greater number of mercenaries.  The coffers of his centralized counting 
houses, not incidentally, were simultaneously being filled from taxes 
levied on the rehabilitated commercial interests.  These same monies 
could also be used to purchase the recently perfected cannon.  One 
of the reasons Da Vinci and other scientists were prized was that 
they could calculate how to fire them.  Accuracy was important in 
order to blast holes in the fortifications protecting local barons from 
an overlord’s displeasure.  Once these barriers could be breached 
with ease, organized resistance to a national sovereign became less 
practical.  In time, the disciplined use of gunpowder was to extend 
to battalions of musketeers and grenadiers, with even greater benefits 
to state formation.
The judicial element in the creation of nation states goes back 
at least as far as Henry II of England.75  His attempts to consolidate 
his hold over the country he inherited entailed an effort to supplant 
local justice with his own.  Provincial cases were generally settled 
in baronial courts, until Henry II sent judges out in circuit courts. 
The trouble had been that what happened in these baronial castles 
was not standardized.  Arbitrary, and often biased, these institutions 
were supplanted by Henry’s appointees who were instructed to avoid 
being capricious or to curry favor by being fair and judicious.  They 
were also empowered to impanel groups of local citizens to act as 
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witnesses in individual cases.  Herein lay the beginnings of juries and 
the common law.  In time, this systematized justice was to provide 
an ingredient in the monarch’s authority.  As convener of the courts 
of last resort, he thus had the last say.   Moreover, in successfully 
applying legitimate coercion within his borders, he gained prestige. 
Rather than have unpredictable personal brawls decide differences of 
opinion, order was maintained by convincing a broad constituency 
to defer to his less subjective procedures.  Subsequently stabilized 
by tradition and a paid constabulary, this mode of civic regulation 
replaced personal allegiances with more homogeneous, impersonal 
bonds.
As earlier occurred in citystates, the King’s justice facilitated 
trade within his larger territories.  Brigandage was less of a problem 
when highwaymen feared the monarch’s troops, and fraud was more 
manageable when charlatans dreaded the verdicts of his judges. 
So dependent did commerce become on these developments that 
Shakespeare’s Henry VI’s quote is often cited: “The first thing we 
do, let’s kill all the lawyers.”  Lawyers were hated by the bard’s time 
because they had become integral to conducting ordinary business. 
Members of one of the first professions, these legal specialists might 
be reviled, but they were also respected.  Representing power in a 
world where written contracts increasingly defined interpersonal 
relations, they had an influence that mattered.  Kings even conscripted 
them in managing national affairs.  Where once only clerics such as 
Thomas Becket could rise to be Lord Chancellor, by the time of the 
Renaissance, a lawyer, Sir Thomas More, might be selected for the 
position.76
The Church too had undergone sweeping dislocations in 
response to the resumption of commerce.  Within Italy, once the 
Pope returned from his French sojourn, the Papal States became 
a player in local power politics.  Julius II was more enthusiastic a 
warrior than a patron of the arts.  In a world where money talked, 
secular supremacy held a greater appeal than did the sacred.  Indeed, 
Alexander VI became infamous for using his election to the seat of St. 
Peter to feather his family’s nest.  His children, Cesare and Lucrezia 
Borgia, are still remembered for the ferocity with which they sought 
temporal power.  This was because Alexander not only believed the 
papacy was to be enjoyed he also wished to establish inheritable 
Origins    1
domains for his progeny.  If this entailed assassinations and treachery, 
so be it.  In fact, the term nepotism came into currency during this 
period.  Based upon the Italian word for “nephew,” it alluded to 
bestowing benefits on illegitimate children who, for purposes of 
decency, were referred to as “nephews.”  Paradoxically, both the ease 
with which Church doctrines were violated and the disapproval with 
which this illegal favoritism was met were signs of a rising commercial 
tide.  Nepotism had not been considered a problem when family 
connections were the primary source of alliances.  It became a threat 
when it promised to undermine business dealings based on profit.  If 
genetic ties were allowed to count for more than reliable streams of 
revenue, then bankruptcy and a descent from grace might be in the 
offing for unconnected tradesmen. 
Once the Church became entangled in these contradictions, its 
legitimacy too was in question.  One of the ways popes attempted 
to generate the funds needed to erect the symbols of their power 
was through the sale of indulgences.77  These passes to get out of 
purgatory could become objects of commerce only in a society where 
the marketplace had ascended to prominence.  They would never 
have sold had not ordinary people resources to spare.  Still, the fact 
that they were for sale offended religious sensibilities.  Martin Luther 
was one who had such sensibilities.78  He could not abide what he 
perceived as a betrayal of faith.  His resultant challenge to the Church 
led to the Protestant Reformation because many others felt as he 
did.  They were not willing to be associates of a religious institution 
that did not respect their commitments.  Fortunately for Luther, this 
dissatisfaction coincided with several other developments.  One of 
these was a growing north-south split in Europe.  Another was the 
fracturing of the Holy Roman Empire.  A third was the spread of 
literacy.
If Italy was the font of the Renaissance, within a century its 
economic ferment spread to the former seat of medieval industry. 
Bruges might be in decline, but Antwerp had risen to replace it. 
In so doing it became a financial center to rival its Mediterranean 
precursors.79  But in time, it would be supplanted by Amsterdam.  The 
Low Countries, like the Italians citystates had access to water borne 
transport.  Located at the confluence of the Rhine River and the 
North Sea, once the lateen sail was developed, they could participate 
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in Atlantic traffic.  The lateen sail, which is triangular in shape, 
permitted a ship to sail at an angle into the wind.  This facilitated 
oceanic voyages.  In the more placid Mediterranean, oars could make 
up for what the wind did not do, whereas in the heavier seas of 
the Atlantic human power was inadequate.  After this changeover 
occurred, the north too became prime commercial territory.  With 
this, the Flemings and Dutch joined the pursuit of riches.80  The 
Germans, incidentally, benefited as well.  Also connected to the 
sea by rivers, they were eager to do business with their Hollander 
cousins.
Luther, a loyal German, was appalled by the avarice of the 
Romans.  So too were German merchants and princes who perceived 
the Italians as political and commercial rivals.  Happily, declaring 
their religious independence would provide a dividend in autonomy 
and market reach.  This declaration, however, would not have been 
possible had there been as potent a German state as there were 
French and Spanish states.  The Holy Roman Empire, which during 
the height of feudalism was reckoned a superpower, in an era of 
incipient nationalism was an anachronism.  Fragmented beyond 
the power of an elected emperor to unite, individual duchies and 
electorates vied with one another for an hegemony that none had 
the strength separately to impose.  This allowed some to defy the 
central authority of an emperor such as Charles V.  A ruler might be 
a loyal son of the Church, yet his military prowess depended not on 
taxes but the voluntary cooperation of vassals who were not prepared 
to cooperate.  War, when it occurred, was, therefore, inconclusive. 
In the end, Luther and his allies survived the wrath of those who 
would have liked to have condemned him as a heretic.  Unlike those 
of previous reformers, his innovations outlasted him, thanks to the 
resources mustered on his behalf.  A rise in commerce, coupled with 
a decline in feudalism, made possible the alliances that tipped in 
his favor.  Paradoxically, although Luther was very much devoted to 
spiritual solutions, his success skewed events against religious power. 
The Catholic Church was to lose much of its dominion, and the 
emerging Protestant denominations were too numerous for any one 
of them to exercise a comparable authority.
There were also the effects of literacy.  Printing made books readily 
available.  Not surprisingly, Guttenberg’s first project was a Bible.81 
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This enabled Protestants to urge their adherents to read the good 
book for themselves.  Instead of having priests interpret its meaning, 
they could develop personal relationships with the deity.  This allowed 
for an autonomy of spirit that had not previously been encouraged. 
Max Weber emphasized a Protestant Ethic that urged communicants 
to seek riches as a sign of being one of God’s elect.  This motivation, 
grounded in a submission to divine providence, theoretically 
provided the discipline needed to generate the capital for economic 
growth.  Perhaps more important, however, was the rigor needed to 
confront eternity on one’s own.  Beginning with the internal controls 
necessary to read a ponderous book unaided, consciously coming 
to Christ likewise required a level of introspection that was useful 
in confronting other independent operators in the marketplace.  If 
good Christians could be entrepreneurs in interpreting a sacred text, 
why not be entrepreneurial in seeking commercial opportunities?
As the Renaissance upsurge of the Commercial Revolution 
approached its conclusion, the Netherlands and England, two 
Protestant nations, rose to prominence.  Henry VIII of England 
began his reign slavishly devoted to Italianate fashions but ended 
as an implacable foe of the Pope.82  The winds of reform would 
soon eventuate in Puritan excess, but in the meantime they inspired 
collective efforts to preserve an independence from Rome.  In other 
words, the disciplines of Protestantism were social as well as personal. 
This was obvious in John Calvin’s Geneva, which decreed strict 
adherence to a common code of conduct and a dogmatic set of beliefs. 
This would unexpectedly provide practice in establishing voluntary 
interpersonal bonds.  One day, civic associations and industrial 
corporations would dominate the landscape, but for the moment the 
protomiddle classes were caught between the marketplace and a need 
to protect their eternal souls. 
The Enlightenment
The starting point of the next83 wave of the Commercial 
Revolution is difficult to pin down.  In many ways the Enlightenment 
was an acceleration of the Renaissance.  It was a period during which 
the emphasis resolutely shifted from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic 
littoral.  The historian Ferdinand Braudel84 chronicles an ever-
quickening rotation of the wheels of commerce, wherein capitalism 
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became a recognized phenomenon and the tentacles of trade spread 
across the globe.  This was the era during which the West asserted its 
dominance over the rest of the world.  In 1529, immediately before 
hegemony began, the Turks besieged Vienna in a near-run thing. 
When they retreated, they nevertheless remained the terror of the 
Balkans.  By 1683, in contrast, conditions had drastically changed. 
A renewed invasion was still able to put Vienna in jeopardy, but 
this time once the city was relieved, the Ottoman Empire85 began its 
fateful decline.  The Austrians, although they were on the fringe of 
European civilization, were able to liberate Hungary on the way to 
eventually freeing almost all of Turkey’s Christian dependencies.  The 
cause of this reversal was nothing less than the relative prosperity of 
a market driven economy.  In making money ever more effectively 
through trade, the West had stolen a march on everyone else.  What 
had been a forested backwater when the Romans arrived was about 
to leap ahead of all its rivals.
Every schoolchild is taught about Columbus’ voyages of 
exploration.86  Undertaken during the Renaissance, they would 
revolutionize the ground rules within a century.  When the 
Portuguese under the direction of Henry the Navigator began their 
cautious descent down the African coast, they did so in caravels 
capable of carrying cargo.  Soon the Portuguese would outflank the 
Venetians in the spice trade.  The Spanish were so eager to follow, 
they inadvertently discovered the New World.  But it would take 
time before this venture was profitable.  Initially what followed was 
the gold and silver fever of the Conquistadors, but presently the 
West Indies would be found to be ideal for raising sugarcane.  This 
crop encouraged the development of a sweet tooth back home that 
could be satisfied at a generous return.  So lucrative was this trade 
that other European powers joined the quest.  England, France, and 
the Netherlands rapidly established their own Caribbean outposts. 
Thanks to the importation of black slaves from Africa, these 
investments also paid off handsomely.  Ironically, the dominance of 
capitalism kick-started an institution that later proved at odds with 
its central ethos.
In the late Renaissance and early Enlightenment industrial power 
was still largely provided by muscle power, whether of humans or 
draft animals.  Because sugar cultivation turned out to be intensive, 
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in order for it to be practicable cheap labor was needed to cut the 
stalks and press them into juice.  Once introduced, slavery unfolded 
according to a logic of its own.  Thus, when the English decided to 
exploit the North American mainland, they too acquired bondsmen 
to grow tobacco, cotton, and indigo.87  Originally intending to take 
advantage of the lumber and turpentine trade, the speculators who 
funded these operations switched to where the money was.  In so 
doing, they sought to emulate the fortunes being made to their 
south.  These riches also had an impact on the mother country.  They 
enabled the adventurous to go abroad relatively impoverished but to 
return with the wherewithal to invest in homegrown commerce.  A 
favorite outlay of these parvenus was in land and its improvements. 
Still living in the shadow of feudalism, the objective was to imitate 
the accoutrements of aristocracy while continuing to derive an 
income from the marketplace.
The Enlightenment would also receive an impetus from the 
evolution of absolutism.  As nation states developed, the temptation 
to centralize became profound.  Newly established kings sought to 
enlarge their dominions.  Even before the Renaissance, Edward I of 
England attempted to consolidate his rule by claiming Wales and 
Scotland.  In Spain, Ferdinand and Isabella united the crowns of 
Aragon and Castile, but they also expelled the Moors from Granada. 
Flush with Middle Age devotion, they also initiated the Inquisition 
designed, to cleanse their realm of heresy.  Not yet commercial in 
mentality, they assumed that a common religion was essential to 
social cohesion.  After Spain captured Mexico and Peru, this attitude 
became evident in the hidalgos who led the occupation, who saw little 
reason to treat pagan Indians with compassion and less to encourage 
commerce.  Later, Philip II inherited a Spain distinct from the 
Hapsburg regions in central Europe in which he cultivated a Spanish 
nationalism.88  While the centralized unity he achieved might have 
facilitated an economic self-sufficiency, he, and his subjects, were too 
dedicated to an anachronistic glory to pursue such an objective.
In France, Francis I consolidated his rule in opposition to that of 
Charles V of the Holy Roman Empire and Henry VIII of England. 
He was sufficiently powerful to devote huge expenditures to chateau 
building and sufficiently attuned to scientific developments to 
induce Leonardo to come to work for him.  Nevertheless, it was not 
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until his successors Louis XIII89 and Louis XIV in the 17th century 
that absolutism fully flowered.  Louis XIV90 is still remembered as 
the Sun King who declared that he was the state.  The builder of 
Versailles, he planned his vast palace complex as a place where his 
nobility could be forced to reside under his watchful presence.91  As 
long as they were in his company, he could rest assured that they were 
plotting social conquests, not his overthrow.  Among those upon 
whom Louis bestowed his munificence and his personal control were 
the nobility of the sword and the nobility of the robe.  Those of the 
sword traced their eminence to the military aristocracy of medieval 
times, whereas those of the robe gained their ascendancy from service 
to the king.  Often of merchant origin, they helped gather taxes and 
administer justice.  Even more than affluent Englishmen, they aspired 
to aristocratic status.  Louis cultivated this propensity by investing 
in luxury industries.  Instead of being oriented toward commerce, 
he found his inspiration in competition with Spain.  Rather than 
capitalize on the peace his absolutist rule brought, he preferred to 
patronize the manufacture of mirrors and tapestries.
In stark contrast were the developments unfolding within the 
Netherlands.92  Mercantile prosperity had prompted the Dutch first 
to seek independence from the Spanish and then to defend it from 
encroachments of the French.  Sturdy burgers, as opposed to foppish 
aristocrats, they were prepared to take to their ships as beggars of 
the sea rather than submit to foreign domination.  Though theirs 
was a tiny territory, they were the most advanced naval architects 
of the time.  Masters of a fleet that could be dedicated either to 
war or to peace, they had the tenacity to outlast all comers.  As a 
result, these burgers became the vanguard of a transition to the 
Enlightenment.  Despite their small numbers, they ventured across 
the globe on business.  Ferocious competitors, they wrested the Spice 
Islands from the Portuguese and used the proceeds to fund a middle 
class lifestyle.  Although they paid deference to the local nobility, the 
prevailing ambience was that of the merchant class.  Those of noble 
descent might lead them into battle, but associations of prominent 
citizens undertook most of the ordinary business of governing. 
These sensibilities are still on display in the art that they financed. 
Rembrandt van Rijn was one they patronized and paintings such as 
his Night Watch demonstrate the pride they took in regulating their 
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affairs.  A miller’s son, Rembrandt also provided a wonderful portrayal 
of a surgeon guild’s satisfaction in its members’ skills.  Prominent too 
among the works of the Dutch masters were evocations of domestic 
life.  Rembrandt depicted the Jewish Bride, while Frans Hals 
presented a gallery of merchant portraits commissioned for their 
own glorification.  Perhaps the best of the middle-class chroniclers 
was Jan Vermeer.  His intimate interiors give a glimpse of ordinary 
life among the comfortably affluent.  Some have suggested that he 
achieved the striking realism of his compositions by utilizing a recent 
scientific innovation, the camera obscura.  If so, both his subject 
matter and his methods reflect the advances of the moment.
The Dutch became legendary not merely for their prosperity 
but also for their tolerance.  Like their Greek counterparts, they 
understood that accepting the idiosyncrasies of one’s customers was 
good business.  As a result, their nation became a refuge from the 
religious storms that ended the Renaissance, attracting among others, 
Spinoza93 from Spain and Descartes94 from France.  Also renowned 
for their financial speculations, the Dutch originated what became 
stock markets.  As with the invention of banking, this promoted 
commerce by providing the funds for dicey opportunities.  Taking 
risks is a defining characteristic of commercial societies.  Because 
they cannot be certain where the profits lie, business types must 
possess the confidence to take the well-researched plunge.  An ability 
to assume calculated gambles, despite their uncertainties, is thus a 
keystone feature of the middle classes.
Across the channel in England an intermediary series of events 
was unfolding.  Somewhere between the absolutism of the French and 
the mercantile common sense of the Dutch was the predemocratic 
turmoil of this island realm.  Building on the political unity and 
financial reserves established by his father, Henry VIII began his rule 
with absolutist aspirations.95  Almost by accident, his desire for a 
male heir and, therefore, for a divorce produced the conditions for 
an upheaval.  Strong enough to confiscate the wealth of the Roman 
Catholic Church on his way to instigating an Anglican Protestantism, 
he unleashed a sequence of currents and countercurrents that remade 
his domain.  The fight over whether England would remain Protestant 
or return to Roman Catholicism eventuated in a constitutional 
monarchy.  Bloody Mary was succeeded by Elizabeth I, who, in part 
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to retain her position, remained the Virgin Queen.  This opened 
the way for James I, who relocated from Scotland, could never hope 
to restore Henry’s supremacy.  His son Charles I96 intended to do 
so, but by then it was too late.  The Puritans had developed a taste 
of autonomy they were not about to relinquish.  Eventually, led by 
Oliver Cromwell,97 their Parliamentary party acquired the clout 
to win a civil war.  Once Cromwell died, the executed king’s son, 
namely Charles II,98 resumed sovereignty.  Yet there were conditions. 
He was to rule together with parliament with the stipulation that 
he be a Protestant.  This he did with such aplomb that the nation 
backed him in a victorious war against the Dutch.99  His brother 
James II, who succeeded him, was a different story.  He was the Duke 
of York, the man for whom New York was named, but he was a 
miserable failure as king.  His high-handed tactics in attempting to 
restore Roman Catholicism were so offensive that they prompted his 
removal.  The Dutch stadtholder, William of Orange, the husband of 
James’s daughter Mary, succeeded his father-in-law in what came to 
be called the Glorious Revolution.  But the price of this victory was 
a further reduction in the monarch’s power.  Scattershot, the nation 
achieved a parliamentary unity, and this novel, democratized stability 
provided the conditions for the coming Industrial Revolution.
The English experience has been recounted in some detail 
because its innovations were crucial to the evolution of the middle 
classes.  Under Henry VIII and even Elizabeth I,100 the sovereign 
could control the economy by conferring mercantile monopolies on 
favored subjects.  This was the inspiration of the colonial ventures in 
Virginia and Pennsylvania.  Yet, as Protestantism grew, parliament 
became less indulgent in such matters.  Even so, because its members 
too wished to distribute largesse, there gradually arose a Whig 
squirearchy dedicated to serving its own interests.  Local magnates, 
in concert, asserted their ascendancy largely through control of 
parliament.  Some of the resources that brought them prominence 
came from the West Indies, but much of these were the result of 
an enclosure movement.  England had long been a commercial 
backwater.  It was a supplier of raw materials rather than a trading 
depot or industrial hub.  The enclosure movement, therefore, fenced 
in common lands that had once been open to the public so that 
they could be devoted to crop cultivation.  This provided surpluses 
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for the marketplace.  At the same time wool previously shipped to 
Flanders was rerouted to local production.  Previously, sheep, after 
being shorn, provided wool shipped to Flanders.  This brought 
the landowners into a money economy and gave them a stake in 
safeguarding market institutions.  Irrespective of the desires of the 
weakened monarchy, they had an interest in promoting legislation to 
protect their property rights.
Into this world burst the Scientific Revolution that constituted the 
intellectual underpinnings of the Enlightenment.  Galileo may have 
been Italian, but before the 17th century ended the center of gravity for 
scientific discoveries had shifted to London.  The home of the Royal 
Society, it became the switching center for the latest developments. 
With English ships beginning to establish the hegemony that would 
allow succeeding generations to sing of Britannia ruling the waves, the 
need to facilitate these journeys was acute.  This turned eyes skyward 
in the belief that the stars might provide the key to navigational 
accuracy.  The titan of the age was Isaac Newton,101 preceded by 
Francis Bacon and Rene Descartes, champions of empiricism and 
analytic geometry.  Newton created a breathtaking synthesis based 
on accurate observations and advanced mathematics.  His theory 
of gravity, coupled with the laws of motion and the discovery of 
integral calculus, explained the movements of the planets.  Johannes 
Kepler had revealed that planetary orbits were elliptical, but Newton 
educed why.  He calculated the moons’ wanderings so precisely that 
eclipses could be predicted and patterns of tides illuminated.  So 
exact were his measures that Edmond Halley could forecast that 
the comet named after him would return in seventy-five years.  For 
good measure, Newton even explained the refraction of light into 
rainbows.  So impressed were his contemporaries that Alexander 
Pope102 penned the immortal couplet, “Nature and Nature’s laws lay 
hid in night/God said, Let Newton be!  And all was Light.”
It is difficult to imagine a more pithy expression of the awe in 
which his achievements were held.  One also gains a sense of the 
emerging prestige of science.103  When, as recently as the lifetime 
of Galileo, the Church had been able to assert that empiricism was 
trivial compared with revelation, observation now loomed supreme. 
In essence, the rationality of business had triumphed.  Numbers used 
to bring order to commercial transactions were doing the same for 
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the universe.  Others besides Newton joined the hunt for secular 
knowledge.  Robert Hooke, secretary of the Royal Society, was his 
competitor in investigating gravity and optics; Robert Boyle was 
making progress regarding the compressibility of gasses; and across 
the channel, a draper, Anthony van Leeuwenhoek, had taken time 
from his shop to peer into a drop of water at the tiny animalcules 
swimming there.  Amateurs, later to be regarded as dilettantes, were 
on the cutting edge of this enterprise.104  Instrument makers, lawyers, 
and soldiers were involved.  Nothing less than a societywide mental 
reorganization had occurred, one that prefigured the professional 
expertise of the future.
Concurrent changes took place in philosophy, literature, and the 
law.  In philosophy, Thomas Hobbes105 pioneered a social contract 
theory of political relations.  Caught up in the turmoil of the English 
Civil War, he speculated that only a monarch could keep order among 
unruly individualists.  John Locke106 writing at the time of Glorious 
Revolution was, in contrast, an apologist for the parliament, not 
for the king.  A personal friend of Newton’s, he postulated thought 
processes based on mental associations.  As a confirmed empiricist, 
he provided a rationale for popular sovereignty.  Across the water in 
France, and almost a century later, Jean-Jacques Rousseau107 became 
the prophet of revolution.  Postulating a loving human nature,108 
he declared that government, which on the continent was still in 
the hands of the nobility, corrupted the innocent.  He preferred 
that general will guided communal decisions.  Either profoundly 
democratic or inchoately fascistic, this placed ordinary people at the 
center of the equation.  Philosophy too was on the verge of entering 
the marketplace.  Rousseau might be preaching to the aristocracy in 
their salons, but he was also selling pamphlets to a populace eager to 
hear of its prospective liberation.
Much of what was occurring had political implications.  France’s 
Voltaire109 was every inch the iconoclast, but also a friend of Frederick 
the Great of Prussia.  Meanwhile Jonathan Swift,110 an Anglican 
prelate in English-held Ireland, perfected the art of the satire.  More 
significantly, Scotland’s Adam Smith111 was heralding the advent 
of laissez-faire economics.  The cornerstone theorist of supply and 
demand, he perceived wealth as created in market transactions.112 
Denis Diderot, back in France, was trying to systematize all this into 
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a massive Encyclopedia, while William Blackstone was attempting to 
bring order to the perceived anarchy of English law.  Law, it should 
be noted, as emphasized by Montesquieu,113 was a theme of the time. 
His Spirit of the Laws underlined the desire for the neutrality of 
objective regulations.  Instead of the personal whims of the ruler 
deciding who received what, formal standards applied equally to 
all.  This rule of law, as opposed to a rule by men, eventually made 
democracy possible, but, as important, provided predictability within 
the marketplace.  Commerce was inherently uncertain; it did not need 
to be further complicated by the caprices of the powerful.  Reason 
needed to prevail everywhere, not just in the countinghouse.
Out in the field, innovations were piling up with dizzying 
alacrity.  Overland transportation had been revolutionized by road 
construction.  For the first time since the days of Rome, new corridors 
were being blazed for both stagecoaches and cargo wagons to wend 
their way.  Of still greater value to merchants were the canals being 
cut through the countryside.  Inland barge traffic could now carry 
volumes of freight previously confined to rivers and seas.  All this 
made for larger urban agglomerations.  Cities like London and Paris 
grew past their earlier limits, because their populations were fed from 
a broadened countryside.  Within their precincts further novelties 
promoted an explosion of business.  Thus coffeehouses sprouted to 
provide venues for discussing mutual interests and innovative ideas, 
such as the provision of insurance, were exchanged among patrons 
who sought to reduce the risks of the road.  These facilities also 
provided the foundations for a democratic chatter similar to that 
which once animated the Athenian agora.114
Coming in at the tail end of the Enlightenment was the American 
experiment.  Planted on the shore of a veritable wilderness but in 
communication with the old world by way of the sea, it produced a 
synthesis of European traditions and frontier improvements.  By its 
very nature populated by risk-takers, these colonials needed to find a 
way to tame their backwoods while simultaneously reproducing the 
amenities of the mother country.  Once more Benjamin Franklin 
is an exemplar of what was evolving.  Walter Isaacson115 describes 
Franklin’s antecedents thus: “During the late Middle Ages, a new 
class emerged in the villages of rural England: men who possessed 
property and wealth but were not members of the titled aristocracy. 
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Proud but without great pretension, assertive of their rights as 
members of an independent middle class, these freeholders came to 
be known as franklins, from the Middle English word ‘frankeleyn’ 
meaning freeman.”   Largely autonomous artisans and shopkeepers, 
these men (and women) managed their own affairs, often with 
considerable dignity.  Adam Smith was to refer to England as a 
nation of shopkeepers, and though this appellation was derisively 
hurled back at him, it denotes an admirable self-reliance.  It was this, 
rather than aristocratic pretensions, that were transplanted into the 
wilds of a new continent.
Franklin, it will be recalled, was a printer.  In this, he copied his 
brother in establishing a newspaper.  Both, however, were imitating 
earlier journals published in London, such as Joseph Addison’s The 
Spectator.116  In this, they revealed that a literate populace was in 
place on both sides of the Atlantic.  Evidently schooling sufficient 
to make reading common was of value in societies where books and 
pamphlets were readily available.  Education and the knowledge it 
provided were helpful within a commercial environment.  Information 
about what was for sale, what was on the political horizon, and where 
fresh opportunities might be found was eagerly sought.  Ordinary 
people wanted to know what was going on and what their neighbors 
were thinking.  So inquisitive they, so ravenous for data, they turned 
Franklin’s Poor Richard’s Almanac into a runaway bestseller.  He 
became the herald of the middle classes, not merely because to 
this was his community, but because tens of thousands of others 
shared his aspirations.  Theirs was a world of initiative and personal 
responsibility.  Franklin was well loved for the on-point advice he 
offered via deft, non-preachy, humor.  Unlike the nobility of old, he 
did not force his ideas on readers but allowed them to adopt what 
they would.
An anecdote told about Franklin illuminates what was 
happening to a nation on the threshold of becoming substantially 
middle class.  Between 1739 and 1741, George Whitefield toured 
the colonies sermonizing on behalf of Methodism.  In one of the 
crowds attracted to his Philadelphia crusade stood Franklin himself. 
At the time a deist not much enamored of organized religion, the 
great man was nevertheless mesmerized.  According to his own 
account he was so charmed that, much against his inclinations, he 
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ended up prepared to empty his pockets into the collection plate. 
His fellow Americans felt the same way.  Calls to comply with 
strict moral rules revitalized their faith during a colonywide episode 
labeled The Great Awakening.117  John Wesley had previously 
instigated a religious reform that provided a reason to trust strangers. 
To the degree that they were evangelized into following his method, 
they could be expected to keep their promises and to refrain from 
cheating.  Essentially a step in inculcating the internal disciplines 
critical to maintaining a continentwide marketplace, this converted 
his admirers into members of the same moral fraternity.
Not long afterwards, Thomas Jefferson118 participated in 
solidifying the foundations for political trust.  In the Declaration of 
Independence, following the lead of John Locke, he affirmed that 
ordinary people had the right to replace their ruler if he violated 
the compact wherein he promised them protection.  Tyrants could 
be overthrown because God had created everyone with equal rights 
to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.  Indeed, when these 
were infringed upon, citizens had a duty to rectify the situation. 
Jefferson almost went as far as Locke in declaring that they had 
a right to property as well.  Private ownership was so integral to 
the commercial communities in which both lived that it was 
unimaginable that the government could peremptorily violate that 
right.  With these assurances in place, both the merchant class and 
ordinary landowning citizens could rely on elected officials to refrain 
from despotism.  Having grown accustomed to regulating their daily 
affairs without undo intrusion, they had no intention of replacing 
one autocrat with another.119
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Chapter 5
Industrialization
So naturalists observe, a flea 
Hath smaller fleas that on him prey; 
And these have smaller still to bite ’em; 
And so proceed ad infinitum.  
(Jonathan Swift, On Poetry)
All systems of either preference or of restraint, therefore, 
being thus completely taken away, the obvious and simple 
system of natural liberty establishes itself of its own accord.  
Every man, as long as he does not violate the laws of 
justice, is left perfectly free to pursue his own interest his 
own way, and to bring his own industry and capital into 
competition with those of any other man or order of men.   
(Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations)
The Great Depression was a government failure, brought 
on principally by Federal Reserve policies that abruptly cut 
the money supply….  High unemployment lasted as long 
as it did because of New Deal policies that took money out 
of people’s pockets, disrupted the money supply, restricted 
production, harassed employers, destroyed jobs, discouraged 
investment, and subverted economic liberty needed for 
sustained business recovery.  (Jim Powell, FDR’s Folly)
Art is a revolt against fate.  (Andre Malraux, Voices of 
Silence)
The Industrial Revolution
Evidently based on Leeuwenhoek’s observations, Swift’s1 
understanding of fleas upon fleas neatly fits the nesting waves 
characteristic of the Commercial Revolution.  It also corresponds 
1    The Great Middle Class Revolution
with the many oscillations manifest within the Industrial Revolution.2 
Often reckoned to be a single cohesive movement, this period can 
be resolved into a series of succeeding intervals.  The details may be 
debated, but that there was a multistage progression cannot.  The 
social capital today so palpable within middle class was not a unitary 
achievement.  Rather, there were regular and advancing stages.
The self-direction and internalized discipline that allow for 
commercial and political decentralization did not appear spontaneously. 
They grew out of a sequence of innovations.  Emotional maturation, 
for instance, could only have evolved through a long series of shared 
experiences.  Adam Smith was wrong in asserting that a simple system 
of natural liberty establishes itself of its own accord.  An invisible 
hand may direct the marketplace, but even it could not operate 
without the preexistence of appropriate interpersonal conditions. 
To be more precise, whereas systems of preference and restraint 
are universal, the controls that keep them within specific channels 
take time to evolve.  Unfairness and coercion never completely fade 
away; hence, no one is ever perfectly free to pursue his unhampered 
interests, but how these interests express themselves depends on the 
rules and personal assets the players bring to the table.  The norms, 
values, and beliefs of societies and their members are significantly 
amended over time.  What is not possible in one era may become 
the conventional wisdom of another.  In truth, both internal and 
external controls mutate in accord with emerging social conditions, 
such that everyone, not just members of bureaucracies, live in quasi-
iron cages.  Of particular interest to the Middle Class Revolution is 
the normative emotional restraints that facilitate or deter particular 
forms of economic and political cooperation.  Of these, the evolution 
of expressive self-control was crucial to the emergence of bourgeois 
authority.  Only its arrival enabled ordinary human beings to work 
harmoniously on ever more complex tasks without submitting to 
tyrannical external constraints.
The unfolding of the Industrial Revolution was integral to 
this succession.  As the need to work with machines progressed, 
it imposed unprecedented demands.  These unfamiliar challenges 
nevertheless took many years to understand and assimilate.  It took 
decades and sometimes centuries for norms, values, and beliefs to 
make the unknown routine.3  It also took time for newly formed 
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alliances and institutions to tame apparently threatening innovations 
and to tamp down the extreme feelings that accompanied them. 
Until fear, overreaction, and denial could be overcome, mistakes were 
inevitable.  Daniel Chirot4 has speculated that this developmental 
sequence unfolded in a series of upheavals that succeeded each other 
as new technologies came forward.  The first wave began in England 
about the middle of the 18th century.5  It was launched because the 
preceding commercial explosion had dramatically increased the call 
for goods.  Not unnaturally, the suppliers of these commodities 
sought more effective means to take advantage of this opportunity. 
Among the innovations that sprang up were the use of coal to replace 
depleting stores of wood, iron smelting to replace more fragile non-
ferrous materials, and the steam engine to replace muscle power.  Of 
these, the steam engine was of paramount significance.  For the first 
time in history, a means had been found to inject almost boundless 
reserves of energy into the economy.  Prior to this, the number of 
human beings required to accomplish a task limited how much of it 
could be achieved.  Now, mindless pieces of machinery worked the 
day around.  People were relieved of traditional drudgery but in the 
process were reduced to tending these devices.  Some thought this a 
demotion; nevertheless, it allowed each worker to turn out far more 
goods than was possible previously. 
James Watt6 brought the steam engine, which began with 
Newcomen’s more inefficient contraption for pumping water out 
of mines, to commercial fulfillment.  Fueled by abundant coal and 
fabricated of newly available iron, it liberated production from the 
marginal locations to which industrialization had been confined. 
Previously, factories had been situated adjacent to rapidly flowing 
streams needed to turn millwheels.  These, not surprisingly, tended 
to be in upland regions where transportation was difficult.  Watt’s 
newfangled devices made it possible to build industrial plants in 
cities where labor was plentiful and where canals could bring in raw 
materials and carry away finished products.  Once more, the volume 
of trade took a leap forward.  The earliest applications of this advance 
were in the textile industry.  England had historically supplied wool 
to continental manufactories, but now James Hargreaves’s spinning 
jenny, Richard Arkwright’s water frame, Samuel Crompton’s mule, 
and Edmund Cartwright’s power loom introduced change.  With 
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this technology, raw fiber could be processed more efficiently at home 
than abroad.  As a result, the country quickly became the center of 
cloth manufacture for the entire world.
All this triggered a profusion of social changes.7  The growing 
output turned Midland towns like Manchester into booming 
cities and converted farm laborers into factory workers.  Textile 
production had previously depended on a putting-out system. 
Individual entrepreneurs carried unfinished materials to individual 
contractors who performed their discrete tasks in their own homes. 
But because the new machines required a central location, employees 
now had to journey to them, with home and work thereby separated 
as never before.  Likewise, the capitalists, that is, those who 
invested in the machines and organized their operations, became 
substantial personages.  As the nexus of production, they exercised 
more influence than had their predecessors.  Flushed with success, 
they unleashed further waves of entrepreneurial spirit.  Ambitious 
individuals now sought the main chance in the marketplace rather 
than the battlefield.  These formerly anonymous souls hoped to grow 
rich and powerful by coming up with ingenious ideas.  Ordinary 
life was similarly revolutionized.  To begin with, the new cheaper 
cloth supplanted the homespuns of yore.  Average people could now 
purchase store-bought materials for less, thereby elevating the quality 
of their daily lives.  No longer were they limited to the products they 
could produce with their own hands.
Over in France, another sort of revolution was brewing.8 
The French looked with envy toward England, hitherto deemed 
inferior.9   Across the ocean in the United States, they also perceived 
the rapid advances of an upstart democracy they had helped 
install.  Unfortunately, bankrolling American independence had 
put a strain on French finances.  This exacerbated an economic dip 
that energized a growing discontent with the country’s governing 
absolutism.  Sparked at first by an entrepreneurial aristocracy that 
hoped to benefit by restricting the monarchy, this dissatisfaction was 
soon appropriated by the bourgeoisie. Through the agency of the 
Estates-General, it managed to topple the ancient regime.  Although 
inexperienced in the ways of democracy, these ambitious parvenus 
manipulated the Paris rabble into becoming the cannon fodder for 
their coup.  In the process, cartloads of heads were severed from 
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their bodies, and the nobility was sent scurrying for the safety of the 
borders, all in the name of liberty, equality, and fraternity.10  
Into this turmoil rode Napoleon Bonaparte.11  After taming the 
passions of the street, he directed his fellow’s interests and energies 
outward toward the conquest of an empire.  Since the efficacy of 
his armies depended on harnessing an insipient patriotism, perhaps 
his greatest achievement was getting ordinary Frenchmen to identify 
with the interests of the nation.  Without millions of individually 
motivated citizens ready to die to expand their nation’s borders, he 
could not have swept away the detritus of European autocracy.  As 
Emperor, he also ostensibly made the rule of law supreme by means of 
the Code Napoleon.  Not he, but the people, were now theoretically 
in charge.  A nation of former peasants came to perceive itself as on 
the vanguard of democratization.  This idea, if not its reality, was 
clearly implanted in the collective psyche.  In fact, it was nationalism 
that had been firmly established.  The individual French became the 
collective French and not merely a collection of disparate provincials. 
Concomitantly, the glory of their subsequent victories instilled a 
nascent nationalism among the defeated Germans and Italians.
England meanwhile had been drawn into this continentwide 
conflict.  Regarded by the Emperor as his chief adversary, it was 
able to sustain the struggle in part due to its industrial and financial 
superiority.  The British had earlier created a national bank to 
oversee its currency.  This could now be turned to generating the 
loans that kept its military in the field.  Contemporaries were 
terrified of the debt thereby acquired, but the cumulative effect 
was to keep the economy and government running.  Once more, 
by inadvertence, an innovative means of sustaining commerce had 
come into being.   In addition, Britain’s parliamentary institutions 
were found more resilient than their French counterparts.  They, and 
not their more radical continental competitors, were the genuine 
pioneers of democracy.  After the dust of the Napoleonic period 
settled, the French too realized the virtues of industrialization, if 
not of democratization.  Though briefly returned to a monarchial 
government, old-line aristocrats such as Saint-Simon12 advocated 
science and technology as a method for catching up with their old 
enemy.  The trouble was that he, and many of his countrymen, took 
a romantic approach to this task.  Instead of the pragmatics of the 
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marketplace, they were fascinated with utopian communities where 
an idealized spirit of cooperation would provide the edge.
On the other side of the Atlantic, more sweeping innovations 
were occurring.13  Almost every contemporary who contemplated 
these matters was convinced that the new nation would forever 
remain an agricultural storehouse.  Blessed with what seemed 
unbroken horizons, there was too much cheap land to make industry 
feasible.  It would clearly be more economical to import finished 
goods from Europe.  One small ripple of dissent was furnished by 
cotton.  This inexpensive fiber had become enormously profitable as 
the Midlands textile mills cranked up their operations.  But it also 
became more plentiful once Eli Whitney’s cotton gin could remove 
the seeds from unprocessed bales.  Since the trading interests of the 
East Coast did not want to be left behind, they clamored for textile 
factories of their own.  These shortly make New England a facsimile 
of its namesake.  
The patron of these protoindustrialists was Alexander Hamilton.14 
The emergent government’s first Secretary of the Treasury, he 
anticipated the eventual arrival of prosperous manufactories.  To 
prepare their way, he insisted that the federal government assume the 
debts incurred by the separate states during the American Revolution.15 
His rationale was that fiscal responsibility would create strong credit 
and that this was good for business.  In his view, financial stability 
would enable businessmen to borrow the money they needed to 
expand and provide the permanence to predict market conditions.16 
In short order, Hamilton was proved right.  The budding American 
industries emulated, and even stole, British technology.  Among their 
best moves was to develop techniques for fabricating interchangeable 
machine parts.  This allowed the assembly of mechanically superior 
and, therefore, competitive products—among which were to be 
breach loading rifles.
Within two decades, a member of the French nobility reported 
on what he observed in the former colonies.  Alexis de Tocqueville17 
ventured across the ocean ostensibly to study the new nation’s 
prison system.  His real concern, however, was in determining what 
made American democracy successful.18  Uncomfortably aware that 
equality had not taken root in his own country, he was obsessed 
with discovering the cause.  Too young to have witnessed his nation’s 
Industrialization    1
revolution, he was nevertheless infected with its liberal aspirations. 
In his travels across the United States, the young man encountered 
a myriad of surprises.  One was the egalitarian comportment of the 
population.  Even ordinary workers would approach him as a peer. 
Unlike their French counterparts, they would shake his hand and 
greet him like a long lost brother.  Evidently, believing that all men 
were created equal had spilled into their politics.   De Tocqueville 
sourly noted that even an illiterate backwoodsman such as Davy 
Crockett could get elected to Congress.
Another phenomenon commented upon by de Tocqueville was 
that these people were addicted to self-help associations.19  Much in 
the manner of Ben Franklin, they, on their own initiative, united 
to solve common problems.  They became members of fraternal 
organizations, the Grange, the Masons,20 political parties, chambers 
of commerce, and school boards.  If, in rural Michigan, there was 
no school for their children to attend, they came together to build 
one.  They did not wait for the central government to act but 
inaugurated the enterprise themselves.  Evidently, in a nation as 
large as theirs, excessive dependence on a central authority would 
have been unproductive.  Washington was simply too far away.  This 
decentralization had several other effects.  First, in cooperating to 
help themselves, ordinary people gained experience in democratic 
action.  They learned how to negotiate with one another and to make 
the concessions to get things done.  Second, they developed a sense 
of independence.  The frontier, in requiring them to face dangers 
with the resources on hand, promoted both cooperation and a 
sturdy individualism.21  Third, this need for self-reliance encouraged 
pragmatism.  Americans came to pride themselves on their know-
how.  Since most jobs got done only when they did them, they made 
sure that what they did worked.
Closely related to this orientation was a rampant commercialism.22 
The shipping interests on the east coast needed to be assertive if they 
were going to carve out markets in a world dominated by more 
powerful nations.  As a result, they took delight in an entrepreneurial 
spirit that contributed to their reputation as Yankee traders.  Out in 
the hinterland a similar disposition was taking shape.  Speculation in 
land, and the products that came from it, was rife.  Everyone dreamed 
of striking it rich long before the advent of the California gold rush. 
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This produced the side effect of muting jealousy of the wealthy.  One 
day they too would move from their present homestead, to where 
they would build the mills that would make their fortunes.  Crockett 
attempted this and nearly succeeded.  Social mobility was a universal 
birthright.  People did not passively accept their fates, but actively 
prepared for better ones.
De Tocqueville was also much taken by the common culture 
that enabled people to move a thousand miles from home and 
still interact with their neighbors.  North and South, East and 
West, all spoke the same language.  Being able to understand what 
strangers said made everyone feel part of a single extended family. 
As significant were shared values.  In addition to a common desire 
to grow rich, they honored a common religious tradition.  More 
than their Protestantism, they had inherited a legacy of religious 
toleration.  With no established church (as there had been in France) 
people enjoyed a freedom of conscience they were pleased to extend 
to others.  Most were quite sincere in their faiths, but also sincere in 
their respect for a plethora of distinct denominations.  Then, too, 
there was litigiousness.  Americans were prepared to sue one another 
at the drop of a hat.  This might seem to betoken an antidemocratic 
divisiveness, but as Tocqueville recognized, it indicated the opposite. 
Ordinary Americans had faith in their courts.  They believed that their 
laws were just and fairly administered.  Able to participate as jurors, 
they readily submitted their grievances to outsiders for resolution. 
This had the effect of containing potential conflicts.  In a mobile 
country continuously becoming more populous, these traditions 
enabled its populace to live in peace without everyone’s belonging to 
the same church or acquiescing to a shared overlord.
Occurring at about the time of Tocqueville’s journey was The 
Second Great Awakening.23  This religious revival was evangelical 
in the manner of its predecessor but more ecumenical.  As 
industrialization spread across the land, a more secular-oriented 
religion began to assert an internal discipline more appropriate to the 
changed conditions.  In places like Rochester, New York,24 factories 
were growing commonplace.  By the 1820s this upstate town 
was one of the fastest developing cities in the country, its fortune 
founded on an auspicious location astride the falls of the Genesee 
River.  Surrounded by flat plains perfect for cultivating wheat and 
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intersected by the newly constructed Erie Canal, it was ideal for 
grinding grain into flour, then shipping it to the trading centers down 
the Hudson.  The transformation that began this voyage occurred in 
mills powered by water which were reasonably large operations the 
profitability of which was contingent upon keeping the machinery 
running.  Like most factories, they required workmen who arrived 
on time and preformed their duties dependably.  They could not be 
drunk, lest they fall into the gears and clog the works.
The trouble was that imbibing alcohol had been a frontier 
tradition.  With transportation limited, turning grain into spirits, 
then consuming roughly three times as much as modern Americans 
do, was the norm.  This is where the interests of evangelicals appeared. 
They were invited to towns by business interests to preach temperance. 
Workers who went to church instead of the saloon would be better 
for the bottom line.  This began a century-long alliance between 
industrialists and the religious.  Because industrialization required 
internal controls not only from the capitalists but also from the 
workforce, sacred motives were used to instill secular virtues.  These 
commercially requisite emotional restraints did not arise because 
those involved recognized their rationality.  Quite the reverse, for 
preexisting emotional commitments were redirected into novel 
channels.
At its early stages, many thought industrialization could not 
be tamed.25  The thinkers theorized about a need to withdraw into 
family-like utopian communities.26  Not only Saint-Simon,27 but 
Charles Fourier in France and Robert Owen in Britain attempted 
to organize such ventures.  Fourier’s ideal inspired Brook Farm and 
Owen’s prompted the founding of New Lanark in Scotland and New 
Harmony in Indiana.  Each of these places seemed at first to be a 
refuge for souls determined to salvage human decency from the hard-
heartedness of the marketplace.  If the goal of making money was to 
convert human beings into extensions of the machine, perhaps it was 
better to renounce the whole project.  The Luddites28 might have 
been too extreme in attempting to destroy Nottingham’s knitting 
machines, but peaceful cooperation among like-minded individuals 
might prove the epitome of what seemed to be a reasonable idealism. 
Sadly, these experiments in anti-industrialism collapsed.  Members 
simply could not cooperate for the long run.  Nevertheless, they 
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heralded a romantic reaction to the march of commercialism.  The 
Industrial Revolution had so disturbed social relationships that a 
widespread desire to undo it had emerged, one that has reverberated 
into the twenty-first century.
The Victorians
Queen Victoria29 came to the British throne at the end of the 
1830s.  By this time, industrialism was firmly established in her 
country.  Though she surely did not intend it, she was to become the 
symbol of the next stage of its evolution.  In 1840, just having entered 
her twenties, she married her first cousin, Prince Albert of Saxe-
Coberg-Gotha.  Though she was at first reluctant, she settled into a 
committed domesticity that became an example for her middle-class 
subjects.  A devoted wife and mother, she ceded many of her powers 
to her consort.  When Albert died in 1861, her grief was inconsolable. 
She immediately withdrew from public life, dressed in black for the 
rest of her life.  When she reemerged into view, after a prolonged 
period of mourning, she came to be regarded as an affectionate 
mother figure.30  She was the embodiment of respectability, and 
her dedication to moral behavior became synonymous with her era. 
Victorianism, now thought of largely as sexual restraint, was in its 
time more closely associated with family values.
Also symbolic of her reign was an undertaking of Prince Albert’s. 
He planned and implemented the Crystal Palace Exposition in 1851. 
Essentially a World’s Fair, it was a celebration of the nation’s industrial 
achievements.  By this time, Great Britain was far ahead of the rest 
of the world; hence, the idea was to showcase its ingenuity and 
productivity.31  The building in which the exhibitions were situated, 
i.e., the Crystal Palace, was itself a singular demonstration of power. 
Built of cast iron and glass, it would not have been possible without 
recent advances in technology.  It would not even have been possible 
to amass that much iron.  Another aspect of the extravaganza was 
equally revealing.  One of the public’s favorite attractions was a garden 
featuring sculptures of dinosaurs.  These were crude affairs, not really 
representative of the huge reptiles upon which they were supposedly 
modeled.   Nevertheless they made an enormous statement.  Not only 
had technology been stimulated by industrialization, so had science. 
Everywhere people were digging into the earth for construction 
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projects, but also from curiosity.  Indeed, curiosity was the hallmark 
of an age in which prosperity opened a wider world to individuals 
who increasingly felt able to master it.  When they unexpectedly 
encountered huge bones, they had the confidence and the knowledge 
to identify these as belonging to long deceased animals.  Where pious 
ancestors suspected similar finds belonged to biblical giants, geology 
now taught them better. 
Approximately twenty years before the Exposition there had 
been a glitch in the march forward.  Before industrialization, periods 
of economic distress had plagued society, but these were generally 
associated with events such as famines and wars.  Now, the business 
cycle swung into operation.  As Daniel Chirot32 explains, one of the 
worst of these reversals occurred when the market for textiles was 
temporarily saturated.  Entrepreneurs had simply produced more 
than the market was prepared to absorb.  Watching this event, a 
German university student named Karl Marx observed the suffering 
of workers who were losing their jobs, and he concluded that this was 
due to contradictions inherent in capitalism.33  In their greed, business 
owners had attempted to wring excess profits from the sweat of their 
wage slaves’ brows.   Against all reason or justice, the actual producers 
of wealth were left to absorb the pain of their bosses’ mistakes. 
Marx’s solution was to encourage laborers to throw off the yokes of 
their oppressors.34  Once they realized they were being exploited, 
they could band together to eliminate the property ownership that 
was the underlying cause of their discomfort.  Then, they could 
exercise joint ownership through the good offices of a government 
they controlled.  After this, thanks to their intrinsic goodwill, they 
would cooperate for the benefit of all.  The increased productivity 
initiated by the bourgeoisie would thereby be channeled to its true 
creators, and everyone would gain access to what was necessary for 
personal comfort.  Machines would finally be harnessed to the needs 
of human beings, rather than the other way around.
Marx’s message resonated with his contemporaries because the 
dislocations of economic progress discomfited so many of them.  The 
proliferating factories and cities displaced millions from traditional 
employments.  No longer living in the countryside, people found 
that the cultural imperatives that had dictated the tempo of their 
daily routines lost their authority.  As we shall also see with respect 
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to the middle-class developments of the twentieth century, changes 
in lifestyle have a cultural lag.  The old rules cease to apply to what 
people are doing or how they are interacting before newer, more 
appropriate ones have yet to emerge.  This leaves individuals adrift. 
They are uncertain where to turn but clamor for answers that might 
provide a sense of security.  The collectivist visions of the communists 
and socialists furnished consolation.  They explained, with what was 
declared to be scientific exactitude, what was happening and where it 
was destined to lead.  They also provided an enemy to hate.  Because 
it is easier for people to cope with human malice than with economic 
and sociological imperatives, vast numbers were happy to embrace 
a story that focused their wrath in a tangible direction.  In the long 
run, this might not help them adjust to the emergent circumstances, 
but it supplied temporary relief.
In any event, the economy was about to roar forward once again. 
A new wave of technological innovations provided the impetus for 
further growth.  Foremost among these developments were those in 
transportation35 and communication.36  Earlier in the century, the 
steam engine had been applied to running cars on rails and powering 
boats through the water.  Toward the middle of the century, the train 
and the steamboat came to prominence.  They opened vast markets 
within continents and ultimately across the seas.  Fulton’s37 invention 
converted the Mississippi River into a broad avenue of commerce and 
coastal waters into conduits of produce.  Where before barges could 
float raw materials down to New Orleans, it now became possible for 
paddleboats to carry finished goods up river to Cincinnati and St. 
Louis.  A flurry of railroad construction extended this activity.  With 
tracks stretched from the east coast to Kansas, cattle were driven 
from the Texas plains all the way to New York City’s Delmonico’s 
Restaurant.  Americans acquired a taste for beef and for mechanical 
inventions—such as reaping machines.  Since these could be shipped 
anywhere by rail, markets mushroomed everywhere and, with 
them, the potential for profits.  One who took advantage of these 
opportunities was Commodore Cornelius Vanderbilt.38  From his 
beginnings as a poor boy in Staten Island, New York, he assembled a 
fleet of ferries, then one of oceangoing craft, and finally a network of 
railroads.  In the end, he became synonymous with wealth.
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Another innovation of the age was the telegraph.39  It allowed 
immediate communication over huge distances, which was to come 
in handy in coordinating the operations of the railroads.  Later came 
the telephone, which permitted voice communication over vast 
expanses.  That device seemed so miraculous that it was featured 
at Philadelphia’s Centennial Exposition of 1876.  This celebration 
of a hundred years of independence was modeled on the Crystal 
Palace and was America’s proclamation that it had come of industrial 
age.  All sorts of mechanical inventions were on display.  Of equal 
note, however, was the coming of steel.  This tougher version of 
iron, which could now be cheaply smelted, was more versatile.  Its 
introduction led to a frenzy of skyscraper construction.  Likewise, 
crude oil, extracted from the ground, now replaced whale oil.  Initially 
refined into kerosene for lamps, it contributed the fuel for internal 
combustion engines.  In the process, Andrew Carnegie40 and John D. 
Rockefeller41 came to rival Vanderbilt in their fortunes.42
With this rush of commercialism came a multiplication in scale. 
Back in Franklin’s day, business was conducted from storefronts.43 
Tradesmen’s goods were displayed and vended in spaces open to the 
streets, while journeymen in the back rooms fabricated the products. 
Upstairs, the families of owners and his family had their apartments. 
With burgeoning production came not only a separation of the 
factory from the home, but of the salesroom from the factory.  The 
centers of what came to be much larger cities sprouted business 
districts replete with department stores.  Ordinary people could now 
take streetcars to patronize multistory structures dedicated solely to 
marketing a widening variety of items.  Clothing, food, and sundries 
of all sorts were suddenly available in one location.  This enabled 
millions of people to reside within the same municipalities.  Both in 
Europe and the United States, Westerners were becoming urbanites.
Unfortunately, cities had historically been sinks for disease.44 
People in close proximity transmitted communicable diseases with 
frightening speed.  In the past, the solution had been for prosperous 
citizens to retreat to country estates, but now there were too many 
people of modest or smaller means.  Increasingly, lethal epidemics 
needed to be controlled.  In this, the scientific advances accompanying 
the technological ferment provided the answers.  Intentional 
investigations demonstrated that pestilences such as cholera were 
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spread by infected water supplies.  With innumerable outhouses 
leaching germs into the soil and this witches’ brew trickling into 
rivers and wells from which public drinking water was drawn, a cycle 
of death was inevitable.  Once this was understood, city fathers began 
investing in sewer systems to conduct the offending agents elsewhere. 
Good hygiene became the order of the day.45  It was at this point that 
people began saying that cleanliness was next to godliness.  Where 
previously baths were the exception, and even grandees covered their 
body odor with generous doses of perfume, now everyone including 
working people began to take weekly soakings.
Hygiene also extended to medicine.  At the turn of the century, 
physicians ridiculed midwives for washing their hands before 
delivering infants.  They considered this insistence on sanitary 
conditions a superstition and saw no difficulty in moving with 
bloodstained fingers from one operation to the next.  Paradoxically, as 
science became more prominent, this meant that a greater proportion 
of middle class women went to the hospital to give birth.  The result 
was a rise in rates of septicemia.  This epidemic provided a stimulus 
for the rise of the germ theory of disease.  Animalcules had long been 
known to pervade the environment, but their connection with illness 
had been dismissed out of hand.  Now a variety of investigators, 
some with medical and others with chemical credentials, postulated 
such a linkage.  A Hungarian physician named Ignaz Semmelweis 
sounded the alarm about puerperal fever and agitated for doctors 
to wash their hands.  Meanwhile, Louis Pasteur,46 a Frenchman 
whose pasteurization preserved his nation’s beer industry, disproved 
the spontaneous generation of microscopic creatures, while also 
demonstrating their agency in causing rabies.  Robert Koch, a 
German country practitioner, likewise invented stains to make visible 
the bacterial sources of tuberculosis and cholera.  In short, modern 
medicine was born, with all its ensuing benefits for life expectancy 
and personal comfort.
Other biological breakthroughs also occurred.  The cell theory 
of large creatures became well established, with its implications for 
anatomy and physiology.  As important was the introduction of a 
viable theory of evolution.  For more than a century there had been 
speculations that complex animals developed from simpler ones. 
This made sense in light of concurrent advances in geology.47  A close 
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inspection of the rocks convinced prudent observers that the earth 
was older than the six thousand years Bishop Ussher had proclaimed. 
The up-and-coming gradualist hypotheses proposed that features 
such as river valleys came into existence by being continuously and 
uniformly eroded.  Divine interventions would not be necessary if 
one judged from the perceptible environmental processes.  These 
hypotheses also made the geological strata of alternating stone 
formations explicable.  This, in turn, called for an elucidation of the 
fossils that kept turning up.  These seemed to be stacked as in a 
layer cake, with the simple at the bottom and the more complex near 
the top.  If this sequence was related to time, and common sense 
said there must be millions of years of time involved, then, animal 
morphology would likely be modified.  The problem was that there 
did not seem to be a mechanism for bringing about these changes. 
It was this dilemma to which Charles Darwin48 addressed himself. 
The suggestion that a competition for survival weeded out some 
creatures, while bolstering the existence of others, was electrifying. 
Natural selection is what Darwin called this process, and it converted 
the mysterious into the palpable.
Also mysterious were the myriad peoples discovered in 
remote corners of the globe.  Unbridled commercialization sent 
traders to formerly inaccessible regions.  At the beginning, there 
strange inhabitants were treated as nuisances.  With the advent of 
imperialism, however, such consideration was impractical.49  The 
natives could not all be exterminated; they had to be governed.  But 
to be governed, they had to be understood.  No longer were travelers’ 
tales of faraway wonders sufficient.  Science must be brought to 
bear,50 as it was with the invention of anthropology.51  Meticulous 
scrutiny of unfamiliar ways of life provided insights beyond those 
held by the ancient Greeks.  Of particular utility was the concept of 
culture.52  Preliterate people could now be understood as possessing 
techniques for coping with diverse environments.  Instead of being 
dismissed as savages, their humanity could be appreciated in context. 
By the next century, this would progress to ideas of cultural and 
ethical relativism.  All perspectives then would be declared equally 
valid, with no overarching criteria available to discriminate among 
them.
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Also laying the foundation for developments was modern 
chemistry.53  The Greeks had introduced an atomic theory of matter, 
but it was during the Victorian era that the modern atomic theory 
took root, leading to veritable land rush to discover new elements. 
Having determined that recognizable materials joined together in 
measurable ratios to form compounds with emergent properties, 
scientists scrutinized the details of these chemical reactions.  As 
significant were associated advances in electricity.  Franklin was 
celebrated for having elucidated the nature of electrical currents, 
and Luigi Galvani had invented the electrical battery, but now 
Humphrey Davy connected the two with his investigations into 
electrochemistry.  Hard on his heels came Michael Faraday’s 
invention of the electric motor and, later, James Clerk Maxwell’s 
discoveries regarding electromagnetism.  Most exhilarating of all was 
Thomas Alva Edison’s54 fabrication of a practical electric light.  The 
arc light and the limelight had already made appearances, but they 
were not suitable for domestic employment.  Edison’s was, and it 
revolutionized society.  Here was another fundamental source of non-
human energy.  For the moment, mostly a curiosity, within decades 
it was to contribute momentum for another wave of industrialism.
All of these changes had repercussions for how business was 
done.  The glimmerings of industrial discipline present during the 
Second Great Awakening became a roaring bonfire as the factory 
system accelerated.  Definitely in America, but also in England, 
reforms piled upon reforms, generally with the goal of developing 
a more reliable workforce.  Isolated objections to imbibing alcohol 
escalated to crusades against demon rum.55  Before the century was 
out, the temperance movement was a regular feature of middle-class 
sobriety.  Neither businessmen who calculated figures nor laborers 
who ran machines could afford the sloppiness which accompanied 
intoxication.  Drunkenness was not rational; it was not profitable. 
Nor was alcoholism good for family life.  This most salient of Victorian 
institutions was threatened by bibulous husbands who would not 
uphold their responsibilities as breadwinners nor refrain from beating 
their wives when under the influence.  This was proclaimed society’s 
foremost problem,56 especially when immigrants57 from across the sea 
or the surrounding countryside began to congregate in inner cities. 
Everyone knew these communities were rife with drunkenness.58  It 
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was, therefore, imperative to civilize their inhabitants by teaching the 
rudiments of abstinence.
Also of momentous import was abolitionism.59  Holding 
slaves was the birthright of the United States60 and the foundation 
of the British textile industry.  In America, the founding fathers 
contemplated abolishing the institution,61 but the greed of Southern 
aristocrats forbade it.  Nevertheless, the logic of commercialism 
militated against slavery.  Both in Britain and in its former colonies, 
the swelling ranks of factory workers resented the competition from 
unpaid labor.  In order to get people from the land and working 
the machines, they had to be compensated.  Bondsmen could 
not be machine tenders because they were not motivated to be 
vigilant.  Slave labor had always been notoriously inefficient, but 
this did not matter when there was no alternative.62  But mechanical 
energy changed this situation.  Conscientious freemen working for 
wages in steam-driven factories could produce far more than sullen 
chattel driven by the whip.  The very success of the marketplace in 
increasing the demand for goods undercut the source of power.  As a 
consequence, there was agitation against slavery.  Ordinary workers 
loathed the peculiar institution63 because they saw it as a menace to 
their earning power.  But even the commercial elites were arrayed 
against it.  They might like the idea of cheap cotton, but they knew 
that real wealth was being generated on the factory floor, not on the 
Southern plantation.
Like temperance, a religious ideology impelled the abolitionists.64 
Despite biblical references honoring slavery, people now interpreted 
shackling others in bondage as against God’s will.65  In America, 
sermons were preached all across the North.  This moral indignation 
motivated the efforts that provided the muscle for the Civil War.66 
What is as interesting was the nature of this religiosity.  A more 
homogenized and secularized Christianity had evolved to lead the 
attack.  Today religion has often been thought of a conservative 
force, but this was not the case in the 19th century.  Activists 
modified the fire-and-brimstone tirades of Puritan forebears to serve 
a more worldly purpose.  As is common in human history, these 
people adapted the tools at hand to novel circumstances.  Their new 
civic religion employed generalized spiritual objectives to promote 
secular goals.  A universalized belief in a merciful God, one that fit 
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comfortably into most Protestant denominations, could be publicly 
proclaimed without offending particular doctrines.  As significantly, 
it could tap into a desire to do good that had been reoriented toward 
an innovative definition of what was good.67
This malleable religiosity was also directed toward the centerpiece 
of Victorian morality.68  As earlier mentioned, the 19th century is 
now identified with a prudish sexuality.69  Husbands and wives were 
certainly urged to remain faithful to each other and their children. 
The use of sexualized language, the promulgation of nude pictures, 
and, most especially, the practice of prostitution were discouraged. 
Truly strenuous efforts, extending to those by England’s Prime 
Minister Gladstone,70 were undertaken to reform prostitutes and 
to close down the houses of ill repute.  Even masturbation was 
suppressed.  Children were told that playing with themselves led 
to blindness or insanity.  Only wholesome sex within marriage was 
sanctioned.  The missionary position was the lone honorable one, 
and women, as everyone knew, were to participate in coitus from 
duty, not for pleasure.  Marriage was sanctified by God.71  This meant 
that having children out of wedlock was strictly forbidden.  Though 
hampered by their poverty, the poor too believed in marital fidelity 
and actively sought the prestige of respectability.  This was promoted 
from pulpits, by politicians, and by neighbors.  Sexual restraint was 
considered a sign of broad restraints.  It indicated that a person was 
self-disciplined and, therefore, trustworthy.  Critics of the Victorians 
tend to disparage this public virtue as hypocritical, but the level of 
illegitimacy during this period was, in fact, dramatically reduced 
from what it had been.
The family became sacrosanct because it was the anchor of 
capitalistic achievement.  Victoria, and her apparently straight-
laced brood, were symbols of domestic stability.72  They modeled 
the calm dependability needed if budding industrialists were to keep 
their fortunes intact.  Money earned could not safely be bequeathed 
to a raucous crowd of bastards.  It had to be conferred on progeny 
who knew what to do with it.  In former times, land could be 
willed to rowdy heirs who kept the lineage going merely by being 
its caretakers.  The complexity of industrial operations made this 
strategy impossible.  Children needed to be groomed in the internal 
disciplines necessary to direct these agglomerations.73  Only a close-
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knit family characterized by love and careful supervision could instill 
what was required.  Thus conventional wisdom held that families 
that ate together, interacted together, and socialized together, stayed 
together.  Sunday mornings were to be spent in the family pew, 
while evenings were to be dedicated to singing lively songs beside the 
family piano.  Ironically, the family home simultaneously became 
a bastion for personal privacy.  The goal was to have what Virginia 
Woolf74 later celebrated as a room of one’s own in which one could 
think private thoughts, privately defended.  This was epitomized by a 
fad for diary-keeping.75   In these precious volumes pubescent young 
women and ambitious older men alike poured secret sentiments, 
thereby both elevating their importance and enabling them to analyze 
their significance.  The ultimate objective of all of this was not merely 
to pass along technical knowledge but also to infuse an emotional 
attachment to upholding family dignity in individuals who were 
eventually to be their own people.  Only this sort of demonstrative 
intimacy could produce the level-headed loyalties and independent 
decision making that had become so imperative.
An obsession with personal dignity was likewise expressed in the 
clothing styles of the period.76  The now familiar distinction between 
white- and blue-collar workers originated among the Victorians. 
Not unexpectedly, both the new entrepreneurs and their middle-
class minions performed most of their tasks in offices.  As such, they 
prided themselves on a clean environment.  Whereas factory workers 
became greasy, stainless raiments declared that office workers did 
not.  Always neatly starched, their detachable collars remained 
spotless.  Also emblematic of status was the wearing of suits and ties. 
So significant were these external advertisements of prominence that 
many upwardly mobile families dressed formally for dinner.  Female 
fashions too mirrored a desire for formality.  Elegant dresses, fitted 
over corseted bodies, bespoke a dedication to following the rules, 
irrespective of the discomfort in doing so.  A high point of this trend 
was the bustle.  Uncomfortable in the extreme, it did not allow for 
ease in sitting.  Nevertheless it was proof of a Victorian gentleman’s 
financial success that his wife and daughters did not have to engage 
in manual labor in order to add to their income.  Likewise the tassels 
in their overstuffed living rooms confirmed prosperity and decorum. 
The level of maintenance these items demanded demonstrated the 
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presence of substantial resources and also the absence of the wild 
behavior that might destroy their delicate orderliness.
Marx would have us believe that the nascent middle classes 
consisted of ink stained clerks who were becoming impoverished, 
but the evidence is otherwise.  One sure marker of the growing 
power of these classes was the spread of democracy.  It was not for 
naught that the Statue of Liberty became emblematic of an entire 
nation.  If Napoleon needed to inspire his soldiers by giving them 
the appearance of liberty, industrial workers required something 
more substantial.  If they were to care about their jobs, they needed 
an assurance of independence.  Laborers who lacked a feeling 
of autonomy performed with as little diligence as slaves.  Roman 
citizenship earlier put the steel into redoubtable legions; democratic 
citizenship did the same for growing industries.  The result was a 
dispersal of the franchise.  Where pre-Revolutionary America 
insisted upon property ownership for voting rights, suffrage became 
universal on both sides of the Atlantic in the 19th century.  Political 
leaders might still be drawn from the elites, but they needed to widen 
their appeal to get elected.  Soon enough, the wealthy would find 
themselves seeking public influence through the mediation of more 
modestly born politicians.
Women, too, were becoming aware and involved.  Their suffrage 
did not come to fruition immediately, but agitation in its favor 
was vigorous.  With larger numbers of women working outside the 
home, suffrage was to become a practical necessity.  The more their 
contributions were required in commercial ventures, the more likely 
they were to insist on independent voices.  The changing of the 
gender guard began with teenaged females in New England textile 
plants, but in short order spread to factory offices.  The invention of 
the typewriter gave the impetus to the rights of the distaff secretary, 
exemplified by the superior fine motor skills of women.  Similar 
reasons brought married women to work in the garment trades.  In 
this case, it was the introduction of the sewing machine that placed a 
premium on manual dexterity.  Women also began to migrate into the 
teaching professions as an expansion of education demanded more 
teachers.  Added to this was the bicycle.  As the historian Gertrude 
Himmelfarb77 points out, its appearance facilitated female autonomy 
by permitting unfettered movement.  Cheaper than carriages, and 
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more compact, bicycles enabled a woman to jump on board and 
pedal to the market without asking her husband’s permission.  
Also fundamentally democratic was the introduction of the civil 
service.78  When governments were small and their contributions to 
prosperity marginal, many jobs were allocated as patronage plums. 
In the United States, this translated into positions for individuals 
who helped politicians get elected.   This, however, was inadequate 
for technologically sophisticated tasks.  Hiring friends and cronies 
likewise imperiled fiscal responsibility.  The all-purpose label for 
these nepotistic shenanigans was corruption79 and it was increasingly 
despised.  Alliances within a commercial society, and all the more in 
an industrial one, were contingent on competence.  What was being 
discovered was that graft and competence were largely incompatible. 
The consequence of public contempt for these abuses were civil-
service reforms that made employment conditional on passing 
appropriate examinations.  Qualifications were to be tested, not 
assumed.  Objectively certified abilities would allow people to rise to 
the positions for which they were prepared.
So hectic did economic activity become that the era immediately 
succeeding the Civil War became known as the Gilded Age.80 
Speculation was so intense that within a few years the United 
States overtook England as the world’s richest industrial state.  The 
Rockefellers and the Fisks gained the reputation for being robber 
barons who accumulated obscenely large fortunes.  Their monopolies 
were so inclusive that it seemed their power would eclipse that of 
the government.  The upshot was a competition between laissez-
faire policies and a desire to tame the trusts.  Capitalistic affluence 
seemed to endorse Adam Smith’s81 belief that complete liberty for 
businesspeople meant liberty and prosperity for everyone.  However, 
the ability of Rockefeller to dictate oil prices was manifestly 
dangerous.82  One man, however well intended, could not be allowed 
to be that arbitrary and potentially vindictive.  It was, therefore, 
imperative to set limits on private enterprise.  The initial efforts at 
this restraint were provided by the labor unions.83  Ordinary workers, 
manipulated by their bosses, exposed to unconscionable dangers, and 
marginally remunerated, manifested the Marxist impulse to unite. 
During this stage of development, their numbers were small and they 
were outmuscled by their employers, but they laid down a marker 
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that would eventually be picked up.  Some of what they achieved 
was obstructionist, but their movement eventuated in a respect for 
employees that redounded to the benefit of all.
Much of the Victorian opposition to capitalist domination 
came from the bohemians.84  A prominent faction of the Romantic 
reaction to industrialization, these artistes were among its most 
passionate critics.  Romanticism85 is a term that came to be applied 
to a literary, artistic, and musical movement that celebrated emotion 
and personality.  Its chief architects were stereotyped as being 
antibusiness, antiscience, antidiscipline, antirational, and antifamily. 
Their quintessential hero was the loner dedicated to self-expression 
and aesthetic rapture.  John Keats,86 one of the first of their number, 
wrote, “’Beauty is truth, truth beauty’ —that is all/ Ye know on earth, 
and all ye need to know.”  Although when taken out of context, this 
is literally nonsensical, the evident purpose this proclamation was 
to rejoice in the dominion of art over science, in personal responses 
over practical achievements.  The Romantics evidently did not want 
to be submerged in the economic advances of the era.  As such, they 
were rebels, albeit not political ones.  By their very nature, they were 
disorganized.  Along with Jean-Jacques Rousseau,87 some admired 
the noble savage.  Primitive though many of them were, they were 
respected for an honesty that refused to knuckle under to emerging 
industrial elites.
Among the more colorful of the Romantics, the bohemians wrote 
or painted emotionally arousing works in lonely garrets in places 
such as Paris’s Left Bank.  Determined to be beholden to no one, 
they scorned the patronage earlier generations of artists had eagerly 
cultivated.  As a result, they could produce works that repudiated the 
bourgeoisie.  Their agents might sell their productions to the middle 
classes, but they personally resisted associating with them.  Novelists 
such as Honore de Balzac,88 Gustav Flaubert,89 and Victor Hugo90 
vented their spleens at the follies and oppression of the moneyed 
class.  Portrayed as amorously inept or terminally avaricious, these 
emerging capitalists were condemned as congenitally disposed to 
hunting good men down for the mere offense of pilfering a loaf of 
bread.  Even death seemed preferable to being trapped in the loveless 
social embrace of their hangers-on.  Meanwhile, painters such as 
Edouard Manet and Claude Monet founded Impressionism91 in 
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opposition to the cloying realism of the officially sanctioned artists 
displayed by the academic salons.  Probably in antipathy to the 
fidelity of the newly developed photography, they attempted to 
capture the transient of everyday life.  Vincent Van Gogh carried 
the trend to a likely conclusion.  Unable to sell his works during his 
lifetime, he recorded the madness consuming him on canvasses that 
suggest the torture that one might experience in an overly routinized 
society.  In music, similar accomplishments were achieved by the 
more mainstream Richard Wagner,92 Peter Tchaikovsky, and Frederic 
Chopin.93  Composing for the public at large, they renounced the 
formalism of the chamber music that was originally intended for 
the amusement of effete aristocrats.  Throwing decorum to the 
winds, they might alternately be loud and commanding or soft 
and amorous.  Wagner, for instance, became the lyrical voice of a 
resurgent German nationalism, while Tchaikovsky voiced Russian 
feelings.  That someone as gifted as Chopin or Keats wasted away 
from consumption only added to their exotic reputations.
The Proud Tower94
In 1893, Chicago hosted the Columbian Exposition.  Intended 
to honor the five hundredth anniversary of the discovery of America, 
its high point was The White City.  One hundred fifty buildings 
constructed of a marble-like material and executed in Romanesque, 
Renaissance, and Greek styles shimmered when illuminated by electric 
light.  The effect was startling.  Like the Eiffel Tower of by four years 
earlier, this was a proclamation of economic might and broadcast 
to the world at large that the United States had genuinely arrived. 
An advertisement of the country’s industrial triumph, it suggested 
that this nation’s accomplishments surpassed those of the ancients. 
The event was thus steeped in optimism and self-satisfaction.  All of 
these wonders proved that the modern world had mastered the idea 
of progress and was poised to ride it into a future of unexampled 
marvels.  The control of its destiny seemed to lie in its own hands. 
Others had dreamt of such grandeur, but none before had managed 
to grasp it.  Visitors to the fair were convinced that this was not 
arrogance that it was merely the truth.  They could not predict that 
within decades their world would be shaken by a series of seismic 
shocks.  Industrialization had not reached its culmination.  More was 
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to come.  Though people did not realize, painful adjustments were 
in the offing.
In the meantime, the prosperity was unprecedented.  No previous 
generation had ever been as rich or as powerful.  After some dips in 
the business cycle, the Gilded Age was replaced by the beginnings of 
modernism.  The industrial order was again kick-started by a fresh 
wave of innovations.  As in the past, technology was part of this 
cavalcade.  Leading the way was the internal combustion engine. 
Lighter than its predecessors, it could power self-propelled vehicles. 
Within years the automobile replaced the horse and carriage, and 
the dream of flying heavier-than-air machines became a reality. 
That which had seemed impossible not only had occurred, it had 
proliferated.  Thanks to Henry Ford’s95 assembly lines, streets formerly 
mined with manure became crowded with Model T’s.  While the 
skies were not as quickly congested, the Wright brothers inspired a 
host of imitators, creating airplanes with specifications more complex 
than their own.   The heavens were also being challenged by a race to 
erect the tallest skyscraper.  Steel had proven able to provide sturdier 
skeletons for tall buildings than had cast iron.  Coupled with Otis’s 
safety elevators, downtowns became canyons of stone and glass.
Among the other major technological advances were those in 
chemistry.  In this area, the Germans stole a march on the rest of the 
world.  As trivial as it seems in retrospect, their mastery of the test tube 
produced coal-tar-based dyes that enabled textiles to boast a rainbow 
of color.  Coal, incidentally, became easier to extract from the earth 
after the invention of dynamite.  Mining, in general, benefited from 
Alfred Nobel’s96 development of an explosive that was safer and more 
powerful than gunpowder.  To be sure, this same material could also 
be exploited on the battlefield.  Bombs filled with this substance 
inflicted more damage than did solid metal balls.  Less lethal was the 
introduction of vulcanized rubber.  Before tires were fabricated of 
this plastic material, iron-rimmed wheels on cobblestone roads had 
made riding a jarring experience.  Afterwards, automobile passengers 
could travel comfortably at amazing speeds.
Among the nontechnological advances that multiplied production 
was the corporation.  As industrialization proceeded to concentrate 
the manufacturing and distribution of goods, companies became 
bigger.  In Karl Marx’s imagination, individual capitalists owned 
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and controlled individual enterprises.  But this picture was rapidly 
going out of focus.  The level of investment in the steel industry or 
the railroads was too great for even the wealthiest entrepreneur to 
muster.  If a company was instead turned into a trust that could be 
owned by multiple stockholders, pooled resources could meet these 
greater challenges.  As importantly, stockholders could share the risks. 
Newly invented legal arrangements provided this limited liability, 
which made it easier to gamble on untried markets and products. 
All this elevated the position of bankers and financiers.  Men like 
J.P. Morgan97 did not run specific companies; they merely oversaw 
those who did.  Many, such as Morgan himself, made a career of 
rationalizing enterprises by assembling them into conglomerates that 
could take advantage of the economies of scale.  Morgan’s crowning 
achievement was U.S. Steel.  Not quite a monopoly over this industry, 
it was still large enough to dominate it.  For providing this service, 
Morgan grew enormously wealthy.
These newfangled corporations were to have another effect. 
Because they were so large, they demanded rationalized forms of 
control.  No individual, no matter how smart or energetic could 
understand the operations of U.S. Steel.  The company itself had 
to be organized in a way that made coordination possible.  This was 
achieved through the invention of bureaucracy.  Protobureaucracies 
had been around since Roman times.  They had been incorporated 
into the Roman Catholic Church and national armies, but their 
structures were now to be perfected.  Max Weber,98 who chronicled 
their emergence, provided an idealized description of their elements. 
First, there had to be an organizational goal.99 Unless the entire entity 
shared a mission, it would be torn by irreconcilable crosscurrents. 
Second, there had to be a functional division of labor.  Multiple, 
necessary tasks could not be efficiently accomplished if they were 
not broken down into interlocking duties.  Third, these duties could 
not be performed effectively if they were not assigned to specific 
individuals.  Such defined offices would indicate who was to do what 
and, therefore, allowed people to be assigned according to individual 
expertise.  Fourth, there needed to be a hierarchy of authority.  Unless 
the participants understood who was in charge of what, they might 
spend more time competing for power than in doing their jobs. 
Hierarchy was not a novel idea, but specifying its dimensions this 
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precisely was.  Fifth, specific tasks were to be performed, not according 
to the whim of the individual, but according to the most effective 
procedures.  Standard forms of operation replaced idiosyncratic 
adventurism, to better the bottom line.  Six, strict records would be 
kept of what had been done and who owed what to whom.  As the 
memory of the organization, these files would enable the business 
to keep running even if the personnel changed.  Together, these six 
dicta constituted a control mechanism so potent that Weber dubbed 
it an “iron cage.”  No individual player could be responsible for the 
whole, but neither could those involved extract themselves from its 
mandates without penalty.  If they attempted to do so, the mass of 
stabilized relationships in which they were entangled would bring 
them back into alignment.
Fundamental to this bureaucratic machinery was its managers. 
Most of those who gave orders were not classical capitalists.  They 
did not own the corporation nor independently decide its directions. 
On the contrary, they were professionals.  Making executive decisions 
was their job; it was not a consequence of possessing the means 
of production.  They were hired because they were self-motivated 
and self-directed, and they proved their worth by increasing the 
profitability of the whole.100  No wonder these administrators found 
Frederick Taylor’s101 scientific management so attractive.  It promised 
to promote efficiency by discovering the optimal procedures.  This 
would enable expertise in defined offices and authoritative directives. 
Subsequently, instead of ambitious children hoping someday to 
establish their own businesses—although many did—a greater 
proportion aspired to become presidents of corporations operating 
under the mandates of boards of directors.  In their imaginations, they 
would become Horatio Alger102 heroes recognized, and rewarded, for 
meritorious contributions to the organization.
Science, too, continued to provide new understandings.  Thus, 
physics reasserted its centrality with a vengeance.  New fundamental 
particles were discovered within the atom and the range of 
electromagnetic waves was extended to cover X-rays and gamma 
rays.  All of a sudden, physicians could peer into living human 
tissue and astronomers out into a more capacious universe.  But 
what really concentrated attention was Albert Einstein’s103 theory 
of relativity.  Not since Newton had there been such a profound 
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reorganization of how nature was understood.  Quite unexpectedly, 
matter and energy were connected in an equation that has had 
momentous implications.  Yet, science also looked inward.  Until 
this point, psychology had been slow to develop because no one 
could figure out how to measure something as ephemeral as the 
workings of the mind.  Now Pavlov introduced the idea of the 
conditioned reflex and Freud104 that of the unconscious.  It would 
not be long before psychoanalysis and behaviorism were the rage. 
In the competition between these, there would develop a tug-of-war 
between introspection and objective manipulation.  Sociology, too, 
was being organized as an independent discipline.  Plagued, as had 
been psychology, by measurement difficulties, Emile Durkheim105 
provided a rationale for social facts and Weber106 catalogued many of 
these.  Not surprisingly, as the social division of labor continued to 
differentiate, investigators were stumbling onto its implications.
The political world too was under renovation.  Progress was not 
confined to the business or scientific realms.  Nation states were more 
powerful than ever.  A shining example was the Dreadnaught.  The 
first truly modern battleship, it was steam powered, heavily armored, 
propeller driven, and studded with countless heavy guns.  Britain 
led the way to naval modernization, but even the isolationist United 
States followed suit.  Now able to project power around the world, 
Teddy Roosevelt107 commissioned its circumnavigation by the Great 
White Fleet.  Roosevelt also arranged for Panama to proclaim its 
independence so that it could serve as the site for a canal uniting 
the Atlantic and Pacific.  In an era when economic power had been 
converted into imperial power, he wished his nation to play.  Not to be 
outdone were the political journalists.  Given an increasingly literate 
public, newspapers became more influential than ever.  This enabled 
William Randolph Hearst108 to incite the Spanish-American War. 
With little provocation, his version of jingoistic yellow journalism 
portrayed the Spanish as murderers.  When the battleship Maine 
was blown up in Havana harbor, he convinced his readers that this 
was a deliberate act, which, as a powerful people, they were required 
avenge.  As a consequence of the ensuing victory, his country acquired 
imperial outposts in Puerto Rico and the Philippines.
All in all, people were acquiring greater control over their 
universe.109  And they were enjoying it.  The rich certainly learned 
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how to celebrate.  Thorstein Veblen110, in 1899, wrote The Theory of 
the Leisure Class based on his observations of the wealthy.  One of his 
lasting contributions was the concept of conspicuous consumption. 
He noticed that the wealthy (and, to a lesser extent, the middle-
classes) made purchases in order to make an impression.  That which 
visibly cost large sums of money demonstrated the power relative 
to those who lacked such resources.  J.P. Morgan111 exemplified this 
attitude in remarking that someone who needed to inquire about the 
price of a yacht evidently could not afford one.  Also opulent were 
the cottages being erected in places like Newport, Rhode Island.112 
In actuality, they were palaces furnished with the leftovers of their 
European forerunners and were designed as stagesets for lavish social 
gatherings.  Maintained by corps of servants, they emulated the 
noble establishments of times past.  Though the middle classes were 
growing, they were still subservient to this moneyed elite.  This was 
why the superrich looked above historic models and not below in 
deciding how to disperse their resources.
The working classes, too, improved their condition.113 
Marx postulated that they would be reduced to privation, but 
industrialization furnished a significant portion of its bounty.  Better 
clothed, fed, and housed than their ancestors, they also had more 
leisure time.  Instead of working from dawn to dusk, they were on 
their way toward the eight-hour day and the five-day week.  This 
meant that, during good weather, they had the freedom to picnic 
in city parks or, in summer, to take streetcars to newly opened 
amusement parks.  In order to drum up business, the trolley tracks 
were extended to places like New York’s Coney Island.114  An early 
prototype of Disneyworld, its Dreamland enticed average workers 
with rides and games of all sorts.  Dressed in finery once reserved 
for church, shopgirls flaunted hats decorated in exotic feathers while 
invisible breezes blew their dresses up over their ankles.  They even 
dared to put on bathing suits to enter the surf and show off their 
nubile figures.
At home, there were also improvements.  Labor saving devices 
proliferated to make housekeeping less burdensome.  Iceboxes 
became commonplace.  Perishables, such as milk, could be purchased 
in advance, without fear of spoilage.  Gas ranges replaced fireplaces. 
This made it possible to cook exotic dishes without danger.  Indoor 
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plumbing also made its appearance.  With indoor flush toilets, 
no longer was it necessary to traipse to the outhouse in the dead 
of winter.  For a lucky few, there were even washing machines. 
Scrubbing clothes by hand had always been one of a housewife’s 
most tedious chores.  Now a mechanical device could eliminate 
this drudgery.  However, families were larger.  Because of medical 
advances, children were no longer dying as frequently as they had. 
In this case, a cultural lag kept the birth rate higher than the death 
rate.  As a result, women often had eight or more offspring under 
their care.  At the same 115time, families were making increased 
investments in their children.  With economic success more than 
ever contingent on expertise, the goal was to prepare the young for 
good jobs.  This was achieved by supporting education.  Instead of 
sending them out to apprenticeships or to work on factory floors, 
young people were encouraged to go to high school.  As a result, 
they were less responsible for contributing to family finances and 
could loiter with peers.  In this, society witnessed the appearance of 
the teenager.
Still, there were nagging problems.  Industrialization had not 
been an unmixed blessing.116  The cities, teeming as never before 
with slums, blighted on the landscape.  Hearst might be encouraging 
of boosterism, but other reporters were investigating society’s dirty 
underbelly.  The muckrakers had arrived on the scene.  One of them, 
Upton Sinclair,117 wrote a novel, The Jungle, in which he exposed 
the sanitary shortcomings of the meatpacking industry.  This so 
appalled the nation that, with the aid of a progressive president, 
reform food and drug legislation quickly passed.  Ida Tarbell118 
added to the political ferment by exposing John D. Rockefeller’s 
predatory business practices.  This, too, created an uproar that led 
to the enforcement of antitrust laws.  Standard Oil was broken up 
into smaller companies, none of which could threaten to monopolize 
commerce.  Meanwhile, Lincoln Steffens119 focused on local 
government corruption in The Shame of the Cities.  Together with 
the goo-goos (i.e., the good government reformers), efforts were made 
to prevent ballot stuffing and under-the-table payoffs.   The result 
was increased democratization.  Control was redistributed between 
the government and the private sector to diminish the likelihood of 
a dangerous concentration of power.
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Progressivism,120 as this movement was called, was closely related 
to populism.  It added a concern for the welfare of the little man 
to the public agenda.  As prosperity became widespread, it seemed 
unconscionable that the poor be left out.  Jacob Riis’s121 pictorial 
reportage revealed the squalor of slums.  Union busting, in which 
hired goons shot unarmed strikers, offended the sense of fairness 
held by ordinary Americans.  Likewise, a terrible fire at the Triangle 
Shirtwaist Factory122, in which 146 young immigrant women workers 
burned to death, underlined the dreadful conditions that prevailed in 
sweatshops.  Because many of these victims died as a result of locked 
exits (in order to reduce pilferage), calls for enforce humane working 
standards were sounded.  For similar reasons, child labor became 
a target of concern, ultimately to be prohibited.  Even outside the 
workplace, efforts to support the poor, e.g., by providing free milk to 
mothers, were proliferating.  Much of this campaign culminated in 
the professed socialism of Eugene V. Debs.123  This onetime leader of 
the American Railroad Union ran for President several times, at one 
point attracting the support of nearly a million voters.
The art scene too was radicalized.  The bohemians graduated 
from Impressionism to Post-Impressionism and from Cubism to 
the Fauve Movement.  The Impressionism of Renoir, Degas, and 
even, in retrospect, of Cezanne, was replaced by the eccentricities 
of Picasso, Kandinsky, and Mondrian.124   Regarded as wild animals 
by the establishment, they competed with one another to see how 
impertinent they could be.  Even in music atonality became a fad. 
Arnold Schoenberg’s radical experiments may have confused many of 
those who counted themselves as among the avant-garde, but “pretty” 
music, art, and literature were nevertheless spurned as bourgeois 
sentimentalism.  A new breed of creators would not be bound by 
the self-satisfaction of the more affluent.  They would instead rub 
people’s noses in the hypocrisies of the time.
The worst shock to the pride of the self-satisfied came with 
the outbreak of World War I.125  Unchecked imperialism led to a 
conflagration that consumed much of what had been built.  The 
multiplying jealousies between Germany126 and the Western powers 
were to be resolved in battles made horrendous by the application 
of industrialism.  Machine guns, poison gas, effective artillery, 
submarines, and airplanes inflated the death rolls.  Trench warfare in 
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which the combatants stood statically from whence they periodically 
emerged to mow each other down took a terrible toll.  Before the 
slaughter ended, millions of corpses lay rotting in the mud.127  The 
effect was to traumatize those involved.  Before the outbreak of 
hostilities, people thought they were in control.  Afterwards, they 
discovered they were not.  The politicians, the generals, and the 
ordinary doughboys were all proved wrong.  This left lasting doubts 
that were not assuaged by the inconclusive Treaty of Versailles.128
Reprise and Collapse
Once the Great War concluded, peace did not descend on an 
exhausted world.129  The confusions, disappointments, and desires 
for vengeance of the combatants were played out over the next 
quarter century.  Industrialization too underwent a period of turmoil. 
Instead of marching forward with the determined progress of the 
preceding decades, movement was hesitant, sideways.  Perhaps an 
evocative description of the interlude would be “manic-depressive.” 
Within the space of a few years, Western society had experienced 
enormous highs and devastating lows.  At one point, individuals 
assumed the millennium was at hand, but within short order they 
were plunged into a despair that looked like hell itself.  In the United 
States, an incoming president campaigned on a platform of a return 
to normalcy.130  For a while, it appeared that he would deliver on 
this,131 but events went seriously awry.  Since no one understood the 
foundations of prosperity, once things did not go as predicted, no 
one knew how to fix them.
Another successful candidate for the American presidency had 
promised a chicken in every pot and two cars in every garage.  In 
light of the concurrent increases in productivity, it seemed that these 
could happen.  Certainly, automobiles had replaced from horse-
drawn transportation.132  Even more symbolic of the economic 
advances were changes in the media.  Beginning with the World War, 
movie making had come into its own.  The blatantly racist The Birth 
of a Nation was praised by Woodrow Wilson as “history written 
with lightening.”133  Distorted though it was, this film demonstrated 
the power of moving images to deliver emotional messages.  By the 
1920s, a habit of going to the cinema overtook the entire Western 
World.134  Quite unexpectedly, public consciousness was being 
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shaped by entertainments guided by uncultivated entrepreneurs. 
The logo of Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer claimed, “Art for art’s sake,” but 
the motive power was satisfying the pubic taste for excitement and 
titillation.  The same was happening in radio.  Before the war, it had 
been an invention in search of an application.  Afterwards, it was 
broadcast music, news, and comedy to a multitude of nations and 
millions of listeners.  Because the technology was inexpensive, most 
families could afford to gather beside their own sets to hear what 
advertisers believed would capture their attention.  The result was an 
unanticipated cultural unity.  Hearing the same songs, listening to the 
same jokes, and being exposed to the same news stories homogenized 
social perspectives beyond anything imaginable in the 19th century. 
It soon enabled politicians to mold public opinion as well.
But before this could occur, the Roaring Twenties saw countless 
social experiments.135  This was the Flapper Era.  A joy at having 
survived a brush with death in the World War unleashed a manic 
exuberance.  Dances, such as the Charleston, were wilder and more 
sexual than the sedate foxtrot of an earlier day.  Dresses were shorter 
and more revealing than the floor-length models of their mothers’ 
generation.  Moreover bathtub gin flowed freely in the speakeasies 
to which Prohibition136 had driven partygoers.  This was the period 
during which the idea of the teenager came to prominence.  Wearing 
raccoon-skin coats and taking hip flasks to football games became 
the epitome of a good time.  Having fun became an international 
obsession.  In Germany, the Berlin nightlife became celebrated for its 
decadence.  In France, American expatriates such as Hemingway wrote 
about bullfights and sexual peccadilloes.  In the United States, huge 
crowds screamed themselves hoarse as Babe Ruth pursued the home 
run record.  Free love was in the air and criminals were in the street. 
Poets and philosophers were proclaiming that marital fidelity was a 
form of bourgeois slavery, while Al Capone137 was exciting Chicago 
with his latest audacious murder.  This was the era of the Tommy 
gun, with which gangsters sprayed bullets in multiple directions. 
As might be expected, art too was indulging in excess.  Modern art 
meant abstract art and that meant in-your-face rebellion.
But then the U.S. stock market crashed, following sky-high 
levels of speculation.  Ordinary workers had purchased their pieces 
of corporations on margin.  Since the sky appeared to be the limit, 
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there was no reason why they, too, should not leverage their resources 
into substantial fortunes.  When the prices began to fall, panic set 
in.  No one, including the professionals, knew how to stem the 
tide.  Attempts at imposing stability by raising interest rates had the 
opposite effect.  By removing liquidity from the market, deflation 
was instituted, which had hideous consequences for business.  So 
dreadful was the impact that within the year the United States entered 
the Great Depression.138  Millions of people lost their jobs.  At one 
point, over twenty percent of the workforce stood idle.  Nothing 
like this had ever been seen before.  The business cycle was not new, 
but its troughs had never been as deep nor lasted as long.  It would 
not be until the Second World War that there would be a definitive 
turnaround.  A full decade would transpire before the factories were 
once again operating up to their potential.139
As bad as this was, it paled in comparison with the German 
experience.  In the wake of its defeat, the nation experimented with 
democracy in the guise of the Weimar Republic.  Yet this, despite 
its noblest intent, was a miserable failure.  The country had no 
history of democracy upon which to draw; hence when things went 
wrong both the elite and the populace longed for familiar trappings 
of stability.  And things did go terribly wrong.  Inexperienced 
politicians precipitated a roaring inflation that left the deutschmark 
nearly worthless.  It soon took wheelbarrows of cash just to purchase 
a loaf of bread.  In this environment, people desperately sought a 
savior.  And potential saviors were not in short supply.  On the left, 
the Communists touted the Bolshevik Revolution as the vanguard of 
an international Communism.140  Nationalization of the country’s 
industries, accompanied by local soviet-style governing councils, 
would return money to the pockets of the people.  Theoretically, 
on the right but also collectivist in mentality, were the National 
Socialists, i.e., the Nazis.  They promised to undo what had lost 
the war and to reintroduce social discipline.  Rival gangs ran wild 
in the street, but thanks to the backing of veterans groups, Adolf 
Hitler141 and his cronies gained power.  Eventually, they won enough 
seats in the Reichstag to make Hitler Chancellor and, within a year, 
Fuehrer.  Totalitarianism had come to Germany,142 as it earlier had 
to Russia and Italy, and soon would to Spain.143  In England and 
France, democratic institutions held on, but socialists, who wished 
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to nationalize industry, also dominated.  Traumatized by memories 
of the late war and labor unrest, politicians promised constancy at 
any price.
Across the Atlantic, conditions were not so desperate.  Franklin 
Roosevelt144 was elected president and he promised his countrymen 
a New Deal.  Something had to be done to prevent banks from 
collapsing and businesses from closing.  People needed to be put to 
work and their confidence restored.  Roosevelt and his team did their 
best.145  They introduced a blizzard of legislation and the president 
himself went on the radio to give reassuring fireside chats.  Part of 
the plan called upon the government to provide jobs and another 
to offer a financial safety net.  Out of this welter of initiatives came 
Social Security.  Widows and orphans would receive checks directly 
from the U.S. treasury, while older Americans would participate in 
an insurance program to provide for retirement.  Unemployment 
benefits too were improved.146  Most important, people were given 
hope.  A nation that had always prided itself on its individualism made 
a decisive turn toward governmental solutions.  Many were convinced 
that capitalism had run its course.147 and that the depression was the 
fulfillment of Marxist prophesies.148  Since the system’s contradictions 
had evidently caught up with it, it was doomed to destruction.  A 
communist utopia was inevitable; hence it made sense to support its 
introduction.  For many, this meant joining the communist party and 
cheering for the Stalinist regime.  For others, it meant becoming a 
social democrat, following the Western European model.149  Yes, they 
were socialists, but they wanted preserve democratic government. 
Roosevelt, according to many academics, acted just in time.  Had 
he not touted his reforms, the pessimism of the average American 
might have grown to critical proportions.  In this case, a German-
style revolution might well have come to the nation’s shores.
The Depression, it must be added, also had a profound impact 
on the family.  All of a sudden, the levels of fertility dropped.  Parents 
who had expected to educate their children no longer possessed the 
resources to do so.  Committed to having smaller families, the average 
number of offspring dropped to two, just enough for replacement 
purposes.  The age of marriage simultaneously increased, so that 
child bearing was postponed until it could be afforded.  During this 
economic catastrophe, people scraped by.  They settled for smaller 
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living quarters and accepted almost any jobs that came along. 
Contributing to the welfare of the group became a way of life.  Since 
there did not seem to be any hope in sight, most people lowered 
expectations, purchased only what was needed, and soldiered on. 
Even the movies reflected this mood.  Some were saccharinely 
sweet; others, intensely gloomy.  In the former, battalions of singers 
and dancers lauded the good times to come, whereas in the latter 
regiments of gangsters shot each other dead.  Banished from sight 
was the sunny sexuality of the twenties.  Even clothing became less 
revealing, perhaps in an effort to hide that of which people had 
become ashamed.
Then came World War II.  As unwelcome as it was, this conflict 
did not arrive as a shock.  Pacifist strains had pressured for the first 
war to be a genuine war to end all wars, but the appeasement policies 
derived from this wishful thinking encouraged would-be aggressors. 
Japan attacked China, and Italy invaded Abyssinia, and no one did 
anything to stop them.  Woodrow Wilson150 envisioned a League of 
Nations as a guarantor of peace, but it degenerated into a debating 
society.  When Spain became the testing ground for Nazi and Soviet 
weaponry, the League of Nations did nothing.  By this time it was 
apparent that unless the major powers had the will to act, there 
would be no action.  Hence, when Hitler marched in to Austria or 
broke the promises he had made at Munich, the lack of an assertive 
response was foreseeable.  That, upon the invasion of Poland, the 
allies finally issued a warning they were prepared to honor was a 
surprise to many.  This event ushered in the greatest conflagration in 
the history of armed quarrels.  By the time it concluded, over fifty 
million people, most of them civilians, had been butchered.  So great 
was the slaughter than it instituted permanent changes.  In many 
ways, the First World War was the opening salvo of a struggle that 
did not cease until after the bombing of Hiroshima.  But when it did, 
the participants were not the same.  The crisis of industrialization at 
its heart was resolved by an extraordinary bloodbath—and then the 
world would move on.
World War II was a case of unequaled horror for several reasons.151 
One was the technology of battle.  Inventions which had been in 
their infancy twenty-five years earlier, reached a dreadful maturity. 
The tank, for instance, formerly a lumbering failure in smashing 
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through defensive trenches, was transformed into the spearhead of 
the blitzkrieg.  It could swiftly move into the rear echelons of an 
enemy, sowing panic as it went.  Thanks to its brutal efficiency, the 
battles of France and Poland were over within weeks.  Much the 
same can be said of the airplane.  In the first war it was almost a toy. 
Swashbuckling aces dueling each other in romantic dogfights thrilled 
earthbound observers, but did little actual damage.  In the second 
war, fleets of bombers turned peaceful cities into flaming funeral 
pyres.  First London, then Dresden and Berlin, and finally Tokyo 
and Nagasaki were flattened and their populations incinerated.  Even 
under the oceans, the techniques for inflicting death had become 
more advanced.  Modern submarines could wander farther, stay 
under the surface longer, and launch more lethal torpedoes.  The 
loss in shipping was, in consequence, calamitous.  Everywhere one 
turned, massive death awaited, even without the reintroduction of 
chemical weapons.
Worse still was the intentional butchery imposed by politicians. 
Nazis, Soviets, and Japanese made terror an official policy.  Able 
to command the efficiency of modern weapons and modern 
bureaucracies, they could order the execution of millions of innocents. 
The Nazis, of course, were the instigators of the Holocaust.  Hitler 
made it his mission to exterminate Jews, Slavs, and Gypsies.  Coming 
to power on the premise that there had been a Jewish conspiracy, he 
pledged to get even.  Few imagined the lengths to which he would go, 
which eventuated in the concentration camps.  Millions were gassed 
to death; many of them were reportedly flayed to turn their skins 
into lampshades.  So well organized was this killing machine that 
Hitler also had millions of Poles and Russians shipped into its maws. 
Not to be outdone, Stalin ordered thousands of his enemies shot 
or imprisoned.  Already an expert in mass murder, having starved 
millions of Ukrainian kulaks and executed thousands of former 
colleagues in show trials, he was prepared to visit his vengeance upon 
German prisoners of war and his own troops who dared to surrender 
to his enemies.  Around the globe in Asia, the Japanese warlords had 
taken on similar delusions of national grandeur.  Heirs to a samurai 
tradition, they scorned those who surrendered rather than perish in 
battle.  They, therefore, kept their POWs in subhuman conditions, 
often starving them to death.  Lesser mortals, such as the Chinese, 
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were treated with unimaginable brutality.  During the rape of 
Nanking, hundreds of thousands of civilians were slain by the sword 
and the bayonet.  In order to give their troops practice with these 
weapons, soldiers were ordered to toss babies into the air and skewer 
them on the way down.  And just as in Hitler’s camps, prisoners 
were subjected to medical experiments that were more torture than 
science.
Thus had industrialization reached its nadir.  Visions of peace and 
prosperity were being drowned in blood and gore.  The technology that 
erected skyscrapers and bridged broad rivers was turned to blasting 
these to bits.  Medicine, which had finally learned to save lives, was 
reduced to preventing them from being taken.  Superior forms of 
organization that had delivered products to remote locations now 
arranged to send battalions to distant battlefields fully equipped to 
deal out mayhem.  Worst of all, democracy was under siege.  Ordinary 
people had been making strides in governing themselves, but now 
the dictators asserted a counterrevolution.  Utilizing the very tools 
that made representative governments feasible, they controlled vast 
armies and intimidated huge populations.  The same disciplines that 
turned factories into the engines of prosperity were redirected into 
engines of destruction.  In the midst of this twisted pandemonium, 
it was not clear that civilization would survive.  Industrialization 
seemed bent on self-immolation.  The commercial revolution that 
began millennia earlier in a few Greek harbors apparently contained 
the seeds of its demise.  The critics had said so, and for the moment 
only the hardiest optimists dared to contradict them.
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Chapter 6
The Tipping Point
That which in England we call the middle class is in 
America virtually the nation.  (Matthew Arnold, A 
Word About America (1882))
The best political community is formed by citizens of the 
middle class.  (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics)
Wealth is not without its advantages, and the case to 
the contrary, although it has often been made, has never 
proved widely persuasive.  (John Kenneth Galbraith, 
The Affluent Society)
The Middle Class Ascendancy
The first atomic bomb sent a plume heavenward that was also an 
exclamation point.  Its mushroom shape bespoke a fantastic power. 
The genie of the subatomic particle had been let out of the bottle 
so violently that over a hundred thousand people lay dead or dying. 
Suddenly mankind had the means of wiping itself out.  A collective 
shudder swept across the planet as billions of individuals wondered 
what was in store for them.  Would this illustration of triumphant 
science usher in a renewed prosperity or did it forecast their personal 
destruction?  For the moment, the United States was this apparition’s 
sole custodian, but how long would it exercise a monopoly? 
Democratic politicians would likely be moderate in its employment, 
but would others be as responsible?  One good thing that could be 
said of this was that it punctuated a temporary American hegemony. 
This upstart nation had been the prime mover in the Axis defeat; 
now its mastery of this astonishing weapon demonstrated that it had 
become a superpower.
One of the consequences of the recent war was that the 
continental United States had been left untouched by destruction. 
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Most of the other belligerents, both in Europe and Asia, sustained 
enormous damage to their infrastructures.  Their cities and factories 
had been bombed into rubble, and their people, turned into refugees. 
Dislocations in their social fabric abounded, whereas in America 
the joy of victory was undiluted.  The nation had fought a just 
war and won a resolute peace.  Even its citizens were impressed by 
their ability to fabricate and mobilize so potent an arsenal.  Pleased 
that fewer than half million of their own had perished, the man in 
the street was horrified that so many others were exterminated in 
Hitler’s concentration camps.  Abraham Lincoln1 almost a century 
beforehand had called their land the last best hope of mankind, and 
more than ever, they believed his words prophetic.  Their nation 
had just delivered humanity from an extraordinary peril, and, as 
when one saves another’s life, they felt responsible for maintaining 
international security.
One worry, however, was the economy.  After the last war 
there had been a recession when the troops came home.  Would 
jobs be available for the conquering heroes this time once they were 
decommissioned?  The women who had manned the factories during 
the conflict would have to return to being domestic engineers, but 
would this be enough?  Memories of the Great Depression lingered.2 
People realized that full employment had not been restored until the 
demands of battle compelled the government to resort to massive 
deficit spending.  Could a civilian economy take up the slack?  No 
one knew for sure because the situation was unprecedented.3  During 
the war, a competition to outdo the other side resulted in a myriad 
of technological innovations.  Would these advances prove useful in 
peacetime?  Once again, no one knew for sure.  Bigger planes had 
proved they could drop tons of bombs on the enemy, but could they 
be converted to carrying passengers across the continent?  Only time 
would tell.
In fact, there was a slight hiccup when the GIs returned home, 
but fortunately it did not last long.  An innovation not contemplated 
after the previous war was to fill the gap.  This was the GI Bill.4 
The last time, the veterans had been promised pensions; this time 
a grateful nation decided to provide a good education.  Most of its 
soldiers had come from blue-collar backgrounds; hence, they had 
been to neither college nor technical school.  Now, it was decided 
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that improving their academic expertise would benefit both them and 
their fellow citizens.  They could get better jobs, and the economy 
would become more robust.  To the surprise of many, those eligible 
for these benefits took up the offer in overwhelming numbers.  Of 
about twelve million servicemen, approximately eight million 
signed on, and, of these, several million opted for college5.  In one 
fell swoop, the educational level of the nation surged upward.  The 
sector of the population crucial to further commercial development 
would now be better equipped to handle these demands.  Sobered 
by their battle experiences, these men (and women) were prepared 
to dedicate themselves to doing their best.  A little hard work would 
be nothing as compared to facing death.  The result was a massive 
infusion of professionalism6 into the work force.7  People who in 
former times would have been satisfied being ordinary working stiffs 
were given a leg up the ladder and, as a result, made a tentative entry 
into the middle class.  For most of them, this was a momentous step. 
For society, too, it was an earth-shattering event.  Few could see it 
coming, but an historical landmark was about to be reached.  The 
threshold into a middle class world would soon be crossed.  Though 
the consequences could not be foreseen, a tipping point8 had arrived 
and a long-building social revolution had entered upon a period 
culmination.
What was in the process of evolving has been characterized as 
a “service” economy or alternatively as a “post-industrial” one.  The 
social commentator Daniel Bell9 has pointed out that the kinds of 
jobs about to be available would mutate as manufacturing processes 
were automated.  During the earlier part of the century something 
similar had occurred.  The body politic had then been traumatized 
as multitudes of farmers were forced from the land.  As a corollary 
of agricultural mechanization, what had been seventy percent of the 
population engaged in farming would be reduced to a scant two 
percent.  This transformation was so shocking that it was met with a 
variety of policies intended to stem the tide.  As is usual with social 
change, a cultural conservatism dictated that people would demand 
a restoration of the status quo ante.  One means attempted for 
achieving this was the imposition of price supports.  Family farmers 
would presumably be kept on the land by paying them not to grow 
crops.  Theoretically, by artificially lowering productivity, more labor 
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would be required.  Continued increases in productivity, however, 
militated in fact against this solution, but an idealization of the 
pioneer spirit prevented a widespread recognition that failure was 
inevitable.  The resultant government programs probably did ease 
the transition for some individuals, but for many others they merely 
held out a false hope.  In the end, all that was accomplished was to 
slow the transformation.
With regard to industry, something similar seemed to be 
occurring in the postwar environment.  Here, too, the number of 
people required to run the operations declined as the machinery, and 
the means of controlling it, became more sophisticated.10  Far more 
goods could now be produced at a lower price with fewer people 
at the controls.  Would this entail an increase in unemployment? 
Would it mean that millions of veterans would descend into poverty? 
Despite battalions of Cassandras, this did not happen.  The nation 
did not slide into a renewed Depression as the manufacturing payrolls 
declined.  People merely transferred from one sort of employment to 
another.  On a personal level, this could be disconcerting.  Individuals 
forced to change jobs had to confront the insecurity of developing 
new skills and the humiliation of losing seniority.  They might even 
be compelled to move from one part of the country to another.  Yet 
from the point of view of the whole, these developments prefigured a 
huge step forward.  None could know it at the time, but the next half 
century would experience no commercial declines as severe as those 
recently experienced.  The business cycle would not be repealed, but 
the post-industrial economy would be much less volatile.  There were 
to be periodic recessions, but none of these would be as deep or 
tenacious.  Instead a regular upward slope would transform the nation 
into the undisputed economic colossus of the planet.  By the end of 
the century, the United States would be its only military superpower 
and its sole enduring economic superpower.  People would say that 
when its marketplace caught a cold, the rest of the world’s financial 
systems got pneumonia.
Nevertheless, to call this emerging economy service-based would 
be misleading.  The sorts of jobs Americans were assuming varied 
enormously in scope.  The division of labor was not merely to be 
between blue- and white-collar workers but encompassed a veritable 
rainbow of shades.  The recipients of the GI Bill found themselves 
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training for a wide variety of tasks.  Not only this, but many of their 
assignments were more intricate, with many of these required to be 
self-directed.  No longer did employees merely carry materials to and 
from machines.  Much of the time, they would not even be tending 
machines.  Rather, working with people and data was to become the 
norm.  Yet, to achieve this effectively required that the participants 
attain internal discipline and a substantial expertise.  To put the matter 
succinctly, they would have to become middle class.  Although their 
own families had not prepared them for this eventuality, they would 
have to find a way to muddle through.  No matter how much they 
might hunger for the simpler lifestyles of their romanticized youths, 
their jobs would oblige them to make changes.
An Occupational Survey
Why this was so can only be appreciated by exploring the 
complexity of the evolving division of labor.11  It was not only 
enormously ramified, but it also included extremely complicated 
activities.  At the risk of becoming tedious, it is essential to review 
its particulars.  To begin with, the U.S. Department of Labor and 
its Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)12 were mandated to keep track 
of what was happening in the workplace.  In order to fulfill this 
obligation, their specialists found it necessary to categorize the tasks 
being performed.  This turned out to be a Herculean endeavor.  They 
discovered that no simple classification could be fully consistent 
in how it represented the myriad of intertwining relationships.  In 
spite of this, an overview of the resultant schema is illustrative of 
why self-direction became standard.13  At the top of their list of 
occupations are those that pertain to management.  These are the 
ones that specialize in higher-level supervision.  As corporations and 
government agencies grew larger,14 the number of people needed to 
coordinate their activities multiplied.  These organizations required 
not just owner/managers, but chief executives and middle managers, 
legislators and legislative assistants.15  The sorts of activities that 
begged for centralized direction varied from advertising to marketing, 
from public relations to human resources, from purchasing to real 
estate.  Their divergent bosses, therefore, needed to know how to 
work with people in order to get the most out of them and also the 
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technical details of the assorted businesses of which they were to be 
in charge.
Closely aligned to these employments are those in the second 
category listed by the BLS.  The heading for this group is Business 
and Financial Operations Occupations.  It includes business 
agents, buyers, claims adjusters, insurances appraisers, recruiters, 
benefits specialists, accountants, bankers, auditors, budget analysts, 
underwriters, and tax examiners.  In a market economy where 
money matters, numerous specialists are required to keep track of 
its flow.  Banks, corporations, insurance companies, department 
stores, and the Internal Revenue service employ them to oversee their 
operations.  Marx’s contingents of clerks were no longer sitting, a 
la Charles Dickens,16 on spindly stools wielding quill pens on ink-
stained ledgers.  They were now making important decisions about 
what would be spent, how this would be recorded, and what was 
likely to be profitable.  Far from being ciphers, they were a semi-
visible army of puppeteers who often determined what others would 
be able to do.  Anyone who knows how the federal government 
operates understands that the Office of the Budget is often where 
the power lies.  In deciding how the available pot of funds will be 
divided, its denizens get to establish who will have the most clout. 
Nowadays, experts in computer management have supplemented 
these fiscal operatives.  As computers assumed control over day-to-
day transactions, programmers, database administrators, statisticians, 
and systems analysts achieved prominence.  Since it is often only 
they who understand how things can be done, they are frequently 
the ones put in charge.
Next down the line in the BLS compendium are architectural 
and engineering occupations.  The list of these is truly impressive. 
Within the architectural area, they include architects, landscape 
architects, cartographers, and surveyors.  It is within the engineering 
grouping that things get more interesting.  These jobs include 
aerospace engineers, agricultural engineers, biomedical engineers, 
chemical engineers, civil engineers, computer-hardware engineers, 
electrical engineers, electronic engineers, environmental engineers, 
health-safety engineers, industrial engineers, marine and naval 
engineers, materials engineers, mining and geological engineers, 
nuclear engineers, and petroleum engineers.  Responsible for 
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translating science into practical operations, these professionals are 
the experts in what is functional.  Hardheaded realists, they are the 
modern incarnation of traditional American know-how.  Clearly, 
what they do requires thought and accountability.  Unless they are 
personally dedicated to making good decisions, bridges fall down 
and people perish.  Nevertheless, they are not lone rangers.  They 
work in teams supported by architectural and civil drafters, electrical 
and electronic drafters, mechanical drafters, aerospace technicians, 
civil engineering technicians, electrical and electronic technicians, 
environmental engineering technicians, industrial engineering 
technicians, and mechanical engineering technicians.  These latter, 
too, though less responsible, must be skilled at what they do.  One 
small slip of the pen (or computer) can have as dire an impact on a 
project as a faulty overall conception.
More directly people oriented are many of the life, physical, 
social-science, and social-service occupations.  As commercialization 
has pushed the technological bubble forward, the sciences underlying 
these developments have grown more critical.  Research and 
development has become crucial to modernization.  Both with regard 
to the products that make it to the marketplace and to the social 
policies that are implemented to solve human problems, intentional 
efforts at expanding the knowledge base tend to precede practical 
applications.  Scientists of all sorts are employed by commercial, 
academic, and governmental organizations.  Agricultural scientists, 
biologists, biochemists, microbiologists, zoologists, epidemiologists, 
astronomers, geographers, physicists, chemists, hydrologists, 
economists, psychologists, anthropologists, sociologists, and political 
scientists all seek answers to questions that may, or may not, prove 
useful down the road.  The embodiment of self-direction, they 
must first figure out what to ask before they even begin to look for 
solutions.  
More pragmatic in their orientation are those dedicated to social 
service.  Substance-abuse, vocational, marriage and family, mental-
health, and rehabilitation counselors and social workers of various 
stripes, including those oriented toward family, mental-health, and 
school, deal directly with individuals in trouble.  The answers they 
provide must, therefore, be tailored to the dilemma of the moment. 
In a sense, the engineers of the social sciences, they bear a similar 
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burden of responsibility.  Also listed in this grouping by the Bureau 
of Labor Statistics (BLS) are clergymen and religious directors. 
They too have become specialists in the human condition and are 
frequently summoned to intervene in personal and interpersonal 
crises.  Where ministers were once expert only in the scriptures, they 
are now being called upon to provide valid answers about marriage, 
business ethics, and personal growth.
De Tocqueville17 long ago suggested that stable commercialized 
relationships are contingent upon a legitimate legal system. 
Apparently the larger the marketplace the greater the need for 
dependable means of settling disputes among strangers.  Still, even he 
would probably be surprised to learn that by the end of the twentieth 
century the United States boasted almost a million persons working 
in legal occupations and that, of these, more than half were lawyers. 
Besides the attorneys, there are judges, hearings officers, arbitrators, 
mediators, paralegals, court reporters, and law clerks.  Not all of the 
lawyers, of course, are trial lawyers, nor are most of these criminal 
lawyers.  A larger proportion is, in fact, engaged in corporate or civil 
law.  Moreover, despite the histrionics for which fictional lawyers are 
famed, most remain under secure emotional control.  Indeed, the 
legal system specializes in emotional control.  It is where people go 
when their own disciplines break down.  As such, it is another venue 
characterized by self-direction.  Lawyers must be able to figure out 
what to say, and how to say it, without undue reliance on external 
supervision.  They have to be first-rate at thinking on their feet.
So, too, must educators.  When they appear before a group of 
students, they must know that which they wish to convey.  If they 
are unfamiliar with the subject matter, they may not know where to 
begin.  Teachers must likewise be expert in how to convey information. 
Those who are knowledgeable, but inarticulate, are nearly useless.  In 
addition, when asked a question, they need to have a sufficient store 
of knowledge to provide a relevant response.  All this is done while 
standing alone in front of what may be a hostile audience.  Like 
lawyers, or, for that matter, counselors, they are typically unable to 
consult a colleague before they reply.  They need, in short, to know 
their stuff and to possess the confidence to deliver it.  So voracious has 
the quest for knowledge become that, as of 2001, the BLS estimated 
that there were over seven and a half million teachers and those in 
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related occupations in the United States.  These individuals teach 
business, computers science, mathematics, architecture, engineering, 
agricultural sciences, forestry, meteorology, chemistry, environmental 
sciences, physics, anthropology, philosophy, economics, social 
science, nursing, criminal justice, law, social work, English, foreign 
languages, and history at primary, middle, and secondary schools 
and at colleges, universities, and proprietary schools.  Joining them 
in this endeavor are special-education, adult literacy and remedial, 
and self-enrichment teachers, archivists and museum curators, 
librarians, audiovisual specialists, and teacher assistants.  Many of 
these would be considered semiprofessionals by sociologists,18 but 
with each passing year they become more professionalized.   The 
levels of knowledge and skill they bring to bear have far surpassed 
what the core professions would have found acceptable a mere two 
centuries ago.
Next on the list of jobs are the arts, design, entertainment, 
sports, and media related occupations.  Not long ago, these would 
have been denied professional recognition.  During the gay nineties, 
actresses, for instance, were considered painted ladies and, therefore, 
next to prostitutes.  Nor would bohemian artists have merited 
professional respect.  Their work was admired, but their genius was 
reckoned akin to madness.  But, times have changed, and now artists 
and entertainers receive extensive training in the refinements of 
their undertakings.  According to the BLS, fewer than ten thousand 
individuals earn their living as fine artists, i.e., painters, sculptors, 
and illustrators, but twice as many are employed as art directors and 
three times as many work as multimedia artists and animators.  Also 
employed in substantial numbers are commercial and industrial artists 
and fashion, floral, graphic, and interior designers and merchandise 
displayers and set designers.  Besides having talent, to be good at 
what they do, these people must possess independent aesthetic 
judgments.  The same applies to actors, producers, directors, dancers, 
choreographers, musicians, composers, and musical directors.  Most 
of them would be happy to consider themselves performing artists 
and would, no doubt, insist on their internalized contributions to 
their craft.  Athletes, though nowadays regarded as entertainers and 
labeled as professionals when they get paid for their sport, do not 
possess the technical knowledge that is the hallmark of the traditional 
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professions.  They must nevertheless be dedicated to honing their 
skills, or they would be consigned to short careers.  Media people, 
too, have come close to being entertainers, especially when they are 
on-the-air personalities, but most have higher ambitions.  Whether 
they are reporters, correspondents, editors, writers, authors, or 
photographers, they claim a journalistic status.  Styling themselves 
members of the “fourth estate,” they claim special privileges and 
unique insights.  Clearly most go to college to learn the subtleties of 
soliciting, interpreting, and conveying the news.
Nowadays outstripping the educational occupations in 
membership are the health related occupations.  Even in the wake 
of the Second World War, they were a presence to be reckoned with. 
As society became more prosperous, people insisted on first-rate care. 
Wonder drugs, most notably antibiotics such as penicillin, convinced 
ordinary Americans that physicians both understood the causes of 
illnesses and possessed the tools to defeat them.  Everything from the 
mumps to heart disease, from indigestion to polio, seemed capable 
of a cure.  Once medicine demonstrated a reliable competence, 
laymen began trooping to doctors’ offices or the hospital.  Actually, 
before the 1950s, it was the physician who visited when people were 
sick.  With further progress, however, preventive medicine came to 
the fore.  Patients, especially those who possessed health insurance, 
went to offices for routine checkups and prophylaxis.  Chapter 3 
has already presented a summary of the proliferation of medically 
associated jobs.  These range from the quintessential professionalism 
of brain surgeons to the less exalted contributions by pharmacy 
technicians and licensed practical nurses.19  Not included in that 
compendium are the less prestigious positions of home-health-care 
and nursing aides, hospital orderlies, occupational and physical-
therapy assistants, massage therapists, dental assistants, medical 
transcriptionists, pharmacy aides, and veterinary assistants.  What 
is notable is that even these lower-status occupations have been 
professionalizing.  The levels of knowledge, training, and dedication 
required of them have all escalated.  No longer merely jobs, they have 
become career orientations that demand special training.
As earlier remarked, this same phenomenon has asserted itself 
within the protective service occupations.  Police officers,20 detectives, 
sheriffs, transit and railroad police, fire fighters, correctional officers, 
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fish and game wardens, animal-control workers, private detectives, 
and also security guards have been impelled to professionalize.21 
They are expected to get better educations than their predecessors 
did and to exercise self-control when on the job.  Self-direction and 
an allegiance to democratic standards are presently considered the 
norm.  Whereas skill with a nightstick was once admired, it has 
become a potential indicator of abuse as a sign that an officer prefers 
to act first and think later.  Yet, thinking has become mandatory for 
protective positions.  Their occupants are not merely expected to 
exercise control but to shelter people from harm.  As such, they must 
understand individual rights and personal vulnerabilities.
Even the sorts of white-collar workers that C. Wright Mills22 
discussed have been professionalizing.  There are now an immense 
number of office and administrative support personal.  The equivalent 
of the nineteenth century clerks, by the end of the twentieth century 
the BLS estimated that there were almost 23 million of these 
adjunct staffers.  Of these, a million and a half were supervisors of 
administrative-support workers.  These, of course, required the people 
skills of supervisors.  Among the first-line workers they oversaw were 
switchboard and telephone operators; bill and account collectors; 
billing, bookkeeping, and auditing, payroll, and procurement 
clerks; bank tellers; brokerage, correspondence, and court clerks; 
customer-service representatives; eligibility interviewers; file and 
hotel and motel desk clerks; loan interviewers; library assistants; new 
accounts and order clerks; human resource assistants; receptionists; 
reservation and ticketing clerks; cargo and freight agents; couriers and 
messengers; police, fire, and ambulance dispatchers; meter readers; 
postal service clerks; postal carriers; postal sorters; production and 
expediting, shipping and receiving, and stock clerks; weighers; 
measurers and checkers; executive secretaries and administrative 
assistants; legal and medical secretaries; computer operators; data-
entry keyers; word processors and typists; insurance-claims, mail, 
and general office clerks; office-machine operators; proofreaders; and 
statistical assistants.  This is quite a list and obviously quite varied. 
Nevertheless, what should jump out from the page is how many 
of these are responsible positions.  Executive and legal secretaries, 
billing clerks, and police dispatchers make decisions involving a great 
deal of money and sometimes life and death.  Moreover, some of 
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these workers, notably those employed by the post office, would be 
insulted were they not referred to as professionals.  In any event, they 
are expected to exercise some degree of self-direction and often quite 
a bit of skill.  Far from being mindless robots tremulously fulfilling 
every request of their superiors, they must be able to engage in 
independent problem solving.  Mills would probably be discomfited 
to learn that a large proportion of them have at least a two-year 
college education.  Like their more educated chiefs, they have been 
upgrading their expertise in the expectation that this will lead to 
greater responsibilities.
Mills might also be astonished by the skills exercised by those in 
sales related occupations.  With almost 15 million people occupying 
them by century’s end, over a million more engage in supervisory 
roles.  In other words, many of those in supposedly subservient posts 
are, in fact, expected to exhibit leadership.  While on the job, they 
are not under constant supervision but are mandated to exercise 
discretion.  Some of their subordinates, such as cashiers, perform 
fairly simple tasks, but even these need to do so with care.  Others, 
such as sales representatives for wholesale, manufacturing, and 
technical and scientific products, need a detailed understanding of 
their merchandise, their customers, and the logistics of joining the 
two.  The same can be said of insurance, advertising-sales, travel, 
and securities, commodities, and financial sales agents and real-
estate brokers.  All require a sensitivity to customer needs that is 
inconsistent with vacuous conformity.  Here, too, Mills might be 
surprised at how many have gone to college to obtain degrees in 
marketing or psychology.
Although Daniel Bell23 characterized the emerging economy as 
service oriented, the BLS estimates that less than three million people 
are currently employed in personal care or service occupations.  Those 
who are include animal caretakers, gaming dealers, motion-picture 
projectionists, ushers and ticket takers, amusement and recreation 
attendants, funeral attendants, barbers, hairdressers, manicurists, 
skin-care specialists, baggage porters and bellhops, concierges, tour 
guides, flight attendants, child care workers, personal and home 
care aids, fitness trainers and aerobics instructors, and recreational 
workers.  Of these, there are only some 12 thousand barbers, 330 
thousand hairdressers, and 115 thousand flight attendants.  The 
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point is that there are fewer in classical service jobs than might be 
supposed, and these are varied in their level of prestige, responsibility, 
and remuneration.  As the United States passed the middle-class 
tipping point, the number of personal servants did not mount to 
astronomic levels.  Once upon a time, in preindustrial England, 
maids and individual private servants were common occupations; 
middle-class Americans, in contrast, are offended by sycophantic 
attention.  Themselves determined to be no one’s servant, they are 
loath to impose this status on others.  The closest they come to 
accepting fawning attention is from those in the food preparation 
and serving occupations.  As members of the middle classes acquired 
money, they began to eat out more frequently.  This was reflected in 
the century’s end tabulation of nearly ten million workers in these 
employments.  Chefs, cooks, bartenders, and waiters and waitresses 
proliferated in taking on these roles, though, they did not deign to 
become menials.  Some chefs became television stars, and many 
servers earn enough to support a plush suburban lifestyle.  Bowing 
and scraping to customers, as opposed to being polite, are deemed 
déclassé.  Often, it is the customers who are intimidated by the 
insouciance and knowledgeability of their attendants.
So far, most of the jobs discussed are at least tangentially white-
collar.  Yet to be mentioned, however, are the traditionally blue-
collar occupations.  These too have metastasized into thousands 
of subspecialties.  Moreover, they, too, have been infected by the 
professionalization mania.24  Although these trades continue to be 
largely manual in nature, their practitioners no longer work merely 
with things.  More and more, they, too, deal with data and people. 
Even in their hands-on aspects, their work has become increasingly 
complex.  A strong back is no longer a sufficient qualification for most 
of their occupations.  The BLS enumerates only six categories that 
may be considered traditionally blue-collar.  These are building and 
grounds cleaning and maintenance, farming, fishing, and forestry, 
construction and extraction, installation, maintenance, and repair, 
productions, and transportation and material-moving occupations. 
Before examining these further, it should be noted that among the 
cleaning and maintenance occupations fewer than a million are 
reported to be maids or housekeepers.  Another two million are 
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janitors.  This agrees well with the notion that personal service has 
gone out of style.  
The most central blue-collar occupations are those that entail 
production.  These are the manufacturing positions, the ones 
historically associated with the Industrial Revolution.  By century’s 
end there are little over 12 million of them, including their supervisors 
and foremen.  What is astonishing, however, is the multitude of 
distinctions among what these people do.  The reader is warned 
that the following inventory, while incomplete, is staggering in its 
tedium.    
The effect of reading this registry would be overwhelming.  It 
makes it clear that skill and conscientiousness are not confined 
to the traditional professions.  Many of the enumerated positions 
would qualify their holders as artisans.  A significant number of these 
workers have spent years learning their crafts and take pride in being 
able to perform operations that others cannot.  Take machinists; 
their ability to shape obdurate materials into complex forms entails 
more than turning on a switch or pushing a few buttons.  In order 
to achieve tolerances often measured by micrometers, each must 
possess a good eye, a superior mechanical aptitude, and a disciplined 
attention span.  This work obviously demands far more expertise 
than did that of a medieval plowman.  To some minds, production 
workers are associated with an innate churlishness, that is, with a 
peasant’s mentality.  With the coming of the middle-class revolution, 
this has ceased to be true.  Classified by most sociologists as perched 
somewhere within the lower middle class, they rightly consider 
themselves as among the middling orders.  They surely have a 
jurisdiction over their own lives that a medieval serf would envy.
One more of the BLS categories should be sufficient to document 
the growth in the division of labor and the professionalization that 
has accompanied the middle class ascendancy.  The transportation 
and material moving occupations are also a hodgepodge of the 
simple and the complicated, the conformist and the responsible. 
They embrace airline pilots; air-traffic controllers; ambulance, bus, 
long-distance truck, light delivery, and taxi drivers; locomotive 
engineers; railroad conductors; sailors and marine oilers; parking-
lot and service-station attendants; conveyor operators and tenders; 
crane and tower, excavating and loading-machine, and industrial 
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truck and tractor operators; hand laborers and freight and stock 
movers; hand packers and packagers; and refuse collectors.  Needless 
to say, the distance between an airline pilot and a refuse collector 
is considerable.  Both in terms of social prestige and occupational 
complexity, they are worlds apart.  Yet, even long-haul truckers have 
increased their levels of responsibility and remuneration.  They are 
accountable for the safe operation of vehicles that have intensified in 
sophistication and ability to do harm if they are not faithfully, and 
independently, managed.
Lastly, and without resort to cataloging occupational divisions 
of labor, construction and repair occupations deserve mention. 
Construction workers can no longer be stereotyped as ditch diggers 
or as human mules to carry loads for others.  Carpenters, masons, 
electricians, and plumbers are almost semiprofessionals.  The tools 
they wield and the plans they follow are intricate and, therefore, a 
mystery to the uninitiated.  Road builders and heavy construction 
workers also employ machinery that cannot be mastered by sitting 
in a seat and turning a wheel.  As for repair occupations, whether 
these are in telecommunications, avionics, automobile repair, air 
conditioning, or factories, the very nature of this work enables 
their providers to control uncertainties.  This becomes a source of 
power.  Workers are not mere plebeians.  Because they can figure out 
what others cannot, they can regulate the resumption of important 
operations.  Consider the plumber who comes to restore what caused 
a flooded basement.  The job must be done; hence the homeowner, 
who probably knows little about plumbing, is at the mercy of a 
technician in dirty overalls.  In most cases, he/she must accept the 
plumber’s diagnosis of the problem on faith and in the hope that, 
when given the bill, he/she won’t be gouged.
One more indicator of the momentous change that has occurred 
must be addressed.  This is what happened to the labor movement. 
From its inception in the nineteenth century with the Knights of 
Labor, labor organizing had been envisioned as a shield to protect 
the workingman from capitalist incursions.  Labor unions decisively 
replaced guilds when industrialization moved people into factories 
where they could compare the multifarious indignities to which 
they were subjected.25  As industrialization advanced, the impetus 
to join together increased.  While the particulars of this movement 
    The Great Middle Class Revolution
varied from country to country, within the United States it reached 
its apotheosis during the Great Depression.  The National Labor 
Relations Act, more familiarly known as the Wagner Act, protected 
the right of workers to become members of these organizations, 
thereby expanding union rolls dramatically.  C. Wright Mills,26 a 
dedicated collectivist, was encouraged that this trend extended well 
into the 1940s.  He noted that, in 1900, only 2.5% of white-collar 
workers and 8.2% of wageworkers belonged to unions.  These figures 
grew during the 1920s but at first dipped in the 1930s.  By 1948, 
however, 16.2% of white-collar workers and 44.1% of wageworkers 
had joined the fold.  At this point, it looked as if unionism would 
dominate the foreseeable future.  Mills hoped that white-collar 
employees would choose solidarity with their greasier brethren, and 
it appeared his wish might be fulfilled.
In the late 40s and earlier 50s unions seemed unstoppable. 
John L. Lewis27 ran the coal miners union with an iron hand and 
could bring the country to its knees by threatening a strike.  So 
potent did these threats appear that, Harry Truman, albeit a 
Democrat, threatened to nationalize the steel industry in order to 
forestall a labor action.  Nevertheless, a reverse trend had already 
begun.  Though controversial, Republicans had pushed through 
Congress the Taft-Hartley Act, which outlawed wildcat strikes and, 
under specific circumstances, mandated collective bargaining.  The 
Landrum-Griffin Act, which further constrained union activities, 
would eventually augment this.  Union abuses were also under attack 
in Congress, where Jimmy Hoffa was forced to answer the questions 
of the McClellan Committee as it investigated racketeering among 
the Teamsters Union.  The most significant change, however, came 
courtesy of the middle class tipping point.  As the nature of jobs 
changed, so did the composition of the unions.  Coal miners, for 
instance, lost their clout as automation came to the mines.  With 
far fewer miners and with those who remained more technically 
proficient, power could be exercised by monopolizing skills rather 
than by instituting shutdowns.  Steel workers also lost leverage 
through automation and competition from other materials.  They 
could not lock the nation in a chokehold once plastic was able to 
substitute for steel.
The Tipping Point    
In general, as industrial occupations declined, the number of 
industrial unionists declined.28  By 1990, only 16% of all American 
workers belonged to a union.  What changed more emphatically was 
who belonged to unions.  In 2002, only 13% of miners and a scant 
15% of manufacturing workers did.  Those in financial and sales 
occupations had even lower concentrations: 3% and 5%, respectively. 
The largest gains had been among government workers.  In this area, 
42% were members, and many of these were professionals, or at least 
semiprofessions.  One of the most heavily unionized groups has been 
the teachers.  Unionism has decisively altered its complexion.  Thanks 
to the middle class revolution, burly laborers have been replaced on 
picket lines.  Standing where they once had stood, were females.  They, 
too, might walk off the job despite laws against this, but their most 
potent tool is political influence.  Backing the right candidates could 
get favorable treatment at the bargaining table.  After all, politicians 
ran government, and government was their employer.  Unionism, 
therefore, came to reflect the professionalization of the workforce. 
Many of its strongest adherents no longer thought of themselves as 
blue collar but as members in good standing of the middle class.  Far 
be it for them to bring the system down.
The Eisenhower Consolidation
Dwight Eisenhower29 was a national father figure.  A few short 
years before he became president, he had led millions of troops in a 
desperate crusade to save civilization from the Nazi challenge.  He 
was safe; he was solid; he could be trusted.  Ike might sometimes 
be boring, but he was never threatening.  In retrospect, it is 
conventional to assert that his presidency was a period during which 
nothing happened.  Thought of as placid and without turmoil, the 
times are deemed as uninspiring as was the nation’s leader.  The 
truth is quite different.  To begin with, there was massive conflict; 
its dimensions were merely different from those of later years.  The 
50s was fundamentally a decade of consolidation.  The middle-class 
tipping point had just been reached, and it was now being knit into 
the social fabric.  In short, a social revolution was in the process of 
being solidified.  The Sturm und Drang might be muted, but this was 
largely because legitimation required agreement, not discord.  Too 
many strident voices of dissent might indicate that the new social 
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order had not been accepted.  An apparent consensus signaled to 
everyone that what had been achieved would not easily be reversed.
One of the things for which the period is remembered is the 
moment when Charles E. Wilson, Eisenhower’s Secretary of Defense 
designate, allegedly said that what was good for General Motors 
was good for the nation.  The outgoing president of GM, he was 
defending the profits his corporation made on defense contracts. 
What is significant about this incident is that it symbolized the 
legitimation of the corporation.  Once a new-fangled innovation 
that had inspired resistance, it now had growing dominance as an 
organizational form made normal.30  Most people had come to 
accept the fact that such business entities strode the economy like 
colossi.  They might be criticized, but very few expected, or even 
intended, to dismantle them.  To do so would kill the goose that lay 
the golden eggs.  On the contrary, the idea was to tame the giants. 
People wanted to work for them, and to move up within them, not to 
supersede them.  They could perhaps stand to be regulated, but their 
destruction was unnecessary.  All that was required was legislation to 
limit their powers.
Similar sentiments applied to those who worked for these 
corporations.  They were organization men; they wore gray flannels 
suits; they were cut from the same cookie-cutter mold.31  Garbed in 
copycat white shirts, uniform ties, and felt hats, they were proud of the 
white-collar conformity Mills so roundly condemned.  The economist 
John Kenneth Galbraith32 described theirs as an affluent society and 
they cheerfully accepted this portrayal.  Viewing themselves on the 
cutting-edge of prosperity, they were too busy pursuing success to 
worry that materialism was unseemly.  Seen from the inside, they 
were innovators and go-getters.  Job advertisements from the period 
routinely sought individuals who were “self-starters.”  The term “self-
direction” might not have been a prominent part of their vocabulary, 
yet its reality was.  The business uniforms so frequently ridiculed were 
the external symbols of an internalized discipline directed toward 
progress.33  The corporate types truly wanted to make things better. 
Indicative of their attitude is another cliché from contemporary 
advertisements.  Virtually every product was extolled as “new and 
improved.”  Otherwise, it was not keeping up with the competition. 
Nothing could be static.  Those doing the pacesetting could always 
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find superior ways to do things. This was the overriding orientation 
of these supposedly mindless clones.
Nor should it be forgotten that this was the era of the Cold 
War.  The Soviet Union had become a strategic adversary.34  Also 
a nuclear power, it presented itself as the wave of a very different 
future.  Trumpeting the inevitable destruction of capitalism, it 
offered totalitarian communism as a more advanced alternative. 
Many intellectuals of the period were convinced this was true. 
They believed that centralized planning was more rational than 
the confusions of the marketplace and that, therefore, it would 
be economically, and militarily, more efficient.  They also alleged 
that socialism, and ultimately communism, were potentially more 
democratic than representative institutions arguably controlled by 
business interests.  In the end, Marx would be vindicated and an 
egalitarian prosperity would be triumphant.  But neither American 
politicians, nor members of the public, were convinced of this.  They 
feared that their hard-won freedoms might be overrun by dictatorial 
aggressors.  The result was an arms race and attempts at containment. 
Vast sums of money were expended to prevent Europe and Korea 
from slipping behind the Iron Curtain.  Eventually the competition 
concerned intercontinental ballistic missiles.  The object was to see 
who could build better rockets to carry nuclear warheads to the 
other’s territory.  Mutually assured destruction (MAD) became the 
watchword of security, and it scared nearly everyone to death.
At home, this confrontation opened with a renewed red 
scare.35  People began to worry that Russian spies had infiltrated the 
government.  At first the House Un-American Activities Committee 
(HUAC), then Senator Joseph McCarthy,36 began to investigate 
a bevy of suspects.37  Many, indeed, turned out to be Soviet 
collaborators, notably Alger Hiss and the Rosenbergs,38 but the seeds 
for a culture war were being sown.  Overreaction in the form of 
blacklists was countered by furious denials of treason.  In later years, 
this episode gave the era a reputation for being ultraconservative. 
Once more, the reality was subtler.  The Eisenhower administration 
did not turn back the clock.  It did not attempt to undo most of 
the New Deal’s social legislation.  Social Security remained intact, 
as did unemployment insurance.  The social-welfare safety net had 
become as much a part of the nation’s institutional fabric as had the 
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corporations.  Even McCarthyism lost its cache.  Eisenhower himself 
found it too extreme for his tastes.
On the domestic front, progress was also evident.  39One of the 
mechanisms of consolidation was television.  Invented in the 20s 
and perfected in the 40s, it did not enter most living rooms until 
the 50s.  Radio had earlier fertilized a national culture, but moving 
pictures that could be summoned at the turn of a dial signaled a 
new dimension in entertainment.  From coast to coast, ordinary 
people saw the same situation comedies, the same variety shows, and 
the same newscasters.  Everyone loved Lucy;40 everyone found Ed 
Sullivan a poker-faced presence on a family friendly program; and 
everyone was impressed with Edward R. Murrow’s41 mellifluous tones 
and ever-present cigarette.  Another mechanism of consolidation 
was the highway system.  Eisenhower sponsored a plan for interstate 
highways partly because his military experience demonstrated the 
utility of being able to move men and equipment across the country, 
but the major benefits were nonetheless civilian.  Now, truckers could 
move merchandise more efficiently than by rail.  Steel tracks could 
not be built into every small town, but asphalt roads could.  Nor 
were trains effective in delivering small loads; trucks were.  This gave 
commerce as much an infusion as had canals many years before.
This expanded highway network had an even more direct 
influence on individuals.  Ford had made automobiles affordable; 
Eisenhower gave them a place to go.42  Before his concrete strips 
crisscrossed the land in emulation of Hitler’s autobahns, intercity 
transportation had been tortuous.  Roads were narrow, winding, 
and sometimes unpaved.  They certainly did not tempt people to 
take pleasure trips far from home.  The interstates transformed 
this.43  They made every corner of the country accessible to every 
other corner.  This prompted a slew of innovations to facilitate these 
journeys.  Motels sprouted like mushrooms.  Holiday Inn was not 
any longer just the title of a movie; it designated a chain of motor 
hotels to which families could repair in the assurance that they 
would be provided ample comfort.  Likewise, a bevy of standardized 
restaurants arose to feed these travelers.  Kentucky Fried Chicken and 
McDonald’s became household names.44  “Finger licking good” and 
the “golden arches” signaled dependable, if not exhilarating, cuisine. 
In the process, these changed the nation’s eating habits.  Because they 
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had to be uniform if they were to guarantee consistency and quick 
if they were to be profitable, they became the progenitors of fast 
food.  Even at home, a TV dinner hastily removed from the freezer 
and eventually popped into the microwave became the standard of 
convenience.  People on the move still expected nourishing food, but 
they did not have the time to be fancy.
Their families too had become compressed.  During the 
Depression, families were postponed for financial reasons, but, after 
the war ended, there was a burst of fertility characterized as The Baby 
Boom.  By the 50s, however, parents were voluntarily confining 
themselves to two children.  In essence, the nuclear family was 
legitimated.  Its flexibility was perfectly suited to the agility needed 
to take advantage of a market economy.  Middle-class families, 
accordingly, no longer participated in extended families in order 
to tend to their immediate needs.45  If anything, they relied more 
on friends who had similar interests than on relatives.  The lesson a 
better educated, 46 and more affluent, generation has absorbed is that 
childrearing is an intensive endeavor.  If the young are to be prepared 
for self-directed success, family resources must be directed their 
way.47  Sending parental attention or financial reserves elsewhere, 
including to extraneous siblings, might shortchange them.  One 
consequence has been the widespread practice of setting up college 
trust funds.  Savings are specifically designated for higher education 
on the premise that it is inevitable and obligatory.  Children are not 
asked whether they want to go to college, but what they expect to 
study once they get there.  The new understanding is that, absent this 
preparation, they will be unmitigated failures.
Yet college is not the start of this preparation.  Parents have 
to make certain that their children go to first-rate primary and 
secondary schools.  One way to ensure this is to move to the 
suburbs.48  Inexpensive automobiles make it possible to live outside 
the city limits,49 and the assembly-line style construction of houses 
make these domiciles affordable.  The Levittown phenomenon has 
arrived.50  Those boxy residences, for which their inhabitants were so 
roundly censured, are cozy affairs that enable people to practice the 
watchword of the modern family, namely “togetherness.”51  Mother, 
father, and their children are expected to comprise a mutually 
supportive household.  Those who play together, and perhaps pray 
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together, will stay together.  Their love will be an umbrella to shelter 
them from the hazards of a world filled with unpredictable strangers. 
The models for this friendly perfection are Ozzie and Harriet and 
Father Knows Best.  Their gentle conversations, during which family 
members discuss their various dilemmas, are how it is supposed to 
be.  Sweet reason and mutual concern provide encouragement for 
their younger members to stand on their own feet.  Parents are there 
to furnish guidance, not dictatorial orders, and children, who in 
their immaturity might bridle at this assistance, would eventually 
incorporate these lessons into their personal repertoires.  Television, 
the very essence of modernity, thereby became an academy for social 
advancement.
Another of the changes that occurred within suburban abodes 
was how discipline was exercised.  During the 30s, John B. Watson52 
had been the guru of childrearing.53  His central recommendation 
was that children not be spoiled.  They must be put on a strict 
schedule, not unlike that found in the contemporary factory.  By the 
40s and into the 50s, Dr. Spock54 asserted a contrary expertise.  He 
recommended a gentler regime.  Children were not to be exposed 
to corporal punishment; they were to be patiently and carefully 
instructed.  When they misbehaved, they were to be sent to their 
rooms so that they could reflect on their misdeeds.  Although 
this sometimes verged on permissiveness, the central intent was 
explored by Melvin Kohn. 55 The underlying goal transmuted from 
obedience to internalized discipline.  Children needed to understand 
why they should do what their parents required.  These external 
objectives had to become their own if they were to be pursued when 
no external authority was available.  The young were, in short, to 
become middle class paragons, capable of emotional restraint and 
competent decisions.  Even in school, discipline was directed toward 
internalized learning.56  Gone were the hickory stick and the “board 
of education.”  A trip to the vice principal for a good talking-to 
replaced a rap across the knuckles.  All of this was reinforced by 
suburbanization wherein a group of like-minded parents migrated 
to the same location to ensure that their offspring could attend good 
schools.  They would thenceforth insist that quality education meant 
a progressive, nonpunitive, education.
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While this was happening, a newly middle-class public was 
insisting that the rules of the game be universal.  They wanted 
equality of opportunity truly extended to all with equivalence before 
the law.  Consumed with a desire to participate in the upward 
mobility57 they saw around them, they were adamant that no one 
receive special favors.  This applied on the job, in the schools, and in 
the courts.  Merit and justice were to govern how things turned out. 
People were supposed to get what they earned.  At work, expertise 
was to be rewarded with promotions; at school superior scholarship 
would be recompensed with good grades, and within the legal system 
no one would to be railroaded because of lowly origins.  Television 
too reinforced these ideals.  On its ubiquitous western and detective 
programs, justice always prevails in the end.  The good guy gets the 
girl, and the bad one is arrested and locked up.
While the Eisenhower era has a reputation for conservative stasis, 
it was actually the springboard for the reforms that flowered in the 
next decade.58  One of these was the Civil Rights Movement.59  The 
Supreme Court’s Brown v. Board of Education ruling was published 
in 1954.60  It launched the movement toward desegregation and then 
integration.  Eisenhower might reluctantly dispatch U.S. marshals to 
Little Rock to enforce the Constitution, but he did dispatch them. 
And at this time, Rosa Parks began the Montgomery bus boycott 
when she refused to move to the back of a bus.  The conventional 
wisdom dismisses this period as a dark age, without noticing that 
a sea change had occurred.  A half century earlier, the Supreme 
Court had ruled that separate could be equal and had acquiesced in 
routine lynchings of assertive blacks.  At the time of these outrages, 
the public did not object.  Keeping blacks as second-class citizens 
seemed the normal order of things.  By the time of the middle class 
tipping point, this was no longer so.  Middle-class values dictated 
fairness for all, irrespective of skin color.61  If social mobility were 
open to talent, then talent could not be denied whatever its shade. 
Blacks, too, had to be allowed to take advantage of the rules, if these 
rules were to mean anything.  Northerners, who became middle class 
before Southerners, were offended when they saw the law perverted 
to enforce segregation.  It was this attitude, one that also infected 
the South as it extricated itself from its agricultural slumber, which 
made the Civil Rights Movement possible.  “Negroes” too were to be 
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inducted into a social class system that could not function if it did 
not reward merit wherever it was found.62
Similar considerations applied to the gathering feminist 
movement.  Nowadays, it is conventional to mock primitive television 
commercials that presented housewives as glorying in their sparkling 
bathrooms, but this was not all that changed.  The togetherness of 
the suburbs celebrated the roles of mother and housekeeper, yet 
in this it was behind the times.  The cleanliness that was so highly 
regarded was handed down from earlier days, reinvigorated by a 
flurry of technical developments.  Electric refrigerators, washing 
machines, dishwashers, and even sponge mops made sanitation more 
easily accomplished.63  So did a host of detergents and grease-cutting 
agents.  Nevertheless, the myth of the housewife trapped in her lonely 
suburban prison was never fully valid.  Rosy the Riveter supposedly 
pioneered the progress of women in the workplace, but her wartime 
contributions were a blip on a much longer continuum.  Women 
had been gradually entering the labor force for over a century, and 
the trend now accelerated.  Wives and mothers were going to work 
in greater numbers, not so much to supplement the family’s budget 
as for personal fulfillment.  With so many of their traditional tasks 
superseded by technology, they needed an opportunity to perform 
respected work.  Better educated than their mothers, they craved 
situations where they could demonstrate their abilities.  Having 
gone to coeducational schools and, often, colleges, they languished 
when restricted to domestic ghettos.  It was these women, and 
their daughters, who were to provide the audience for a looming 
feminism.64
Dissent, such as it was during these years, was marginalized. 
Most famous from the time were the beatniks.65  They affected scruffy 
beards, ill-fitting berets, and embarrassing poetry.  Contemptuous of 
the materialistic surrounding them, they were ostentatiously poor. 
Styling themselves intellectuals, they sounded the tocsin of impending 
dehumanization.  Updated bohemians, they gathered in coffee-houses 
to admire one another’s work and to curse organizational types. 
Mothers cautioned their children not to become such wastrels, but 
for the moment they need not have worried.  The Beat Generation 
might have been an object of curiosity, but it was also one of ridicule. 
While the middle-class consolidation was at its peak, people were 
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too focused on business to be attracted by its message.  They would 
have agreed with Calvin Coolidge that the business of America was 
business.
The Hippie Eruption
The 60s began with John F. Kennedy.66  When he stood with 
his head uncovered by the customary top hat to deliver his ringing 
inaugural address, it was as if there really was a New Frontier.  By 
general consensus, he represented a fresh generation, one untainted 
by war or Depression.  In his campaign, he promised to get the 
country moving again.  Implying that nothing much had happened 
under Ike, he pledged social as well as economic progress.  What 
seems to have been forgotten over the succeeding decades is that he 
was elected on a platform dedicated to prosecuting the Cold War 
more effectively.  In his debates with Richard Nixon,67 he promised 
he would close a “missile gap” with Russia and protect Quemoy 
and Matsu from Communist Chinese expansion.  Even the famous 
peroration in which he said, “And so my fellow Americans, ask not 
what your country can do for you, ask what you can do for your 
country,” has, as its goal, patriotism.  
Before these oft-quoted words, Kennedy had also declared, 
“Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we 
will pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any 
friend, oppose any foe, to insure the survival and success of liberty.” 
Protecting freedom, the quintessential middle-class value, was the 
central aim of his presidency.  But the packaging was new.  Thus, he 
began his address by asserting, “Let the word go forth from this time 
and place, to friend and foe alike, that the torch has been passed to a 
new generation of Americans, born in this century, tempered in war, 
disciplined by a hard and bitter peace, proud of our ancient heritage, 
and unwilling to witness or permit the slow undoing of those human 
rights to which this nation has always been committed….”  The 
theme was clear: it was idealism in service to standards already set by 
the American experiment.  Kennedy’s signature program, the Peace 
Corps, underlined this direction.  It would spread middle class values 
across the world.  Youths committed to doing good would travel to 
third-world countries, for little or no pay, where they would teach 
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the lessons they had learned at home.  In this, they would convert 
their moral aspirations into action.
The actual accomplishments of JFK’s administration are very 
much mixed.  He had stared down Big Steel,68 flubbed the Bay of 
Pigs landings, recouped during the Cuban Missile Crisis, pledged 
to send men to the moon, instituted a tax cut, and begun inserting 
advisors into Viet Nam.69  The war on poverty was not yet off the 
drawing board, and it would not get started until after he was 
assassinated.  What must strike the neutral observer is the idealism 
apparent in most of these programs.  The youthful vigor of Camelot 
reverberated around the land, especially among the young.  They 
wanted to save the world, not merely to aspire to suburban affluence. 
This attitude was to erupt in full blossom in the hippie generation. 
These children of the children of depression had been raised on tales 
of frustrated idealism.  Their parents wanted to change the world 
but had been diverted into rescuing it from a barbarian invasion. 
Now the young were chafing at the bit to fulfill their parent’s aborted 
missions.  They would not sell out just to attain personal comfort. 
Since the millennium was visibly within reach, they would see things 
through regardless of the obstacles blocking the way.
Some of these ambitious youths were red diaper babies.70  Their 
parents had been Depression era revolutionaries from whence they 
imbibed a Marxist legacy.  Most, however, came from families with 
a liberal bent, or, if from conservative ones, they were in rebellion 
against a reactionary heritage.  A majority of the activists were college 
educated.  Members of the first cohort of middle-class children 
where a higher education was considered mandatory, they believed 
themselves to be intellectually superior to their forebears.  As such, 
they were certain that their idealism was grounded in an enhanced 
understanding of the human condition.  Despite their youth and 
inexperience, they were persuaded they knew best.71  Their book 
learning and good intentions ensured that this was so.  If their elders 
would simply listen to their prescriptions with an open mind, they 
too would realize that the problems of the past were amenable to 
solution.  All that was needed was the will to implement reforms.72
The hippie ideal was fairly simple.73  The Beatles74 were soon to 
capture its essence in a hit song.  “All you really need is love” went 
their mantra.  The key to universal happiness wasn’t a mystery; it 
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was a matter of dedication.  Another popular song advised: “If you 
are going to San Francisco, you’re going to meet some gentle people 
there.  If you are going to San Francisco, be sure to wear a flower in 
your hair.”  The Haight-Ashbury district of San Francisco, along with 
New York City’s East Village, became the capitals of a peace-oriented 
movement.  Along their urban streets wandered bona-fide converts 
to the cause.  Dressed in tie-dyed tee shirts and sporting granny 
glasses, they preached a message of universal love to all comers.75 
“Make love, not war!” and exercise “flower power” were among their 
observations.  If people would just be nice to one another, there 
would be no need for a confrontation with the Soviets.  If everyone 
pursued beauty, as opposed to avarice, there would likewise be no 
need for the rat race.  People of every shade and description could 
join hands and lift their voices in song.  At long last recognizing their 
inherent brotherhood, they would automatically seek to help, rather 
than hurt, their neighbors.
Among the other slogans making the rounds were “Don’t trust 
anyone over thirty”; “If it feels good, do it”; and “Do your own 
thing.”  The idea was that the children knew best.  Uncorrupted 
by the need to earn a living, or to prove how powerful they were, 
they reincarnated Rousseau’s noble savages.76  Often financed by 
their parents, they would nevertheless seek to achieve dignified 
objectives.  Art, for instance, was high on their list.  But this was not 
the art of their parents.  It was more vibrant and more rebellious. 
Some of it was psychedelic.  Bright, otherworldly colors replaced 
less adventurous shades.  Some of it was pop art.  Andy Warhol led 
the way in appreciating the beauty of ordinary objects.  The catch 
here is that these objects are simultaneously being satirized.  They are 
kitsch, not true art.  Although many hippies emulated the beards and 
long hair associated with the bohemians of old, few were practicing 
artists.  They merely copied the poverty of these long-ago rebels.  If 
they lived in lofts, this was by choice, not necessity.  The best they 
could do by way of artistry was to engage in handicrafts.  Personally 
made objects, whether clothing, jewelry, or furniture, took on a 
status significantly more elevated than that of manufactured goods. 
The very imperfections indicated that they were more honest.
Most important was their rejection of the middle class discipline 
of the older generation.  These young people would not play the 
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commercial game.  Money did not matter.  One of their mentors, 
Abbie Hoffman,77 went so far as to entitle a book Steal This Book. 
The objective was to undermine the market, not to participate in it. 
They preferred to be like Neil Diamond, “forever in blue jeans.”  If 
they had anything to say about it, their privileged childhoods would 
never end.  Work would not be necessary because they would never 
make the mistake of assuming its responsibilities.  They knew that 
spontaneous feelings are what really counted.  Getting in touch with 
one’s inner self, rather than obtaining a huge bank account, earned 
the respect of one’s peers.  This made it attractive to pursue shortcuts. 
One of these was song.  Folk music and, to a lesser extent, rock and 
roll touched the soul.  With a guitar in one’s hand, one could share an 
expression of intense emotion with others.  All could communicate 
a joint appreciation of the poignant question: Where have all the 
flowers gone?  The answer was “the graveyard,” but this generation 
would never personally join in the slaughter.  Striving for universal 
peace was the core of what it meant to be a loving individual.  It’s 
what flower power was about.  As its partisans also said, one should 
“make love not war,” for if everyone did, there obviously would be 
no war.78
Another shortcut was drugs.  It was a simple matter to zone 
out with a joint in one’s hand.  The Depression-era generation 
sought discipline by avoiding narcotics, but this generation was too 
sophisticated to be fooled by the propaganda that beguiled its parents. 
The young people knew that pot was not the killer depicted in Reefer 
Madness. Marijuana did not make a person crazy; it only made one 
feel good.  Passing roaches around at a party was an expression of 
solidarity, love, and even creativity.  More potent still was LSD.  The 
Harvard psychologist Timothy Leary79 was then touted it as the 
perfect gateway to self-understanding.  He described trips illuminated 
by vivid colors and deep insights.  “Tune in, turn on, drop out” was 
his rallying cry.  The world of inner beauty thereby released was far 
more valid than crass materialism of the marketplace.  It, and not 
mere things, was what life was about.  Heroin too was out there in 
the streets, but most of the hippies knew that it was deadly.  They 
also passed along the word that “speed (i.e., amphetamines) kills.” 
They would use drugs, but recreationally rather than addictively. 
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A third shortcut was sex.   It was love made tangible by the 
act of coitus.  Pippin, one of the era’s Broadway plays, promulgated 
the message that sex was fun.  It was no more harmful than pot 
and had been denied these youngsters by their parents because they 
were envious of youth.  Like the actors in Hair, they would take 
off their clothes and do what came naturally.  Sex was not dirty; it 
was a biological function.  Unlike the Victorians, one should not 
be prudish.  One should be proud of one’s body, not ashamed of it 
or the pleasure it gave.  Nor was marriage a necessary prerequisite 
for doing the deed.  This too was a superstition inherited from less 
enlightened times.  Why did people need a piece of paper in order 
to express their affection for one another?  It was perfectly all right 
to shack up.  By the same token, it was okay to take advantage of 
crash pads.  Sleeping on the floor of a total stranger’s apartment, 
where what happened happened, was a sign of generosity, rather 
than of immorality.  The apotheosis of this occurred at Woodstock. 
This open-air celebration of music was characterized by several days 
of mud and nudity.  Reckoned to be a milestone of the up-to-the-
minute mindset, in later years people could prove they were hip 
by recounting how they made the trek to this Catskill Mountain 
extravaganza.
Nevertheless, the hippie generation was also typified by ennui. 
Many young people were bored.  Most of their days were spent just 
hanging around and doing nothing.  They literally did not know 
what to do with their lives or where to look for clues about how to 
find out.  There was a genuine sense of being adrift.  Deep down, 
they hoped things would work out, but they were not sure things 
would.  Despite all the idealism, there was a nagging emptiness akin 
to that experienced by the beatniks.  Because so much of what was 
valued was determined by what would offend parents, these young 
people were not sure what they personally wanted.  They were certain 
they were morally superior and that it was their duty to inherit the 
world; they were not definite about what to do with this bequest.
Not surprisingly, this fragile bubble burst when confronted by 
harsh realities.80  Another of the era’s clichés proclaimed that those 
who were not part of the solution were part of the problem.  In spite 
of this, unfocused loved turned out a poor mechanism for problem 
solving.  The first great shock was Kennedy’s assassination.81  He was 
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so much an icon that most people did not believe that his murder was 
possible.  He was too vibrant to be snatched away at so appallingly 
early an age.  The result was a cottage industry in conspiracy theories. 
Because it did not seem reasonable that a single misfit could change 
history, the idea that Lee Harvey Oswald was a lone assassin was 
rejected out of hand.  Something more sinister had to be responsible. 
Despite the fact that there was little evidence to this effect, many 
concluded that members of the elite were to blame.  Perhaps LBJ was 
too eager to become president.  Perhaps, the CIA, or was it the FBI, 
did not want Kennedy to discontinue the Viet Nam project.  Never 
mind that he was the one who initiated it.  Never mind also that the 
proof of these nefarious plots kept changing.  That Jack Ruby shot 
Oswald and that some witnesses thought they heard shots from the 
grassy knoll were too suspicious not to be expanded.
When within years Robert F. Kennedy, the deceased president’s 
equally charismatic brother and Martin Luther King Jr.,82 the 
compelling leader of the Civil Rights Movement, were also 
assassinated, it was too much to bear.  Naïve love had not been able to 
stay the hand of evil.  Sense could not be made by those who believed 
that love would conquer all.  Sadly, they could find no comforting 
explanations.  Several other of their fondest hopes were also running 
into trouble.  The Viet Nam War had turned into a quagmire,83 the 
war on poverty was spinning its wheels,84 and riots had broken out 
in urban streets.  Flower power turned out to be an illusion.  The 
hippies of Haight-Ashbury were easy marks for muggers; the drug 
scene mutated into a killing zone; and commercial interests ripped 
off their art.  Worst of all were the Tate-La Bianca murders.  The 
work of the infamous Manson family, these nailed the lid on hippie 
coffins.85  Even the name of Charles Manson’s ill-assorted clan gave 
the lie to hippie ideals.  This group of unrelated individuals fancied 
itself a family.  Living, and having sex together, its members thought 
of themselves as the embodiment of selfless love.  Charmed by 
Manson’s story-telling abilities and his personalized attentions, these 
middle-class throwaways felt that they had found unconditional 
positive regard.  Charlie cared.  Charlie would watch out for them. 
All he asked in return was their loyalty.  Going out to kill people to 
start a race war was thus a reasonable request.  They would do it in 
the name of their love for Charlie and for the good of humanity.
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This facile brutality was too much, save for the most hard-bitten 
of the love children.  The hippie kingdom succumbed to reality. 
It dissolved as a product of its own unfulfilled promises.  Most of 
those who participated moved on to more conventional lives, but 
its central aspirations would no more disappear than had those of 
the Depression.  They were incorporated within the liberalism that 
became a standard middle class affectation.  The former hippies did 
not renounce their youthful indiscretions; they looked back upon 
them with nostalgia.  For many, these were the most exciting times 
they would ever experience.  Never again would they know the heady 
feeling of saving the world.  Never again would they be embryonic 
geniuses for whom all things were possible.  If their odysseys had not 
ended as they had anticipated, at least they had tried.
The irony of the hippie interval is that it is a parody of middle-
class ascendancy.  The superannuated teenaged heirs to unprecedented 
social mobility did not know what to do with this heritage.  In fact, 
most of their parents were first generation members of a higher social 
status.  Not quite sure of how to inhabit an unaccustomed lifestyle, 
they were even less sure of how to transmit it to their offspring.86  As 
a result, they requested that their young be successful; they provided 
them with material well being; and they bundled them off to college. 
What they could not manage was teaching them how to be self-
directed.  Consumed with coming to grips with the difficult task of 
becoming effectively middle-class, they asked their children to learn 
the how and why of things without providing them the keys to doing 
so.  The upshot was that the 60s generation was left to experiment 
without the guidance of clear directives.  Confronted with a myriad 
of uncertainties, they pounced on simple answers.  Pampered when 
they were young, they retrogressed to the uncomplicated remedies of 
their halcyon days.  With little personal experience of the ways of the 
world, they substituted fantasy for practicality.
More specifically, the hippie cohort exhibited a caricature of 
self-direction.  Without putting effort into attaining emotional 
maturity or acquiring certified expertise, they made decisions based 
on whim or anxiety.  Expected to perform better than their parents 
but unconvinced of their ability to accomplish this, they renounced 
hierarchy as a species of immoral exploitation.  Theirs would be 
a world of perfect cooperation and total equality.  The only thing 
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necessary to validate one’s worth would be one’s humanity.  And 
since nothing was more human than one’s emotions, these were 
sufficient to make everyone equal to everyone else.  To be honest to 
one’s inner core, rather than to put on airs as did their parents, was 
to demonstrate one’s superiority.  Rather than seek empty symbols of 
success, or kowtow mindlessly to insensitive bosses, they would seek 
to be genuine and independent.  The trouble was that everyone had 
feelings.  To be true to oneself, and no more, left one indistinguishable 
from the common ruck.  This might be fundamentally democratic, 
but to be this undistinguished was essentially to be a failure.
One of the contradictions that the hippies could not resolve 
was that between merit and equality.  In asserting an allegiance to 
art, they were aspiring to a particular form of excellence, whereas 
in denouncing independent achievement, they were abrogating 
efforts at being outstanding.  The hippies believed in tolerance, but 
as idealists, they took tolerance to an extreme.  Everything was as 
good as everything else; therefore nothing was better than anything 
else.  Daniel Patrick Moynihan87 in another context talked about 
society’s “defining deviance down.”  He suggested that outrageous 
behavior had become more commonplace because people were no 
longer offended by conduct once considered disgraceful.  Hippie 
tolerance was one of the starting places of this decline.  In adopting 
styles of dress and standards of action expressly designed to outrage 
the older generation, this generation lowered the bar for those who 
would follow them.  In their rejection of discipline, these young also 
rejected efforts to do well.  Since doing good, or even being good, is 
contingent upon meeting standards, to discard these out of hand is 
to eschew both quality performances and social decency.
At least as serious was the mutiny against responsibility.  If the 
middle class specializes in making social decisions, to be worthy of 
this designation, it must execute this assignment earnestly.  It cannot 
be frivolous or sloppy nor can it indiscriminately slough off blame. 
Above all, its members must try to do a good job.  To put momentary 
pleasure above responsibility would be to condemn others to harm. 
Yet in playing the victim, rather than acting as a locus of personal 
control, the hippies failed to do what could be done.  They did not 
believe in their power to shape events.  Instead, they cast the future to 
the winds of chance.  For them, planning for what was not yet present 
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was anathema.  Theirs was a here-and-now universe in which mental 
images substituted for solid achievements.  Determined not to hold 
down nine-to-five jobs, they considered a drug-induced haze the 
equivalent of productive activity.  Almost constitutionally opposed 
to following rules, they celebrated anarchistic impulsivity.  They not 
only rejected discipline in terms of the standards they honored but 
also in terms of the efforts they exerted.  With short attention spans 
and a restricted event horizon, they could not mobilize themselves for 
long-term projects.  Nothing mattered enough to apply that much 
energy.  As a result, they did not accomplish a great deal.  Looking 
back, they left no substantial monuments except their romantic 
attitudes.  Not even in art did they produce timeless masterpieces.
 The hippies, of course, preached cooperation.  Loath to be 
competitive, they mouthed platitudes about working together in 
harmony.  In fact, given their lack of discipline, they were poor allies. 
Whatever their promises, they could not be relied upon to fulfill them. 
The consequence was that they could not band together to assert 
their power against straight society.88  Aggressively nonpolitical, they 
treated exercises in seeking hierarchical advancement as sinful.  To 
be ambitious was to be selfish; to join with others in asserting social 
control was oppressive.  Nor would they descend to being pragmatic. 
This would require them to contaminate their hands with mundane 
occupations, and they were above this.  Essentially immature egoists, 
they gloried in their own isolation and uselessness.  In their own 
minds, they were pure and unsullied and, therefore, exceptional 
human beings.  The antithesis of what it meant to be middle class, 
they were bent on disassembling the social class structure.  The way 
that this was expressed was to claim that the system was at fault. 
Exactly in what the system consisted, they were unprepared to say. 
Undisciplined even in their intellectual life, the details of history, 
sociology, or political science left them cold.  Nor could they explain 
the future in concrete terms.  As they never tired of reminding their 
critics, love was all one needed.
This love, however, did not extend to marriage.  Marriage and 
children and a lifelong commitment were for the more conventional. 
Worried primarily about the present, their plans did not encompass 
the next generation.  Primarily concerned with rebelling against 
their parents, they suffered from a Peter Pan complex.  In their own 
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terms flower children, they took pride in a resistance to growing up. 
Although many continued their lifestyle well into their twenties, they 
refused to equate their sexual promiscuity with potential parenthood. 
Farthest from their thoughts was any conception of how to prepare 
the young to meet future middle-class responsibilities.  Tireless in 
their complaints about what their own parents had done wrong, they 
were remarkably hazy about how such mistakes could be corrected. 
Defiantly young in spirit, it seemed enough that they should get their 
own way, without figuring out the implications of this direction. 
Convinced of their moral worth, they were certain that their instincts 
would be infallible.  Not unexpectedly, utterly excluded from their 
consciousness were thoughts of returning to the suburbs.  For many, 
this was the scene of their former incarceration.  That a detached 
home, surrounded by a manicured lawn, might prove a suitable 
environment for raising their own children was inconceivable.  This 
would be the epitome of selling out.  It would betray the sources of 
their moral supremacy for the monotony of responsibility.
After Kennedy’s death, his promise of a New Frontier was followed 
by the specter of Barry Goldwater.89  The Republican candidate who 
opposed Lyndon Johnson, he promised the nation a choice, not an 
echo.  Uncompromisingly conservative, he unabashedly championed 
a return to a market-oriented economy.  For the hippies, despite 
their lack of political passion, this was a joke.  Capitalism had been 
thoroughly discredited; hence a return to its middle-class standards 
was unthinkable.  Everyone knew that Goldwater was a madman 
dedicated into nuking the Communists back to the Stone Age. 
Ineffably dangerous, he was the personification of an extremist. 
Thus, when he stood before the Republican convention to accept its 
nomination and opined, “Extremism in the defense of liberty is no 
vice.  And…moderation in the pursuit of justice is no virtue,” they 
were persuaded that their fears were vindicated.  Four short years 
earlier, Kennedy had vowed to “pay any price, bear any burden, [and] 
meet any hardship” in defense of liberty, but that was then.  The 
revolt against the middle-class ascendancy was now at full cry, and 
anyone who suggested that this might be an ill-advised adventure 
was obviously a less than competent counterrevolutionary.
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Chapter 7
The Reaction
For every action there is always opposed an equal reaction.  
(Isaac Newton, Principia Mathematica)
Attack is the reaction; I never think I have hit hard unless 
it rebounds.  (Samuel Johnson, from Boswell’s Life of 
Johnson)
Every reform, however necessary, will by weak minds 
be carried to an excess, that itself will need reforming.  
(Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Biographia Literaria)
The Reform Impulse
The middle class ascendancy threw up a series of challenges.  As 
the world changed, an unanticipated crop of conundrums arose to 
puzzle society.1  This new stage of the Commercial Revolution was not 
a walk across an untroubled upland meadow.  The way was littered 
with conflicts, abuses, and even stupidities.2  People had always 
dreamt that progress would culminate in greater happiness and fewer 
uncertainties, but its realization was fraught with anxieties and the 
consciousness of human limitations.3  Rain clouds surrounded the 
heads of the inexperienced.  Unequivocal happiness was apparently 
not to be the lot of mankind.  The more people got, the more 
they wanted and the greater their power, the more numerous their 
frustrations.  Or, so it seemed.  Observers were transfixed with what 
had gone wrong, rather than what was going right.  It is a journalistic 
cliché that good news is no news.  The unexpected predicament, 
not the ordinary accomplishment, is what captures public attention. 
When a man bites a dog, especially when there is not supposed to 
be any biting, bystanders take notice.  This sort of event requires 
concentration.  If it is to be assimilated, it is imperative to figure out 
what happened and why.
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Likewise, the more revolutionary the change, the more intense 
the reaction to it.4  That which is exceedingly different from what 
preceded it feels uncomfortable merely because it is different.  When 
people do not possess the routines with which to cope with a new 
situation, they feel impelled to respond.  This novel circumstance 
is sensed as problematic and, therefore, as in need of a solution. 
The stumbling block lies in finding an appropriate answer.  Given 
that the Middle Class Revolution was a seismic event, it called 
forth a series of momentous, if not always appropriate, rejoinders5. 
Although hardly remarked upon as it occurred, the transformation 
traumatized the social structure.  Commentators were aware of the 
dislocations of the Industrial Revolution6 but were less cognizant of 
the tribulations intrinsic to so great a success.  Nevertheless, many 
crucial relationships were not what they had once been.  In point 
of fact, the social hierarchy was shaken to its foundations.  Those 
who now got to the top of the greasy pole were not the same ones 
who got there before.   Nor were the strengths that once produced 
success identical with those of the past.  The professionalization of 
society had changed the ground rules.  Technological expertise, for 
instance, counted for much more than it ever had previously.  Nor 
were the types of jobs people performed the same.  The division of 
labor fractured into so many anomalous pieces that it was difficult 
to grasp how they fit together.  Occupations were changed, their 
associated statuses were altered; political techniques were revised; 
educational demands were amended; and even family interactions 
were under siege.   Something had to be done, but no one could be 
certain of what.  
The hippies, in their own immature and inarticulate way, had 
sought answers.7  Unfortunately, their remedies, though striking, 
were soon found wanting.8  What was presently to emerge in their 
place was a sequence of politicized solutions.  The nation, and indeed 
the world, would be rocked by a succession of political earthquakes in 
what amounted to an outburst of reform mania.  As people felt driven 
to deal with the displacements in their lives, they got caught up in 
an uncomfortable cycle of disguised cultural lag.  Intending to keep 
moving forward, their problem solving inclinations unexpectedly 
betrayed them.  In place of developing truly innovative answers, they 
inadvertently recycled those of a bygone age.  As might be expected, 
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in a civilization increasingly populated by middle-class strivers, it 
would not take long for the nouveau riche to apply their talents to 
the conundrums elicited by their triumphs.  They were, after all, 
professional decision makers.  Accustomed to utilizing their expertise 
to organize productive activities, they assumed this approach would 
be appropriate to their current predicament.  On balance, the tactic 
had surely worked well within the industrial arena—hadn’t it? 
Techniques for scheduling the arrival of raw materials to cleverly 
designed machines undoubtedly resulted in a cornucopia of goods 
stocking suburban shopping malls.  Why couldn’t this same stratagem 
be applied to interpersonal dilemmas?  If these too were addressed 
in an orderly manner, they too should prove amenable to resolution. 
Even as astute an observer as Max Weber9 depicted this method 
as “rational.”  It was simply what made sense.  Not surprisingly, 
those who extrapolated from this supposition presumed that, if the 
government were assigned the task of correcting social injustices, it 
could manage the mission.  With greater resources available than 
any combination of individuals and kept within reasonable bounds 
via democratic oversights, it could, without question, be trusted to 
do what was best for all concerned.  The sticking point was that 
government would have to perform this magic blindly.  In a world 
that had never before undergone a middle-class revolution, no one 
could accurately predict what would be required.
The resultant line of attack is generally referred to as social 
engineering.10  Patterned on tangible forms of manipulation, it 
theoretically converts social knowledge into enlightened plans of 
action.  Deliberate, disciplined, and well motivated, how could it 
not achieve desirable ends?  As with other varieties of engineering, 
this one is steeped in efforts at control.  Grounded in rationality, it 
is expected to take the mystery out of human misery and enable the 
community to implement shared objectives.  Yet, asserting control 
does not, of itself, provide control.  It is one thing to declare mastery 
of a situation, quite another to master it.  Sadly, social engineering 
did not live up to its billing.  Time and again, it has failed to produce 
the promised results.  What has really rankled is that problems meant 
to be corrected have frequently been exacerbated.  Instead of efforts 
at improving a situation making things better, they often made them 
worse.
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The reason is not hard to fathom.  Social engineering takes for 
granted three prerequisites.11  First, it assumes that the target problem 
is understood.  Clearly, people must know what is wrong before they 
can fix it.  Second, the solution to the difficulty is believed to be 
readily at hand.  It is imagined that the experts can always devise an 
ingenious means of overcoming a problem.  Third, when the solution 
is known, it is presupposed that it can, and will, be implemented. 
The authorities, and the people, will do what needs to be done, and 
the issue will evaporate.  The trouble with this scenario is that in most 
cases, one, or more, of these preconditions is not met.  People do not 
understand the source of their discomfort and/or how this distress 
can be relieved and/or how the appropriate resources can be brought 
to bear.   Activists speak glibly of root causes without evidence that 
these are the actual sources of difficulty.  Similarly, they routinely 
proclaim insights into the ideal intervention.  Swearing up and down 
that a favorite policy will do the trick, they rarely produce facts to back 
this up.  Likewise problematic is mobilizing the appropriate actions. 
Politicians engrossed in petty squabbles often find it impossible to 
develop a well-timed consensus.  Too little too late is a common 
failing, but just as frequently the requisite resources cannot be 
assembled, irrespective of good-faith efforts.  To illustrate, if personal 
therapy is deemed a sovereign cure for individual unhappiness, this 
does not mean that there will be enough qualified therapists.  Nor 
does it mean that there are sufficient funds to pay them.  Indeed, the 
facts of social life are such that the players are usually ignorant of 
what is transpiring.  Worse yet, they are often congenitally incapable 
of executing that to which they are consciously committed.  Merely 
to get from day to day, human beings have a knack of fooling 
themselves about their fundamental circumstances.
The gap between action and intention is regularly filled 
by idealism.12  People genuinely want to do good, but their 
ideas regarding what is good are often based more on hope than 
practicality.  Ignorant of what is taking place, they substitute visions 
of a romanticized future for a bleaker reality.  Things will work out 
for the best if only others will strive toward this perfect endpoint. 
How, indeed, could they not?  All the same, where this ideal came 
from is, nine times out of ten, itself troublesome.  Potential reformers 
habitually refer to a future they are convinced is within their grasp, 
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yet its outlines typically owe more to the past than to their prophetic 
powers.  Peering over the horizon is notoriously ticklish.  No one 
can literally foresee what is to come.  More common is extrapolating 
from what is known to what is unknown, from the familiar to the 
unfamiliar.  Generally what is recognizable is reworked to serve as a 
model for what is desired.  One reason why cultural lag is so prevalent 
is that people unintentionally tighten their hold, on what used to be 
in the very process of trying to cope with what is materializing.  They 
literally look toward what once succeeded for hints about what is to 
come.
The reforms that were about to take center stage in response 
to the middle-class ascendancy had their inception in idealizations 
of this sort.  Their backers were working from visions generalized 
from past events.  Promised cures were based, not on demonstrable 
results but on purified ideals.  Indeed, the nature of these ideals 
depended on mentally cleaning messy realities.  That which had been 
was simplified and its rough edges smoothed out  Eyeliner made the 
outlines of the eyes more distinct and rouge produced cheekbones 
that stood out.  The ideal glowed with promise precisely because it 
had been made extreme.  More intense than real life, as with many 
mental constructs, it did not suffer from mundane gaps or nagging 
imperfections.  
An ideal is by definition perfect.13  It is what people would want 
if they could manipulate the world as they wished.  As such, it is a 
bright beacon that derives its allure from deeply buried fantasies.  Yet 
fantasies are inherently immoderate.  They tend to go farther than 
the facts allow because they are not impeded by facts.  Nevertheless, 
being fantasies, they may be impossible to achieve.  However much 
they are desired, often they cannot come true.  People may approach 
them and assume that, with a little more effort, they can be reached, 
but this is apt to be an illusion.  The worst part about uncritical 
objectives is that they offer false hope.  In convincing people that 
improbable tactics can solve their troubles, they divert efforts from 
what is possible.  The perfect becomes the enemy of the good, and 
people wind up with less than they might have had were they not so 
credulous.
With regard to the middle-class reaction to its preeminence, 
the sorts of ideals sought derived largely from factors perceived as 
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contributing to this dominance.  One of these was a veneration of 
peace.  As the wheels of commerce began to accelerate, the kind 
of warfare in which medieval knights gloried became unproductive. 
Hand to hand combat did not add to the output of factories or hasten 
goods to market.  Rather, it placed all this in jeopardy.  To put the 
matter crudely, violence was not good for business.  The result was 
that physical aggression declined.  Highwaymen disappeared from 
the arteries of commerce, and successful capitalists refused to wear 
swords in emulation of a vanished aristocracy.  Peace came to be seen 
as a good in its own right.  Thus Benjamin Franklin14 was widely 
quoted as saying, “There never was a good war or a bad peace.” 
Himself an architect of revolution, he nonetheless preferred the 
comforts of home and hearth.  Pacifism had come into vogue.  “No 
wars ever, for any reason,” became a guiding principle for would-be 
social saviors.  Certainly, this made sense.  Since war is harmful to 
living things, no sane person could possibly favor it.
Another idealized goal is equality.15  As the commercial 
revolution rushed forward, so did social mobility.  Those who had 
been poor could reasonably expect to grow rich, whereas those who 
had been rich, if they were careless, might slide into obscurity.  In 
any event, the ranks of those in the middle of the pack expanded 
immeasurably.  This meant that the distance between the top and 
the bottom had been reduced.  The direction of this change was 
evident for all to see and, if it were projected into the future, might 
eventuate in the space between the best and the worst closing into 
nothingness.  To many, it seemed clear that the endpoint would be 
complete equality.  Hierarchy would disappear and be replaced by 
an egalitarian brotherhood.  The result would indisputably be true 
democracy.  Not only would there be equality before the law and 
equality of opportunity but also an equality of results.  Material 
resources would be distributed uniformly, as would social power.  No 
one would have any more than anyone else; hence all jealousies and 
conflicts would abate.
A third ideal that arose in tandem with the middle classes was 
rationality.  Businesspeople needed to make careful calculations in 
order to insure a profit, but this rationalism could be utilized for 
other purposes.  One of these was science.16  In this field, especially 
within the physical sciences, mental discipline proved invaluable. 
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Its projected application to the social sciences was, therefore, a no-
brainer.  The same could be said of social engineering.  Employing the 
computations of the sciences to solve irritating social predicaments 
made sense.  That this might not be automatic was regarded as trivial. 
Surely, given sufficient diligence, every significant problem would one 
day be amenable to systematic solution.  On the other hand, those 
who hated what they perceived as the cold, dead hand of science 
idealized its opposite.  Unprepared to allow passionless prognoses 
to dominate social events, these romantics celebrated emotion. 
Feelings, rather than precise measurements, were their standard of 
value.  It was these that made people human; these that had to be 
intensified and allowed to determine communal dealings.
Part of what made the middle-class revolution unique was that 
these ideals were not allowed to sit on the shelf.  Previous generations 
had had their own moral ambitions, which they attempted to bring 
to fruition, but this time these efforts were to be more methodical. 
The medieval knights, when they first set out to rescue Jerusalem 
from the infidels, did so haphazardly.  They took to the highways 
with sketchy maps of their itinerary.  Contemporary Westerners 
launched their crusades in a more orderly fashion.  Carefully crafted 
social and political policies guided their steps.  Purposefully they set 
out to implement reforms scientifically.  Or, so it was hoped.  In the 
event, this journey turned out to be more disorganized than expected. 
Although even the most romantic of the reformers conceived of 
themselves as intellectuals, they exercised less conscious control than 
they had imagined.  Disoriented by an inability to distinguish the 
ideal from the real, their intentions were, time and again, frustrated 
by an obdurate universe.
The Reforms
War is not good for business; as a consequence it is not good for 
the middle- classes.  It disrupts their orderly lives and throws their 
plans for success into a cocked hat.  Instead of children marching off 
to college and then on to commercial triumphs, they are drafted into 
a meat-grinder from whence they can not escape unharmed.  The 
difficulty is that pacifism is not good for business either.  Antiwar 
advocates complain that capitalists are warmongers because they 
make a profit from the arms trade, whereas the actual merchants 
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of death are a tiny sliver of that number.  The real reason that war 
can be of benefit to the bourgeoisie is precisely because they are 
rich.  Relative to others, they possess attractive resources.  Were they 
unprepared to defend these, by the sword if necessary, they would 
soon find themselves stripped of all they have.  The new middle 
classes, like it or not, also developed a stake in this wealth.  They 
too have much to lose to the envious.  If they lived in a world where 
selflessness was the norm, they might not have to worry.  Similarly, 
were the less affluent content to stay in their places, the middle-class 
need not dread coercive attempts to appropriate their goods.  In fact, 
the poor are not so inclined.  Given the opportunity and the belief 
that they would encounter no opposition, many of them would act 
in what they perceived to be their best interests.
These opposing impulses, that is, in favor of peace but also 
approving of self-defense, have resulted in ongoing squabbles within 
the middle classes.  What has exacerbated this conflict and made 
pacifist reformers more insistent are the unprecedented dangers that 
surfaced during the twentieth century.  This was an era during which 
warfare graduated to incalculably lethal dimensions.  The First and 
Second World Wars truly were world wars.  Nations in every corner 
of the planet were drawn into bloodbaths of unparalleled scope. 
Advances in communication and transportation made it possible for 
countries separated by thousands of miles to participate in different 
theaters of the same hostilities.  And when they did, advances in 
technology and productive capacity made the carnage all the greater. 
This peril was further escalated when science unleashed the power of 
the atom.  In short order, there was reason to fear that rockets tipped 
with hydrogen bombs could within minutes traverse broad oceans 
to deliver death on a massive scale.  No one would be safe, no one 
immune.
The peace movement was a response to this specter.17  In the 
wake of the Great War it gathered momentum toward outlawing 
aggressive militarism.  Unfortunately this contributed to the 
appeasement policies that provided Hitler his opportunity for 
expansion.  Nonetheless, after the bombing of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki,18 the need for general disarmament seemed imperative. 
When Russia, too, developed the bomb, and the Cold War arose 
between former allies, a desire to prevent a universal conflagration 
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animated efforts to impose sanity.  Reformers first asked both sides 
to renounce their arsenals, but when this call went unheeded, they 
turned to agitating for unilateral disarmament.  Of course, the Soviet 
Union was not a democracy, but the Western powers were.  If only 
their people put pressure on their governments to dismantle these 
weapons, the Russians might feel less threatened and follow suit.  This, 
of course, did not happen.  However, by the 60s the Students for a 
Democratic Society (SDS)19 was a potent force on American college 
campuses.  The organization made pacifism seem both acceptable 
and intellectual.  Reasonable people could surely agree that it was the 
duty of the most advanced industrial nation on earth to set a good 
example.  Marching and singing songs (in emulation of the hippies), 
the young sought to educate their elders to the dangers—and the 
opportunities.
When the Viet Nam War intervened to complicate this picture, 
the peace activists knew where they stood.20  They were convinced 
that politicians were disingenuously arguing that hostilities were an 
attempt to prevent a domino effect, that if an aggressive communism 
were allowed to succeed in one area, its appetite for hegemony would 
be whetted.  Conservatives mistakenly claimed that other nations 
would soon be invaded and, in their increased anxiety, be less prepared 
to defend their independence.  In the long run, the United States and 
Western Europe would be encircled and overthrown.  The Korean 
War had laid down a marker; now it was time to lay down another. 
Communists must be sent a message this time, that aggression would 
not be appeased.  While the public seemed to buy this argument, the 
students knew better.  The United States was becoming an imperialist 
power, and they would have none of it.  The domino theory was a 
myth, as was the idea of a monolithically aggressive Communism. 
In order to get the word out, they organized teach-ins.  The facts 
would be put forward to counter the hysterical fictions emanating 
from Washington.  Eventually the ordinary voter must recognize that 
Southeast Asia should be left to the Southeast Asians.
This antiwar initiative was to rise to national proportions when 
the media joined the effort.21  Reporters who at first filed heroic stories 
about the deeds of the Green Berets became increasingly skeptical.  A 
conflict that dragged on for years with ever-larger casualty lists began 
to feel like a quagmire.  As more of the combatants came home in 
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body bags, journalists, both in the field and at home, became cynical. 
The youth refused to believe in the accuracy of the body counts 
issued by the military brass.  With their own eyes they concluded 
that the struggle was unwinnable.  Images of death became routine 
thanks to a television technology that allowed ordinary citizens to 
view the battlefield from their living rooms.  In time, the pacifist 
demonstrators, at first regarded as kooks, were given sympathetic 
coverage.  The critical point was reached during the Tet Offensive. 
Once the Communists committed themselves to overrunning 
southern cities, the disturbing effects of combat were perceptible. 
Prominent newscasters such as Walter Cronkite interpreted this 
as a loss.  Although the Viet Cong suffered a crushing defeat, the 
American people were informed otherwise.  This increased the 
pressure exercised on politicians to refrain from incursions into 
the enemy’s bases.  North Viet Nam, Cambodia, and Laos became 
off-limits; hence when they were bombed a hullabaloo arose in the 
nation’s streets.  Critics of the war burned their draft cards; peace 
marchers converged on the capital; and members of Congress began 
to demand a peaceful resolution.  Some advised the president simply 
to declare victory and pull out.  Others cringed when the protestors 
chanted, “Hey, hey, LBJ, how many kids have you killed today,” 
but then did nothing.  Even when Jane Fonda flew to the North 
Vietnamese capital to praise Ho Chi Minh and condemn America, 
she escaped prosecution for treason upon her return home.
The accumulated effect of this was to persuade President Johnson22 
not to stand for reelection.  Likewise, responding to these strains, his 
successor Richard Nixon,23 felt impelled to sue for peace.  Eventually, 
after a treaty was signed, the southern armies were left to fend for 
themselves.  The United States pledged to provide support should 
the North violate its undertakings, but once these transgressions 
occurred, Congress refused to honor the promised of aid.  Soon the 
South fell, and the images of refugees being helicoptered from Saigon 
rooftops convinced millions of viewers that the war had been futile. 
It had not accomplished anything, and, therefore, war should never 
again be attempted.  In the future, no American children should be 
sacrificed to the arrogance of power.  As far away as Western Europe, 
the public reached the same conclusion.  Anti-Americanism became 
fashionable.  The world’s greatest superpower was told it must learn 
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to mind its manners.  Power was inherently oppressive, and the only 
way to keep it from doing harm was to keep its sword permanently 
sheathed.
Another reform that emerged in America in tandem with 
pacifism was the Civil Rights Movement.  Achieving racial equality 
became as imperative as achieving worldwide peace.  The seeds of 
this crusade were planted early in the twentieth century.  Although 
American slaves had been officially liberated by the events of the 
Civil War, they did not acquire anything like parity with whites. 
Almost universally regarded as of inferior ability, they were relegated 
to second-class citizenship.  Neither in the marketplace nor in 
politics nor in the courts were they accorded equal weight.  Agitation 
to fulfill the Declaration of Independence’s objective of equality for 
all had survived in the abolitionist cause, but just barely.  Slowly, 
however, African Americans were allowed to do more.  Booker T. 
Washington24 was invited to have dinner in the White House;25 the 
resurgent Ku Klux Klan26 of the 1920s was driven into disgrace; and 
the NAACP began to institute lawsuits to widen access to public 
accommodations.27  Nevertheless, it was not until after World War 
II, that is, after the middle-class revolution had reached its apogee 
that civil rights became visible. It was an issue at the Democratic 
nominating convention, when Harry Truman28 issued a presidential 
order mandating the desegregation of the military and when the 
Supreme Court decided Brown v. the Board of Education.29
The court’s decision that “separate is inherently unequal” signaled 
an acceleration in the efforts to provide racial justice.  Building upon 
a change in attitudes that had already stimulated scientific research 
into the ill effects of discrimination, the justices promptly ordered 
that desegregation occur with “all deliberate speed.”  The law was to 
be obeyed, which meant that black students were to be allowed into 
the same classrooms as whites.  Subterfuges designed to postpone 
the inevitable would not be tolerated.  Soon thereafter, the nation, 
outside of the South, cheered when Central High School in Little 
Rock, Arkansas was integrated.30  Millions saw the hatred on the 
faces of the parents opposed to this measure and were appalled.  They 
did not understand how children could be treated so barbarically. 
This was not the American way.  In middle-class America, everyone 
is to be given the benefit of our society.  In a democracy, whatever 
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your origins, you deserve an opportunity to prove yourself.  Several 
years later, when Bull Connor, Commissioner of Public Safety in 
Birmingham, Alabama, unloosed dogs on peaceful demonstrators, 
the aversion was palpable.31  It reminded people of the Nazis, and 
they would not tolerate it.
Initially this movement was very much about civil rights.32 
The objective was to enforce the equal application of the law. 
Everyone, regardless of race, was to be allowed to go to publicly 
funded schools,33 to ride publicly subsidized buses, to use public 
restrooms, to be served at public restaurants, and to vote in civic 
elections.  De jure segregation was to be dismantled, that is, the laws 
were to be changed when they were unfair and were to be equally 
applied when they were mandated to be equal.  The culmination of 
this was the civil rights legislation that passed following Kennedy’s 
assassination.  It was only subsequent to this that the call also went 
up for an end to de facto segregation.34  If the proportion of the races 
in different schools was different, not because legislation required 
this, but because the neighborhoods in which the children lived were 
segregated, this too was deemed to be unacceptable.35  As a result, 
efforts at integration moved north.  Students were to be redistributed 
within school systems according to their percentages in the larger 
community.  If this could not be achieved by redistricting, forced 
busing would impose it.  Despite the resistance of parents eager to 
preserve neighborhood schools, the government moved to compel 
the desired outcome.36
The culmination of this policy was the advent of affirmative 
action.37  Gradually, but with increasing momentum during the 
Nixon administration, the government used race to manipulate 
social phenomena.  Rather than allow the marketplace, or individual 
choice, to determine how individuals were distributed, various 
agencies intervened to coerce an idea of fairness.  Generally, this 
meant that the final result would be in line with group representation 
within the total population.38  Anything less was deemed racist and 
subject to rectification by a quota system.  Since quotas are anathema 
in a democracy, these preferences usually went by another name, e.g., 
“diversity”39 or “multiculturalism.”40  On the job, in schools, and 
in the dispersal of government contracts, one’s group membership 
became the deciding factor, with lower standards typically applied 
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to black, and later to Hispanics.41  The public at large believed these 
techniques unjustified, but for the activists they were so crucial that 
they made their influence felt at the ballot box.42
Another change occurred in the sorts of pressure employed to 
achieve these goals.  Initially, under the tutelage of Martin Luther 
King, Jr.43, the Civil Rights Movement was dedicated to passive 
resistance.  Inspired by Mohandas Gandhi’s efforts in liberating India 
from the British Raj,44 people pursued their objective through moral 
suasion to convince Americans to liberate African Americans.  Sit-ins, 
boycotts, marches, and freedom rides were determinedly nonviolent. 
The protesters held hands and sang about overcoming injustice 
while they were beaten by batons or soaked by fire hoses.  In fact, 
this strategy worked as intended.  When properly publicized, these 
incidents had the expected effect.  Ordinary middle-class Americans 
were morally offended by the exercise of excessive force against 
innocent protesters.  So outraged were they that they demanded 
reform.  Nevertheless, as these developments gathered impetus, 
they were deemed insufficient.45  Their very success whetted the 
appetite of the activists for more and faster.  Persuasion was replaced 
by “nonnegotiable demands.”  The authorities, or whoever was the 
target, had to comply instantly and completely.  There was no room 
for equivocation or compromise.  What the militants decided was 
moral did not permit of adulteration.
All too quickly, this intransigence erupted into violence.46  Across 
the country, inner cities erupted into riots.  The phrase “long, hot 
summer” became a commonplace as flames and bloodshed swept 
over the North and West.47  Embittered firebrands now demanded 
power rather than civil rights.48  They wanted to be in control.  Even 
though more African-American politicians were winning elections, 
activists found the pace too slow.  Soon gun-toting, beret-wearing 
revolutionaries were out on the streets.  Led by the Black Panthers,49 
they insisted upon control of their neighborhoods.  The police, 
disparagingly referred to as “pigs,” were regarded as an occupying 
army even as many more of them were black.  Some suggested 
that whites be cleared out of Mississippi so that it could become 
an entirely black enclave.  Gone now were calls for integration. 
Separation became the order of the day, that is, so long as minorities 
themselves engineered it.  By the time the 90s arrived, some colleges 
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were offering segregated dormitories on the premise that oppressed 
groups were more comfortable living among their own kind. 
Even some high schools, once the focus of efforts at integration, 
unabashedly sponsored separate graduations for African Americans 
and Hispanics.50
The victim mentality had become a national obsession.51  Whites 
were expected to feel guilty for their continuing acts of oppression, 
whereas blacks were excused from responsibility on the grounds that 
they were innocents.  Because Caucasians had imposed racism on 
Negroes, it was assumed that prejudice and discrimination could 
not flow the other way around.  Hypocrisy became a way of life as 
people refused to say publicly what they privately believed.  Whites 
refrained from criticizing blacks for fear of being branded racist, 
while blacks concealed negative aspects of their communities on 
the assumption that the truth would be used against them.  The 
only people that seemed happy with the situation were the liberals.52 
Enduring frictions enabled them to pose as racial saviors and to reap 
the rewards at the ballot box.
Piggybacking on the Civil Rights Movement was the Feminist 
Movement.  Its pedigree was as hoary as that of the racial activists, but 
it had lain fairly dormant since the achievement of suffrage.  Agitation 
on behalf of women began with the dawn of the Industrial Age, but 
its manifestations were at first isolated and sporadic.53  Not until 
the middle of the 19th century did it become a force to be reckoned 
with.  Spurred by the entrance of women into factories and then into 
classrooms and offices, aggrieved spokespersons began to demand 
civic rights commensurate with their public occupations.  Initially, 
the focus was on the vote.  Male resistance to sharing governmental 
power was so stubborn that seeking it required a concentrated effort. 
Women were also making their presence felt in fields such as social 
work.  Leaders in the temperance and antiprostitution movements, 
they sought changes in the areas that affected them most.  Desirous of 
respect, they were able to obtain it in significant measure.  Additionally 
coeducation became available as industrialization progressed.
With the achievement of constitutional amendments regarding 
Prohibition and the vote, many thought that feminist objectives 
had been satisfied.  There was an evanescent distaff upsurge during 
the 1920s when so-called flappers flaunted their sexuality in short 
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skirts and agitated dances, but this was to go underground during 
the 30s.  Depression-era virtue, as well as an enforced poverty, kept 
female vivacity in check.  During the Second World War, Rosie the 
Riveter made her appearance, but she was the product of a national 
crisis.  While many women acquired a taste for the freedom that 
accompanied earning paychecks, they were nevertheless prepared to 
return to domestic chores during the 50s.  It was not until the 60s 
that a self-conscious feminism emerged to demand its share of the 
social pie.  Among many contributors to these developments, the 
opening salvo might be attributed to Betty Friedan.54  Her book, The 
Feminine Mystique,55 sounded a clarion call to battle.  Women across 
the nation responded to her thesis that selfish husbands imprisoned 
wives in the suburbs.  Placed on a pedestal and forced to endure 
empty lives, women were subservient to a male jurisdiction over 
important decisions.
As with blacks, the initial quest was for equal rights.56  Women 
wanted to be able to sign contracts without obtaining their husbands’ 
permission or to take out loans in their own names rather than 
under another person’s identity.  In short, they wished to obtain 
an independent legal status, with rights that belonged to them 
personally.  The activists saw an opening with the advent of civil 
rights legislation.  If the law was amended to read that both race and 
gender were impermissible criteria for discrimination, women could 
make effortless gains.  This transpired when male legislators could see 
no reason to deny women what they were prepared to give African 
Americans.  Women, with this one stroke, became an oppressed 
minority with all the deference this implied.  Not initially, but fairly 
quickly, they too became eligible for affirmative action.57  Were they 
for any reason to be denied jobs on account of gender or equal pay 
for equal work, they too could seek relief in court.  So tightly was 
the concept of gender oppression bound to racial oppression that 
sociology textbooks were rewritten to include race, gender, and social 
class as equivalent phenomena.
Still, this was not enough for the reformers.  They insisted 
that absolute equality be written into the fundamental law of the 
land.58  Thus were born the lobbying efforts to include an equal 
rights amendment (ERA) in the Constitution.  Women, by law, were 
to be considered comparable to men in every respect.  The critics 
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fretted that such an edict would ultimately impose unisex bathrooms 
and enlist female infantry soldiers,59 but its advocates denied these 
intents.  While the amendment was itself never fully approved by all 
the requisite members of state legislatures, its aspirations gradually 
began to permeate society.  Bathrooms were never fully integrated, 
but the military increasingly was.  Women were mandated to be 
given basic training alongside men on the grounds that they could do 
anything their brothers could.  The watchword among committed 
feminists was that everything should be fifty-fifty.  All jobs, including 
the most powerful, were to follow this guideline.  No longer would 
there be a glass ceiling that prevented women from rising to the 
executive suite.60  No longer would custom prevent women from 
becoming construction workers or men from working in nursery 
schools.  There was, these partisans insisted, no biological difference 
between male and female abilities; therefore, there should be none in 
the marketplace or home.61  Housework too should be fifty-fifty, with 
men becoming Mr. Moms.  The endpoint was to be androgyny.62 
Henceforward, gender would be irrelevant.  For starters, traditional 
gender roles were to be deconstructed so that all tasks were open to 
everyone.  Even dating patterns would be reorganized so that women 
could ask men out.  Moreover, just as with race, the final arbiter of 
success would be an equality of results.  Only when gender made no 
difference,63 as certified by the equivalence of a color-blindness with 
regard to sex, would this goal be achieved.  Only then would women 
be free to be whatever they wanted to be.
The ideal of androgyny, however, was impeded by traditional 
social arrangements.64  First, as long as children were socialized 
according to historical practices,65 they would be trained to perpetuate 
artificial differences.  With little boys given guns or trucks as toys and 
little girls presented with dolls, boys would continue to aspire to 
be soldiers and girls, mothers.  What was needed was to give each 
the other’s playthings—although on the grounds that they were too 
violent, guns would be omitted.  Eventually, a rationalized nurture 
would overwhelm obsolete superstitions, and a new, more humane 
division of labor would arrive. 66  Second, male aggression had to be 
curbed.67  The reason that gender oppression lasted was that males had 
grown accustomed to intimidating women into submission.  Taking 
advantage of their larger size, they had persisted in threatening rape 
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should women assert their independence.  This had to be stopped.68 
Not merely persuasion, but strict punishment, had to be imposed 
for violations of female rights.  Men needed to be sent to jail if they 
physically abused their wives.  They also had to be chastised, e.g., by 
being expelled from school, for engaging in any equivalent of rape. 
Using sexualized language or staring lasciviously at a woman who did 
not want to be admired qualified for this category.  Such behaviors 
created an impermissibly hostile working environment.  Just as 
physical rape prompted efforts to “take back the night,”69 it would be 
necessary for enlightened women to protest pornography and male 
boorishness.  Third, in the catalogue of social changes, female values 
had to replace their male counterparts.  Because competition was 
destructive, it needed to be supplanted by feminine cooperation. 
Mutual supportiveness, rather than nasty rivalries, would reduce 
communal violence and produce a better social environment for all.
In time, at least for a while, a tension equivalent to what had 
developed among the races arose between men and women.  Men no 
longer knew whether they were expected to be chivalrous or asexual, 
while women were unsure about whether to be gracious or assertive. 
Were men supposed to cry in public?  Were women to become 
more bossy?  No one knew for sure.  There were even intimations 
from some feminists that marriage, as historically defined, was 
constitutionally permissive of rape.  Perhaps, women did not require 
male companionship at all.  Gloria Steinem70 indicated as much 
when she opined that women needed men as much as a fish needed 
a bicycle.  Nor was there a consensus about having children.  In 
many circles, caring for them was deemed oppressive; hence, many 
thousands of professional women postponed motherhood in favor of 
careers.  All in all, the feminist revolution precipitated a great deal of 
angst for men, for women, for couples, and for children.  Expected 
to open new vistas of female fulfillment, it inadvertently aroused 
bewilderment for individuals and families alike.
The last watershed reform associated with middle-class 
ascendancy was the War on Poverty. 71  Only a middle-class society 
intoxicated with its own achievements could imagine that poverty 
might be abolished.  John Kenneth Galbraith72 celebrated America as 
an affluent society, and people took this to heart.  They were evidently 
so rich that they had the resources to make certain no one would ever 
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be poor again.  Clearly, social mobility should be open to everyone. 
So many individuals had climbed into comfortable positions that 
it was unconscionable that anyone be left behind.  This was unfair 
and should not be tolerated by a moral community.  According to 
the middle class ethos, if the rules were applied equally to everyone, 
then everyone should have a shot at doing well.  Failing that, 
provisions should be made to transfer payments to those who could 
not compete on an equal basis.  If a handicap or a social disability 
impeded success, comfort should still be possible for those owed an 
opportunity to share in the common good fortune.
For openers, welfare was declared a right and not a privilege.73 
Government agents were instructed to inform those eligible that 
they need not feel ashamed to apply for that to which they were 
entitled.  When welfare had been instituted during the Depression, 
the fear was that free handouts would breed dependency.  Franklin 
D. Roosevelt74 himself was concerned lest people lose the incentive 
to be responsible for their own well-being.  This was to be forestalled 
by imposing strict guidelines for eligibility.  Now, these guidelines 
were to be relaxed.  In some cases, all a person had to do to enter the 
relief rolls was to sign a form attesting to the lack of resources.  Nor 
would caseworkers act like detectives attempting to sniff out illicit 
arrangements of men living with the women who were their clients. 
Teenagers too, if they were in distress, could qualify as independent 
recipients.  This was the case if they were mothers.  By the same token, 
solvent relatives would no longer be compelled to support indigent 
kin.  In particular, children would not be required to contribute to 
the upkeep of elderly parents.  All were to be considered independent 
of each other and, therefore, entitled to equal treatment.
Another front of the War on Poverty engaged social mobility.75 
The intention here was to empower individuals who had been robbed 
of their autonomy by an oppressive elite.76  Heretofore, reformers had 
concentrated on redistributing physical resources; now, they would 
attempt to redistribute social power.  Democracy was reconceptualized 
as entailing equivalent interpersonal influence.  That some individuals 
should exercise greater control over their destiny than others was 
declared unjust.  It was, therefore, necessary to train the weaker to 
become stronger.  First, they had to be told that it was their right to 
be more powerful.  Second, they had to delegate authority over their 
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lives.  Should they gain practice in making significant decisions, they 
might be able to apply this to other situations.  Third, they had to 
be instructed in marketable skills.  The illiterate would be taught to 
read and write; high-school graduates would be encouraged to go 
to college; blue collar workers would be steered toward vocational 
training.   Fourth, they also had to be taught to cooperate rather than 
to compete.  Community organizers would be sent forth to integrate 
their activities.  Only if the poor could pool their power could this 
clout serve as a counterweight to that of the elites.  In the end, it 
would enable them to join the system and reap its benefits.
Begun with the sincerest of intentions, this crusade was to falter 
before long.  Some blamed this failure on the diversion of resources 
to the Viet Nam War.  They concluded that the nation could not 
simultaneously finance guns and butter.  Others thought that the 
blame lay with a Republican administration that was not sufficiently 
committed to the fundamental principles of the War on Poverty.  In 
any event, in little more than a decade, the campaign stumbled into 
oblivion.  Despite the floods of idealism tapped among the young 
and social scientists, the momentum could not be sustained.  By the 
1980s, conventional wisdom was ascribing the program’s demise to 
the rise of greed.  The latest generation of Americans had evidently 
stopped worrying about social justice and instead turned its attention 
to individual enrichment.  Early estimates that poverty might be 
driven to extinction turned out to be premature.  The poor were still 
very much with us; indeed the ranks of those on welfare had grown. 
Once more, promises of correcting the difficulties exposed by the 
middle-class ascendancy proved empty.  To the question What next? 
few claimed to know the answer.
Before assessing the issue of these reforms, we should 
acknowledge their Marxist roots.  Obsessed with equality, the 
reformers sought to impose a collectivist version of parity.  Marx 
envisioned that class conflicts would conclude with the triumph of 
the proletarians.  Once property was eliminated, competition would 
disappear; hence, there would no way for some to assert superiority 
over others.  Everyone would voluntarily work for the whole and 
then collect only what they needed from it.  Much as on the starship 
Enterprise, money would no longer be needed in a world where 
exchange was unnecessary.  Neo-Marxists were aghast that in the 
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world as it is competing parties persisted in vying for dominance. 
The leitmotif of their reforms was the need to resist the oppression 
this principle generated.  Elites, however conceived, were regarded 
as the enemy.  Only after they were overthrown could true equality 
arise.  A genuine egalitarianism, in which everyone was equal, could 
not prevail so long as the bourgeoisie reigned.  This contrasts sharply 
with Jeffersonian impartiality.  The Declaration of Independence 
asserts that all people have an equal right to life, liberty, and the 
pursuit of happiness.  An equality of results was never contemplated, 
never mind to be coercively imposed.77  Indeed, Jefferson was candid 
in advocating an aristocracy of merit.  He hoped that in a free society, 
the best would rise to the top.  They might not be born to command 
but would earn this distinction through their actions.
The Marxist and neo-Marxist epiphanies imagined a world 
without hierarchy.  Yet if hierarchy is built into human nature, 
this was a fatuous expectation.  To illustrate, most contemporary 
sociologists recognize that poverty is a matter of relative deprivation. 
They realize that America’s poor are not poor by historical standards.78 
According to the American Census Bureau, as of 2002, 46% of 
poor households owned their own homes; 76% of them had air 
conditioning; nearly three-quarters owned a car; 97% had a color 
television; and 73% possessed microwave ovens.  Their poverty did 
not consist in having to endure squalor or semistarvation.  Compared 
to others in their society, they were not doing well, but this measure 
was only comparative.  Yet, that is the point.  What hurts about 
poverty is not how little you have, but that you have less than the 
next guy.  Since hierarchies always have a bottom, those to be found 
there feel disadvantaged compared with those above them.  Given 
the logic of this situation, absolute poverty can never be eliminated. 
The best that can be achieved is to bring more people into the middle 
by making social mobility available to all.
Power, too, is relative.  It is also hierarchical and, therefore, can 
never be parceled out with complete equivalence.  The racial, feminist, 
and poverty reformers all excoriated oppression in the expectation of 
deliverance by a utopian equality of results.  As romantic idealists, they 
took an extremist view of equality, one that did not take account of 
the human condition.  The same was true of antiwar reformers.  They 
perceived an arrogance of power even in attempts at self-defense.  As 
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long as the United States is more powerful than other nations and, 
therefore, superior, they would condemn its policies as unilateral. 
But because its actions always betrayed this greater strength, it was 
enjoined from exercising them.  Only weakness, as imposed perhaps 
by the collapse of the middle class, would satisfy this particular sense 
of morality.  The same applied to race, gender, and wealth.  The only 
definitive way to cease being oppressively racist, sexist, or financially 
successful was to become poor and powerless, not an end likely to 
recommend itself to those who were doing well—or who hoped to 
do so.
The Great Disruption
The politicized reforms that followed hard on the heels of the 
hippie eruption backfired.  Despite preliminary optimism, these 
reforms were not well calculated to improve the human condition. 
Conceived in haste and in reaction to social changes that were difficult 
to digest, they did not address the actual sources of discomfort.  To 
judge by what occurred subsequent to their imposition, we see that a 
series of unanticipated complications followed.  The timing of these 
emergent problems, their temporal convergence, and their occurrence 
in disparate societies suggest a disquieting causal relationship.  This 
was Francis Fukuyama’s79 conclusion.  A political scientist by trade, 
he dubbed what transpired “The Great Disruption.”  Until this point 
in its history, the Middle-Class Revolution had been making orderly 
progress.  The Eisenhower consolidation was relatively smooth, and 
the hippie eruption had been more amusing than alarming.  Once 
the politicized reforms got going, however, small clouds on the 
horizon swelled into thunderheads.  Instead of people’s adjusting to 
success and making it more general, society as a whole and a few of 
its subdivisions in particular were subjected to significant harm.
Among the indicators of disruption to which Fukuyama alludes 
is crime.  First in the United States, then in Western Europe as it 
caught up economically, crime rates soared.80  Starting slowly in the 
1950s, but accelerating rapidly by the mid 60s, the violent crime rate 
multiplied by many times.  Assault, rape, and murder all became more 
common, with, by the 90s, the murder rate almost ten times what 
it had been at the turn of the century.  Both the Wild West and the 
gangster ridden 30s have worse reputations, but they were eclipsed 
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by later events.  Property crimes, such as theft and robbery, also 
mushroomed.  Ordinary people began to worry about being mugged 
in their own neighborhoods.  In New York City, they avoided places 
like Central Park where they feared this might to take place.81  The 
night became more frightening as potential victims contemplated 
how much easier it was to be attacked after dark.  In large cities, the 
conventional wisdom now declared the streets ungovernable.  Despite 
hiring more police, there seemed no way to stem the torrent.
The family, too, appeared to be under assault.82  Once reckoned 
the cornerstone of civilized society, it was falling apart.  After the 
elevated number of births in the Baby Boom, fertility rates declined 
to fewer than the replacement rate of two per family.  In Europe this 
had long been so, but in the United States it was a novel experience for 
times of prosperity.  By century’s end, the population was still rising, 
but this was due to high birth rates among fecund immigrants.  More 
troublesome was the increase in divorce.83  Its incidence, too, began 
to spike in the mid 60s and reached an historically elevated plateau 
in the 90s.  By then, approximately half of all marriages ended in 
court.  This was better than it sounded, but only marginally so.  In 
fact, only a third of first marriages terminated in divorce; the rest of 
the statistic was based one second, third, and fourth couplings.  Most 
people continued to get married—well over ninety percent—but 
they did so at later ages,84 expecting their unions to last, through well 
aware of the divorce rate.  Once upon a time divorce was a deviant 
act, but those days have receded into antique memory.
More disconcerting still was the growth in the rate of illegitimacy. 
Divorce was already creating a generation of children raised by single 
parents.85  As would be seen, this was stressful for the young, but 
worse yet was growing up in a family that had never consisted of 
two parents.  Before 1950, fewer than five percent of all births were 
out of wedlock.  The pregnancies of unmarried women had once 
been considered shameful.  Often she would leave home to have her 
child elsewhere, lest knowledge of her transgression ruin her chances 
for married respectability.  Giving the child up for adoption was 
a forgone conclusion.  When couples shared the prospect of such 
a birth, they frequently married to provide legitimacy.  After such 
hastily arranged affairs, they explained to friends and relatives that the 
child was premature.  By the 90s, over thirty percent of children were 
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being born to single mothers.  In the African-American community, 
more than two thirds of all youngsters suffered this fate.  Nor was 
it unusual for many to come of age in a family populated by several 
half-siblings.  It was also common to be raised by grandparents, 
especially for children of teenaged mothers.  Sadly unexceptional, 
these children having children were unprepared for the responsibility 
of parenthood.  Many preferred to continue the party lifestyle that 
put them in the family way in the first place.  To compound this 
misery, the largest share of illegitimacy occurred among the poor. 
Those with the least adequate financial and social resources were the 
ones most likely to bear the burden.
Fukuyama86 also emphasized the decline in interpersonal trust. 
He had earlier documented that trust is imperative in gesellschaft 
societies, and it was within these communities that the decline 
was most precipitous.  As the number of interdependent strangers 
increased, their confidence in one another declined.  People now 
expected others to lie.  They also expected cheating when someone 
could get away with it.  Sadly, surveys have shown, at least in school, 
most did.  Where once people left their front doors unlocked, 
confident that no one would rob them, multiple lock, kept bolted, 
became the norm, especially in large cities.  Conventional wisdom 
now stressed that placing temptation in front of others was almost as 
serious an offense as the theft itself.  Leaving one’s keys in an unlocked 
car was condemned an invitation to teenaged joy riding.  Ordinary 
people were also encouraged to buy guns.87  These might be hidden 
to keep children from having accidents, but not owning a firearm, 
nor understanding how to use it, was thought to make families 
vulnerable.  It left them at the mercy of those who might attempt 
a home invasion.  In some towns, such as Kennesaw, Georgia, gun 
ownership became mandatory.  After this law went into effect, as was 
intended, the volume of crime went down.
This lack of trust extended to particular segments of society.  The 
faith that Americans had in their government’s ability to help them 
eroded badly.  They were especially disillusioned with politicians. 
Cynically convinced that most were liars, they considered their 
promises with a grain of salt.  Amazingly, when Bill Clinton88 was 
caught red-handed, a common response was that everyone did what 
he had done; that everyone lied to and cheated on their spouses. 
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Although his denial of having sex with Monica Lewinsky was 
patently false, it was not immoral because everyone told untruths 
about sex.  Sex was a private affair to be judged only by the wife. 
What had once been considered depraved behavior had transmuted 
into a justification of itself. 89 
A similar cynicism extended to the media.90  The journalistic 
purveyors of bad news became associated with their products, 
particularly since they were assumed to slant the news to serve their 
own purposes.91  Thanks to television, the volume of news to which 
people was exposed had increased exponentially.92  Average viewers 
could now see paparazzi pestering celebrities for photographs, pundits 
of all sorts wildly spinning the facts to suit ideological preferences, 
and vulgar sensationalism dressed up as the public’s right to know.93 
If the public paid attention, it could also hear pious anchorpersons 
justifying their latest biases.  But many were not listening.  They 
had heard it all before.  Even the police and courts were treated to 
this suspicion.94  In previous years, before the Great Disruption, the 
police had been the ordinary citizens’ friends and the legal system was 
assumed to be the world’s best.  Fairness and integrity were taken for 
granted.95  Unfortunately, too many scandals followed.  A drumbeat 
of accusations about police brutality, political corruption, and sexual 
peccadilloes convinced observers that where there was smoke, there 
must be fire.  They understood that much of what they saw was 
exaggerated—that hyperbole was the standard means of generating 
media interest—but they could not believe that none of it was true. 
Though they knew that it was safer to trust little of what one saw and 
less of what one heard, some of it registered.
Were this all that resulted from the turmoils following the Great 
Middle-Class Revolution, it would be noteworthy.  But there was 
more.  Not only were there more incidences of crime and distrust; 
there was also greater disorder.96  Levels of civility declined along 
with communal security.97  People were not as polite as they had 
once been.98  Where vulgar language had previously been considered 
a sign of poor breeding, four-letter words now sprinkled even erudite 
conversations.99  Being too persnickety about obscene words came to 
be interpreted as evidence of artificiality.  It was stiff and uptight and 
far too square for relaxed discourse.  People said what was on their 
minds, even when it was earthy.  Real people apparently also wrote 
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choice epithets on the sides of subway cars, abandoned buildings, 
and unprotected billboards.  Graffiti, formerly dismissed as a species 
of vandalism, was reevaluated as street art.  Among the cognoscenti, 
graffiti came to be widely admired as a form of communication open 
to those otherwise silenced by social conventions.  This pattern of 
rationalization became the norm in private discussions and public 
forums; it also became standard fare in the entertainment industry. 
Words never before heard coming from the silver screen or the 
television set issued from the mouths of demure heroines.  Worst of 
all was what happened to music.  During the 50s most popular songs 
had been sweet and romantic.  There were, to be sure, sexual allusions, 
but they remained just that, allusions.  The language of early rock and 
roll was more explicit, but its words paled in comparison with those 
in rap music, heavy metal, grunge, and hip-hop.  Vocalists had no 
difficulty in advocating that the police be murdered or that women 
be treated as prostitutes.  Accompanied by videos that left less and 
less to the imagination, even young children were bombarded with 
the next best thing to coitus.  When criticized for these improprieties, 
the entertainment executives and artists did not back down.  This, 
they explained, was real life, and real life needed no apologies.
Overall attitudes toward sexuality had undergone a 
metamorphosis.100  In the pre-disruption 50s, television producers 
were loath even to show married couples sleeping in the same bed.101 
Usually they occupied twin beds and, if seen in an embrace, had 
at least one foot on the floor.  By the 90s, by common consent, 
there had been a sexual revolution.  Almost everyone now admitted 
that sex was a natural function.  People talked openly about it, and 
television seemed obsessed with it.  Scarcely a single episode of most 
situation comedies could conclude without intimations of musical 
beds.  Consummating even the slighted physical attraction was 
considered sophisticated.  Everyone knew that being abstinent was a 
religious affectation.  Normal people had normal desires, which it was 
healthy to fulfill.  To do less was to be a prude.  It indicated a neurotic 
insecurity that was to be pitied rather than emulated.  Virginity was 
not a virtue; it was almost a psychological disorder.  Ever since the 
promulgation of the birth-control pill, there was no need to worry 
about unwanted pregnancies.  As long as people were careful, and 
after the spread of AIDS102 this meant utilizing a condom, casual sex 
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imposed no harm and was, therefore, no foul.  Sex was fun, and what 
was life for if not to extract its pleasures?  Even the term “promiscuity” 
went of fashion.  Why not have multiple partners?  During the 60s 
and 70s, there was actually a period in which swinging was extolled. 
Sharing partners, including in the midst of orgies, was praised for 
improving relationships and removing guilt.  It was just doing what 
came naturally.
As time progressed, advertisements for casual sex appeared almost 
everywhere.  Besides the testimonials in the media, social dancing 
became orgiastic.  Bodies not only writhed in sexual ecstasy but 
came to express in a pantomime of sexual collaboration.  Clothing, 
too, became more than suggestive.  During the 60s, the miniskirt 
made its appearance.  Rising much higher than its 20’s forerunner, it 
barely covered the crotch.  This, however, was to seem modest when 
compared with the thong.  First introduced in bathing suits intended 
to do bikinis one better, they became undergarment standards.  With 
the buttocks exposed and frequently highlighted by tattoos, the next 
demand was that the breasts be liberated.  Early feminists attempted 
the feat by burning their bras, whereas later libertines reveled in wet 
tee-shirt contests and in “girls gone wild” episodes of flashing chests. 
Men, too, got into the act by discovering the Full Monte of male 
strippers.  The effect of this is to lower standards, albeit not to the 
degree that it might appear.  Yes, it is true that among girls the age of 
first sexual encounter dropped to the high school years; with virgins 
often ridiculed for their timidity.  It also came to be expected that 
couples would have sex before they were married.  By the same token, 
many decided to live together before marrying.  At first promoted as 
a sort of trial marriage intended to determine whether formal union 
would succeed, when this turned out not to improve the chances of a 
lasting relationship, it was simply accepted for what it was.  Couples 
became comfortable introducing their bed partners as roommates, 
even to their parents.  All the same, there was more private sexual 
morality than was publicly advertised.
To begin with, the amount of sexual activity did not rise as 
much as might have been predicted.103  People, especially women, 
continued to be selective in their pairings.  Frequently ashamed at 
their own diffidence, they were unaware that others were privately 
as reserved as they.  Nor was cheating as extensive as the media 
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depicted.  More men strayed than did women, but the best evidence 
indicated that this was about 25% for them versus 15% for women. 
The misreading of what was happening had been encouraged by the 
fact that the exhibitionists were more visible than more modest folks. 
Nevertheless there was more experimentation with different sorts of 
sex and with different sorts of partners.  What made this dangerous 
was that it was the young who were most vulnerable to being seduced 
into compromising positions.
Also escalating during the Great Disruption was the rate of 
substance abuse.104  Some of this increase was relatively modest. 
Most people did not become confirmed addicts.  Nevertheless, in 
its early appearances marijuana was a gateway drug.  Many who 
experimented with it later turned to heroin and cocaine.  There might 
have been warnings, yet millions succumbed.  And when hooked, 
abusers became shadows of their former selves.  Unable to hold down 
solid jobs and addicted to expensive habits, they resorted to crime 
and prostitution.  This pattern became epidemic when crack cocaine 
arrived on the scene.  It could be smoked, rather than snorted or 
injected; hence it was easier to use.  Besides, it was cheaper.  This made 
it attractive to the poor; consequently they were most devastated by 
its spread.  Ironically, cocaine had begun as a high-status drug with 
a reputation for being nonaddictive.  When it became apparent 
that addiction was possible, and after the government sponsored a 
“just say no” campaign, usage among the middle classes declined. 
Individuals who intended to be socially mobile understood that 
success was incompatible with zoned-out substance dependence. 
This left members of the lower classes to wallow in their wretchedness. 
Already more vulnerable to alcoholism, addicted mothers gave birth 
to crack babies, needle sharers were susceptible to AIDS, and all were 
at the mercy of violent drug dealers.  Added to this were the miseries 
inherent in other substances.  A plague descended upon many 
neighborhoods, as amphetamines, quaaludes, ecstasy, angel dust, 
and designer drugs flooded the market.105  Some of these recreational 
narcotics established a foothold among middle-class teenagers, but, 
in time, they easily made their way to ghettos and barrios. 
Ironically, despite the fact that the middle classes flourished with 
improvements in education, schools were among the most serious 
casualties of the Great Disruption.106  Instead of learning becoming 
    The Great Middle Class Revolution
more highly developed, the reverse occurred.107  Education became 
more widely spread in the sense that a greater number of children went 
to school and more of them graduated with advanced credentials, but 
the amount of information acquired declined.  This decline was so 
substantial that professional educators called it The Great Decline.108 
Among its first indicators were the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) 
scores.  This gatekeeper test for college admissions was once 
accounted a landmark of American education.  Previous to its arrival, 
acceptance to prestigious universities depended more upon family 
connections than academic abilities.  Consequently, universities like 
Harvard and Yale were typified by the intellectual superiority of their 
student.109  They became way stations that guided the nation’s best 
and brightest into its most responsible and remunerative positions. 
As a result, colleges of every description and students of every aptitude 
scrambled to make use of the SAT.  This diluted the talent pool, but 
the deterioration in scores outstripped what was contained in this 
explanation.  In both reading and math, after the 60s, the college 
bound did less well.  So serious did this become that the Educational 
Testing Service that owns the test changed its scoring procedures so 
that the outcomes would be less embarrassing.
Below the college level, the devastation was as general.110  In 
both primary and secondary schools, testing demonstrated that 
students were less well prepared than earlier generations.  Regularly 
administered achievement tests made it plain that reading and math 
competences were barely holding their own and that there was about 
a four-year difference in the accomplishments between majority and 
minority students.  In areas such as science and history, the results 
were especially discomforting.  They revealed levels of knowledge 
that were incredibly low and getting lower.  When these figures were 
compared with those of other countries, the American students 
invariably came out toward the lower end of the spectrum.  Even 
students in third-world countries routinely did better in tests of 
science and math.  Much of this was disguised from parents because 
their children’s grades remained high.  In fact, they were probably 
better than the parents’ own.  This was not because they knew more 
but because of grade inflation.  Teachers were simply giving better 
evaluations for inferior performances.  They knew that to do well 
their charges had to get into college and that bad averages might ruin 
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their chances.  Moreover, in passing nearly everyone rather than in 
improving their teaching techniques, they more easily satisfied the 
pressures coming from parents and administrators.  Little Johnny 
had to get good grades to keep these potential critics happy.  Long 
gone too was the technique of tracking students according to their 
abilities.  Because the final results were supposed to be equal, no 
one was allowed to get special treatment to accelerate learning. 
This would have been antidemocratic, but could be prevented by 
the simple expedient of permitting everyone to remain comparably 
ignorant.
Another of the educational declines was in discipline.  In the 
past, students were expected to heed their elders.  When asked to 
behave themselves, they generally complied—often fearful that if 
they did not, their parents would inflict dire punishments.  This too 
changed.  Middle-class parents became advocates for their offspring. 
They lobbied teachers to make sure that Johnny was given a fair 
shake.  Lower-class parents were often as adamant.  They would not 
stand to have their children.  If Junior complained of an injustice, his 
parents were certain his obstreperous behavior had been justified.  The 
teacher needed to shapeup, not the student.  As a consequence, many 
inner-city classrooms were reduced to bedlam.  The pupils would 
not sit quietly in their seats for teachers who could not enforce social 
order.  Many youngsters even brought weapons to class.  Teachers 
and administrators became so concerned for their own safety that 
they refrained from imposing discipline.  Instead of teaching the 
sort of self-control that is a prerequisite of middle class success, they 
allowed chaos to reign, both externally and internally.
Already mentioned was the increase in the numbers on welfare 
rolls.111  More people were getting more money from the federal 
government than ever before, on the condition that they not make 
efforts to support themselves.  This not only promoted dependence, 
it also encouraged cheating.  Subsequent accountings would 
demonstrate that double and triple dipping was common.  With 
loosened restraints appearing throughout society, taking advantage 
of bureaucratic slackness appeared to be the rule.  One could, for 
instance, collect welfare from several venues, get unemployment 
insurance while working under the table, obtain workman’s 
compensation for fake disabilities, and receive training for a job 
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only to quit it immediately to be trained for something else one also 
did not intend to do.  No one in charge seemed to care about such 
cheating, so why should the cheaters?
Emblematic of these patterns is the Watergate scandal.112  Richard 
Nixon stood before television cameras to declare that he was “not a 
crook,” symbolizing the lowering of standards so characteristic of the 
Great Disruption.  If the president could manipulate the truth, why 
shouldn’t everyone else?  It was all a matter of what you could get 
away with.  Besides, the country was rich.  It was so rich that none 
of this mattered.  The middle class cornucopia furnished a bounty so 
enormous that it covered a multitude of sins.  Why not scramble for 
a bigger piece of the pie when there was so much pie to go around? 
Why not cheat a little when no one would be seriously hurt by this 
larceny? There was no need to come to honest terms with these 
disruptions as long as almost everyone was sliding by.
The Culture Wars
The Great Disruption exacerbated what had already been a 
division between liberals and conservatives.  They were now at each 
other’s throats over the most fundamental community values.  So 
ferocious did their conflicts become that they were dubbed a Culture 
War.113  Each side was convinced that the other was ruining the 
republic and, therefore, put up a stiff fight to preserve civilization 
from destruction.  According to the liberals, democracy hung in the 
balance.  Unless the appropriate reforms were put into effect, freedom 
and equality were in jeopardy.  According to the conservatives, these 
reforms were the real source of jeopardy.  They were said to undermine 
the principles upon which freedom depended.  To this charge liberals 
responded by dismissing the conservatives as rigid troglodytes.  They 
were evidently so opposed to change that they refused to repair what 
was unequivocally broken.  The conservatives did acknowledge a 
respect for tradition, but they insisted that their goal was to defend 
crucial institutions.114  They too wanted things to be better; but they 
did not want to throw the baby out with the bath water.
Both sides had a point, but they also missed a larger one.  Though 
each would vociferously deny the claim, what both were attempting 
to do was intimately intertwined with what the other was seeking. 
Each assumed that it was engaged in an independent activity, while 
The Reaction    
it was, in fact, participating in a social give-and-take.  Theirs was a 
moral negotiation.115  Most people, including the parties to significant 
disputes, assume that morality is a matter of eternal truths.  They 
believe it is a set of absolute and inviolable rules.  What is good 
is by definition good, and what is right is inherently right.  There 
can be no ands, ifs, or maybes about such matters.  Nonetheless, 
such dichotomous inflexibility is wrong-headed.  Morality is not 
a compendium of peculiarly obdurate facts.  Nor is it something 
discovered by inspecting the texture of the universe.  Morality is a 
social process.  Its rules are socially constructed, socially modified, 
and socially enforced.  As a result, the standards people apply are 
always of evolving.  They never stand still.  By their very nature, 
dynamic, they perpetually trap humankind in a tug-o-war between 
competing factions.
The nature of moral negotiations is distinctive.116  Because moral 
rules are considered exceptionally important, conflicts over their 
shape are typically animated.  Among other things, the parties to 
any enterprises tend to be polarized.117  They perceive themselves 
as the good guys, with their own side always in the right.  This 
places a premium on distinguishing oneself and one’s allies from the 
competing faction.  But to be distinct, one has to be distinctive.  Both 
cliques want the differences separating the sides to be so striking that 
potential converts will have no difficulty in choosing sides.  This, 
however, fosters extremism.  Because the real world is pervaded by 
shades of gray, to provide the desired clarity, divergences have to be 
enhanced and the lines between them artificially straightened.  In 
other words, the differences have to be simplified and strengthened 
if the players are to assemble the alliances necessary to promote their 
positions.  Moral goals, therefore, tend to be idealized, with each side 
regarding its own as perfect and the other’s as the opposite.  Both are 
certain that were they to succeed, the world would become a better 
place, whereas a victory for their enemy would be tantamount to an 
excursion into hell.
Moral negotiations normally emerge when people are faced with 
unusual circumstances.  They engage in debate about the standards 
best equipped to mange their discomfort because they are not sure of 
what will work.  Although stated in objective terms, their positions 
are customarily predicated on individual situations and distinct 
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socializations.  In essence, what they conclude has helped them and 
their allies to prosper is projected as potentially helpful to everyone. 
Often intransigent in these assertions, the battle can seesaw back 
and forth for centuries until a compromise is achieved.  Because 
this argument can escalate into warfare, people are often grievously 
injured in their quests for justice.  Nevertheless, this slipshod means 
of developing a communal consensus ultimately subsumes more 
information than might a purpose-designed settlement.  Just as 
with economic planning, a centralized version of moral planning 
would be ill advised.  Rather than displaying rationality, it would be 
coercively unfair—favoring the interests of its designers over those 
of the community.  In morality and, therefore, in moral negotiations 
no one has the final authority because no one is neutral or objective. 
Since no individual can discern all that is involved, even the best 
of intentions can go astray.  The upshot is that mistakes are made, 
sometimes corrected, and then replaced by new mistakes.  This is 
one of the reasons why history proceeds in waves.  A push-and-
pull of discovery, often based on idealized miscalculations, results 
in both progress and error.  Improvements tend to accumulate, but 
the missteps that occur along the way can send civilization reeling 
backward.
A contemporary illustration of a moral negotiation is the debate 
over abortion.118  Generally this squabble is framed in either/or 
terms.  The pro-choice faction demands that abortion be available 
to all, including teenaged girls, upon request.  The pro-life faction 
counters that abortion is equivalent to murder and is, therefore, 
never acceptable.  These are extreme positions, but it is usually the 
extremists who are most active in asserting the virtues of any side. 
Eventually, a modified position tends to emerge.  For abortion, this 
looks as if it might eventuate in discouraging abortion, while making 
it legal in most cases.  It should also be noted that this quarrel first 
arose only after modern medicine made it probable most children 
would grow to adulthood.  Before that, natural deaths swept away 
many babies before anyone could contemplate abortion.  Similar 
considerations apply to euthanasia and alcoholism.  Euthanasia 
was not a moral problem requiring a social solution until medicine 
made chronic illness more common by increasing life expectancy. 
Likewise, alcoholism was not regarded as a social difficulty until 
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industrialization demanded workplace discipline.  Only then did 
discussions of temperance and prohibition enter the public domain.
By the time of the middle-class tipping point, liberals had taken 
the initiative in promoting moral reforms.119  Their efforts to reduce 
incidences of racism, sexism, and poverty came to the fore as social 
mobility became available to more and more people.120  It seemed 
to these activists that a variety of impediments were interfering with 
success based on merit.  Those already on top, namely the elite, were 
oppressively preventing others from supplanting them.  One of the first 
challenges to this form of intimidation developed out of anthropology. 
These social scientists, in dealing with preliterate peoples, discovered 
that their subjects too were fully human.  Anthropologists also 
found that, in order to understand these other lifestyles, they had to 
view the world from that perspective.  This practice was eventually 
codified as “cultural relativism.”  Soon thereafter, cultural relativism 
mutated into ethical relativism.121  Figures such as Frans Boas122 were 
appalled when Social Darwinism123 was utilized to justify eugenics. 
At the turn of the century, Francis Galton’s argument that society 
should improve its genetic heritage by preventing the poor and 
disabled from reproducing had won many converts.124  It seemed 
reasonable that society should not handicap itself by diverting its 
surpluses into supporting individuals who could never contribute to 
the commonweal.125  What Boas and his colleagues realized was that 
this theory was being used to excuse the punishment of those on the 
bottom.  In the United States, welfare clients, who were often black, 
were inaccurately accused of mental retardation and subsequently 
sterilized.  This was not only barbaric, it was also a depraved form of 
discrimination.
Ethical relativism, however, went further; it argued that moral 
rules were culturally specific.  Each society constructed its own 
standards, and, therefore, no group was entitled to criticize the 
imperatives of another.  Each was right unto itself.  Thus, if Muslims 
practiced polygamy, it was valid for them, whereas monogamy was 
correct for Americans.  In due course, this relativism was idealized 
to promote non-judgmentalism.  The intellectually sophisticated 
were to refrain from judging how any others chose to live.  This 
was their own business, not those of the busybodies.  By the 1940s, 
Carl Rogers126 had imported this attitude into psychotherapy. 
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His client-centered therapy taught that every individual deserved 
“unconditional positive regard.”  Parents and therapists distinguished 
between the person and the deed so that the individual was always 
accorded loving support.  In psychotherapy, this had the advantage 
of putting vulnerable clients at ease, but within society as a whole it 
justified universal tolerance.  No one was to be punished for misdeeds 
but rather to be presented with an opportunity for rehabilitation. 
This would enhance a miscreant’s self-esteem so that he/she would 
never be motivated to repeat mischief.  People who loved themselves, 
because others loved them, would pass this attitude along to still 
others.  Ultimately, unqualified kindness would be the rule.  Social 
mobility would, in effect, become universal because cooperation 
would replace competition.
By the end of the century, this philosophy had mutated again. 
Now it was identified with multiculturalism and diversity.127  Not 
only were women and minority groups to be accorded respect, their 
differences were to be celebrated.  Society as a whole would benefit 
from cultivating their unique contributions.  One of the means 
through which this was expressed was “rights talk.”128  Sooner or later 
most political conversations devolved into assertions of individual 
or group rights.  Formerly, civic-minded persons were concerned 
with promoting duties. Now, the issues are what is due the claimant. 
Activists never tired of presenting women and blacks as victims 
entitled to protection from the more powerful.  Only this could 
insure that there would be no social losers.  Only this protection 
could guarantee that all would share in the advantages of freedom. 
Far from imposing social or personal discipline, punishment and 
violence were to be outlawed.  Even symbolic violence, that is, 
making people feel uncomfortable by treating them unwelcomely, 
was to be banished.129  Merely to express a hatred or sexual attraction 
toward protected groups was intolerable.  Denying the right to feel 
good personally was considered the equivalent of punishment.
Competition, too, was seen as punitive.  Because competition 
required some to win and others to lose, it imposed pain on the 
weak.  Instead of accepting the weak as they were, competition 
consigned them to failure.  In response to this abuse, efforts were 
instituted to eliminate the circumstances productive of invidious 
comparisons.  Dodge-ball was banned from the schoolyard on the 
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grounds that it was both violent and discriminatory.  By the same 
token, many Little League teams decided not to keep score.  At the 
end of the season, everyone would get a trophy regardless of efforts 
or talent.  Enlightened persons began to say—and mean—“it’s not 
whether you win or lose, but how you play the game.”  Actually, 
it was not even how you played, but merely whether you showed 
up—and sometimes not even that.  Anything less was oppressively 
unequal and, therefore, the opposite of genuine freedom.
It was this moral entrepreneurship that sparked a revival of 
conservatism.130  Largely in retreat through the 50s and 60s, by the 70s, 
referring to oneself as a “conservative” once more became respectable. 
This appellation, however, had undergone a transformation.  The 
political turf was now crowded with fiscal conservatives, social 
conservatives, neocons, religious fundamentalists, and libertarians.131 
All claimed an allegiance to tradition in one form or another, but 
what made them allies was a shared revulsion at what liberalism had 
become.132  They looked at the reforms accelerating into extremism 
and demanded a halt.  Blacks might deserve a color-blind society, 
but not quota-oriented affirmative action.  Women were entitled 
to equal pay for equal work, but not androgyny.  The poor were 
worthy of a chance to get ahead, but not to excessively generous 
transfer payments that robbed them of their independence.  Leading 
the charge in this culture war were the religiously committed.  More 
deeply offended by the assault on family values than most, they had a 
faith which gave them the courage to stand up and say so.  When the 
multiculturalists asserted that single parenthood was just as legitimate 
as the traditional family, they bridled at the suggestion.  This was not 
what the Bible said, and they would not be persuaded otherwise. 
Conservatives, in general, asserted an adherence to the primacy 
of the nuclear family.  What many did not realize was that this was 
less traditional than they imagined.  While household consisting 
of a man, woman, and their children was of ancient lineage, the 
companionate marriage is a recent innovation.  Though the gospels 
urged women to be subordinate to the husbands, this was not how 
contemporary fundamentalists regarded the message.  They, too, 
emphasized mutual respect between spouses.  There was to be a 
division of labor between the two, but this was not the same as it had 
been.  Essentially, middle class standards were being grafted onto old 
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texts.  The fundamentalists, while quick to defend school prayer, had 
no intention of instituting a Christian theocracy.  As democratically 
committed as their fellow citizens, they found nondenominational 
messages perfectly acceptable.  Indicative of their attitude were 
attempts to place copies of the Ten Commandments in courtrooms. 
These, they argued, were representative of no particular church, but 
were part of the Judeo-Christian, and even the Muslim, tradition.
Among the values conservatives defended most vociferously were 
“responsibility,” “merit,” and “discipline.”133  They believed in old-
fashioned standards and wanted to see them respected.  This mind-
set was exemplified in their approach to law and order.  Exasperated 
by the legalistic exploitation of excuses to relieve malefactors of 
blame, they wanted hold them accountable for their misdeeds.134  If 
this meant that murderers deserved capital punishment, so be it.  As 
to the major liberal reforms, conservatives were ambivalent.  Most 
believed passionately in fairness, but they were convinced that benefits 
targeted for oppressed minorities were a mistake.  Unimpressed with 
claims that one had to tilt in order to restore balance, conservatives 
insisted that the same rules be applied to all.  Committed to a market 
economy and interpersonal competition, they wanted people to 
earn what they received.  Nevertheless, in return for upholding this 
version of fairness, conservatives were castigated as racists, sexists, 
and classists.  According to the liberals, they were merely protofascists 
determined to turn back the clock.
The liberals, despite a professed dedication to being nonjudgmental, 
held strong opinions about conservatives.135  Although prepared to 
leap to the defense of fascists and Marxists, the fact that conservatives 
might be able to impose their values made them too dangerous to 
disregard.  Tolerance was acceptable for embattled minorities, not 
for potential majorities.  These could not be accorded unconditional 
positive regard but must be converted to the correct viewpoints.  Nor 
was this to be done gently.  Conservatives offended liberals.  Liberals 
grew indignant at conservative attitudes and were unwilling to allow 
those to prevail.  In this, liberals were prepared to utilize political 
coercion.  After all, that which was immoral had to be suppressed. 
Thus, laws needed to be instituted to make certain that hate crimes 
were extinguished.  Those who used drugs recreationally might find 
their habits decriminalized, whereas those who murdered minority 
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members would be treated more harshly than those who killed 
members of the majority—with women, numbering more than 
men, of course, defined as a minority.  Likewise, men who battered 
their wives would no longer be warned to desist but immediately 
would be carted off to jail.  Moreover, cultures that engaged in female 
circumcision would be ostracized for their barbarity.  To the extent 
possible, in the name of female liberation, pressures would be exerted 
to criminalize what had been a religious rite.
Remarkably, liberalism reverted from universalistic to 
particularistic standards.  During the Middle Ages, members of 
the nobility were subject to different laws than others were.  The ax 
rather than the noose, for instance, was used to execute them.  With 
the dominance of commercialism and its resolve to level the playing 
field, equality before the law became a central aim.  Contemporary 
liberalism reversed this trend.  Some people would receive special 
benefits because of their classification, whereas others were to receive 
harsher punishments.  Even the weight one’s testimony was accorded 
in courts would vary with group membership.  Women, to provide 
a salient example, were allowed to judge whether they had been 
sexually offended.  The standard of what was permissible was their 
reaction, rather than a more objective standard.  Instead of a color-
blind or gender-blind society, a socially engineered equality became 
the goal.
    The Great Middle Class Revolution
Endnotes
1 Corey, L.  1935.  The Crisis of the Middle Class.  New York: Columbia University 
Press; D’Souza, D.  2000.  The Virtue of Prosperity: Finding Values in an 
Age of Techno-Affluence.  New York: The Free Press.
2 Hughes, R.  1993.  Culture of Complaint: The Fraying of America.  New York: 
Oxford University Press.
3 Samuelson, R.  1996.  The Good Life and Its Discontents:  The American Dream in 
the Age of Entitlement 1945-1995.  New York: Times Books.
4 de Botton, A.  2004   Status Anxiety.  New York: Pantheon Books; Skocpol, T.  
2000.  The Missing Middle: Working Families and the Future of American 
Social Policy.  New York: W.W. Norton & Co.
5 Wolfe, A.  1996.  Marginalized in the Middle.  Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press.
6 Lipset, S.M. and Bendix, R.  1959.  Social Mobility in Industrial Society.  
Berkeley: University of California Press.; Dahrendorf, R.  1959.  Class 
and Class Conflict in Industrial Society.  Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press.; Doty, C.S. (Ed.)  1969.  The Industrial Revolution.  New York: Holt, 
Rinehart and Winston.
7 Riech, C.A.  1971.  The Greening of America.  New York: Bantam.
8 Collier, P. and Horowitz, D.  1989.  Destructive Generation: Second Thoughts 
about the ‘60s.  New York: The Free Press.
9 Gerth, H. and Mills, C.W. (Eds.)  1946.  From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology.  
New York: Oxford University Press.
10 Fein, M.  2001  Race and Morality: How Good Intentions Undermine Social 
Justice and Perpetuate Inequality.  New York: Kluwer/Plenum.
11 Fein, M.  1999.  The Limits of Idealism: When Good Intentions Go Bad.  New 
York: Kluwer/Plenum.
12 Fein, M.  1999.  The Limits of Idealism: When Good Intentions Go Bad.  New 
York: Kluwer/Plenum.
13 Fein, M.  1999.  The Limits of Idealism: When Good Intentions Go Bad.  New 
York: Kluwer/Plenum.
14 Isaacson, W.  2003.  Benjamin Franklin: An American Life.  New York: Simon & 
Schuster.
15 Fein, M.  2001  Race and Morality: How Good Intentions Undermine Social Justice 
and Perpetuate Inequality.  New York: Kluwer/Plenum.; Myrdal, G.  1944.  
An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and American Democracy.  New 
York: Harper & Row.
16 Laudan, L.  1977.  Progress and Its Problems: Towards a Theory of Scientific 
Growth.  Berkeley: University of California Press.
17 Gray, T.  1976.  Champion of Peace: The Story of Alfred Nobel, the Peace Prize, 
and the Laureates.  New York: Paddington Press.; Chatfield, C.  1992.  
The Reaction    
The American Peace Movement: Ideals and Activism.  New York: Twayne 
Publishers.
18 Hersey, J.  1946.  Hiroshima.  New York: Bantam Books.
19 Sale, K.  1973.  SDS.  New York: Random House.
20 Halberstam, D.  1969.  The Best and the Brightest.  New York: Random House.: 
Halberstam, D.  1986.  The Reckoning.  New York: William Morrow Co.; 
Joes, A.J.  1989.  The War for South Viet Nam 1954-1975.  New York: 
Praeger.
21 Kohn, B.  2003.  Journalistic Fraud: How The New York Times Distorts the News 
and Why It Can No Longer Be Trusted.  Nashville: WND Books.
22 Goodwin, D.K.  1971.  Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream.  New York: 
Harper & Row.
23 Ambrose, S.E.  1987.  Nixon: The Education of a Politician 1913-1962.  New 
York: Simon and Schuster.; Wicker, T.  1991.  One of Us: Richard Nixon 
and the American Dream.  New York: Random House.
24 Washington, B.T.  1901.  (1985)  Up From Slavery.  New York: Oxford 
University Press.
25 Morris, E.  2001.  Theodore Rex.  New York: Random House.
26 Lowe, D.  1967.  Ku Klux Klan: The Invisible Empire.  New York: W.W. Norton.; 
Allport, G.  1954.  The Nature of Prejudice.  Boston: Beacon Press.
27 Park, R.  1950.  Race and Culture.  Glencoe, Ill: Free Press.
28 McCullough, D.  1992.  Truman.  New York: Simon & Schuster.
29 Williams, J.  1998.  Thurgood Marshall: American Revolutionary.  New York: 
Times Books.
30 Morin, R.  1969.  Dwight D. Eisenhower: A Gauge of Greatness.  New York: 
Simon & Schuster.
31 Pyatt, S.E.  1986.  Martin Luther King, Jr.: An Annotated Bibliography.  New 
York: Greenwood Press.
32 Thernstrom, S. and Thernstrom, A.  1997.  America in Black and White: One 
Nation, Indivisible.  New York: Simon and Schuster.
33 Coleman, J.S., Campbell, E.Q, Hobson, C.J., McPartland, J., Mood, A.M., 
Weinfeld, F.D. and York, R.L.  1966.  Equality of Educational Opportunity. 
Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office.
34 Rieder, J.  1985.  Canarsie: The Jews and Italians of Brooklyn against Liberalism.  
Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.
35 Coleman, J.S., Campbell, E.Q, Hobson, C.J., McPartland, J., Mood, A.M., 
Weinfeld, F.D. and York, R.L.  1966.  Equality of Educational Opportunity. 
Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office.
36 Rubin L. B.  1972.  Busing & Backlash: White Against White in an Urban School 
District.  Berkeley: University of California Press.
    The Great Middle Class Revolution
37 Bergmann, B.R.  1996.  In Defense of Affirmative Action.  New York: Basic 
Books.; Skrentny, J.L.  1996.  The Ironies of Affirmative Action: Politics, 
Culture, and Justice in America.  Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
38 Schlesinger, A.M.  1992.  The Disuniting of America.  New York: W.W. Norton 
& Co.; Kinder, R.R. and Sanders L.M.  1996.  Divided by Color: Racial 
Politics and Democratic Ideals.  Chicago: University of Chicago Press.; 
Connerly, W.  2000.  Creating Equal: My Fight Against Race Prejudices.  
San Francisco: Encounter Books.
39 Wood, P.  2003.  Diversity: The Invention of a Concept.  San Francisco: 
Encounter Books.
40 Glazer, N.  1997.  We are All Multiculturalists Now.  Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press.; Bernstein, R.  1994.  Dictatorship of Virtue: 
Multiculturalism and the Battle for America’s Future.  New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf.
41 Thernstrom, S. and Thernstrom, A.  2003.  No Excuses: Closing the Racial Gap in 
Learning.  New York: Simon and Schuster.
42 Deveaux, M.  2000.  Cultural Pluralism and Dilemmas of Justice.  Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press.
43 Pyatt, S.E.  1986.  Martin Luther King, Jr.: An Annotated Bibliography.  New 
York: Greenwood Press.
44 Erikson, E.  1969.  Gandhi’s Truth: On the Origins of Militant Nonviolence.  
WE.W. Norton.
45 D’Souza, D.  1995.  The End of Racism: Principles for a Multiracial Society.  New 
York: The Free Press.
46 Brownstein, H.H.  2000.  The Social Reality of Violence and Violent Crime.  
Needham Heights, MA: Allyn and Bacon.
47 Sears, D.O. and McConahay, J.B.  1973.  The Politics of Violence: The New 
Urban Black and the Watts Riot.  Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
48 Cleaver, E.  1967.  Soul on Ice.  New York: McGraw-Hill.
49 Horowitz. D.  1997.  Radical Son: A Generational Odyssey.  New York: The Free 
Press. 
50 Entwisle, D.R., Alexander, K.L. and Olson, L.S.  1997.  Children, Schools & 
Inequality.  Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
51 Steele, S.  1990.  The Content of Our Character: A New Vision of Race in America. 
New York: St. Martin’s Press.; Steele, S.  1998.  A Dream Deferred: The 
Second Betrayal of Black Freedom in America.  New York: HarperCollins 
Publishers.
52 Ball, T. and Dagger, R.  1999.  Political Ideologies and the Democratic Ideal.  New 
York: Longman.
53 Rossi, A.S. (Ed.)  1973.  The Feminist Papers: From Adams to de Beauvoir.  New 
York: Bantam Books.
54 Horowitz, D.  1998.  Betty Friedan and the Making of the Feminine Mystique.  
Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press.
The Reaction    
55 Friedan, B.  1963.  The Feminine Mystique.  New York: W.W. Norton & Co.
56 Becker, S.D.  1981.  The Origins of the Equal Right Amendment: American 
Feminism between the Wars.  Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.; 
MacKinnon, C.A.  1987.  Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and 
Law.  Cambridge, MS: Harvard University Press.
57 Epstein, C.F.  1970.  Woman’s Place: Options and Limits in Professional Careers.  
Berkeley: University of California Press.
58 French, M.  1992.  The War Against Women.  New York: Summit Books.
59 Gutmann, S.  2000.  The Kinder, Gentler Military: Can America’s Gender-Neutral 
Fighting Force Still Win Wars?  New York: Scribner.
60 Faludi, S.  1991.  Backlash: The Undeclared War Against American Women.  New 
York: Crown Publishers.
61 Lorber, J.  1994.  Paradoxes of Gender.  New Haven: Yale University Press.
62 Jagger, A.M.  1988.  Feminist Politics and Human Nature.  Totowa, NJ: Rowman 
& Littlefield.
63 Baron-Cohen, S.  2003.  The Essential Difference: The Truth about the Male and 
Female Brain.  New York: Basic Books.
64 Blankenhorn, D.  1995.  Fatherless America: Confronting Our Most Urgent Social 
Problem.  New York: Basic Books.
65 Clausen, J. (Ed.)  1968.  Socialization and Society.  Boston: Little Brown.
66 Gilligan, C. 1982.  In a Different Voice.  Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press.
67 Brownmiller, S.  1975.  Against Our Will: Men, Women and Rape.  New York: 
Bantam.
68 Gelles, R.J.  1997.  Intimate Violence in Families (3rd Edition)  Beverly Hills: 
Sage Publications.; Gelles, R.J and Straus, M.A.  1989.  Intimate Violence: 
The Causes and Consequences of Abuse in the American Family.  New York: 
Touchstone Books.
69 Roiphe, K.  1993.  The Morning After: Sex, Fear, and Feminism On Campus.  
Boston: Little, Brown, & Co.
70 Steinem, G.  1992.  Revolution From Within: A Book of Self-Esteem.  Boston: 
Little, Brown.; Fein, M.  1999.  The Limits of Idealism: When Good 
Intentions Go Bad.  New York: Kluwer/Plenum.
71 Humphrey, H.H.  1964.  War on Poverty.  New York: McGraw-Hill.; Zarefsky, 
D.  1986.  President Johnson’s War on Poverty.  University, Ala: University of 
Alabama Press.
72 Galbraith, J.K.  1958.  The Affluent Society.  Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
73 Murray, C.  1986.  Losing Ground: American Social Policy.  New York: Basic 
Books.
74 Powell, J.  2003.  FDR’s Folly: How Roosevelt and His New Deal Prolonged the 
Great Depression.  New York: Crown Forum.
0    The Great Middle Class Revolution
75 Piven, F.F. and Cloward, R.A.  1977.  Poor People’s Movement’s: Why They 
Succeed, How They Fail.  New York: Vintage.
76 Lewis, O.  1966.  La Vida: A Puerto Rican Family in the Culture of Poverty.  
New York: Random House.; Valentine, C.  1968.  Culture and Poverty.  
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
77 Mill, J.S.  1863.  On Liberty.  London. 
78 Stein, H. and Foss, M.  1999.  The Illustrated Guide to the American Economy, 
Third Edition.  Washington, D.C.: AEI Press.
79 Fukuyama, F.  1999.  The Great Disruption: Human Nature and the reconstitution 
of Social Order.  New York: Free Press.
80 Garbarino, J., Schellenbach, C.J. and Sebes, J.  1986.  Troubled Youth, Troubled 
Families.  New York: Aldine De Gruyter.
81 Giuliani, R.W.  2002.  Leadership.  New York: Miramax Books.
82 Coontz, S.  1992.  The Way We Never Were: American Families and the Nostalgia 
Trap.  New York: Basic Books. 
83 Whitehead, B.D.  1998.  The Divorce Culture: Rethinking Our Commitments to 
Marriage and the Family.  New York: Random House.
84 Cherlin, A.J.  1992.  Marriage, Divorce, and Remarriage.  Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press.
85 Wallenstein, J.S., Lewis, J.M. and Blakesee, S.  2000.  The Unexpected Legacy 
of Divorce: A 25 Year Landmark Study.  New York: Hyperion.; Coltrane, 
S.  1996.  Family Man: Fatherhood, Housework, and Gender Equity.  New 
York: Oxford University Press.
86 Fukuyama, F.  1995.  Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity.  
New York: Free Press.
87 Lott, J.R.  1998.  More Guns, Less Crime: Understanding Crime and Gun Control 
Laws.  Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
88 Schippers, A.  2000.  Sellout: The Inside Story of President Clinton’s Impeachment.  
Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing.; Lowery, R.  2003.  Legacy: Paying 
the Price for the Clinton Years.  Washington, D.C.: Regnery Publishing.
89 Baker, P.  2000.  The Breach: Inside the Impeachment and Trial of William Jefferson 
Clinton.  New York: Scribner.
90 Goldberg, B.  2002.  Bias: A CBS Insider Exposes How the Media Distort the 
News.  Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing.; Goldberg, B.  2003.  
Arrogance: Rescuing America from the Media Elite.  New York: Warner 
Books
91 Blyth, M.  2004.  Spin Sisters: How the Women of the Media Sell Unhappiness and 
Liberalism to the Women of America.  New York: St. Martin’s Press.
92 Bozell, L.B.  2004.  Weapons of Mass Distortion: The Coming Meltdown of the 
Liberal Media.  New York: Crown Forum.
93 Kohn, B.  2003.  Journalistic Fraud: How The New York Times Distorts the 
News and Why It Can No Longer Be Trusted.  Nashville: WND Books.; 
The Reaction    1
McGowan, W.  2001.  Coloring the News: How Crusading for Diversity Has 
Corrupted American Journalism.  San Francisco: Encounter Books.
94 McDonald, H.  2003.  Are Cops Racist?: How the Wear Against the Police Harms 
Black Americans.  Chicago: Ivan R. Dee.; Rothwax, H.J.  1995.  Guilty: 
The Collapse of Criminal Justice.  New York: Random House.; Boot, M.  
1998.  Out of Order: Arrogance, Corruption, and Incompetence on the Bench. 
New York: Basic Books.
95 Campos, P.F.  1998.  Jurismania: The Madness of American Law.  New York: 
Oxford University Press.; Cantor, N.F.  1997.  Imagining the Law: 
Common Law and the Foundations of the American Legal System.  New 
York: HarperCollins Publishers.
96 Farber, D.A. and Sherry, S.  1997.  Beyond All Reason: The Radical Assault on 
Truth in American Law.  New York: Oxford University Press.
97 Carter, S.L.  1998.  Civility: Manners, Morals and the Etiquette of Democracy.  
New York: Basic Books.; Lasch, C.  1979.  The Culture of Narcissism: 
American Life in an Age of Diminishing Expectations.  New York: Warner 
Books.
98 Elias, N.  1982.  Power and Civility.  New York: Pantheon Books.
99 Sheed, W.  1975.  Muhammad Ali: A Portrait in Words and Photographs.  New 
York: Crowell.
100 Jones, J.H.  1997.  Alfred C. Kinsey: A Life.  New York: W.W. Norton & Co.
101 Lichter, S.R., Lichter, L.S. and Rothman, S.  1994.  Prime Time: How TV 
Portrays American Culture.  Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing.
102 Shilts, R.  1988.  And the Band Played On: Politics, People and the AIDS 
Epidemic.  New York: Penguin Books.
103 Michael, R.T., Gagnon, J.H., Laumann, E.O. and Kolata, G.  1994.  Sex in 
America: A Definitive Study.  New York: Warner Books.
104 Glass, I.B. (Ed.)  1991.  The International Handbook of Addiction.  New York: 
Tavistock/Routledge.; Morgan, H.W.  1981.  Drugs in America 1800-
1980.  Syracuse: University of Syracuse Press.
105 Glass, I.B. (Ed.)  1991.  The International Handbook of Addiction.  New York: 
Tavistock/Routledge.
106 Brimelow, P.  2003.  The Worm in the Apple: How the Teacher Unions Are 
Destroying American Education.  New York: HarperCollins Publishers.
107 National Center for Educational Statistics.  2001.  Digest of Educational 
Statistics, 2001.  Washington, DC.  Government Printing Office
108 Kramer, R.  1991.  Ed School Follies: The Miseducation of America’s Teachers.  
New York: The Free Press.
109 D’Souza, D.  1991.  Illiberal Education: The Politics of Race and Sex on Campus.  
New York: The Free Press.
110 Zigler, E. and Valentines, J. (Eds.)  1979.  Head Start: A Legacy of the War on 
Poverty.  New York: Free Press.
    The Great Middle Class Revolution
111 Sommers, P.M. (Ed.)  1982.  Welfare Reform in America: Perspectives and 
Prospects.  Boston: Kluwer and Nijhoff.
112 Bernstein, C. and Woodward, B.  1974.  All the President’s Men.  New York: 
Simon and Schuster.
113 Hunter, J.D.  1991.  Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America.  New York: 
Basic Books.
114 Gerson, M. (Ed.)  1996.  The Essential Neo-Conservative Reader.  Reading, MA: 
Addison-Wesley Publishing.
115 Fein, M.  1997.  Hardball Without an Umpire: The Sociology of Morality.  
Westport, CT: Praeger.
116 Fein, M.  1997.  Hardball Without an Umpire: The Sociology of Morality.  
Westport, CT: Praeger.
117 Fein, M.  1999.  The Limits of Idealism: When Good Intentions Go Bad.  New 
York: Kluwer/Plenum.
118 Cook, A.E., Jelen T.G. & Wilcox, C.  1992.  Between Two Absolutes: Public 
Opinion and the Politics of Abortion.  Boulder: Westview Press.
119 Kramer, H. and Kimball, R.  1999.  The Betrayal of Liberalism: How the 
Disciples of Freedom and Equality Helped Foster the Illiberal Politics of 
Coercion and Control.  Chicago: Ivan R. Dee.
120 Feagin, J.R. and Sikes, M.P.  1994.  Living with Racism: The Black Middle-Class 
Experience.  Boston: Beacon Press.
121 Westermarck, E.  1960.  Ethical Relativity.  Paterson, NJ: Littlefield, Adams, 
and Co.
122 Boas, F.  1928.  Anthropology and Modern Life.  New York: Dover Publishers. 
123 Bannister, R.C.  1979.  Social Darwinism: Science and Myth in Anglo-American 
Social Thought.  Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
124 Newnan, H.H.  1969.  Evolution, Genetics, and Eugenics.  New York: 
Greenwood Press.
125 Betzig, LL.  1986.  Despotism and Differential Reproduction: A Darwinian View 
of History.  New York: Aldine.
126 Rogers, C.  1951.  Client Centered Therapy.  Boston: Houghton Mifflin.; 
Rogers, C.  1961.  On Becoming a Person.  Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
127 Lynch, F.R.  1997.  The Diversity Machine.  New York: The Free Press.
128 Glendon, M.A.  1991.  Rights Talk: The Impoverishment of Political 
Discourse.  New York: Free Press.
129 Bourdieu, P.  1990.  The Logic of Practice.  Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press.
130 Goldwater, B.M.  1964.  Conscience of a Conservative.  New York: MacFadden-
Bartell Corp.
131 Ball, T. and Dagger, R.  1999.  Political Ideologies and the Democratic Ideal.  
New York: Longman.
The Reaction    
132 Bork, R.  1996.  Slouching Toward Gomorrah: Modern Liberalism and American 
Decline.  New York: Regan Books.
133 Bennett, W.J. (Ed.)  1993.  The Book of Virtues: A Treasury of Great Moral 
Stories.  New York: Simon & Schuster.
134 Boot, M.  1998.  Out of Order: Arrogance, Corruption, and Incompetence on the 
Bench.  New York: Basic Books.
135 Farber, D.A. and Sherry, S.  1997.  Beyond All Reason: The Radical Assault on 
Truth in American Law.  New York: Oxford University Press.

Chapter 8
Bobos in Limbo
The inherent vice of capitalism is the unequal sharing 
of blessings; the inherent virtue of socialism is the equal 
sharing of miseries.  (Winston Churchill, Saying)
CONSERVATIVE. n. A statesman who is enamored 
of existing evils, as distinguished from the Liberal, who 
wishes to replace them with others. (Ambrose Bierce, The 
Devil’s Dictionary)
What a chimera then is man!  What a novelty! What a 
monster, what a chaos, what a contradiction, what a 
prodigy!  Judge of all things, feeble earthworm, depository 
of truth, a sink of uncertainty and error, the glory and the 
shame of the universe.  (Blaise Pascal, Pensees)
Bobos
David Brooks1 is owed a debt of gratitude for introducing the 
term “bobo” into our lexicon.  Related to the concept “yuppie,” the 
appellation places a critical segment of the middle class in historical 
context.  The yuppies were young, upwardly mobile professionals. 
They were go-getters on the rise, whereas the bobos are defined as 
“bourgeois-bohemians.”  This clever elision calls attention to the 
artistic connections of many of the recently successful.  Brooks 
begins his ethnography of what is mistakenly labeled “the new upper 
class” by exploring changes that occurred in the New York Times 
society section.  During the 1950s, the paper routinely identified 
couples about to be married by the prominent families to which they 
belonged.  The WASP establishment was then very much intact.  It 
took pride in its heritage and the nation’s most prominent newspaper 
was happy to collude in this.  To quote Brooks, one such notice read: 
“She [the bride] is descended from Richard Warren, who came to 
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Brookhaven in 1664.  Her husband, a descendent of Dr. Benjamin 
Treadwell, who settled in old Westbury in 1767, is an alumnus of 
Gunnery School and a senior at Colgate University.”2  The towns 
in which the parties lived, and the fortunes to which they were heir, 
clearly took precedence over personal achievements.  And, as clearly, 
the longer their pedigree, the better.
By the 60s, this had begun to change and by the 90s the style was 
radically different.  Not only had ethnics, such as Jews and Italians, 
replaced the Episcopalian elite,3 but their claims to higher status 
rested on other grounds.  They were part of an emerging educated 
class.  Instead of families of recent immigrant origin taking pride 
in their roots, the new wedding notices featured the couple’s own 
accomplishments.  The bride might be described as a graduate of Yale 
University who was employed as a buyer by Bonwitt-Teller, whereas 
the groom would be recognized as having received a degree from 
Princeton and now working for a Wall Street law firm.  Again to 
cite Brooks, as of 1999 a reader of the wedding section “learned that 
Stuart Anthony Kingsley…graduated magna cum from Dartmouth 
and got an MBA from Harvard on the way to becoming a partner 
at McKinsey & Company.  His father was a trustee of the National 
Trust for Historic Preservation, and his mother an overseer of the 
Boston Symphony Orchestra…”4   Thus, even the WASP elite had 
begun to justify their inclusion by personal or family achievements. 
Their lineages might be long, but it was education, expertise, and 
service that earned them notice.
The bobos, who edged their way to privileged status, were very 
much a product of the middle class.  Prominent, not because of their 
fortunes, or those of their ancestors, they were instead eager to be 
portrayed as “the best and the brightest.”5  Theirs was a dominance 
predicated on the exercise of power, and this power was predicated 
on what they knew.  As a result, they were not given to ostentatious 
display6.  Long gone were the palatial estates of the Robber Barons.7 
The bobos might have multi-million dollar apartments just off Park 
Avenue and even more expensive ski lodges in Aspen, but they were 
not fawned over by battalions of servants.  Like President Jimmy 
Carter,8 they were prepared to carry their own luggage.  Flagrant 
luxuries struck them as pretentious.  They were just ordinary folks 
whose jobs happened to provide a comfortable living.  Painfully 
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aware that they were not Vanderbilts,9 or Astors,10 most did not want 
to be.  They were content to be hard-working professionals whose 
prestige derived from their social contributions.
If the bobos were not into luxuries, they were into lavish 
necessities.  Brooks presents what he calls the bobo “code of 
financial correctness.”   According to this list of conventions, it is 
virtuous to spend $25, 000 on one’s bathroom, but not $15,000 
on a sound system.  Top of the line leather patent leather shoes are 
a no, no, whereas pricey hiking boots are not.  Kitchen equipment 
is definitely okay, no matter the cost, but purchasing a Corvette, 
rather than an SUV, is tasteless.  It is also “perfectly acceptable to 
spend lots of money on anything that is of ‘professional quality,’ even 
if it has nothing to do with your profession.”11  Paying $300 for a 
“multi-purpose industrial-strength toasting system,” therefore makes 
more sense than paying $30 for an ordinary toaster.  These pretend 
journeymen often congregate together in “Latte Towns” such as 
Boulder, Colorado and Burlington, Vermont, where they revel in 
upscale coffee shops and arts and craftsy main streets.  Dedicated to 
the games of their youth, they flaunt a healthy physicality.  Much 
like over-grown college students, they enjoy demonstrating that 
they can still play tennis or skipper a sailboat.  Then too, they love 
nature.  They dote on climbing mountains to appreciate their beauty. 
Dedicated environmentalists, they are committed to saving virgin 
forests, rather than cutting them down.  Besides, this naturalness is 
good for one’s health.  Jogging around the reservoir in the morning 
and eating greens for lunch preserves one into a vigorous old age. 
Evidently not only are the bobos smart in business; they are smart in 
their personal lives.  
Emblematic of the bobo mentality are Ben and Jerry of Ben 
and Jerry’s Ice Cream.  Vermont based refugees from New York, 
they learned how to make their product from a library book.  They 
then proceeded to name their politically correct flavors for their 
culture heroes, e.g. Cherry Garcia.  More importantly, they have 
been ostentatious in supporting liberal causes.  The bobos may be 
successful professionals, but they harbor an antibusiness mentality. 
Comprehending themselves as erudite specialists, they resent the 
managers they perceive as the real bosses.  In their view, they are 
hardworking employees, whereas these executives are the loutish 
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heirs of the old bourgeoisie.  Even when self-employed, the bobos 
regard themselves as oppressed under-dogs.  They, as opposed to more 
business-oriented types, are creative in their approach.  Definitely 
not power-hungry parasites, they contribute their ingenuity for the 
good of mankind.  Self-expression, not insensitive control, is their 
forte.  Though they make innumerable business decisions, they 
reject any association with a profit motive.  Theirs is the world of the 
intellectual and the artist, not of the avaricious capitalist.
Bobos, whether they understand it or not, are cultural specialists. 
Because their power derives from their education, they identify 
with pursuing knowledge and beauty for their own sake.  The old-
line bohemians12 clustered on the fringe of polite society, yet were 
aggressively excluded from it.  Prosperous capitalists might patronize 
their productions, but these unconventional creators themselves lived 
in scruffy poverty.  The new bohemians, in contrast, find themselves 
smack-dab amongst the bourgeoisie.  Living upscale lifestyles, their 
self-conceptions are nevertheless those of the impoverished outsider. 
While not aesthetic innovators on anything like the scale of their 
forebears, they aspire to this standing.  Decidedly not organizational 
conformists, most are nevertheless tied to corporate giants, either 
as employees or contractual providers.  Apt to depict themselves as 
hierarchically feeble, regardless of their poormouthing, they set the 
standards for these establishments.  They dictate what is tasteful, what 
is linguistically appropriate, and what is morally acceptable.  As the 
lawyers, the doctors, and the artistic directors of untold companies, 
they determine what is within bounds and what is doable.  In this, 
they are guided by cultural principles derived from the bohemian 
past.  What they believe is proper often has more to do with what 
these antecedents thought than with what works in the here and 
now.
The chief innovation of the bobos is in how they manage self-
direction.13  Avowed enemies of bureaucratic institutions, they 
loathe the technical rationality it theoretically embodies.  Max 
Weber dissected organizations he thought were tightly controlled 
by scientifically validated procedures.14  In the quest for efficiency, 
these institutions ostensibly sought to banish the human factor in 
favor of impersonal rules.  Such rigidity does not, however, appeal 
to individuals invested in creative autonomy.  Having majored in 
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the arts, the humanities, and the social sciences, they are not about 
to defer to the authority of MBAs or engineers.15  When they make 
decisions, they wish these to be in flagrant disregard of systematic 
rationality—or so it would seem.  Bobo self-direction is grounded 
more in aesthetics, emotion, and self-expression.  They go with their 
gut-feelings, not with cut-and-dried regulations.  In fact, energetic 
and competitive, they affect an easy-going cooperativeness.  From 
their mouths roll forth collectivist platitudes, yet their behaviors 
speak a different language.  The situation is exemplified in an episode 
of the television program Law and Order, where a Hollywood 
executive explains that she works with people who talk like hippies, 
but who act like members of the Sicilian mob.  Utterly cutthroat 
in their tactics, as they twist in the knife, they justify what they are 
doing in artistic and humanist terms.
Caught in a time warp, many bobos feel more controlled than 
controlling.  Excruciatingly aware of their personal limitations, 
they appropriate an historical rationalization to vindicate their 
shortcomings.  Part of being a social leader is dealing with uncertainties, 
which means making some choices that will not work out.  Being able 
to blame these on the wayward foolishness of uncouth managers can, 
therefore, be psychologically comforting.  Obviously the greed and 
narrow-mindedness of these supreme leaders is at fault.  The bobo, 
however, is guided by an impeccable sense of what is appropriate. 
Individual feelings and tastes cannot go wrong, especially when 
these are imputed to moral sources.  In this, the cultivated bobo is 
in touch with the natural, and perhaps spiritual, springs of correct 
behavior.  Much as the old bohemians were certain of their muses, 
their cultural descendents are as romantically inspired.  This means 
that they cannot be wrong; nor be blamed for what goes wrong.  The 
problem must be with the system, or those in charge of it—never 
themselves.  Though, in fact, responsible for many critical decisions, 
they do not feel responsible.
Politically, the bobos have become the standard-bearers of 
liberalism.  Flamboyantly in sympathy with progress, this is conceived 
of in antiestablishment terms.  Because they do not pride themselves 
on being pillars of the system, but rather as its victims, they feel 
justified in agitating for its dismemberment.  Indeed, the bobos and 
modern liberalism were born in the same crucible.  They both came 
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to prominence as the hippie eruption subsided.  When the blatant 
bohemianism of the flower children proved a disappointment, its 
aspirations were transferred to more politicized objectives.  Members 
of the middle class who were disillusioned with the oppressive 
discipline of their jobs appropriated this reformist reaction for 
their own purposes.  Uncomfortable both with internalized rules 
and restraints on their social mobility, they adopted a philosophy 
opposed to both.  They too would fight for a world in which social 
stratification was abolished, but would do so using the tools of the 
middle class.  Well educated, and familiar with the means of social 
organization, they would turn these skills to the task of achieving 
complete equality.  Though they would be appalled by the suggestion, 
their liberalism was a variety of political romanticism.  With their 
goals largely determined by emotional reactions, they were even 
given to theatrical politics.  For them, dramatic promises replaced 
careful evaluations in deciding public policy.  It became enough for 
office seekers to indicate that they “cared” about the welfare of their 
constituents; they didn’t actually need to do anything to promote it. 
Likewise, as long as they proclaimed their approval of cooperation, 
they could be as competitive as they pleased.
Brooks describes the bobos as living in paradise.16  He notes 
both their political ascendancy and the comfort in which they live. 
He also suggests that they have achieved a stable adjustment to 
contemporary conditions.  According to him, “we are not living in 
an age of transition.  We are living just after an age of transition. 
We are living just after the culture war that roiled American life 
for a generation.  Between the 1960s and the 1980s the forces of 
bohemia and the force of the bourgeoisie launched their final 
offensives….  But out of that climactic turmoil a new reconciliation 
has been forged.  A new order and a new establishment have settled 
into place….”17  This new order is the bobo order.  It supposedly 
combines the bohemian and the bourgeois in a stable compromise 
that satisfies both sides of the dispute—and the nation as well.  The 
new elite, namely this culturally dominant middle class, can, owing 
to its ingenious rationalizations,18 exercise leadership responsibilities 
without having to acknowledge them.  It can apply its skills and 
energies for the common good, without anyone admitting that the 
old elite has been superceded.
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Nevertheless, there is reason to believe this is overly optimistic. 
The culture wars are not yet over; they have not even taken a respite. 
Today’s sulfurous politics do not include the riots of yesteryear, 
but they hardly bespeak a renewed “era of good feelings.”  The 
antagonisms continue to run deep because a durable settlement has 
not been achieved.19  Rather than the bobos being in paradise, they 
are more accurately described as hovering in limbo.  Caught between 
a bohemian lifestyle they cannot truly emulate and leadership 
responsibilities they have not fully embraced, they do not rest easy. 
Theirs is a temporary stopping place.  Because it sits on a foundation 
of contradictions, the so-called “bobo reconciliation” promises to be 
torn asunder.  Since much of what is being attempted is impossible, 
it cannot come to fruition.  For similar reasons, camouflaged 
resentments directed toward the old establishment portend 
difficulties.  Eventually these hatreds must be seen for what they are 
and resented.  The current resolution runs only along the surface, 
with oppositionalist policies frequently breaking through.  Many of 
the players persist in doing things designed to injure their enemies 
rather than to accomplish positive objectives.  Thus they press for 
regulations to hamper despised business interests or they promote 
a sexual promiscuity that cannot be good for the next generation, 
irrespective of the consequences.  Sooner or later this must redound 
against community interests and motivate fresh efforts to find a 
workable solution.  Despite Brooks’s assurances, the transitional 
period has not ended.  Still a work in progress, much remains to 
be done.  Where this middle class reaction will come to rest is not 
certain, but that it is not yet reached this place is.
The Liberal Hegemony
Liberalism has a reputation for being the wave of the future,20 
whereas it is actually an undertow from the past.  While its champions 
claim that is the herald of things to come, it reverberates with ideas 
derived from times long gone.  Although liberalism has not lived up 
to its promises, it has nevertheless become the dominant force in 
contemporary politics.21  In the United States and Western Europe 
it is currently the default position.  In both of these middle class 
societies, criticisms of the market economy, and of those at its apex, 
have become standard fare.  This is a fact of life.  The momentary 
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state of the cultural wars may obscure this verity, but it needs to be 
explained.  Even though liberals present themselves as an embattled 
minority, while conservatives assert that the liberal advantage is merely 
temporary, this is because both are embroiled in a desperate battle. 
Each side is seeking to define the situation in tactically advantageous 
terms.  Thus, liberals derogate their favorable position lest their allies 
grow complacent, whereas conservatives boast of modest victories to 
inflate their apparent strength.
Still and all, liberalism is the contemporary gold standard.  It 
declarations are widely considered pure and free from the taint of 
avarice.  Although what conservatives advocate was traditional 
within the recent past, nowadays it is castigated as “extremist.”22 
Amazingly, should the traditionalists come to the defense of the 
market system, they are immediately suspected of greedily oppressing 
the disenfranchised.  Or if they argue on behalf of merit, they are 
dismissed was favoring their associates.  Meanwhile, liberal promises 
of total equality are assumed to be realizable.  The conditions they 
endorse may never have existed among human beings, but these are 
regarded as what would prevail if opposing forces did not intervene. 
Moreover, liberals are assumed to favor “progress.”  They want to 
bring about changes for the better, whereas conservatives, in Ambrose 
Bierce’s23 memorable words, “are enamored of existing evils.” 
Apparently suffering from inborn anxieties, they are too apprehensive 
to experiment with up-to-the-minute solutions.  Unlike the liberals, 
they do not possess the courage to peer into the future or to conceive 
of substantial improvements.
Liberalism has become the international orthodoxy wherever 
the industrial revolution has triumphed.  In Western Europe 
conservatives have occasionally prevailed at the polls, but they have 
scarcely been able to undo the nationalizing impulses that convulsed 
the continent immediately following the last World War.  Deeply 
steeped in welfare economics, their governments continue to tax their 
citizens for “essential” services.  More particularly, national medical 
programs tend to be state run and vacations centrally mandated. 
Likewise traumatized by Nazism and the Cold War, ordinary people 
have opted for a civilized pacifism.  They do not want to see their 
homes or families devastated, hence when conservatives urge them 
to take defensive measures, they reject these out of hand.  Even when 
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the United States, an ocean away, was shaken into an anti-terrorist 
resolve and decided to invade Iraq, they were outraged.  Perhaps an 
embargo might do, but once this was demonstrated to be ineffective, 
actual combat remained unthinkable.  Much preferred was hand 
wringing about the environment and global warming.  The Green 
parties, not the neo-fascists, created the stir in the streets.
In the United States, despite the successes of Richard Nixon 
and Ronald Reagan,24 liberalism has continued to set the agenda. 
Nixon,25 on account of his earlier anti-communist grandstanding, 
was commonly reckoned to be a die-heart conservative, but that was 
not how he governed.  Not only did he preside over the opening 
to Communist China,26 but he instituted significant extensions 
to affirmative action and, when inflation arose, he imposed price 
controls.  Reagan was more conservative, but found that the only way 
to control government spending was to create budget deficits.  This 
was necessary because congress continued to enact programs aimed at 
solving a raft of imagined problems.  The best he was able to achieve 
was a political stalemate.  With each new electoral cycle politicians 
continued to promise legislation to satisfy the latest political itch. 
Their proposals to end racism, sexism, poverty, or medical inequality 
regularly crowded the legislative calendar.  The public might hate 
higher taxes, but it clung to its love affair with government-sponsored 
benefits.  Nonetheless, there arose a split between the urbanized 
coasts and the less professionalized heartland.  So-called “blue” states 
like New York27 and California became reliably liberal in national 
elections.  The bobos that increasingly populated their voter lists 
hailed government initiatives and tilted toward candidates who 
supported them.  They even contributed record amounts to their 
campaigns.  From their perspective, liberalism was enlightened self-
interest.  Conservatives were, in comparison, consigned to a holding 
operation.  The best they could usually muster was to slow the liberal 
impetus.
Another indicator of the supremacy of the liberal establishment 
was the spread of political correctness (PC).28  Despite the ridicule such 
super-sensitivities elicited among ordinary people, its prohibitions 
became a national obsession.  Formerly unexceptional words were no 
longer allowed—on pain of ostracism.  Women could not be called 
girls or airline stewardesses “stewardesses.”   They were now “flight 
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attendants.”29  The greatest sensitivities dealt with race.  Though a 
host of four-letter words began to seep past the censors, this did 
not include the “N-word.”  It was strictly off limits.  Talking about 
“Negroes” or “colored people” is impolite, but alluding to “niggers”30 
is vicious.  So malicious was this considered that when detective 
Mark Fuhrman was discovered to have employed it in private eight 
years before the O.J. Simpson trial,31 this was taken as prima facie 
evidence that he was a racist and, therefore, that his testimony could 
not be trusted.  Without any additional proof, jurors jumped to the 
conclusion that he must have planted the incriminating glove.  As a 
result, they acquitted a person that the nation perceived to be a cold-
blooded killer.
Liberals tend to believe in the inevitability of their dominance. 
Just as Marxists at one time boasted that they were on the side of 
history, these semiMarxists sense that impending developments are 
ineluctably trending as they prefer.  Liberalism promises a bobo 
millennium.  Once the cold hand of capitalism is lifted from the 
throats of workingpersons, everyone will be free to be his/her self. 
The “system” will no longer repress self-expression; hence along with 
complete equality will come complete freedom.  What they fail to 
add is that they will be in control32 of these events.  As their sponsors, 
they intend to preside over the implementation of the required 
reforms.  The bobos also claim that they will eliminate competition. 
In their future, cooperation will win out because fair-mined people 
will recognize its virtues.  What is not mentioned is the parallel 
between their situation and that of the early capitalists.  Adam 
Smith33 is famed for remarking that no one hated competition more 
than business people.  They realized that unbridled struggles over 
market share could result in bankruptcy.  In response, whenever they 
got together, they colluded to fix prices.  Best of all was monopolistic 
control of the marketplace.  This guaranteed profits without the 
anxiety of trying to out-do one’s competitors.  Bobos too despise 
the uncertainties of scuffling for success.  Their goals may be more 
cultural, entailing the triumph of ideas or aesthetics, but these too 
are open to defeat.  Abolishing competition would, at least in their 
imaginations, preserve them from this fate.  In their future, there will 
be no losers—especially among themselves.
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Paradoxically, liberalism is more reactionary than liberal.  For 
the better part of a century, liberalism has been identified with 
social change.  High school civics classes routinely define it as the 
political doctrine that promotes prudent reforms.  Thought to be 
inherently forward-looking, it has been described as the opposite of 
conservative.  Nevertheless, liberalism would reinstall ancient social 
structures if it could.  The names may change, but the patterns are 
of primordial vintage.  Just because people proclaim an allegiance 
to progress does not prevent them from looking backwards.  Thus 
Joseph Stalin34 described the collective farms he was imposing on the 
rural Soviet Union as a prelude to communist democracy, whereas 
they were like nothing so much as a reincarnation of the old-time 
estates of the Russian boyars.35  In both cases, the peasants were ruled 
from above.  The only difference is that under Stalin, the effective 
owners were the party apparatchiks.  A similar allegation can be 
lodged against Napoleon Bonaparte.36  Although he proclaimed 
himself the embodiment of the French Revolution,37 he had himself 
crowned Emperor.  To the end of his days he portrayed himself as the 
champion of liberty, whereas he had in reality attempted to reinstate 
a draconian form of absolutist rule.
Liberals too are absolutists.  In their love of government 
programs, they continuously press for centralized rule.  Remarkably 
like the communists, they assume that they are smarter than other 
people and, therefore, that they know what is good for them.  Better 
educated than their peers, they readily imagine themselves in the 
role of “philosopher king.”38  Once triumphant, they would surely 
work for the benefit of their fellow citizens.  In this, they would 
also be uncannily effective.  As a natural “intelligentsia,” they would 
accurately assess their constituents’ true interests.  And because 
contemporary technology permits improved communications, as the 
central planners, they would implement these more efficaciously than 
did a Louis XIV.39  Instantly transmitted orders would be quickly 
monitored regarding their results and the information revolution 
would make the ensuing decisions more relevant.  Added to this, an 
unparalleled command of the facts would enable them to determine 
the most cost-effective ways to achieve communal goals.  Given the 
advantages of this sort of centralized command, it was their duty to 
quash opposing forces.  Where the Sun King was once preoccupied 
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with drawing the fangs of the French nobility, their destiny was to 
reduce the power of commercial interests.  Forever on the alert to 
corporate corruption, they needed to minimize the resources available 
to bourgeois leaders.  Among the tools for achieving this would 
be crippling taxes and complex regulations.  By imposing either 
or both, they would prevent greedy plutocrats from doing further 
mischief.  Left out of these calculations, however, was the mischief of 
an unopposed liberal dominion.  That it too might become corrupt 
was unimaginable.
Liberals are also romantic naturalists.  They want to turn back 
the clock to a time before human interference distorted Nature. 
Rousseau’s40 noble savages never existed, but today’s college educated 
observers are aware that there was a time when our ancestors were 
hunter-gatherers.  During this Golden Age, people presumably dealt 
with each other as their biology decreed that they should.  Men 
and women were total equals; and no one was the paramount chief. 
Humankind lived in large, extended families where they treated 
each other like honored relatives—because they were.  Inherently 
loving, they had not yet been crippled by the competitive pressures 
of commercialization.  This is taken as an article of liberal faith; 
one redeemable only by dismantling the machinery sustaining the 
Industrial Revolution.  How could it be doubted that if people get 
back to nature, they would thereby get back to their true selves? 
This was clearly what the Unabomber thought.  Albeit a grotesque 
offshoot of the liberal ideal, in his manifesto justifying random 
killings he vilified industrialism as heartily as might any nature child. 
Leaning upon his mathematical training, he was simply more explicit 
in drawing out the implications of this thesis than most.
In many ways liberalism represents a fusion of Marxism and 
bohemianism.  Though the “liberal” designation has been around 
for many years, in its current manifestation it is relatively recent. 
At the dawn of the twentieth century, what was to become modern 
liberalism was associated with progressivism41 and socialism.42  The 
excesses of rampant industrialization had already become apparent, 
as had the discomforts of urbanization.  Progressives like Theodore 
Roosevelt43 wished to fix these by tinkering with the system.  They 
sought legislation to curb the abuses of the monopolists and to insure 
healthful products in the marketplace.  The socialists, however, 
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sought bolder solutions.  They wanted the government to control all 
property.  This, they insisted, was the only way to enforce economic 
justice.  Nevertheless—although Eugene Debs did well in the voting 
booth—most Americans were fearful of such dramatic change.  They 
preferred to be cautious, especially after the Russian Revolution sent 
a shudder through elite circles.  In fact, it was not until the 1916 
presidential campaign that the editors of The New Republic, in an 
effort to distinguish their position from the fading progressives, 
popularized the “liberal” label.44  This term had international 
cachet because of its prior use in Europe, but it now took on more 
democratic overtones.  Soon, however, the prosperity of the roaring 
twenties was to make an enormous social upheaval, in any form, 
seem superfluous.
The Great Depression45 changed all this, and incidentally made 
liberalism more respectable.  With capitalism falling apart, the do-
nothing Republicanism of Coolidge seemed insufficient.  Something 
had to be done.  Franklin Roosevelt46 did his best to administer 
the appropriate medicine.  Himself a scion of the upper class, he 
did not intend to destroy his country’s heritage.  Nonetheless his 
administration was riddled with activists who did.  As a consequence, 
socialist, and to some extent communist, solutions found their way 
into his policies.  These did not, however, dominate.  A sort of 
compromise was reached.  The New Deal blend of capitalism with 
collectivism was to prove the underpinning of modern liberalism.47 
The role of the government was significantly enhanced, but it did not 
assume an ownership function.  For ordinary people, there was the 
safety net of social security, for workers support for unionization; for 
business people regulation to prevent speculation and profiteering. 
The government would be the final arbiter of what was fair and 
under dire circumstances would provide the stimulus to restart the 
economy.
This compromise was to outlast the return of normalcy under 
Eisenhower.48  Although a Republican, he made few efforts to undo 
the policies that underwrote confidence in the system.  Yet liberalism 
in its ascendant format was really to take shape during the 1960s. 
First under Kennedy,49 but more decisively under Johnson,50 it 
became political dogma.  The movement from the hippie reaction to 
political romanticism has already been outlined, but how this resulted 
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in a fusion of Marxism and bohemianism has not.  The bohemianism 
of the hippies is patent, as was their idealistic inefficiency.  Indeed, 
it was this inefficiency that the emerging Marxist element sought to 
rectify.  If there were to be genuine reforms, i.e., if complete parity 
was to come to fruition, the activists would need more than flower 
power—they would require well-planned interventions.  At the time, 
conventional wisdom held that centralized planning was inherently 
more effective than unsupervised market transactions.  Communists 
might be mean-spirited, but they were also supremely rational. 
Thus, if the lingering socialism of the 30s were combined with the 
warmheartedness of the hippies, it might be possible to correct the 
defects of both.  What the Europeans called “social democracy” 
could then come into being, with ordinary people protected by a 
government that genuinely cared about them.  Racism, sexism, and 
poverty51 would succumb to social engineering presided over by 
an educated middle class that retained the idealism of the flower 
children.  Some might describe this as governmentally enforced 
love, but reformers intoxicated by visions of universal ecstasy were 
undeterred.  They had seen the light at the end of the tunnel, and it 
was a liberal light.
Liberalism52 glowed with such vivacity because it incorporated, 
or seemed to incorporate, crucial middle class values.  Peace, equality, 
and rationality were the apparent bedrock of democratic prosperity. 
To enhance and intensify these could only be good.  Marxism, in 
piggybacking on these, made its projections seem compassionate. 
No war for any reasons, equality in all things, and rationality 
administered by intellectuals would make a good thing better.  These 
themes did not include freedom because it seemed to Americans 
raised on assurances of liberty that this was a foregone conclusion.  It 
did not occur to them that equality and freedom might sometimes 
be at odds.  Nor could they imagine that equality would be coercively 
imposed.  They were not that kind of people.  They were Americans; 
i.e., they were nice!
Universal niceness has indeed been one of the most enduring 
themes of liberalism.  Forged in hippie friendliness, it assumed 
that if one is nice to others, they will reciprocate by being equally 
nice.  There is no need to be coercive because everyone wants to 
be friendly if given the opportunity.  The origins of this attitude 
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can be found in children raised in middle class prosperity.  Taught 
to share their toys, they were also instructed that when they did, 
their playmates would return the favor.  It did not occur to middle 
class types that a propensity to share was contingent upon possessing 
surplus resources.  They sincerely believed that even the meanest 
person would desist from evil if confronted with a broad smile and 
a welcoming handshake.  This sort of niceness essentially combined 
the goals of peace and equality.  In refusing to threaten others and, in 
treating them with respect, it sent the message that their aspirations 
toward parity would not be challenged.  No one was going to force 
those on the bottom to settle for less; there was, consequently, no 
need to resort to defensive force.  Everyone could be friendly because 
no one was going to exhibit any animosity.  So compelling was 
this logic that even criminals could be rehabilitated once they were 
showered with ample doses of love and compassion.53
This was peace and equality as advanced by emotional means. 
Primarily a hippie, rather than a Marxist contribution, the role of 
warm feelings was raised to heroic proportions thanks to the Bohemian 
legacy.  It created what some have dubbed a “social Marxism,”54 i.e., a 
Marxism based on Herbert Marcuse style love and sex.55  The pivotal 
thesis was that if what was inside a person made him/her what he/
she was, then surely placing this in contact with others would alter 
what they were.  At a minimum, it would draw out emotional truths 
hidden deep within.  No longer would there be tests of strength 
between individuals; only communication between kindred spirits. 
Gone too would be an impulse toward competition; replaced by a 
firmly entrenched commitment to be non-judgmental.56  Also firmly 
installed would be a desire to be compassionate.  People would want 
to feel empathy for others and this would impel them to help those 
in need of assistance.  Furthermore, once their insides were exposed 
to each other, they could not help but experience sympathy.  And 
once they were sympathetic, they would act benevolently.
One of the forms this compassion took was a defense of the 
underdog.57  Those who did not have the power58 to safeguard 
themselves could be equal only if others came to their rescue. 
Niceness demanded efforts at such universal protection.  Left out of 
this assessment, however, was whether such interventions would be 
just.  It was assumed that evening out differences was automatically 
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fair.  Unfortunately, the reflexive emotionality of this attitude has 
been visited upon the Israelis, with results they would not consider 
appropriate.59  When the Jewish state was first established, most 
western nations supported its independence.  A couple of million 
Jews pitted against many tens of millions of Arabs did not seem to 
be a principled contest.  Initially it appeared that these refugees from 
the Holocaust might be pushed into the sea, but when they managed 
to hold their own, they were roundly applauded for their courage. 
For a while, they looked like an heroic David, who had felled an 
aggressive Goliath.  Then came the Six Days War and the Yom 
Kippur War.  During these, a well-equipped Israeli military soundly 
defeated Egypt, Jordan, and Syria.  This too seemed like the underdog 
coming out on top and was at first welcomed.  But as the years 
passed, the odds were turned on their head.  The longer the misery 
of the Palestinian refugee camps appeared on television screens, the 
more the losers began to seem like the real underdogs.  The Jews had 
been transmuted into an army of occupation and, in some eyes, into 
racist oppressors.  Despite the fact that Islamic fundamentalists still 
threatened to throw them into the sea, and the small detail that both 
sides were Semitic, they were scolded for taking repressive measures 
against suicide bombers.  Now depicted as terrorists for resisting 
terror, their capacity to protect themselves deprived them of their 
earlier sympathy, and converted many liberals into the allies of their 
foes.  The lesson was that niceness was accorded the weak rather than 
the strong; irrespective of the moral implications.
A second enduring theme of liberalism has been its adherence 
to centralization.  Planned economies, and cradle-to-grave welfare 
programs, appear rational to those who obtain their status from a 
cultural expertise.60  Intent on exercising these skills, they are certain 
the man on the street is too ill informed and too selfish61 to make 
sound choices.  Despite protestations of being social democrats, they 
distrust democratic institutions; especially those of the marketplace. 
One of the clichés of American politics is that having to meet a 
payroll equips businesspeople with both a sense of responsibility and 
the personal discipline to oversee governmental budgets.  This surely 
goes too far—as the success of any number of nonbusiness politicos 
can testify.  Nevertheless, those who learn their administrative skills 
from ideological sources can be sadly deficient.  Cultural leaders, who 
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develop their plans of action in bull sessions with their peers, easily 
go astray if they never get to test these in practice.  They may believe 
that a perfectly balanced scheme for achieving a particular objective 
cannot help but succeed, only to discover too late that it will not. 
This has been one of the unwelcome lessons of social engineering. 
Programs, such as Head Start,62 looked unstoppable on paper.  How 
could providing minority children with personalized instruction 
before they entered grammar school not enable them to keep up 
with better-prepared peers?  The only problem was that experience 
proved it did not.  Though these youngsters made initial gains, these 
did not last past the fourth grade.  This, however, did not prevent 
liberals from proposing a federal take-over of the nation’s medical 
system.  They were certain that they could manage one seventh of the 
country’s economy more efficiently by placing it under the direction 
of a bevy of public agencies.  Not even the experience of Medicare 
costs escalating wildly beyond the original predictions cautioned 
them to be modest.
Centralization is good for many things.  When coordination 
and/or uniformity are called for, it is frequently the best approach. 
Nevertheless centralization does not automatically confer insight or 
wisdom.  Because planners are subject to the hubris of power, they 
tend to over-estimate what they understand or can control.  There 
is also a tendency to underestimate the appropriateness of socially 
negotiated outcomes.  Indeed, processes in which no one has a 
preponderant voice strike them as anarchic.  Combined with the 
liberal certitude in their innate goodness, there is an unwillingness 
to consider decentralized solutions.  To the political romantics 
allowing others to address their own problems seems to tantamount 
to abdicating their duty to save their inferiors from themselves.  It is 
to do nothing in the face of a palpable obstacle, which is equivalent 
to allowing problems to spiral out of control.  That their proposed 
interventions might be irrational makes no sense to those bred to be 
proficient problem-solvers.63
A third enduring theme of liberalism is its ambivalence toward 
social rules.64  On the one hand, rules are perceived as an essential tool 
of centralization.  Those who sit in the middle of the social web know 
they must often implement decisions by promulgating laws and/or 
administrative regulations.  Unless others are ordered to take action 
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on pain of a specified sanction, they may not respond.  Moreover, 
centralized rules, that is, approved forms of standardized behavior, 
are supposedly superior because those best able to determine what 
is for the common good have formulated them.  Were individuals 
to go off on personal tangents, they would make grievous errors. 
They might, for instance, behave in a bigoted or unfair manner. 
On the other hand, standardized rules impose personal constraints. 
They prevent people from acting as individuals and convert them 
into virtual automatons.  Such obligations are definitely inimical to 
creativity or self-expression.  Nor do externally imposed controls allow 
people to be guided by their feelings or aesthetic sense.  Intrinsically 
judgmental, uniform regulations provide no outlet for unconditional 
positive regard.  They are, to be blunt, the diametric opposite of 
tolerance.  In enforcing one-size-fits-all solutions, differences are 
submerged and conformity is demanded.  Which is definitely not 
nice.
This, however, does not prevent liberals from endorsing 
some rules; or from doing so enthusiastically.  If they believe that 
significant moral principles are at stake, they are eager to see them 
enforced.  This was the case with the Supreme Court’s decisions 
regarding integration.  Whether or not “separate is inherently 
unequal” is literally true, they supported the use state power to act 
as if it were.  The same is the case with Roe v. Wade.65  When more 
democratic institutions failed to pass legislation making abortion 
legal, they turned to an un-elected court to do their bidding.  After 
a mere majority of appointed justices eventually found a previously 
undiscovered constitutional right to privacy, they applauded its 
discernment.  In their view, this protected freedom and was, therefore, 
an exception to their antipathy toward external directives.  The same 
applies to the constraints of political correctness.  Whether these 
standards are enshrined in university codes of permissible language, 
or are less formally enforced via ridicule, they are deemed justified 
omissions vis-à-vis the consecration of self-expression.  Indeed, 
because they are intended to protect people, they are not regarded as 
rules, but as elementary common sense.  This enables their advocates 
to engage in mental gymnastics to vindicate whatever they want.  To 
illustrate, burning an American flag gets interpreted as a form of 
protected speech, whereas calling someone the N-word is regarded 
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as a hostile act worthy of being banned.  The liberal antagonism 
toward rules is thus managed by particularizing them.  Instead of 
the universalization dominant within market relationships, a tactic 
more reminiscent of absolutism is preferred.  The only way to predict 
which rules liberals will approve is first to distinguish between their 
friends and enemies.  Despite unending protestations of an allegiance 
to principle, this is trimmed to fit the political exigencies of specific 
alliances.  A Clarence Thomas66 could surely explain why he, but not 
a Bill Clinton,67 was condemned as sexist.  Apparently making an 
off-color joke is more culpable than is engaging is sex with an intern, 
that is, if one is also opposed to Roe v. Wade.
Sitting cheek by jowl with particularized rules is liberal 
permissiveness.  In the name of being nice, it is considered imperative 
not to offend people by demanding that they do what they are not 
inclined to do.  This attitude has, first and foremost, been applied to 
the family.68  Liberal parents frequently decide that it is better to be 
a child’s friend than an authority figure.69  Children who are allowed 
to get their way are placates their offspring when they protest against 
being punished.  This way, their brood will love, rather than fear them. 
Spouses too are allowed free reign.70  The object is to demonstrate 
that they are not pierces of property, but free to pursue pleasures 
in their own fashion.  In perhaps the most bizarre manifestation of 
this phenomenon, partner swapping71 has been advocated as the 
ultimate expression of interpersonal trust.  The same approach also 
extends beyond the home, e.g., to the school.72  No longer is it to be 
regimented, but it must become a place dedicated to cultivating free 
expression and creativity.  Children are not to be forced to sit silently 
in their seats, but are encouraged to decide what they want to learn 
and how they want to learn it.  Old style discipline is rejected as 
tantamount to imprisonment.73  Even dress codes are discarded as 
too restrictive.  In essence, the liberal solution to an ambivalence 
regarding rules is that they are okay for others, but not for themselves 
or their friends.  They (and their allies) are loving people who do not 
require external constraints to keep them in line.
Contradictions of Liberalism 
Among liberals, it is an article of faith that capitalism is riven with 
contradictions.74  A system based on decentralized commercialism 
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and representative democracy is regarded as inherently unstable.75 
This analysis goes back at least as far as Marx.76  He assumed that the 
same mechanisms that made the industrial order distasteful would 
eventually force its demise.  One of the reasons the market-based 
system generated unprecedented prosperity was that its entrepreneurs 
were driven by greed.  It was because they were seeking to accumulate 
as much as they could that they implemented profitable efficiencies. 
At the same time, in their unrelenting pursuit of riches, the fruits 
of their achievements were concentrated in ever fewer hands.  This 
would ultimately alienate the workers who made this possible. 
Once they understood that they were being exploited, they would 
overthrow their masters.  Out-numbered, and grown effete from 
luxury, the bourgeois hegemony would disappear as unconditionally 
as had the dominion of the dissolute Romans.
Undiscouraged by the failure of this prediction, the neo-Marxist 
element in liberalism still expects capitalism to crumble.  Marx had 
not anticipated the rise of the middle class, nor its dominance within 
representative democracies, but this has not deterred his acolytes 
from uncovering fresh reasons for its imminent downfall.  Daniel 
Bell,77 who describes himself as a socialist in economic matters, 
is among these.  He perceives an intrinsic conflict between the 
avariciousness of modern materialism and the asceticism necessary 
to finance economic growth.  In the old days, when the Protestant 
Ethic78 was operative, entrepreneurs willingly postponed gratification 
in order to invest in their enterprises.  Fully expecting their reward 
in heaven, they could control their desires in the here and now in 
favor of was needed by their businesses.  With affluence, however, 
came decadence.  Those grown unimaginably rich could not refrain 
from indulging their private dreams.  As some of their number began 
to say, “when you’ve got it, flaunt it.”79  Why not fly the Concorde 
to Europe to save a few hours?  Why not purchase a sports car that 
can go one hundred and fifty miles an hour?  What else is money 
for?  This attitude effectively diverted them from commerce.  It made 
the governing classes lazy and sidetracked their resources from more 
productive purposes.
In this, however, Bell is wrong.  First, as to their laziness, this 
has no more occurred than did the impoverishment of the working 
classes.  The middling orders, including the bobos, are, for the most 
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part, very hard workers.  They put in long hours and do so in a 
disciplined manner.  Religious asceticism is evidently not necessary 
for commercial effort.  People can be motivated by professionalism as 
well as by a desire to please God.  Second, other ways to finance capital 
formation than through personal savings have been developed.80 
Contemporary capitalism invented numerous such mechanisms.  To 
state but a few, stocks, bonds, and government programs all proved 
effective in concentrating the necessary funds.  Corroboration of this 
is found in a constantly growing economy.  Thus when computers 
were invented, they were not consigned to a back shelf because 
companies were strapped for cash.  Nor did self-satisfied executives 
refuse to learn how to use them.
Bell81 also suggests that there is a conflict between 
bureaucratization and a desire for self-expression.  He characterizes 
the modern corporation as hide-bound by a devotion to detailed 
procedures and picky records keeping.  This, he laments, contrasts 
sharply with the predilections of an educated workforce preoccupied 
with its emotional well-being.  There is, to be sure, this sort of 
tension, but it is not true that the market has found no ways to 
cope with it.  Just as Marx over-looked the emergence of the middle 
class, Bell discounts the emergence of a professionalized middle class. 
The specialization inherent in postindustrialization called forth an 
individuation that is indeed inconsistent with idealized forms of 
bureaucracy.  Nevertheless professional workers are capable of a 
decentralized organization in which they control much of their own 
efforts.  They, thereby, escape the close supervision that characterized 
early industrialization.  Since their expertise and internal motivation 
permit more creativity and emotional independence than Bell 
imagined, they get to call the shots.
This said, adjusting to the on-going evolution of the Commercial 
Revolution entails more than an appeal to tradition.  Because 
the past cannot be an infallible guide to the future, the ideals 
appropriate to primitive capitalism are insufficient to its more recent 
professionalized form.  The nature of interpersonal honesty, social 
responsibility, and family relationships cannot be identical in a mass 
society.  A certain level of social experimentation has, therefore, been 
inevitable.  So has a conflict between increasingly divergent moral 
perspectives.  Indeed, this is essential as a means of testing revised 
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solutions.  Liberalism itself has put forward an assortment of such 
social innovations, while traditionalists have challenged the validity 
of these proposals in an effort to find something better.  Each side 
of this culture war is convinced of its correctness, but the eventual 
resolution is likely to differ from what either would find ideal.  That 
which works under emergent conditions is invariably beyond the 
ability of the participants to foresee.
What is clear is that the liberal solutions have proved no more 
satisfactory than would have an unalloyed traditionalism.  To 
judge from the nascent disorders of the Great Disruption,82 they 
too failed to resolve the dilemmas thrown up by the Middle Class 
Revolution.  Questions about how to handle prosperity, a revised 
division of labor, and self-direction among professionals have not 
yielded to their idealism.  Specifically, they have not reconciled the 
conflict between emotional spontaneity and rational calculation. 
If anything, the contradictions of liberalism are more serious than 
those of traditional capitalism.  Ideologues who attempt to execute 
their visions verbatim are in for grievous disappointments.  Because 
their dreams always include inconsistencies, they can never deliver 
precisely as promised.  As an example, more often than not, the 
centralized and naturalistic mechanisms said to promote peace, 
equality, and rationality are incapable of doing so.  They certainly 
cannot promote these simultaneously.  To illustrate, liberalism 
implies that it can supply both equality and freedom.  But this is a 
vain assurance.  The situation is rather like that to which Winston 
Churchill83 alluded after Neville Chamberlain came back from 
Munich promising “peace in our times.”  Churchill observed that the 
prime minister had chosen peace over honor, but would eventually 
have neither.  Liberals likewise tend to choose equality over freedom 
and are destined to achieve neither.
Liberalism, in shunning market-oriented values such as 
responsibility, merit, and discipline, does not help professionals adjust 
to their newfound powers.84  Instead of assisting them in applying 
their expertise and motivation, it offers comfort via a fictitious, 
never-never land of pipe dreams.  Far from being compassionate, 
or even moral, it undermines its aspirations through its grandiosity. 
Taking idealism too far ensures the opposite of what is desired.  A 
platitude most children learn is that the road to hell is paved with 
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good intentions.  This is as true of the liberals as it was of the hippies. 
Despite their hopes, a resort to Marxist embellishments did not provide 
rationalism so much as an additional layer of fantasy.  Paradoxically, 
liberals go on to denounce conservatives as mean-spirited and cold-
hearted.  Their adversaries are assumed either to be callous computing 
machines or greedy monsters.  Alleged to suffer from a condition 
analogous to that of the Conquistadors when Cortez told the Aztecs 
that his Spaniards had a disease that could only be cured by gold, they 
too are labeled terminally avaricious.  Nevertheless, in believing this, 
liberals demonstrate their own emotional immaturity.  In refusing to 
see people, including their enemies, as complex human beings, they 
confirm an idealistic short-sightedness.
To begin with, liberals specialize in “invidious goodness.”85  They 
condemn their moral competitors as “bad,” that is, in comparison 
with themselves.86  Instead of modestly performing good works, 
they ostentatiously proclaim a dedication to these in order to put 
others down.  As they tell it, they are the ones that care about the 
poor and downtrodden; whereas the traditionalists do not.  They 
compassionately feel other’s pain, whereas conservatives are self-
involved egoists.  In essence, their opponents are censured for not 
living up to liberal standards.  But in making this claim, they engage 
in the very behavior of which they theoretically disapprove.  Ironically, 
they are the ones being “mean” when they insist on rubbing in their 
goodness.  Were they truly moral, they would let their deeds speak 
for themselves.
Nor is liberal relativism inherently moral.87  Those who tolerate 
everything, including the intolerable, have no standards.  When they 
accept whatever is as right, because they are not prepared to judge 
anything as wrong, they perforce accept conditions others would 
recognize as morally abhorrent.  Thus, were some people to find 
slavery, human sacrifice, or genocide to their taste, on what grounds 
could these be criticized?  The consistent relativist must desist from 
outlawing cannibalism or ethnic cleansing should those who commit 
these deeds believe them valid.  If unconditional positive regard 
cannot be withheld for any reason, the true relativist is barred from 
expressing disagreement.  Deep down most liberals know this.  In fact, 
they do disagree with many practices—often vehemently.  Rather 
than stand quietly aside while others engage in racism or sexism, 
1    The Great Middle Class Revolution
they protest.  Nor are they troubled by Emerson’s88 criticizing the 
“foolish consistencies” as “hobgoblins of little minds.”  Inconsistent 
though they may be, they are addicted to particularizing.  Regularly 
making ad hoc judgments about their opponent’s shortcomings, 
they exempt conservatives from their strictures of tolerance.  As 
the bad guys of their moral universe, those on the right side of the 
aisle are admonished for their purported callousness.  Meanwhile, 
their friends, e.g., the feminists, are not allowed to languish without 
assistance.  Like other human beings, liberals delight in hurling verbal 
barbs at their foes, while regaling their allies with praise.  Theirs is 
thus a selective compassion.  They may feel for the agony of the street 
junky, but they gloat when a Rush Limbaugh reveals he is addicted 
to painkillers.  For them, the anguish of the “little guy” is far more 
repugnant than that of an articulate opponent.
Worse still is the immorality of the short horizon.  Liberals tend 
to make extravagant promises without fretting about their long-term 
consequences.  It matters less to them whether their programs work 
than whether they promise to work.  If increasing the minimum wage 
is intended to put money in the pockets of the poor, but, in fact, 
results in their becoming unemployed, they will continue to advocate 
for it.  If bi-lingual education89 is sold as facilitating the assimilation 
of immigrant children, but produces a generation incompetent in 
English, at least they tried.  The difficulty with this approach is 
that ignoring predictable consequences is equivalent to not caring 
about what happens to people.  It is to live in a fantasy world where 
actual pain counts for less than imagined pleasures.  After all, in the 
Antebellum South, slaveholders justified their peculiar institution 
by insisting that they were intent on civilizing their property.  They 
did not consider themselves immoral because they overlooked 
the many injuries thereby inflicted.  In contemporary America, 
something analogous occurs with regard to school discipline.  It is 
anathematized as inflicting force on the powerless without regard 
to the implications of abolishing social control.  Samuel Bowles 
castigates classroom order as a means of channeling poor children 
into work as factory laborers.  Yet were he to peer further into the 
future, he would perceive that these external disciplines instigate the 
internal disciplines vital for social mobility.  Merely letting children 
do whatever they please implicitly consents to their ignorance and 
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subsequent failure.  Similarly, advocating multicultural families on 
the grounds that this permits individual freedom is to doom the poor 
to single parent households that cannot prepare them for economic 
advancement.  It is to promote short-term expediency over the long-
term happiness of millions of innocents.
Nor is liberalism particularly nice.90  Coercion is alleged to be 
the domain of traditionalists who believe in such things as spanking 
small children.  Yet there is more than one way to be coercive.  One 
can also inflict force indirectly.  One can, for instance, impose it 
without overt acknowledgement.  Liberals proclaim that they are 
always kind, but because they want to win, they frequently play 
rough.  Human experience is such that everyone learns that excessive 
niceness is an invitation to exploitation.  People who never stand 
up for themselves are habitually relegated to the leftovers.  The 
result is that most individuals discover how to be assertive.  Some 
disguise their aggressiveness by accusing others of being nasty, but 
upon closer inspection themselves inflict pain.  Thus throwing 
conservatives out of academic positions on the grounds that they are 
not being collegial surely qualifies as unkind.  So does destroying the 
newspapers of campus Republicans when they publish unwelcome 
editorials.  Name-calling, which has become a liberal staple, is 
likewise not very nice.  Sticks and stones break bones, but names 
break spirits.  Even so, deadly violence is not excluded from the liberal 
arsenal.  The lengths to which they can go—and this is admittedly 
an atypical case—was demonstrated by the Weather Underground.91 
An offshoot of the Students for a Democratic Society,92 this faction 
of urban terrorists came to the conclusion that peace would never 
arrive through persuasion alone.  When politicians failed to heed 
their warnings, they decided to bomb them into compliance.  Sadly, 
peaceful demonstrations also have a way of escalating into violent 
confrontations.  When frustrated, idealists have a way of mutating 
into Molotov cocktail-throwing thugs.
Contrary to expectations, a less direct means of liberal coercive 
is tolerance itself.  One of the contradictions of naïve niceness is that 
it is impotent against the truly nasty.  When everything is treated 
as equal and, therefore, as deserving of the same protection, the 
intolerant are given a helping hand in becoming dominant.  This 
is an unintended implication of multiculturalism.  Contemporary 
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democracy did not come into being full-blown.93  It evolved through 
an accretion of norms, values, and attitudes.  A tolerance of political 
differences, for instance, emerged from innumerable street clashes 
and many contested elections.  To be more specific, the Irish, when 
they arrived on American shores were initially regarded as heretical 
bog-hoppers.  They later earned respect, in part, when urban riots 
made them a force to be reckoned with.  On the other hand, they 
were only gradually recruited into democratic practices.94  It took time 
for them to resort to the ballot box, and even longer to desist from 
stuffing it.  Yet nowadays the progeny of these once squalid outsiders 
are as horrified by electoral fraud as any native Protestant.  They 
too reckon electoral honesty intrinsic of the structure of democracy; 
that, were it not widespread, would dictate elections counting for 
naught.
Yet multiculturalists show little reverence for this normative 
infrastructure.  In advocating tolerance and equality, they 
simultaneously advocate the rights of minorities who are opposed 
to democratic traditions.  As good relativists, they are apologists for 
groups like the Black Panthers when they aim to impose their will 
at gunpoint.  While they oppose the KKK95 and skinhead militias, 
they readily find excuses for draft card burners.  The Palestinians, 
in particular, are given a free pass for their suicide bombers and 
Islamists, in general, are excused for promoting Jihad.96  What seems 
not to be appreciated is that were these minorities to get their way, 
democratic traditions would erode and with them the protections 
they offer.  Idealists who loathe coercion, therefore, pave the way 
for coercion imposed by those currently too weak to impose it. 
On behalf of equality, they empower precisely the sort of people 
who do not accept the equality of others.97  Paradoxically, in their 
unsophisticated niceness, they assume that egalitarian pluralism 
is possible in a world where not everybody is benevolent; in one 
where hierarchy is a biological imperative and not a momentary 
aberration.98
By the same token, to be against internal discipline is implicitly 
to favor random violence.  As per Rousseau,99 human beings may 
be born with kindly impulses, but they also come equipped with 
angry and vengeful ones.  As any mother knows, frustrated infants 
are capable of temper tantrums.  Were these to go unsocialized, in 
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the hands of adults, they could prove fatal.  Like Ivan the Terrible,100 
who in a towering rage stuck down his own son, ordinary parents 
might kill their youngsters over trivial disagreements.  Ivan, as Czar 
of all the Russias, grew up believing that he could do whatever he 
wished.  Most ordinary people learn otherwise.  They are taught to 
feel guilt when their anger passes certain bounds.  As a result, they 
become their own keepers.  Though they may have violent thoughts, 
they develop the means of keeping these under wraps.  Advocates 
of unrestrained niceness inadvertently open the cage containing the 
monsters from the id.  Despite their pipe dreams, because everyone 
is both nice and nasty, everyone must learn to encourage one and 
restrain the other.
When liberals heap scorn upon the traditional family because they 
perceive it as an impediment to self-expression, they inadvertently 
encourage impulsive violence.101  Likewise, when they describe the 
nuclear family as a prison that should be breached by sponsoring 
other formats, they interfere with inculcating personal discipline. 
Every society has some form of family because every society has 
found it essential to socializing its young.  Unless children acquire 
basic rules, including emotional rules, they become the enemies of 
social order.102  In the contemporary middle class universe, neither 
an orderly marketplace nor peaceful democracy would be possible 
without them.  The virtue of the family is that it provides the emotional 
supports and the close instruction crucial to instilling what is needed. 
Self-discipline is a significant accomplishment that is facilitated 
by loving relationships and expert counsel.  The insecure and the 
uninstructed are unguided missiles.  They become indiscriminately 
coercive because they are incapable of better.  This makes the family, 
as it were, the workshop of civilization.  To suppose that it might be 
supplanted by public education or government transfer payments is 
wishful thinking.  For moral rules to mean anything, they must be 
enforced, and to be externally enforced, they must first be internally 
enforced.
Liberalism for all its vaunted moralism undermines its own 
aspirations.  It is not rational if rationality implies utilizing facts 
and logic to achieve stated aims.103  By disguising what it is doing, 
and failing to acknowledge the implications of its policies, it 
encourages the opposite of what is sought.  Instead of eliminating 
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social conflicts, it incites them.  Despite protestations of universal 
love, it stimulates antagonisms.  Yet in its stubborn refusal to engage 
in honest negotiations with its foes, it ensures that these hostilities 
will continue.  As incongruously, by insisting on total equality, it 
prevents those at the bottom rung from rising as quickly as they 
might.  Attempts at social engineering that ignore the realities of tests 
of strength or alliance formation deprive the poor of the skills and 
emotional strengths needed to get ahead.  Because equality cannot 
come by way of social fiat, to deny the realities of social mobility is to 
impede it.  Finally, in opposing merit and responsibility, it undercuts 
the sources of social prosperity and representative democracy, i.e., in 
demanding a utopian whole loaf, it attacks the conditions that make 
ordinary decorum possible.  
Marx thought that communism could come about because 
industrialization would produce the surpluses needed to provide 
everyone with comfort.104  He did not understand that the machinery 
of a commercial system would not run itself and that once market 
institutions were dismantled this excess of wealth would vanish. 
Present-day liberals make a similar mistake.  They assume that values 
such as merit and responsibility produce destructive competition 
without recognizing that they also generate efficiency and 
interpersonal restraint.  Were these standards no longer to be passed 
to the next generation, the post-modern edifice would collapse.  The 
products liberals expect to redistribute would cease coming from the 
factories and the power they hope to equalize would evaporate in an 
explosion of anarchism.  To sum up, liberalism promises peace, but 
serves up conflict; it promises equality, but keeps the poor powerless; 
it promises rationality, but is mired in childish emotionalism and a 
myriad of contradictions.
Foremost among these contradictions is the conflict between 
liberalism’s absolutist and egalitarian impulses.  The draconian 
coercion of one and the sentimental warn-heartedness of the other 
are not compatible.  While they are easy to reconcile on a conceptual 
level, they cannot coexist in practice.  Karl Marx and 60’s style hippies 
make uncomfortable bedfellows.  As long as they are in agreement, 
they can share a love-fest.  Yet should they have a falling out, there 
will be hell to pay.  Unconditional love and centralized planning must 
clash when economic quotas are unfulfilled.  Furthermore, the only 
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way to believe that the victims of centralized penalties are equal is to 
pretend they are not in distress.  Like it or not, freedom and equality 
are incompatible so long as freedom leads to inequalities.  But in 
the real world it does.  Unequal inputs create unequal results; hence 
the only way to prevent this is through coercion.  In a world where 
the lottery of birth favors some over others, this demands that the 
winners be cut down to size.  Plato105 thought stealing babies from 
their mothers and raising them by nurses could achieve this.  Liberals 
think they can do it through universal education and democratic 
regulations.  They are both wrong.  Because their goals cannot be 
accomplished without opposition, this opposition must be stilled by 
means of force.
Sources of Power
Liberalism denies the implications of social power.106  In 
their niceness, its advocates pretend they neither have, nor seek 
hegemony.  They are merely individuals in quest of universal justice. 
Peaceful and non-hierarchical, they would instantly return to their 
creative endeavors if the political situation allowed it.  Like George 
Washington,107 or Cincinnatus before him, they are generals who 
would happily go back to plowing their fields once the battle against 
the reactionaries is won.  It is only the exigencies of the moment that 
rouse them to fight as energetically as they do. Yet liberalism, like 
any other political movement thrives on power.  Those who would 
foist their ideas on others could not achieve this without the ability 
to be persuasive, or failing this, to be coercive.  Leadership, including 
ideological leadership, is a species of authority.108  Liberals may 
renounce any intention to obtain superiority, but, in their eagerness 
to be influential, they give the lie to this assertion.
One more paradox of liberalism is that the sort of power it exercises 
is retrogressive.  Instead of grounding itself in a commercially oriented 
professionalism, it turns to absolutist and religious sources.  As the 
Middle Class Revolution gathered momentum, internalized controls 
transferred power to individuals.109  People made more decentralized 
decisions as increasingly complex institutions demanded that 
expertise and motivation be concentrated in their hands.  Liberalism 
reverses this trend by attempting to re-centralize control.  As per the 
absolutists,110 it employs government coercion to impose its dictates. 
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Whatever the perceived problem, the solution is a state administered 
program.  Nor is liberalism averse to using coercion on a personal 
level.  Those who oppose its plans find their reputations besmirched 
and their careers interrupted.  In essence, liberalism finds much of its 
support in personal relationships.111  In particularizing the sting of 
its sanctions, or the benefits of its support, it acts as might a military 
brotherhood.  Within the community of its own interest, love is all 
that matters; whereas outside this family, the politics of personal 
destruction are allowed free reign.
Nevertheless the most important source of liberal power derives 
from quasi-religious sources.112  Despite being adamantly secular, 
the movement is also profoundly ideological.  Time and again, 
unsubstantiated beliefs trump facts.  Strange to say, one of the reasons 
for the antipathy between liberals and fundamentalists113 is that they 
are remarkably similar.  Both exhibit a certitude based on moral 
commitments.  Though they would be aghast at the suggestion, 
many of their central allegiances are nearly identical.  Liberals believe 
in universal niceness, whereas Christian fundamentalists believe in 
universal love.  Liberals believe that niceness breeds niceness, whereas 
fundamentalists are urged to turn the other cheek.   Both likewise 
have collectivist tendencies.  They believe in cooperation, rather 
than competition, and would like to implement something akin to 
primitive communism.  Moreover, each is grounded in a community 
of the faithful.  Within their own confines they impose an intense 
loyalty and a strict orthodoxy.  Durkheim114 argued that the power 
of the sacred derives from the united devotion of the true believers 
and one sees this operating in both locals.  Theirs is each a solidarity 
validated by holding fast to those within the fold, while execrating the 
heretics.  Then too, both sets of communicants share a grandiosity of 
spirit.  The fundamentalists promise their followers entrance to heaven 
for reliable devotion; the liberals counter with a utopian heaven on 
earth.  Convinced of their respective righteousness, they both have 
no doubt they will reap tangible rewards.  The difference between 
them is, of course, that one believes in a deity and the other does not; 
one is avowedly spiritual and the other obstinately secular.  But this is 
sufficient to guarantee mutual revulsion.115  Precisely because they are 
so similar, they assert their uniqueness by reviling the other.  What 
might seem minor discrepancies are elevated to heroic proportions, 
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with one side anathematized as Godless humanists and the other as 
mindless dogmatists.
In fact, both are faiths.116  Many have asserted this as a metaphor, 
but it is much more than that.  Freud117 speculated that monotheism 
of the Judeo-Christian variety depended upon the projection of a 
strong and protective father figure upon the heavens.  The faithful 
imaginatively, if unconsciously, created their deity as an answer 
to their hopes and fears.  Utopians of the neo-Marxist variety rely 
instead upon the projection of a kind and protective family upon 
the future.118  They mentally conjure up an imminent society based 
on good will and total equality that will one day redeem them 
from the tribulations of social conflict.  In each case the intellectual 
consensus upon which they rest depends not on evidence, but an 
implacable allegiance to shared beliefs.  Furthermore, these beliefs 
are not subject to disconfirmation.  No matter what facts come to 
light, they cannot shake true believers of their central commitments. 
Karl Popper119 argued that an ability to disconfirm its hypotheses was 
the distinctive element of science.  Scientists examined the world, 
proposed an explanation of what was going on, made predictions 
based on this thesis, then modified their theories in light of what 
turned out to be true or false.  Religious beliefs, in contrast, cannot 
be falsified.  If they seem to be erroneous, it is only because people 
have misinterpreted them.  For the faithful, that which has been 
promulgated by an eternal authority, be it natural or super-natural, 
cannot be abrogated by human perception.  
Some years ago Festinger, Riecken, and Schacter120 did a study of 
a cult that had predicted the end of the world.  In When Prophesy Fails, 
their account of what happened when this forecast was apparently 
disconfirmed, these investigators initially registered surprise when this 
did not result in the sect’s demise.  On the contrary, after a period of 
disappointment, the event was interpreted as reinforcing the group’s 
articles of faith.  According to its affiliate’s revised view, the world 
continued because of some miscalculations had been made.  What 
was needed to insure the millennium was to recalculate the date and 
reinvigorate their commitment.  This tendency to excuse failure by 
converting it into proof of an accepted revelation has a long pedigree. 
The ancient Hebrews routinely indulged in it.121  When something 
terrible happened, that is, when their God failed to protect them, 
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a prophet arose to explain that this was because they were guilty of 
some religious infraction.  Jehovah was punishing them because they 
had been derelict in their duties.  They must, therefore, rededicate 
themselves to his service in order to receive a renewed blessing.
The same tendency is found in liberalism.  It too makes 
predictions, which when they fail to come to pass are reworked to 
demonstrate the fundamental correctness of the central assertions. 
The unity of liberalism is rooted in this inability to disconfirm its 
premises.  It is, therefore, a faith.  The list of events that might have 
been taken as disproving its contentions is long.  That these have not 
had this result, suggests the absence of a scientific point of reference. 
A partial inventory follows:
A generous welfare system was supposed to foster social 
mobility; it did not.
Tighter restrictions on welfare would surely to produce 
more misery; they did not.
Unionization was to be the wave of the future; it was not.
Poverty levels were said to be been increasing; they have 
not.
The minimum wage was alleged to reduce poverty; it does 
not.
Healthcare is described as in crisis; but life expectancy 
keeps rising.
The poor are said not to receive health care; they do, albeit 
not through employer paid insurance.
Race relations were to be improved by affirmative action; 
they have not been.
Affirmative action was to produce social mobility; it did 
not.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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Easy divorce was to produce solid marriages; the reverse is 
closer to the truth.
Casual sex was to be a liberating experience; it was not.
Stay-at-home moms have been called traitors to their 
gender; they are not.
Multicultural families were supposedly more supportive of 
children; they are less so.
Rape was assumed be epidemic; it is not.
Men, in general, have been condemned as innate rapists; 
they are not.
The suburbs are depicted as a living hell; they are a middle 
class utopia.
Most members of the middle class are portrayed as 
insensitive louts; they are not.
Instilling unearned self-esteem in children would make 
them more successful; it did not.
Bi-lingual education would stimulate minority 
assimilation; it does not.
Stereotypes caused racism; they do not.
Acid rain would destroy the forests; it did not.
DDT would contaminate the environment; thanks to 
its discontinuation millions of children have died from 
malaria.
Arsenic in the water supply was an imminent threat; it is 
not.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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Criminals could be reformed via rehabilitation; they were 
not.
Police brutality is on the rise; it is declining.
Profiling is ineffective and racist; it is not.
FDR’s reforms shortened the Great Depression; they 
lengthened it.
Rent control would guarantee affordable housing; it did 
not.
Price controls would prevent inflation; they never do.
Alger Hiss was not a communist spy; he was.
The Rosenbergs did not steal secrets for the Russians; they 
did.
Increasing the defense budget could not defeat 
Communism; it pushed the Soviet economy into 
bankruptcy.
The United States’s arrogance brought terrorism on itself; it 
did not.
America is an imperialist power; it is not.
International trade bankrupts rich countries and exploits 
poor ones; it provides wealth for nearly all.
Star-wars was a fiasco; it brought the Soviet Union to its 
knees.
Training programs would end poverty; they have not.
Kneeling buses would provide independence for the 
disabled; they did not.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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Socialist planning produces prosperity; it does not.
Mental illness could be controlled by deinstitutionalization; 
it increased homelessness. 
Protecting homosexuals from public ridicule was more 
socially beneficial than aggressively testing for AIDS; it was 
not.
Women would be happier becoming superwomen; most 
did not.
Women should be more aggressive daters; they find this 
awkward.  
Military intelligence was an oxymoron; it is not.
Progressive education would improve reading scores; it did 
not.
Government housing could eliminate homelessness; it 
could not.
Guaranteeing jobs through strict employment laws would 
reduce insecurity; it breeds conflicts.
Lauding it as street art would control graffiti; it did not.
Aggressive policing does not reduce crime: it does.
Political correctness instills interpersonal respect; it 
promotes social dishonesty.
Community policing would lessen crime; it did not.
North Korea could be trusted to dismantle its nuclear 
program; it could not.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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Castro would renounce Communism if treated 
respectfully; he did not.
Civilization is intrinsically anti-human; it is not.
Everyone lies and cheats (except liberals); they do not.
These are more than a handful of anomalies.122  The presence of 
this many represents a pattern; a pattern some might equate with 
the extreme spasms of a moment in its death throes.  Whatever the 
reason, liberalism plainly exhibits an inclination to disregard the 
truth.  So egregious has this tendency been that political spinmiesters 
do not hesitate to stand before the television cameras to proclaim 
the demonstrably ridiculous.  In one amusing case, a Democratic 
spokesman explained that Arnold Schwartzenegger’s victory in 
California’s recall election was actually a defeat for the Republicans. 
Because the loser, Gray Davis, was an incumbent, this was surely bad 
news for incumbents such as George W. Bush.  By the same logic, if 
liberal programs have not been successful, all this proves is that they 
haven’t been given a chance.  Not enough money was invested; too 
little skill was applied to administering them; insufficient confidence 
was placed in them.  What is necessary is to go back and do things the 
right way.  Triple the budgets, make the regulations more inclusive, 
employ harsher punishments, and all will go well.  In any event, 
the liberal paladins fought the good fight, for which they deserve 
credit.  They did their best to improve the world and conditions 
would surely have been worse had they not.
Die-hard liberals claim the reason they have not prevailed is 
attributable to a determined, and powerfully immoral, opposition. 
When the Bolsheviks were attempting to communize Russia, 
they blamed their difficulties on “counter-revolutionaries.”123  If a 
production quota was not met or famine hobbled the grain belt, the 
cause was sabotage.  Those who wished to restore the Czars patently 
conspired to make the system look bad.  Since these villains were 
beyond redemption, the only way to terminate their interference was 
to extirpate them root and branch.  They had to be removed from 
their jobs, sent to the Gulag, and most likely killed.  So must their 
relatives, lest they pass on a lethal infection.  Only after millions 
of such souls were eliminated would good communists be able to 
•
•
•
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implant genuine socialism.   For parallel reasons, the traditionally 
religious, ascribe their failures to the devil.  Were it not for him, 
mankind would never have been seduced away from following God’s 
will.  A supernatural rebel, he diligently continues to proselytize for 
his empire of darkness.
For liberals, conservatives and traditionalists are the devil.  Their 
intransigence prevents a collectivist utopia from actualizing; their 
seductions divert good people from supporting necessary reforms. 
Were they physically removed progress would certainly accelerate. 
This is why they must be resisted.  This is why they have to be 
barred from positions of power.  Were they allowed a bully pulpit 
of any sort, they would utilize it to corrupt the defenseless.  Given 
this menace, liberals have nothing for which to apologize; nothing 
to retract.  If they have mistakenly asserted something that is not 
true, even acknowledging this might present evil with a weapon with 
which to bludgeon the good.  All that is necessary is to move on 
without comment.  Or if a lie promotes the good, e.g. by inflating the 
number of homeless124 and, therefore, the resources devoted to them, 
it may still be promulgated because it represents a deeper truth.  This 
strategy places them in exactly the same situation as the Popes when 
they forbade the teaching of a heliocentric universe that might elicit 
doubts about the Bible.
The faith-saturated moralism of liberals is further confirmed 
by the manner in which they engage in moral negotiations.  Their 
vociferousness betrays an almost spiritual confidence in their 
rectitude.  When the religious fundamentalists were riding high, 
they were as strident.  God-besotted ministers would hurl fire and 
brimstone thunderbolts from the pulpit.  Those who dared question 
their orthodoxy were promised an eternity in hell.  Indeed, during 
the Middle Ages, the insufficiently conformist might be accused of 
witchcraft and purged of their corrupted souls by way of searing 
flames.  Contemporary liberals are not so vulgar.  They too attack 
their adversaries, but not with threats of immolation.  Name-calling 
is generally deemed adequate.125  Those who disagree are accused of 
being ignorant fascists.  Instead of having their arguments examined, 
they are dismissed by means of ad hominem assaults.  Judge Kenneth 
Starr126 is transmuted into a priggish extremist, George W. Bush is seen 
as a stupid party-boy (or is that a diplomatic cowboy), and Clarence 
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Thomas is converted into an ungrateful mediocrity who owes his 
elevation to affirmative action.  Not merely maligned as inept or 
evil, they are ridiculed for a plethora of putative absurdities.  George 
Bush’s malapropisms are proof of dimwittedness, Dan Quayle’s 
difficulties with spelling “potato” demonstrate mental limitations, 
and Gerald Ford’s stumbles derive from years of playing football 
without a helmet.  Liberals, it must be understood, are exempt from 
such mockery.  When Edward Kennedy misidentified Sammy Sosa 
after he set a home run record, his lack of knowledge was passed over 
in silence.
This attack dog spirit is supplemented by a penchant for 
supporting liberal initiatives by way of sob stories.  The problems 
their reforms are intended to rectify are invariably elaborated upon 
in heartrending illustrations.  If drug costs are said to be too high, 
Aunt Minnie from Oshkosh is trotted out explain that she was 
reduced to eating cat food because her social security did not cover 
her medical expenses.  Or if racism is alleged to be virulent, the 
tragic dragging of a black man to his death is asserted to be the norm 
in race relations.  The objective is not to investigate the extent of 
a difficulty, but to arouse an emotional response.  People need to 
be motivated to do good; not merely to understand its nature.  In 
traditional religions, evil was painted in as evocative terms.127  Were 
this not so, people might sit on their hands as opposed to joining the 
war against immorality.  Action, not disinterested thought, is what 
wins moral contests.
After raising the specter of evil, the old-line religions explained 
what the forces of light needed to do in order to triumph.  Among 
the recommended actions were prayer, good works, regular church 
attendance, and belief in the catechism.  The liberals, as confirmed 
secularists, put forth a different agenda.  Their salvation is not aimed 
at a heavenly reward, but a more mundane one.  Drawing on their 
Marxist core, they invariably propose governmental solutions. 
Whatever is wrong, a state organized program can fix it.  A new 
bureaucracy and/or more money are the sovereign remedies for any 
difficulty.  The details of these programs are never fully elaborated; 
nevertheless their intended purposes are sufficient to overcome 
all barriers.  Nor are the results honestly evaluated.  Because their 
sponsors and administrators have vested interests in success, whatever 
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the actual outcome, it is celebrated as surpassing expectations.  Head 
Start may not have improved the academic performance of minority 
students, but look at the many millions it served.  At least they were 
not labeled retarded.
Whatever the outcome of these programs, the time comes to 
move on.  Liberal moralizing is contingent on promises, not results. 
Sooner or later the subject is changed and a new sob story is put 
forward for the edification of the voters.  When the traditionalists 
question this account, they are attacked for their insensitivity and 
the game is once again afoot.  Even successes may be bypassed on the 
way to a freshly embellished future.  Sad to say, old triumphs, such 
as social security, are boring.  They may be cited as in need of defense 
from reactionaries, or as evidence of liberal compassion, but on their 
own are not sufficient to elicit support.  Faith-based impulses are not 
satisfied by what is, but only by what might be.  Whether via heaven, 
or an earthly utopia, hope is what animates communal solidarity. 
Either that, or terror of a vividly limned devil.
Nowadays the bobo faith has nearly transmuted into nature 
worship.  A desire to protect the environment has become the 
signature cause of the cultural middle class.  According to the 
standard cliché the ecology is “fragile” and must defended lest it go 
out of balance.128  If one small part is disrupted, the whole will lose its 
equilibrium.  Humankind itself is threatened by such unenlightened 
tampering.  In their greed, people will destroy the very factors that 
make survival possible.  They must, therefore, be educated to become 
environmentalists and conservationists.  Instead of wasting the 
precious resources upon which they depend, they must limit their 
consumption.  Rather than infringe on nature’s eternal wisdom, they 
must work in conjunction with it.
This is a gentle, lyrical philosophy, one befitting the college 
educated, but it is based on a tautology.  Every eco-system is fragile 
because every one represents a particular equilibrium.  If something 
is altered, the old balance is gone, but this does not mean that 
doom is imminent.  What happens is that a new equilibrium comes 
into being.  A priori, this development is neither better nor worse 
than the one that preceded it.  Since the world is always changing, 
a succession of equilibria is a fact of nature.  Once upon a time 
the North American skies were blackened by flights of passenger 
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pigeons.  For over a century now these birds have been gone; hunted 
into premature extinction.  This is sad, but it did not result in the 
desolation of the continent.  Non-native birds such as sparrows and 
starlings took over some of their environmental niches, but then 
so have European immigrants vis-à-vis Amerindians.  Treating that 
which is as intrinsically sacred is not a scientific necessity, but a moral 
imperative.  Despite the reputation of liberals for being progressive, 
they make a fetish of stability.
An illustration of the mindset of this naturalistic faith is the fight 
over drilling for oil on the North Slope of Alaska.129  A Republican 
administration, in order to lessen dependence on imported oil, 
proposed opening the area to exploration and utilization.   An 
uproar immediately ensued among the environmentalists.  This, 
they groaned, was one of the few untouched regions in the nation. 
Moreover, it was particularly fragile.  Bringing in heavy equipment 
would irreparably damage the permafrost and put endangered 
species, such as the caribou, in jeopardy.  This objection sent oil 
industry experts scurrying to their drawing boards.  They came up 
with several solutions.  One was to use a single platform to house 
multiple directional wells.  This would mean that only a few acres 
would be necessary for production purposes.  Another was to bring 
in equipment over ice roads in the dead of winter.  By summer these 
thoroughfares would melt without any impact on the underlying 
soil.  As was also pointed out, even more intrusive techniques had 
proven caribou friendly.  The trans-Alaska pipeline, in particular, had 
not decreased their numbers.  They had actually increased.
All of this made no impression on the environmentalists.  It was 
the purity of the North Slope they were defending, not its physical 
integrity.   Any intrusion was too much for their liking.  No matter 
how their concerns were addressed, the rhetoric remained the same. 
Arctic Alaska was a pristine wilderness that must not be desecrated 
for commercial purposes.  What they did not emphasize is that even 
tourism would have impacted the land.  Feet on the ground, housed 
in heated facilities, and brought in by modern transport might 
profoundly injure the ecosystem.  This too would be intolerable. 
Therefore, in order to maintain Nature unspoiled, it could neither 
be drilled nor viewed.  It would just have to lie there off-limits to any 
human involvement.  This, it must be noted, is the perfect definition 
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of what it is to be sacred.  It demonstrates that the environmentalists 
were no so much seeking to protect against catastrophe, as to 
safeguard an emotional ideal.
Environmental excesses have proliferated in many directions. 
No matter what the cost, streams and rivers must be cleaned up, 
toxic dumpsites returned to absolute purity, miniscule the traces 
arsenic removed from water supply, and carbon dioxide and sulfur 
oxide scrubbed from the air.  Global warming and environmental 
poisoning need to be prevented despite the fact that these remain 
theoretical possibilities.  The worst possible computer models, 
as opposed to hard data, are publicized to alert the population to 
speculative hazards.  Even if this creates an economic decline, the 
health benefits must come first.  Left out of these calculations is that 
a prosperous economy might produce the resources and technology 
to address other problems.  Also not considered is the misery of 
poverty.130  The reason for these oversights is that the environmental 
religion is fundamentally antibusiness.  Time and again, the changes 
demanded are in how commerce is conducted.  The villain is 
industrial production and the salvation lies in relieving industrialists 
of their profits so that these can be sunk into restorative programs. 
Herein one sees the bobo revenge.  They are using the appearance 
of science to get even with their hated superiors.  Conceiving of 
themselves as powerless workers exploited by callous managers, 
they seek to turn the rationality of industrialism against itself.  As 
cultural experts, they use their facility with language to coordinate an 
alliance of the disaffected.  The way they tell it, catastrophe lies just 
over the horizon—the numbers prove it—and we must all hasten 
to stave it off.  Yet this is being done with mirrors.  Mysteries are 
created out of symbolic distortions in order to recruit allies to equally 
mysterious solutions.  Some bobos apparently believe that if they are 
not running the show, they can at least leverage the insecurities of 
others to enhance their influence.
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Chapter 9
Temples of Liberalism
By education most have been misled;
So they believe, because they so were bred
The priest continues what the nurse began,
And thus the child imposes on the man.
(John Dryden, The Hind and the Panther)
Journalists say a thing that they know isn’t true in the hope 
that if they keep saying it long enough, it will be true. 
(Arnold Bennett, The Title)
Men never do evil so completely and so cheerfully as when 
they do so from religious conviction.  (Blaise Pascal, 
Pensees)
Cultural Institutions
As if the middle-class revolution has not been difficult enough, 
adjusting to it has been made more difficult thanks to the resistance 
provided by the institutionalization of reactionary liberalism. 
Institutions, whether theocratic or ideological, are the bane of 
self-direction.  They are also the enemy of unbiased expertise. 
Institutions specialize in providing and enforcing standard answers. 
In this respect, the institutionalization of liberalism is no different. 
It focuses on facilitating anti-middle class power plays grounded in a 
self-righteous moral consensus.  It insists upon collectivist orthodoxies 
and furnishes reliable anti-middle class coalitions to impose these 
orthodoxies; coalitions for which, not incidentally, C. Wright Mills’ 
characterization of middle class foibles remain valid.  As such, it has 
attempted to derail the middle class ascendancy.
To begin with, religions are institutionalized.1  This enables 
societies to develop the cultural and structural means of perpetuating 
themselves.  Consisting of stabilized belief systems and formalized 
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social relationships, these much respected spiritual establishments 
are able to carry recognizable ideological systems forward; often 
for millennia.  Through their agency, communities hold on to their 
core ideas with a tenacity, and a uniformity, that prevents their 
disintegration.  The Jewish faith has managed this feat for almost 
three thousand years,2 the Christian for two thousand,3 and Islam 
for well over a thousand.4  We call these institutions “churches” and 
they posses a solidity that can make them seem like facts of nature. 
They are, in essence, a method for conserving shared norms, values, 
and viewpoints.
Among the assets institutionalized religions typically possess are 
communal belief systems.  Included within these are cosmologies that 
explain how the world was created and moral codes that specify how 
communicants should live.  These concepts are normally promulgated 
within an accepted format; e.g., a set of scriptures.  As some point, it 
is officially decided which beliefs count as orthodox and these are set 
forth in an authorized configuration.  For Christians, the Council of 
Nicaea was instrumental in certifying that God was to be considered 
a Trinity.  For Jews, their Rabbis decided that some books belonged 
in the Bible,5 whereas others were apocryphal, decisions made by 
Christian authorities are often vested in particular persons.  These 
individuals constitute a designated leadership; hence their opinions 
are accorded extra weight.  Sometimes these “holy” ones are arranged 
in a hierarchy.  The Roman Catholic chain of command is a case 
in point.  Other religions are less formal, with status established by 
individual merit.  Both Judaism and Islam come closer to this model. 
There are also designated times and places where worship occurs. 
Whether in cathedrals, synagogues, or mosques, the faithful gather at 
predictable moments to celebrate what they jointly regard as sacred. 
In this, they reinforce their connection to a powerful communion, 
thereby enhancing their individual feelings of control.
Quasireligions, such as liberalism, are also institutionalized, yet 
their cultures and structures are not as formal.  As cultural ideologies, 
they too require a stabilized consensus in order to perpetuate 
themselves.  Nonetheless this need not be as strict as that exhibited 
by their spiritual counterparts.  Secular communicants require an 
emotional bond to observably similar beliefs,6 but not necessarily one 
stabilized by a scriptural format.  Most get by with a conventional 
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wisdom that is sustained by a common literature and regularized 
communications.  It is enough that people read the same things, 
praise interchangeable opinions, and condemn familiar heresies.  Nor 
do they need an official leadership.  Here it is sufficient that there be 
recognized opinion leaders.  Individuals noted for their intelligence, 
energy, and/or communication skills articulate positions that are 
later dispersed by unofficial means.  Communicants read what they 
write, listen to what they say, and then repeat this within their own 
social circles at their own initiative.  These off the record contacts 
are essential; hence they are facilitated by occurring at predictable 
locations.  Liberals, for instance, are not uniformly distributed 
throughout society.7  There are particular places where they constitute 
a majority and thus where they feel free to exchange their beliefs. 
Nowadays, the universities are one of these sites.  They provide a 
comfort zone for jocular self-congratulation and joint derision of 
outsiders.  Moreover, these gathering places provide the resources 
necessary for their continuation.  True believers can, therefore, be 
assured that these locations will be available tomorrow and ten years 
from tomorrow.  This provides them the confidence to make the 
moral, emotional, and intellectual commitments that sustain their 
faith. 
Some quasireligions are more institutionalized than others. 
Until recently the Communists boasted an official party hierarchy 
upon which they could rely for leadership and a sense of security.8 
A central command dictated an official party line adhered to by 
card-carrying members.  There were also authorized texts written 
by Marx,9 Lenin,10 and Mao11 that could be consulted to determine 
eternal truths.  Needless to say, the party possessed a bureaucratic 
configuration, not unlike that of the Vatican, in which apparatchiks 
sought to establish a rewarding career.  This provided a shared 
discipline, a common agenda, and a party headquarters.  In places 
like the Soviet Union, countless splendid buildings were essentially 
party property.  
Meanwhile, in the United States, political organizations, such 
at the Democratic Party, did not approach this level of structure. 
Back in the 1920s, Will Rogers12 could joke that he did not belong 
to an organized party—that he was a Democrat.  He knew that his 
party had squishy political positions, a constantly shifting panoply 
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of local and national alliances, and a headquarters that floated upon 
the political tide.  There might be temporary platforms, daily talking 
points, and successful candidates for office, but no single individual, 
or idea, could claim exclusivity.  While Democrats could distinguish 
themselves from Republicans, the boundaries between them were 
porous.13  People joined or left their ranks via private declarations 
of intention.  The same could be said about the convictions they 
represented.  Although Democrats prided themselves on being the 
party of the little people, how these were to be represented varied with 
the electoral cycle.  Entrepreneurial candidates routinely modified 
their policies and rhetoric to conform to public opinion.  Democrats 
could not even boast that their primary constituency consisted of 
working people.  Contrary to a widely held perception, by the end 
of the twentieth century almost half of the nation’s wealthiest voters 
were casting ballots for them.
When one considers liberals, the state of their institutionalization 
is still more tenuous.  Although associated with the Democratic Party, 
not all Democrats are liberals14 and not all liberals are Democrats. 
More a diffuse cultural orientation than a concretely identifiable 
faction, liberalism is dominated by the bobos.  They provide the 
outlook’s most articulate spokespersons and its more powerful 
defenders.  Indeed, it is their institutional connections that give the 
perspective its backbone and its megaphone; i.e., they who provide its 
stabilized points of transmission.  To add to the confusion, the central 
tenets of liberalism are not codified in an identifiable sourcebook, 
nor sanctioned by an official convocation.  Its wellsprings are instead 
found in a loose consensus of culture-based professionals.  People, 
whose jobs entail manipulating ideas, coordinate their beliefs over 
the water fountain or the dinner table.  They also do so while playing 
tennis, during intermission at the symphony, or when standing 
before paintings at the art gallery.  Because they are plugged into 
the same scuttlebutt at work, consistent sermons at church, and 
congruent psychological theories, they tend to see things the same 
way.  Likewise, having gone to the same schools, watched the same 
news programs, and read identical books, they can predict what 
their peers will find persuasive.  Theirs is not a conspiracy, but what 
Bernard Goldberg15 characterizes as a “bubble” of opinion.
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Eventually there arises a “canon” to which most remain loyal.16 
Once upon a time the literature sophisticated people perused and the 
music to which they listened were determined by upper class tastes. 
In the English-speaking world, to be unfamiliar with Shakespeare 
was to be a cultural clod; to never have attended a chamber music 
concert was to be déclassé.  With the initial arrival of the middle 
classes, allusions to popular novels became the currency of cultivated 
conversation, while sentimental songs could be found on most 
lips.  The bobo ascendancy dramatically changed this.  A liberal 
oppositionalism rejected anything associated with the traditional 
bastions of power.  That which was produced by dead white males 
became anathema.  Now works created by former outsiders set the 
tone.  A Rigoberta Menchu,17 not a John Milton, received their kudos. 
Often it was enough that an author was a member of a minority or 
a musician was uncommonly vulgar to obtain public acclaim.  The 
liberal establishment consistently certified that that which offended 
conservative sensibilities was intrinsically valuable.
Liberals do not, however, possess a formal hierarchy.  No single 
person directs their opinions.  Nevertheless they know whom they 
are expected to admire.  Some sources of information are considered 
reliable, whereas others are not; some persons trustworthy, and others 
not.  Individually in quest of reputations for credibility, many prize 
the status of a “guru.”  Little surpasses the honor of being regarded as 
an expert by one’s peers or as creative force by future generations.  As 
representational specialists, they cherish being persuasive over being 
intimidating.  Liberals may thus be thought of as secular preachers. 
In their own minds, custodians of “the truth,” they compete to garner 
acclaim for their lay sermons.  This makes liberalism a venue for 
almost non-stop moralizing.18  Indeed, the crux of the movement’s 
institutionalization is located in an atmosphere of shared, and 
vigorously projected, testimonials.
Where these homilies occur is not a trivial matter.  Liberalism 
has appropriated many of society’s junction boxes to broadcast 
its messages.  Virtually monopolizing centers of communication 
and education, its devotees control “mainstream” viewpoints.19 
Primary and secondary schools, higher education, the media, and 
entertainment outlets have all become their strongholds.20  So have 
philanthropical foundations, agencies providing research grants, and 
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professional societies. While no underlying plot directs what is taught 
in colleges or transmitted over the evening news, a community of 
views holds sway as if one did.  Professors and students, editors and 
reporters, participate in feedback loops that rein them in as tightly 
as any party line.  Most know that the punishment for apostasy is 
severe; that to deviate too far from the established consensus risks 
ostracism.  Friends and acquaintances will look at a renegade askance 
and are suddenly unavailable for lunch.  This sort of isolation may 
sound trivial, but it is the lifeblood of human sociality.  Most people 
want to “belong” and will do almost anything to maintain their 
social contacts.  Over and above this are the more substantial matters 
of careers and their concomitant material rewards.  Those who do 
not conform to the approved attitudes find themselves out of a job 
or no longer in line for promotion.21  In many cases, they never 
receive the initial appointment.  The gatekeepers who do the hiring, 
or determine what gets published, do not overtly condemn their 
deviations; they merely find others more qualified.  Members of the 
faith, not defectors, get the big houses, the fancy cars, and the corner 
offices.  They are the ones who obtain prizes for their books, face 
time before the camera, and elective office in professional societies.
Progressive Education
Education was once the province of the church, the nobility, 
and prosperous merchants, but with the arrival of the middle classes 
formal learning was democratized.  Schools grew in number and 
the period of instruction in length.  Ultimately education was to be 
universal.22  Even the children of the lower classes were tutored in the 
rudiments of what every citizen should know.  This would provide 
the foundation for a representative democracy and a technologically 
based commerce.  The questions then arose as to what should to be 
taught and how would this to be realized.  The old liberal education 
of the Middle Ages was designed for the clergy and a smattering of 
professionals, but advances in the sciences and scholarly achievements 
made this obsolete.  Moreover, it was essential that these newly 
valuable subjects no longer be taught by rote.  If students were to be 
flexible thinkers, they had to cultivate more than a good memory. 
They would have to become proficient in something other than the 
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once pervasive Greek and Latin—as taught to the tune of the hickory 
stick.
Ideas for liberating pupils from the tyranny of aristocratic 
conformity go back hundreds of years.  Jean-Jacques Rousseau23 
was one of the more influential exponents of what came to be 
called “progressive education.”  He asserted that young children 
must be allowed to follow their instincts.  Tutors might arrange 
their environments so that these would lead them to important 
discoveries, but their insights had to come from the youngsters 
themselves.  That which failed to excite their interests or enlist 
voluntary experimentation was an epiphenomenon that would be 
lost once the teacher’s discipline was removed.  What was needed 
instead was something more practical; something related to the world 
in which the child would one day operate.  Rousseau was himself of 
the old school.  Emile, his major excursion into educational theory, 
revolved around a single tutor mentoring a single child.  Its model 
was the aristocratic household and the purpose hired scholar.  Once 
education became more democratized, these did not apply.  The 
sort of close supervision possible in a one-on-one relationship was 
impossible is a schoolroom where one teacher confronted dozens of 
students.
By the dawn of the twentieth century, the appropriate alterations 
in perspective had been made.  At this point, the leading theorist of 
progressive education was John Dewey.24  A pragmatic philosopher 
by background, in time his focus shifted to preparing children for 
modernity.  One of his primary concepts was that of “experience.” 
Instead of being artificially intellectual, he wanted the young to 
interact with the world.  It was by doing, and not simply absorbing 
verbal lessons, that they would acquire a genuine understanding of 
their environment.  This perspective was institutionalized in the 
“project method.”  Either individually, or in groups, students would 
engage in pieces of independent research, art, or social intervention. 
They would choose their own goals, and their own means, and 
implement these with the assistance, not the oppressive direction, 
of the teacher.25  In this, not only would they develop the initiative 
needed to control their own lives; they would also learn how to be 
creative.  In essence, they would discover the secrets of being self-
directed.  Given this head start on personal growth, they would be 
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prepared continually to expand their horizons once they entered the 
professionalized world of their future.26
This, at least, was the theory.  The practice was very different.27 
An example of what happened was the “open classroom.”28  In 
order to introduce freedom to the grammar school curriculum, 
the traditional classroom was torn down.  Gone were fixed seating 
arrangements and solid walls separating classes.  Taking their place 
were movable seats and impermanent partitions.  This way, children 
could move around from one project to another and one work group 
to a second.  The teacher would no longer stand before the collected 
group to deliver a boring one-size-fits-all lecture.  Instead, she would 
move between individuals providing personalized instruction as she 
went.  All would, therefore, move at their own pace and come out 
ahead of where they would have with an enforced conformity.  This 
sounded heaven-sent and a perfect fit for a middle class dominated 
society.
The problem was that not everyone was from the middling 
orders.  Most of the children who went to public schools did not 
come from upper middle class backgrounds.29  Those who did had 
already been taught to be considerate of others, to be interested in 
how and why things happened, and to exercise self-control.  They 
had also been trained to think things through and to take personal 
initiative.  Thus, when presented with an opportunity to choose an 
individual learning project and then to follow it up, they possessed 
the internalized disciplines to succeed.  Lower class children, however, 
came from homes where their parents placed more emphasis on 
good manners, being neat and clean, and obeying those in authority. 
Primed to conform, they had no practice in how to exercise 
independent judgment.  When asked to take control over their own 
activities, they were more apt to seek an easy way out.  Having already 
encountered oppressive power, their primary concern was to evade 
it.  Few took advantage of the opportunity to learn how to be self-
directed.  In the end, this form of progressive education ratified the 
pre-existing social class structure.  Platitudes about sponsoring social 
mobility were contradicted by the reality making families responsible 
for inculcating both internal discipline and the value of knowledge. 
Instead of freeing lower class children from oppression, it insured 
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that they would one day be subject to the external discipline of the 
workplace.
The same considerations applied to other educational reforms.30 
One of these was the “whole word” means of learning to read.  Gone 
were the phonics of yesteryear.  Ascertaining the pronunciation of 
individual letters and sounding them out in words was supposedly 
too monotonous to sustain student attention.  Simply jumping 
in and recognizing combinations of words as embedded in stories 
would be more enticing.  In fact, it was more confusing; particularly 
for lower class children.  Less likely to have been introduced to books 
at home, this facsimile of being thrown into the deep end of the pool 
was decidedly not reassuring.  Nor was it helpful when they were 
told that spelling didn’t matter and that grammar was old-fashioned. 
Starting with less preparation in reading, and with parents whose 
linguistic skills were wanting, this was a formula for remaining 
permanently handicapped.  Because they were also instructed, when 
asked to write stories, that whatever came naturally was acceptable, 
they never developed the vocabulary or the disciplined approach to 
linear organization necessary to handle professional communications. 
Then too, “modern math” was equally debilitating.31  Where once 
children were drilled in their times tables, it became fashionable to 
introduce them to conceptual themes.  Instead of calculating twelve 
times twelve in their heads, an approximate answer was deemed 
good enough.  Teachers believed that understanding the rudiments 
of symbolic logic was more important.  The difficulty here was 
that students who relied upon calculating machines, rather than 
internalized mental operations, never became comfortable with 
numbers.  As a result, they never pursued the higher mathematics for 
which a familiarity with set theory was ostensibly to prepare them. 
Once more, it was the offspring of the higher classes whose parents 
had instilled these skills who surged ahead.  It was they, because they 
were less intimidated, who took the advanced classes in these topics.
As sadly, students who were forced to serve their own teachers 
could not turn for assistance to adult pedagogues who knew 
much of anything.32  Those delegated to supervise their education 
might be skilled in motivating, but not in instructing them.  The 
educators of potential educators believed it imperative that soon-
to-be teachers care more about the welfare of their students, rather 
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than acquire something to share with them.  Liberalism had come 
to the classroom.33  What mattered were good intentions, emotional 
rapport, and creative aspirations.  Schools of education were no longer 
places dedicated to promoting knowledge.  They sought instead to 
imbue politically correct attitudes.  Teaching was presented as more 
akin to social work than to an academic enterprise.34  Children were 
to be furnished with self-esteem,35 rather than intellectual tools. 
Presumably, if they learned to feel good about themselves, they 
would automatically be able to achieve what was later expected of 
them.  For similar reasons, they were to learn to be cooperative rather 
than competitive.  Modern society was represented as a place where 
love would predominate over conflict, that is, if everyone learned to 
be nonviolent.  In this vein, students were to celebrate the differences 
that existed in a multicultural society.  They must be indoctrinated to 
believe that everyone was as good as everyone else.  Only this would 
expunge sexism, racism, and classism.36  By this logic, if children 
studied history, it must be as a cautionary tale against oppression.37 
They needed to learn about the horrors perpetrated by their ancestors 
so as never to repeat them.  Likewise, if they read literature, it was to 
be as an object lesson in tolerance and universal love.  Only stories 
that showed women, gays, and minorities as active winners would be 
allowed on the reading list.  Rather incongruously, this watered down 
curriculum sat well with novice teachers.  Most of them had never 
been very good students; hence they appreciated a program that was 
not intellectually demanding.  Far from intending to pass along a 
love of learning, they were satisfied to be well-meaning babysitters.
Given these objectives, contemporary schools of education 
focus on teaching methods, not content.  They insist on fostering 
an absolute equality of results,38 rather than academic excellence. 
Neo-Marxist as it was possible to be without proclaiming oneself 
a Marxist and as bohemian without retiring to a Montmartre loft, 
they promote egalitarian techniques ad nauseum.   Rita Kramer,39 
while taking a national tour of Ed schools, overheard numerous 
exhortations of the prevailing philosophy.  Coast to coast, she was 
privy to sentiments inimical to “meritocracy.”  Thus, working hard 
at on one’s lessons was frequently dismissed as totalitarian, for as one 
student opined, “if it doesn’t work, if you don’t succeed, you think, 
What’s wrong with me?  [And] because it doesn’t always work” this 
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is terrible for the losers.  This suggests that a failure is the student’s 
fault, blaming the victim, which is equivalent to a death sentence.40 
It also fosters hierarchical thinking, and that too would be wrong. 
Clearly, suggesting that one child might be better than another 
harmed both.41  As one professor insisted in explaining the rationale 
of multicultural education, “The central and overriding [objective] is 
to promote equity in student achievement.”  Everyone must come out 
the same.  But Kramer, herself, had doubts.  She comments that, “the 
real losers in this situation are the ones they profess to be concerned 
with helping.  In their determination to avoid the charge of ‘elitism’ 
by providing the same education in the same classroom for everyone, 
they ignore not only the needs of those youngsters with an academic 
bent but those with more practical interests as well.”  Paradoxically, 
in this rush for equality, no one gets much of anything.
What tends to happen with extreme egalitarianism is that the 
lessons get “dumbed down.”42  Since the only way for everyone 
to do equally well is for the best to do less well than they can, the 
emphasis is on fun rather than on effort.  Courses are geared to the 
lowest common denominator and are expected to be more enjoyable 
than enlightening.   Under these circumstances, arts and crafts and 
visual aids drive out the more challenging currency of lectures and 
homework dwindles to the vanishing point.  And because no one is 
allowed to fail, grade inflation becomes the rule.  Every student is 
expected to get an A or a B, whether or not this is earned.  Even a B 
is considered an insult to students who expect to receive a college-
bound average just for showing up.  Nor are textbooks allowed to 
be challenging.  The slightest hint of controversy might insult, and, 
therefore, damage the scholarship of sensitive students.  Although this 
generates boredom, the teacher is delegated to find a way to sustain 
interest.  There is also an antitest bias.  Since time immemorial, 
students have been reluctant to take examinations.  These produce 
enormous anxiety because it is possible to fail them.  Try as one 
might, one can still come out worse than others.  This has produced 
a cottage industry in derogating tests.  First, they are alleged not 
to reveal what matters.  As artificial assessments, they are said to 
leave out what the student really knows.  Second, other means of 
evaluation are declared superior.  Personal journals and portfolios are 
thought to be better at disclosing creativity.  The problem is that there 
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are no standardized means of evaluating these alternative indicators. 
There is the additional difficulty that the traditional methods have 
a documented ability to predict academic success, whereas their 
replacements do not.
Many liberal educators have come to the conclusion that what 
matters most are credentials.  Since it is degrees that allow students 
to obtain employment, these must be equally available to all.  Much 
as the Wizard of Oz’s scarecrow had his ability to think confirmed by 
a diploma, all students are to be allowed their “piece of parchment.” 
This has at least two consequences.  One is an escalation in the degrees 
sought.  If everyone is a graduate, then the only way to distinguish 
one’s competence is to obtain a yet higher degree.  There is also the 
phenomenon of mainstreaming.  Every student, irrespective of ability 
or motivation, is said to deserve to be in the same classroom.  To 
isolate anyone because of low intelligence or obstreperous behavior 
is to stigmatize him or her.  This “labeling”43 will surely convince the 
victim that he/she is unable to keep up.  Such practices as tracking are, 
therefore, tantamount to oppression in that they sponsor some for 
success and others for the opposite.  Particularly reviled is providing 
extra help for gifted students.  Since they already have an advantage, 
giving them further assistance is unfair.  If this leaves them bored, 
and society deprived of their abilities, this is a small price to pay for 
promoting democracy.
Exceptionally large sums have been devoted to helping mentally 
retarded students.  Both in terms of funds and time, attentions have 
been lavished on them that might have been more productively 
invested elsewhere.  The concept of “normalization”44 holds that if 
intellectually disabled children are placed in ordinary classrooms and 
treated as normal, they will function close to normal levels.  This, 
in fact, is massive denial in service to an egalitarianism fantasy. 
Retarded children are biologically handicapped and can never keep 
up with their undamaged peers.  That middle class parents agitate 
for them to achieve comparable results is understandable in terms of 
the middle class need for success.  Less understandable is diverting 
social energies that would have a greater payback if directed toward 
those with superior abilities.  The results have, in fact, been meager. 
Educational budgets have swollen and class sizes have decreased, 
but this has had little impact on overall achievement.  As foolishly, 
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because ordinary teachers are not experts in special education, those 
students who do require expert attention are deprived of it.
Romantic egalitarianism has also been unproductive with 
respect to racial differences and classroom discipline.  Instead of 
comparable demands being made of all students, African-American 
and Hispanics have been allowed to languish.45  The continued 
existence of discrimination has been invoked as an excuse for 
lowering the standards they are expected to realize.  This has resulted 
in large disparities in achievement tests, with the importance of these 
instruments written off as an artifact of segregation, lesser funding, 
or cultural bias.  No matter how often these causes are disproved, 
minority students (excepting, of course, Asians) are permitted to slack 
off.  Although the advocates of special attention for blacks contend 
that they are promoting equality, they do not seem to believe black 
abilities are equivalent to those of whites.  Somehow, sitting beside a 
white is supposed to substitute for reading books or doing homework.46 
With respect to maintaining classroom order, it is similarly argued 
that imposing discipline is indistinguishable from racial repression. 
Those from different cultures are said to require approaches unique 
to them.  If they are made to sit still, this theoretically deprives them 
of the advantages of a more dynamic heritage.  To suggest that all 
students, irrespective of their backgrounds, require peace and quiet 
to absorb their lessons is dismissed as ethnocentric.  Somehow “street 
smarts” are thought a viable alternative to what must be read and 
tranquilly assimilated.
Teachers unions have promoted much of this agenda.47  Their 
leaders have become the de facto bishops of liberal, multi-cultural 
education.  Incessantly agitating for the progressive program, they 
contend that additional money and more personalized instruction 
are the answers to all questions.  Asserting a professional expertise 
that trumps the demands of disappointed parents, their hierarchies 
remain unfazed by evidence of failure.  Whenever testing indicates 
that gains have not been made, it is alleged that classes are too large 
or that private schools are creaming the best students.  Particularly 
anathema to an oligarchy that derives its power from the shear 
numbers of public school teachers are proposals for voucher 
systems.48  Giving parents monies directly might enable them to 
utilize the power of the purse to discipline unsuccessful schools and 
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this is unacceptable to those who wish to retain control.  In essence, 
a pseudo-professionalism is employed to resist efforts toward a more 
genuine professionalization of education.
Higher Education
One of the consequences of the Middle Class Revolution is the 
belief that every child deserves a college education.49  With so many 
good jobs contingent upon the expertise and motivation inculcated 
in higher education, everyone is expected to have the opportunity 
to acquire these.  Whether or not an individual demonstrates an 
academic bent, he/she is urged to go beyond high school; often at 
public expense.  Even functional illiteracy is not a disqualification. 
As most colleges and universities have learned, they are now expected 
to compensate for lessons not previously learned; thus almost all 
have remedial programs designed to provide the foundation for more 
traditional courses.  Even so, the results have been disappointing.  A 
large proportion of students admitted to college never complete a 
degree.  Despite the aid of grade inflation,50 they drop out.
As unhappily, higher education has been subject to the pressures 
from progressive forces.51  Equality of results is supposed to apply 
in this instance too.  Once again, however, the only way to achieve 
absolute parity is to demand less from all.  Knowledge that was 
previously considered the inevitable outcome of university training is 
never broached, never mind attained.  Moreover, as with their lower 
status peers, many college professors and administrators have come 
to believe that their primary task is social reform.  Dedicated liberals, 
they dismiss an accumulation of facts as of secondary importance. 
Far more significant is becoming a tolerant, peace-loving person.  Far 
from encouraging merit, their aim is a non-judgmental altruism that 
fosters egalitarianism; albeit one with a creative tinge.  Cooperation, 
not competition, is their aspiration, with emotional spontaneity, 
not intellectual incandescence, the sign of accomplishment.  Just 
as in the lower grades, the traditional canon is dismissed as sterile, 
whereas political correctness has become de rigueur.  This means that 
grade inflation,52 non-traditional assessment formats, and affirmative 
action have become the norm.53  Anything that might discourage 
tender souls is off limits, especially in the arts, humanities, and social 
Temples of Liberalism    
sciences.  All must be allowed into the tent and all graduate with the 
same degree, irrespective of their shortcomings.
Much of this is a consequence of the faculty’s gatekeeping 
tendencies.54  During the 60s, and especially at the height of the 
Viet Nam War, colleges became a sanctuary from the real world.55 
As long as one was a student, one did not need to get a real job 
or submit to military discipline.  The university campus was also 
the perfect nexus for a social consciousness.  Much better to prepare 
oneself for enlistment in the War on Poverty than for the paddy fields 
of Southeast Asia.  The effect was to produce a generation of liberal 
Ph.D.s.  So great was their dominance that by 2002 a survey by 
the American Enterprise Institute revealed an overwhelming liberal 
hegemony.56  In elite universities such as Harvard and Brown literally 
95% of the faculty were registered to vote as affiliates of “parties 
of the left.”  In general, across the academic spectrum the ratio of 
Democrats to Republicans tended to be roughly 10 to 1.  
Evidently convinced that their pacifism and selflessness were 
intellectually justified, these enthusiasts had devoted themselves 
to remaking their disciplines in the image of their political 
commitments.  Gone was the academic rigor of previous cohorts; in 
its place arose a self-congratulatory moralism.  Emblematic of this 
transformation was the ascendancy of post-modernism.57  Even more 
modern than modernity, it preached that there was no such thing 
as truth.  No one could be more correct than anyone else, because 
there are no absolute standards of correctness.  Nevertheless, these 
same post-modernists felt justified in indoctrinating students in their 
own moral viewpoints.58  More genuine and principled than their 
predecessors, in tearing down the remnants of the old order, they 
were paving the way for a kinder, more democratic, future.
This neo-Marxist,59 bobo inspired, liberalism became the 
conventional wisdom in fields such as history,60 English literature,61 
and sociology.62  Each of these cultural-based disciplines sought 
to contribute to an emerging canon.  But first they needed to 
“deconstruct” the existing intellectual edifice.63  As per Marx, they 
had to demonstrate that people believed what they did because a “false 
consciousness” propagated by the capitalists obscured their vision. 
Old-fashioned ideas such as truth, merit, and responsibility were 
evidently rationalizations for concentrating power in the hands of the 
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rich.  If one looked past what was said to what was done, it became 
obvious that the intention was to handicap the poor.  Historians 
contributed to this interpretation by emphasizing how pervasive 
sexism and racism had been.64  Instead of delving into the activities 
of politicians and industrialists, they shifted their gaze toward their 
innocent victims, i.e., the women and minorities.  Where once the 
Civil War was understood in terms of what Abraham Lincoln had 
done, Sojourner Truth emerged as a major player.  Almost invisible 
now were the contributions of Thomas Edison, exchanged for the 
depredations of Joseph McCarthy.65  What mattered was to show 
how ordinary people lived.  Also essential was demonstrating how 
vicious the oppression had been.  George Washington was to become 
more renowned for being a slaveowner than as the Father of His 
Country.  That contrary to the wishes of his relatives, he, on his 
deathbed, freed his bondsmen was not as well publicized, for this 
might contradict the image being purveyed.
In literature, the transformations were more dramatic.66  The 
authority figures decided that Standard English was too confining.67 
Ruled the arbitrary creation of a predatory elite, students needed to be 
taught that other forms of expression were equally valid.  They were 
now allowed to sprinkle their writings with what would once have 
been thought vulgar.  They could likewise collaborate in committees 
to produce original works of art.  Thanks to the computer, groups of 
individuals were encouraged to contribute to common ventures.  If 
asked to analyze literature, this was intended either to deconstruct 
the biases of the past or to explore the authenticity of once marginal 
figures.  Charles Dickens was still acceptable as a spokesperson for 
the downtrodden, but Mark Twain was uncomfortably addicted 
to the n-word.68  Jane Austin was a wonderful example of female 
genius, whereas Samuel Johnson was a misogynist buffoon.  William 
Shakespeare was definitely out of date, while obscure authors from 
Africa and Latin America enjoyed a vogue.  Students might themselves 
read Ayn Rand, whereas in class they poured over John Steinbeck’s69 
The Grapes of Wrath in order to determine how the reserve army 
of the unemployed had been used to keep workers impotent.  In 
1989 The Wall Street Journal70 described the curriculum of Stanford 
University’s course in Western Civilization thus: “Dante’s ‘Inferno’ is 
out…but ‘I…Rigoberta Menchu’ is in…Aquinas and Thomas More 
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are out, but ‘Their Eyes Were Watching God” by feminist Zora Neale 
Hurston is in…Locke and Mill go down the memory hole, replaced 
by the U.N Declaration of Human Rights and Rastafarian poetry…
[while] Virgil, Cicero, and Tacitus give way to Frantz Fanon….”
In sociology, as in most of the social sciences, the emphasis 
shifted to exposing oppression to the antiseptic effects of intellectual 
sunlight.71  Students needed to become familiar with the continuing 
universality of exploitation.  Understanding how societies were put 
together thus took a backseat to revealing the means whereby they 
perpetuated immorality.72  Once upon a time functionalists sought 
to determine the prerequisites of community survival, but by the 
70s conflict theorists had defiantly supplanted them.  Neo-Marxists 
in all but name, they were preoccupied by issues of inequality.  On 
the grounds that race, class, and gender were all about disparities in 
power, these were taught in the same courses.  It did not matter that 
social class had more to do with hierarchical relationships and gender 
relations with heterosexual intimacy.  Furthermore, much of what 
was covered was treated as problematic.  Marriage was revealed to be 
an institution dedicated to suppressing women and children,73 and 
schools a mechanism for instilling industrial uniformity.74  Time and 
again, the answer to human misery was seen as liberating people from 
the despotic grip of greedy capitalists.  According to authoritative 
professors, when business people spoke of responsibility, they 
meant an allegiance to themselves.  When they praised merit, this 
was a code word for that in which they excelled.  Since many who 
gravitated to sociology had been involved in social reforms, they were 
also fascinated with social movements.75  Essentially “movement” 
people, they were not so much interested in studying how morality 
operated as in determining the means of making their interventions 
successful.  This might not be social science as originally conceived, 
but it was in line with their liberal dispositions.
This moral certitude produced classrooms of stifling 
conventionality.76  The correct answers might not be representative 
of the larger society, but they were the ones students were expected 
to proselytize once they exited the halls of academe.77  In former 
times, professors had been committed to exposing students to all 
sides of important issues in a relatively dispassionate manner.  The 
students were to be introduced to the facts and to canons of logic, 
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and then make up their own minds.  This was now history.  Despite 
protestations of promoting “critical thinking,”78 the only critiques 
allowed were of the old order.  A deconstruction of the particulars 
of the liberal establishment was strictly off limits.  Its faith was to 
be the guiding faith, not the target of a disinterested investigation. 
So virulent was this new orthodoxy that ridicule was deemed an 
appropriate means of enforcing its tenets.  Professors literally failed 
students who expressed the wrong views about race or gender. 
Moreover, they did so unabashedly.  With upwards of ninety percent 
of faculty members in the humanities and social sciences of elite 
institutions avowedly liberal (or left of liberal), there was little dissent 
when they taught or graded ideologically.  In sociology, for instance, 
it was routinely assumed that the science dictated liberal conclusions. 
This meant that only liberal texts were assigned and only liberal 
speakers invited to speak on campus.  “Only” may be too strong a 
term, but one study indicated that, when it came to commencement 
speakers, if a political orientation was demonstrable, it was liberal by 
a ratio of sixteen to one.
Something more sinister occurred to the nature of science. 
Dispassionate science, one of the hallmarks of industrialization, 
made its mark by utilizing disciplined observations to push out the 
boundaries of knowledge.  In areas such as physics, chemistry, and 
biology this continued to be the situation.  In the social sciences, 
however, political correctness became the standard of truth.  The 
moral agendas of investigators determined what would be studied 
and how this would be interpreted.  Because committed ideologues 
dominated subjects like sociology, they did not even pretend to go 
beyond this.  Theirs became advocacy research.  The goal was to 
disseminate what was already believed, but to do so with the authority 
of science.  Unconscious biases had always been the bane of social 
science, but keeping them unconscious was no longer a priority. 
The post-modernists79 argued that since everyone had a bias, Max 
Weber’s notion of value neutrality was naïve.  The only question was 
how persuasive one could be in propagating one’s views.  Given that 
the liberals were on the side of justice,80 it was incumbent upon them 
to be as convincing as possible.  Not the truth of their observations, 
but their righteousness was what counted.
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“Scientism,” as opposed to science, exploited the trappings of 
rational investigation.81  Though it employed the language of science, 
and often such valid techniques as statistical analysis, it did this 
without a genuine commitment to discovering important truths. 
The prestige of science, not its motivating spirit, was appropriated to 
serve moral interests.  This enabled the advocacy researchers to distort 
their activities with a clear conscience.  They could, for example, 
exaggerate the positive impact of affirmative action82 or detract from 
negative effects of divorce without qualms.  Some pieces of research 
could be totally ignored if they contained unwelcome implications. 
This was the fate of James Coleman’s83 massive study on education. 
When he found that parental values mattered more for student 
success than did school resources, his conclusions were hushed 
up.  Sometimes the measuring rods were manipulated to produce 
the desired inferences.  This is what occurred with respect to sexual 
abuse.  Because conventional liberal opinion demanded that males 
be guilty of overwhelming abuse of women, what was regarded as 
“abuse” was expanded beyond its ordinary meaning.  Merely casting 
an admiring glance at a female could be viewed as the equivalent 
of rape, that is, if its object found it objectionable.  Sometimes 
interpretations were massaged after the fact.  One set of investigators 
reported that teachers were paying more attention to boys than girls 
and that this was injuring the self-esteem of the girls.84  What they 
failed to divulge was that most of this attention was negative.  The 
boys were being told to shut up because they were more disruptive 
than the girls.  How this was supposed to enhance their self-images 
was a mystery.  Also left unsaid was that the girls were doing better 
in school.  Despite questioning their abilities, they got better grades 
and entered college in larger numbers.
Much of this distortion of science took the form of statistical 
manipulations.85  Both in college classes, and on the political 
hustings, impressive figures were manufactured because they proved 
persuasive.  This made it advantageous both to inflate the numbers 
and to misinterpret their implications.  To wit, although the census 
bureau could only find three hundred thousand homeless persons, 
homeless advocates, including academic sociologists, cited three 
million as the actual count.  This was no more than a seat-of-the-pants 
estimate, yet it was treated as an absolute fact.  For a while it was also 
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taken on faith that strangers annually kidnapped over two million 
children, although the true number was under a few hundred.  Even 
when the figures were correct they could be given a deceptive spin. 
Percentages, for instance, might be ignored in favor of raw numbers. 
To illustrate, it was said that crime and welfare were not concentrated 
among African-Americans because there were in fact more Caucasians 
in jail or on the dole than blacks.  This was true, but to get the 
appropriate incarceration figures they had to combine the white and 
Hispanic census.  More importantly, they had to disregard the minor 
detail that blacks were only thirteen percent of the population. 
What mattered were proportions, not absolute numbers, but stating 
this would have produced the wrong impression.  People might have 
realized that per capita blacks were committing more than seven 
times as many murders as whites.  They might also have recognized 
that per capita many more members of minorities are on welfare. 
This perpetuates a debilitating dependence, but to acknowledge it 
might induce the public to come to racist conclusions.  The same 
statistical smoke and mirrors applied to marriage.  Academics who 
found the institution outdated produced articles that suggested that 
less than ten percent of families consisted of the traditional husband, 
wife, and their two children.  What they neglected to add was that 
most of these households were either still childless, or past the child 
rearing period, or composed of single individuals.  Despite divorce 
and out-of-wedlock births, most children continued to be raised by 
married couples.
Higher education had become infested with these “just so” 
stories.86  As with more traditional religious institutions, what was 
disseminated was chosen for its moral effect, not its truth-value. 
Faculty members and administrators had come to think of themselves 
as trustees of the next generation.  Intent on making sure that the 
young were protected from corrupting influences, they censored that 
to which they were exposed.  Some of this as overt, but much of it 
was accomplished via a community of opinion.  Just as what was 
considered beautiful has been determined by a cultural zeitgeist, so 
was that which was deemed intellectually valid.
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Journalists
Journalism and democratic politics shared the same cradle.87 
Both came into being dependent upon the other.  If free citizens 
were to elect suitable representatives, they needed to know who these 
persons were and for what they stood.  As importantly, they had to 
keep track of their activities once in office.  In fact, the most important 
function of the first newspapers, and more recently the electronic 
media, has been electioneering.  From the beginning candidates 
were not content to leave their fate to chance.88  If they could, they 
would stage-manage pubic attitudes to their advantage.  What made 
it into the journals, and how this information was construed, was 
critical to their interests.  Sometimes these manipulations were quite 
sophisticated, as when the Federalist Papers89 were used to agitate 
for ratification of the American Constitution.  Sometimes they were 
evocative, as with Thomas Paine’s90 proindependence pamphlet 
Common Sense.  At other times, they were merely scurrilous, as 
when Thomas Jefferson91 was lambasted for having an affair with 
Sally Hemmings.  In retrospect, the origins of the United States may 
seem sedate, and even dignified, but as they were unfolding they 
were so raucous that John Adams92 attempted to muzzle the press 
with a sedition act that made it illegal to write offensive pieces about 
public figures.
The partisan nature of the press is, therefore, of ancient lineage. 
What has changed with the advent of liberal dominance is that this 
influence became monolithic.  The biases of reporters and their 
editors grew to be so one-sided as to produce an apparent unanimity 
of opinion.  Henry Luce,93 the founder of Time Magazine, though 
an outspoken conservative, observed that he was forced to rely on a 
liberal staff because they were better writers.94  Unquestionably they 
were a larger proportion of those from whom he was obliged to draw. 
Although it has become compulsory to deny that journalists are 
largely left wing, this has long been the case.  Surveys of their voting 
patterns routinely demonstrate that upwards of ninety percent vote 
Democratic, yet most reporters insist that as professionals they can 
separate their private beliefs from their occupational judgments. 
Even a Dan Rather, whom his colleague Andy Rooney described as 
transparently liberal, could continue to describe himself as politically 
neutral after vociferously defending forged documents intended to be 
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detrimental to a Republican president.95  The truth seems to be that 
journalism attracts a certain sort of person.  Many are idealists, who if 
they weren’t writing about the world, would be attempting to reform 
it.  Indeed, many seem to be attempting both; the quintessential 
social workers with pens.  
Added to this is the reality that journalists are cultural experts. 
They may seem to know everything, but what they know best is 
the prevailing conventional wisdom.96  While many affect an air 
of detached omniscience, they come closer to being observers with 
attitudes than disinterested authorities.  As a matter of fact, most of the 
people who turn out to be reporters or editors study communication, 
rather than technical skills.  Some have backgrounds in political 
science or economics, but many more majored in journalism, 
English, or the law.  Their competence thus lies in how to disseminate 
a message, not in making certain that it is accurate.  Under these 
circumstances being theatrical is often of more consequence than 
being honest.  Though many in the press portray themselves as 
pundits, this is a self-proclaimed designation.  The platform they 
have achieved, rather than the insights they possess, lend them 
their air of legitimacy.  Often a stentorian voice or an elegant 
way with the printed word is their sole claim to public attention. 
Also of inestimable value in validating their pronouncements is 
the uniformity of opinion with which they are surrounded.  The 
repetition of bald-faced absurdities, if sufficiently homogeneous, 
can make almost anything sound plausible.  Ordinary consumers, 
if they do not have access to contrary viewpoints, may have no way 
of distinguishing truth from falsehood.  The liberal dominance has, 
therefore, converted the press into a Temple of sacrosanct ideas.  As 
soon as technological advances limited the number of newspapers 
and media outlets, only their propaganda reached the public ear. 
Standardized reportage accordingly came close to being spiritual 
indoctrination once contrary voices were muted.
One of the indicators of this development was the metamorphosis 
of the front page of newspapers into an extension of their editorial 
pages.  Where previously this was considered unprofessional, 
journalists began to insert personal viewpoints into their stories and 
headlines.  The tipping points for this progression seem to have been 
the Viet Nam War and the Watergate affair.  After Walter Cronkite,97 
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by unanimous consent “the most trusted man in America,” indicated 
that the Tet offensive was a terrible defeat, many of his viewers lost 
their faith in the war.98  In time, the government was forced to extricate 
the nation from its commitment.  This achievement convinced 
journalists of their ability to influence events.  Shortly thereafter, 
Richard Nixon’s disgrace confirmed this assessment.  Reportage by 
the Washington Post was largely credited with exposing the illegal 
cover-up of a third rate burglary, thereby driving a president from 
office.99  This, in turn, was construed as saving the nation from 
totalitarian ruin.  In this manner, having saved both the peace and 
democracy, journalism, and particularly investigative journalism, 
was tinged with romantic potency.  Talented journalism students 
could now project themselves as heirs to the mantle of Woodward 
and Bernstein.  Someday they too would uncover a scandal so great 
that their names would be imbued with legendary status.
Under these circumstances ordinary newspersons began to think 
of themselves as adversaries of the political elite.  Their job, as the 
shadow government, was “to tell truth to power,” which meant that 
their goal was to reveal as many lies as possible.100  News conferences, 
which had once been sedate venues for obtaining information, 
became opportunities to embarrass public officials.  Even liberal 
office-holders were subjected to “gotcha” exercises in tripping them 
up over small matters.  During FDR’s administration, those who 
covered him felt obligated to hide his paralysis from the public on 
the grounds that this was in the national interest.  Now national 
purposes were to be damned when they conflicted with “the public’s 
right to know.”  When the politician was a conservative, the glee in 
exposing his feet of clay was palpable.  Given that journalists believed 
that their profession endowed them with both moral authority and 
technical proficiency, they routinely explained what the news really 
meant.  They not only told their audiences what happened, but why 
it had happened and what the long-term effect would be.  Strange 
to say, this was habitually consistent with liberal platitudes.  In 
this way, Monday morning quarterbacking was transformed into a 
seven-day-a-week distraction.  Whatever occurred, reporters could 
elucidate how it could have been done better.  During the Nixon 
administration101 Spiro Agnew, the soon to be discredited Vice 
President, drew disdain for labeling these pundits “nattering nabobs 
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of negativity.”  Yet this criticism stopped no one.  Both its message 
and its alliteration struck those at whom it was aimed as over the top. 
Themselves emancipated of responsibility for achieving results, they 
systematically found those who were accountable wanting.  Well 
aware that their own prescriptions were unlikely to be tested, they 
could paint their consequences in the rosiest of hues without fear 
of contradiction.  Despite the revolving door between the press and 
office-holding,102 when journalists were on the outside looking in 
their disparagement was so strident as to be malicious.  An aura of 
smug self-satisfaction clung to romantic analyses that were never to 
be tested against the disinterested verdict of reality.
In many ways contemporary journalists have become emotional 
demagogues.  They utilize sentiments to manipulate the perception 
of policies for which they are not answerable.  Theirs is power without 
consequence.  Theirs is the muscle to set the parameters of debate 
without having to consider the outcomes.  The New York Times 
has demonstrated the degree to which moralistic kibitzing can color 
events.103  Widely considered America’s most influential newspaper, 
in the past it prided itself on being the nation’s journal of record. 
In presenting all the news “fit to print,” its staff considered itself 
engaged in presenting the first draft of history.  As such, accuracy 
and even-handed objectivity were the goal.  Those days, however, 
are long gone.  With the advent of the liberal hegemony, the Times 
was transformed into the cathedral of left wing political thought. 
Though an integral part of the nation’s political establishment, it 
became obsessed with crusading for change.  Much as might a small 
town newspaper seeking to unseat a corrupt mayor, it flooded its 
pages with stories intended to promote a compassionate collectivism. 
Thus one of its chief objectives was to promote peace.  Writers, as 
pacifistic as any tied-dyed hippy, rarely found a kind word to say 
about military adventures.  This included efforts to confront terrorism 
after the devastation of 9/11.  In particular, they resolutely sought to 
undermine the Bush Administration’s Iraq undertaking.104
Throughout its coverage, the Times depicted the Iraqi situation 
as analogous to Viet Nam.  Within days of launching the ground 
action, one of its most prestigious columnists used the front page to 
moan about an impending “quagmire.”  Wont to quote any public 
figure remotely critical of Bush’s policy, its editors had the temerity 
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to misquote Henry Kissinger about its legitimacy and then to drag 
their feet before giving a grudging retraction.  So far as the Times 
was concerned, it would be impossible to defeat Saddam Hussein 
because there was no viable “plan” for doing so.  One might have 
imagined that entering Baghdad within a mere three weeks would 
have quieted these editorial qualms, but it did not.  As Bob Kohn105 
documents, before, during, and after major combat the Times ran a 
preponderance of negative stories.  It began by fearing a “protracted 
war’ and a new “jihad,” then it worried that the British “mistrusted” 
how the U.S. was waging the battle, and it highlighted a “chorus 
of criticism” that speculated “images of victory overshadow doses of 
realism.”   As the climax drew near, it perceived new dangers in the 
“final push” and described American troops as “weary” from their 
exertions.  Meanwhile the paper stressed that images of the war were 
“faltering in the Arab world,” found disagreement pervading the 
U.S. Congress, depicted a “trail of death” in the Iraqi capital, and 
reported the enemy as claiming the U.S push had been “thwarted.” 
Soon it was proclaiming that the “urban war begins: it was real scary,” 
while speculating that the “evidence contradicts rumors of torture.” 
Moreover, “anti-Americanism” was growing in Greece, and an African 
leader was saying the “Iraq war sets bad precedent.”  When weapons 
of mass destruction were not immediately found this prompted loud 
skepticism about whether they ever existed.  Eventually it would be 
implied that George W. Bush lied about their presence in order to get 
revenge for his father’s earlier fiasco.106
One of the more revealing episodes disclosed the lengths to which 
the Times would go to portray the government as incompetent. 
After Baghdad fell, looting broke out in the streets.  This was quickly 
blamed on the administration’s failure to anticipate disorder or to react 
expeditiously.  Particularly shocking was that the national museum 
had been robbed of hundreds of thousands of irreplaceable treasures. 
Obviously this legacy of Mesopotamian civilization should have 
been protected by the conquering troops.  The American military 
simply stood by while unalloyed greed destroyed a part of everyone’s 
heritage.  From the beginning the Times’ reporters knew that things 
were not what they seemed, nevertheless their editors could not resist 
printing archeological testimony about how horrendous this event 
was.  Within days other outlets were suggesting that the missing 
0    The Great Middle Class Revolution
artifacts might have been removed by the museum’s own staff, but 
this did not stop the Times’ from continuing the assault.  Eventually 
it was found that no more than a couple of dozen items were lost; 
that most had merely been transferred elsewhere for safekeeping. 
But the damage had been done.  The impression was created that 
the American military was composed of vulgar philistines led by 
uncivilized warmongers.
On the home front similar distortions ruled the day.  In matters 
small and large, a tendentious flavor of liberalism and a nagging 
disdain for its enemies prevailed.  One of the longstanding disputes 
between liberals and traditionalists concerned crime.107  Those with 
a conservative bent insisted that law and order must be maintained, 
whereas “progressives” claimed that rehabilitation and respect for 
diversity would eliminate the root causes of criminality.  For many 
years, it seemed that there would be no resolution to this controversy. 
Then Rudy Giuliani appeared on the scene.108  Once he was elected 
mayor of New York City, he determined to end the disorder on 
its streets.  The local Democratic establishment, which included 
the Times, had taken to describing the city as ungovernable.  It 
contended that the crime rates traced an unbroken gradient due to 
the community’s large population and freewheeling spirit; that, and, 
of course, the bigotry on the mean-spirited Right.  Giuliani, however, 
decided to give the Broken Window Theory a try.  He would instruct 
his underlings to pursue small, as well as large, violations of the law. 
And this is what happened.  Within a couple of years the effects were 
dramatic.  The crime rate tumbled, with the number of murders 
falling to almost one fourth of what they had been.  The streets, and 
the subways, were measurably safer.  People began to talk about the 
community having been taken back from the criminals.  Even the 
graffiti had been scrubbed off of public property.  The environment 
was literally cleaner than it had been in decades.
One might have thought the Times would celebrate these 
events.109  Presumably its editors too preferred safer neighborhoods. 
From their perspective, however, the price was intolerable.  A 
Republican mayor had achieved what his liberal predecessors only 
promised.  His solution, not theirs, had been demonstrated to be 
effective.  Were this allowed to stand, it might cast doubts on the 
entire liberal enterprise.  Some fly had to be found in the ointment 
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and people convinced that this was serious enough to renew their 
confidence in the old prescriptions.  Providence was soon to provide 
what seemed the perfect vehicle.  A young African street vendor, 
Amadou Diallo, was gunned down outside his home in the Bronx. 
Not just this, but the police had riddled his body with over forty 
shots.  This over-kill was unambiguous evidence of brutality.  Yes, 
crime had gone down, but only because a totalitarian regime was 
allowed to dominate the streets.
The Times quickly went on the offensive.110  A paper that 
had historically spurned crime reporting in favor of national and 
international coverage became obsessed with pursuing justice.  Day 
after day, week after week, often several times a day, it ran stories 
about the incident.  When there was no news, it recruited Al 
Sharpton to lead protest rallies designed to highlight the incipient 
racism.  Sharpton was a well-known demagogue, but he was also 
an articulate spokesperson.  His antics were sure to draw attention. 
Through all this, the Times was aware that police brutality had been 
on the decline.  Under Giuliani there were fewer such acts than their 
had been under an earlier African-American mayor.  There were 
also fewer such incidents than in most large cities.  This did not 
matter.  What did was that a graphic episode could make it appear 
that conservatives were insensitive brutes.  Nor were officials at 
the Times concerned that an investigation showed the killing had 
been accidental or that the police officers involved were later found 
innocent in a court of law.  This was about appearances, and as the 
gatekeepers of public perceptions, they could manipulate these to 
send the appropriate political message.  Even when they became 
aware that their crusade provoked the police to reduce their presence 
in minority neighborhoods and that this reduction was followed 
by an increase in crime, they were not apologetic.  They could no 
more admit a mistake than a Pope could express doubts about the 
resurrection of Christ.
Though they persistently deny it, journalists habitually implement 
their ideological commitments in their editorial choices.111  They 
regularly decide what they will write about and how they will describe 
it.  This both the substance and tone of the media are at their discretion. 
While these are not always conscious decisions, they are momentous. 
This is why political correctness continues to flourish.112  In general, 
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members of the establishment share core beliefs that influence what 
is considered newsworthy.  Almost entirely sympathetic to abortion, 
its proponents receive a supportive hearing, whereas its foes are 
portrayed as kooks.113  Likewise strongly approving of feminism, it 
is represented as defending the rights of women, whereas traditional 
views are depicted as oppressive.114  Also in favor of gun control, 
they brook no amount of contrary evidence convinces them that gun 
ownership does not increase murder rates.115  Similarly, the efficacy 
of affirmative action is never seriously reviewed.116  To be against it 
is assumed to be racist and, therefore, its achievements are exempt 
from neutral evaluation.117  Even prayer in schools gets short shrift. 
Routinely identified with fundamentalism, advocates of school 
prayer are seen as advancing a religious orientation.  The result is 
that a molehill is presented as a barbaric onslaught against religious 
freedom.
As arbiters of good and evil, the priesthood of institutionalized 
journalism exercises the prerogatives of an image-maker.118  Whose 
words are quoted, how these are edited, the details chosen to convey 
their ambiance, what adjectives applied, and the critics selected for 
provide a rebuttal determine how what is reported will be perceived. 
If he did not already understand this, Arnold Schwarzenegger 
discovered it when he ran for California governor.  Having previously 
been considered an open-minded friend of Jewish interests, the Los 
Angeles Times suggested that he had years earlier made pro-Hitler 
comments.  These were ostensibly cited in full, but subsequent 
investigations revealed that they had been revised to leave out his 
anti-Hitler assertions.  Corresponding to this libel have been those 
addressed toward virtually every Republican president.  Democrats are 
praised for their intelligence and compassion, whereas conservatives 
are ridiculed for stupidity and avarice.  George W. Bush was already 
being dismissed as an intellectual lightweight when a reporter sprung 
a surprise quiz about obscure world leaders.  When Bush missed most 
of these, this was taken as confirmation of his mental limitations. 
Needless to say, no Democratic candidate faced similar opprobrium. 
It cannot be an accident that Ronald Reagan119 was regarded as a 
genial dunce, Dwight Eisenhower120 a dim-witted grandfather, and 
Gerald Ford121 a clumsy oaf, while John Kennedy122 was a brilliant 
young leader, Adlai Stevenson an intellectual statesman, Al Gore a 
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wooden, but insightful intellect, Jimmy Carter123 a detailed scientific 
mind, and Bill Clinton124 one of the smartest men to inhabit the 
Whiter House.  Even conservatives too bright to be labeled dumb 
did not escape.  Richard Nixon125 became a villainous crook, Barry 
Goldwater126 a troglodyte cold warrior, and George Bush the elder 
an out of touch elitist who did not understand how supermarket 
scanner worked.
Needless to say, liberals are presented as paragons of the 
mainstream, whereas their opponents are dismissed as extremists.127 
Those on the left are likewise victims of McCarthyite slurs, while 
those on the right perpetrate these.  It does not matter that it has 
been decades since liberals were accused of being communists, the 
implication of a lack of patriotism remains.  Nor does it matter that 
conservatives are hounded for being racist, sexist, homophobes; 
they undoubtedly deserve it.  Progressives are the “real” democrats, 
in sharp contrast to these traditionalists, who are closet Nazis.  No 
epithet, not liar, mass-murderer, or warmonger is too severe.  The spin 
is never-ending.  Nowadays the accusations have reached a crescendo 
with the arrival of competing news outlets.  Both the Fox network 
and talk radio have aroused suspicions that the liberal monopoly may 
not endure.  As a result, the rhetoric has heated up with accusations 
that it is the conservatives who are actually in charge.
It must be noted in passing that liberals also dominate the 
publishing business.  Most of the big houses have a penchant for 
printing and publicizing works congruent with these preferred 
beliefs.  With most of the larger companies headquartered in New 
York City, their editors are influenced by the prejudices of the 
Manhattan intellectuals who are their friends.  The neo-Marxism 
of these thinkers appears mainstream to decision-makers who are 
exposed to little else when they make their social rounds.
Entertainment
If America’s image-makers are concentrated in New York City, 
its myth-makers are clustered in Hollywood, California.128  Just as a 
society’s beliefs are shaped by the facts its institutions transmit, so they 
are molded by the stories they tell.  Human beings learn about their 
world as much from fictional accounts of it as from direct observation. 
These narratives have the advantage of possessing uncluttered plots 
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and emotional clarity.  For the most part, straightforward depictions 
of who is good or evil, they are the contemporary version of biblical 
parables.  As a result, audiences receive transparent instructions on 
whom to root for or against.  Once, the Christian Church utilized 
passion plays to tutor the laity on the rudiments of faith.  Today, in 
our more secular times, the entertainment industry has acquired this 
function.  In movies, television dramas,129 and music it broadcasts its 
favorite lessons in the form of easy to swallow amusements.  People 
pay attention because they are emotionally enlisted into performances 
that appeal to their instinctual dispositions.  Though they know this 
is make-believe, they nevertheless care about who wins and loses 
because they are biologically programmed to care about such things. 
As it happens, liberals have attained a virtual monopoly within the 
entertainment industry.  In control of the machinery of storytelling, 
they produce materials uniformly favorable to their point of view.
The cultural dominance of liberalism is revealed by pieces 
of evidence such as how U.S. presidents are portrayed.  In almost 
every instance, positive renderings are reserved for liberal politicians. 
From the movie’s American President to television’s West Wing, 
conservatives are rendered as heartless villains intent of destroying 
sympathetic left-leaning heroes.  Indeed, it is far more likely that 
a president will be depicted as a bloodthirsty murderer than as a 
conscientious traditionalist trying to reduce the size of government 
in order to preserve freedom.  Much more visible are Dr. Strangelove 
characters who are plotting an anti-democratic conflagration.  The 
attitude is also exposed in depictions of tradition.  Pleasantville was 
one such concoction.  This film magically transported teenagers 
back into a black and white television portrayal of the 1950s.  Not 
only was color gone from this world, so were art, love, and sex.  The 
morals of a half-century ago were thereby pilloried as crimped and 
antihumanistic.  They clearly needed to be loosened up by a large 
dose of abstract painting and lyrically represented lust.  They needed, 
in short, to be rescued by an injection of liberal values.
One of fiction’s specialties is presenting the unreal as true.  There 
may never have been dragons, but novelists and filmmakers routinely 
construct images that make them appear factual.  The same can be 
said of idealized models of the future.  A world in which hierarchy 
fades away may not be possible, but is on the silver screen.  So is one 
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in which indiscriminate sex has no unfavorable consequences.130  The 
Pleasantville teens did not fret about becoming pregnant, that is, as 
long as the producers kept this out of the story line.  In the same way, 
history can be reworked to serve contemporary purposes.  Nixon and 
JFK could identify the scoundrels as whoever their director desired. 
Yet that which was shown to have happened never really unfolded in 
that way.  Even in a genre as simple as westerns, the staples have been 
revised to convey liberal shibboleths.  Once upon a time the good 
guys wore white hats and the bad ones black.  Once upon a time the 
Indians attacked the wagon train and the cavalry drove them off.  In 
recent years, this has been reversed.  In Dances with Wolves there is 
no question that the underdogs are morally superior.  Their defects 
are passed over in poetic silence.
A casual glance at the academy awards131 demonstrates who is 
in and who out.  From Gentlemen’s Agreement in 1947, to The 
Apartment in 1960, to Midnight Cowboy in 1969, to Rocky in 
1976, to Platoon in 1986, to the Unforgiven in 1992, the underdogs 
received compassionate treatment.  About the only conservative 
hero to win an award was Patton in 1970.  More recently Bowling 
for Columbine was honored with the Oscar for best documentary. 
Blatantly anti-establishment, and riddled with misrepresentations, 
its awkward filmmaking nevertheless impressed voters in agreement 
with its central thesis.  Less egregious is what happened to made-for-
television movies.  Though many of these traded in sensationalism 
for its own sake, another batch were dedicated to illustrating the 
“problem of the week.”  Just as liberal politicians specialize in sob 
stories about whatever grievance they promise to solve, so media 
moguls feature social conditions that cry out for reform.  That they 
are not able to offer a viable solution takes a back seat to mobilizing 
social concern for a legislative intervention.
Hollywood has also produced a bumper crop of liberal celebrities. 
Artists whose only claim to fame is that their occupation provides 
a larger-than-life image leap to the defense of causes they barely 
understand.  Imbued with the romance of being among the beautiful 
people,132 viewers often confuse them with the roles they play.  While 
actors and actresses have as much right to be politically active as 
any citizen, many nevertheless disingenuously conceal their modest 
intellectual credentials.  For many, a liberal-oriented appearance 
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of compassion is a good career move.  It is certainly valuable to 
politicians who can raise huge donations by associating themselves 
with well-loved entertainers.
One of the worst effects of the entertainment industry has been 
on sexual mores.  In an effort to attract viewers, conventionalized 
lasciviousness has become the order of the day.  Full frontal nudity, 
plus simulated sexual intercourse, have migrated from the x-rated 
movie theater to the television screen.  No longer is much off-limits. 
Worse yet, promiscuity is represented as exciting and sophisticated. 
To judge from what appears in the cinema or on situation comedies, 
the beautiful people routinely swap bed partners.  They have learned 
that sex is natural, beautiful, and inconsequential, and like Madonna 
are trying to liberate others by sharing their insights.  When it is 
objected that this sends the wrong ideas to young people, the response 
is to lament censorship.  Government regulations are denounced 
as totalitarian impositions that must be resisted lest democracy be 
imperiled.  Even private criticisms of casual sexuality are deplored as 
smacking of fascism.  They are said to portray a narrow-mindedness 
inimical to art and creativity.  The paradox in this is that those who 
defend a complete freedom of sexual expression also favor broader 
representation for minority performers.  In this case, they argue 
that the downtrodden need positive role models if they are to move 
forward.  Yet if race relations can be improved by providing such 
models, why shouldn’t sexuality receive analogous treatment?  Why 
isn’t casual promiscuity an image that needs to be shunned as much 
as are Sambo representations of African-Americans?
In fact, a ready access to cavalier sexuality seems to have had 
grievous consequences.  The very individuals liberals claim to be 
defending are the ones most adversely affected.  Youngsters impressed 
by the glamour of publicly exposed skin conclude that going naked 
is not so terrible.  Less likely to come from families that instill strict 
standards, they are easily drawn into prostitution and/or relationships 
based on physical attributes.  Instead of being encouraged to seek the 
professional skills needed to move up the social class ladder, they are 
seduced into besmirching their reputations.  It is as if they have been 
lured into one-night stands by unscrupulous media Lotharios who 
promise they will still love the victims in the morning.  The same can 
be said of hip-hop music133 that substitutes friction between body 
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organs for enduring love.  “Shake your booty” and “give it to me 
baby” and you will be liberated from oppression shout a bevy of half-
naked millionaires.  And the very young listen.  They submit to the 
importations of their lustful boyfriends and flash their breasts for the 
television camera.  It is all in good fun and in a world were everyone 
is destined to be equal can have no unfortunate by-products.
Lawyers and Social Workers
A few words must also be said about lawyers and social workers. 
They too have become pillars of the liberal establishment.  In their 
different ways dedicated to supporting centralized government, they 
have likewise contributed to the institutionalization of niceness.  Both, 
for example, theoretically fight for the rights of the disempowered. 
Both also have a vested interest in promoting victimization and 
collectivist solutions.  Although respectively professionals and semi-
professionals, they are occupationally committed to discouraging 
others from becoming professionalized.  Neither group would accept 
this characterization—quite the contrary, they consider themselves 
compassionate facilitators of social justice—yet they exhibit a bobo 
mentality that undermines their official intentions.
Lawyering has become a growth industry.134  Ironically, the more 
commercialized our society has become, the more de Tocqueville’s 
social peacemakers have taken to tearing at its foundations.135  Many 
attorneys dedicate their careers to settling contractual disputes, but 
many more use the law as a bludgeon to beat the powerful into 
submission.136  Casting themselves in the role of a David sworn to fell 
the capitalist Goliath, they perceive themselves as making democracy 
work for the little guy.  In their own eyes, legal ombudsmen who apply 
the law to correct grievances for those who have no other recourse, 
they do so with so a blunt instrument that they are in danger of 
weakening the social infrastructure undergirding the law.137  The very 
market system that produced the values and self-discipline to make 
universalistic regulations viable is attacked with singular enthusiasm. 
Instead of genuinely fostering an even playing field, victory at any 
cost is all that matters.138
The primary tool of legal liberals is tort law.139  Torts are civil 
wrongs such as negligence.  Private citizens suing each other in court 
to have their differences decided by a judge or jury enforce these 
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statutes.  Out of this frequently comes a monetary award intended to 
correct the adjudicated imbalance.  Someone who has been injured 
by slipping on ice might, therefore, have his medical costs paid by the 
party held responsible for having cleared that ice.  But the tort law 
goes farther than this.  It allows the injured party to collect “punitive 
damages.”  This is intended to discourage others from committing 
the same wrong.  Trial lawyers who specialize in negligence suits, as 
a  consequence, regard themselves as a bulwark against iniquity.  In 
their own view, they make sure that doctors avoid malpractice, that 
manufacturers do not sell defective products, that employers guard 
against sexual harassment, that motorists exercise due caution, and 
that schools do not smuggle in Christian prayer under the guise of a 
moment of silence.
All of this sounds reasonable, yet in the hands of unscrupulous 
practitioners has been overdone.  Once upon a time, the damage 
awards were relatively modest.  Nowadays they have escalated into 
the billions of dollars.  The objective is not merely to send a message, 
but to drive the villains into bankruptcy.  Thus when liberals were 
unable to pass legislation outlawing tobacco, they did an end run 
around democracy by seeking to drive the tobacco companies out 
of business.  This has not yet been achieved, but they did destroy 
the asbestos business.  What makes this tactic egregious is that 
virtually any court can impose these awards.  Attorneys are free to 
do venue shopping.140  They can bring their suits before jurisdictions 
sympathetic to their clients.  This has the effect of holding the accused 
hostage to the least common denominator.  As a result, the potential 
quarry is hesitant to engage in actions some unelected vigilantes 
might find objectionable.  Corporations, in general, fearing that 
they might be detested for their commercial success often avoid risky 
enterprises in the expectation that these might draw unwanted fire. 
The outcome is to play it safe and retard progress.
Another result of this is a spate of frivolous suits brought for 
profit rather than to redress injustices.  In legal circles it is well 
understood that some actions are brought only because the defendant 
has “deep pockets.”  Another reason for these cases is that they can 
be brought at no cost to the accuser.  Because victory can be so 
profitable, lawyers are prepared to work for contingency fees, that 
is, they agree to work for a proportion of what they can later extract 
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from the target.  This technique has become so prevalent that it has 
driven up medical costs to unconscionable levels.  In order to engage 
in practice, physicians must carry malpractice insurance that costs 
them hundreds of thousands of dollars.  They must also engage in 
defensive medicine, ordering unnecessary, but expensive tests, lest 
they afterward be accused of failing to do so.  All of this provides trial 
lawyers with a financial incentive to make sure there exist regulations 
others can be sued for violating.  In favor of big government because 
it is good for their business, they are generous contributors to the 
party of Big Government, i.e., the Democratic Party (which even 
nominated a trial lawyer for vice-president).
Another devotee of big government is the American Civil 
Liberties Union (ACLU).141  Dedicated to constitutional cases 
ostensibly in defense of personal freedoms,142 somehow the freedoms 
protected are never those of conservatives.  More apt to be on the 
organization’s agenda are measures shielding affirmative action than 
those challenging reverse discrimination.  Remarkably, the ACLU’s 
idea of free speech is either liberal or crackpot speech.  It never seems 
to get involved when a college president refuses to protect a student 
newspaper from being vandalized, that is, if the paper’s editorial 
policy is right of center.  Here too the institutionalized “niceness” is 
highly particularized.
Still more associated with niceness is social work.143  It too has 
been a growth industry in a society that considers itself affluent enough 
to rescue everyone from any conceivable disability.  Much of the 
social engineering that liberals have sponsored is understood in social 
work terms.  As was mentioned above, many educators today regard 
themselves as social reformers.  They believe in neo-Marxist changes 
and expect that in instituting an equality of academic results they 
are laying the foundation for broader social equalities.  Professional 
social workers have similar aims.  Given an enormous boost both by 
the war of poverty and the advent of psychotherapy, they have long 
since surpassed their origins in assimilating immigrant populations. 
Professionally nice, they believe that compassion dictates a quest for 
complete equity.
The primary recipients of social work attention have always 
been the poor.  This has naturally engendered a commiseration with 
their condition.  Social workers get an up-close and personal view of 
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the devastation poverty can impose.  Were they able to they would 
wave a magic wand to raise everyone’s social status.  Given the facts 
of social hierarchy, however, this is not possible.  Improvements 
can be made, but these are always limited and, therefore, to some 
degree frustrating.  For many, solace is found in liberal idealism.  Its 
extravagant promises are supported in the belief that they can be 
redeemed.  That they are impractical contradictions, which cannot 
come to fruition, is suppressed.  As true believers, social workers are 
among the most persuasive advocates of programmatic solutions.
Psychotherapy too has provided a wedge to produce change.144 
The Freudian discovery that analyzing emotional impediments could 
facilitate personal growth had by the 1940s created a therapeutic 
craze among the well heeled.  Financially, the only way the poor could 
participate in this treatment was to avail themselves of therapists less 
expensive than the physicians who introduced the procedure.  Social 
workers fit this bill.  For the most part, less intensively trained, they 
were prepared to work for less.  The irony is that they performed 
this so well that the demand for their services outgrew the ability of 
insurance companies to afford long-term interventions.  The result 
was that instead of well-motivated clients receiving services that 
could in fact promote social mobility, they were shunted into brief 
therapies that more or less maintained the status quo.  Liberalism 
having over-promised, it delivered almost the opposite of what it 
promised.  In the hands of social work, it became a rationalization 
that legitimized the reverse of what its supporters hoped.
The Working Class Counterattack
The Middle Class Revolution has produced many winners, but 
not everyone can be counted among their numbers.  Those who 
remain on a lower rung have benefited materially, yet they understand 
that many others outrank them.  As disturbingly, they recognize 
that they are subject to direction from above.  Trapped in relatively 
conformist occupations, they may be more self-directed than their 
ancestors, but are less so than their bosses.  This can be so irritating 
that it impels them toward rebellion.  They become oppositionalists 
who decide what to do on the basis of what will exasperate those with 
greater power.  Feeling relatively weak, they go out of their way to 
embrace purported symbols of strength.
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How this strategy operates can be seen in the wrestling ring.145  In 
almost every corner of the country, gigantic blue-collar bruisers can 
be found standing before huge crowds shouting their defiance toward 
the world.  With muscles pumped up to grotesque proportions, they 
threaten to wreck violence on anyone who gets it their way.  To this, 
their audiences respond with vicarious delirium.  They too shout 
their insubordination toward anonymous others; thereby engaging 
in a symbolic mutiny they could never sustain on the job.  Among 
their other forms of disobedience are the self-mutilations of tattoos 
and body piercing.  As visible evidence that they are willing to endure 
physical pain, these disfigurements are boasts of being stronger than 
effete corporate executives.  So too are song lyrics that promise to 
shoot law officers and rape uppity women.  Those who sing them 
out at rock concerts know full well that they offend law-abiding 
sensibilities.  And this is the point—to get away with being vulgarly 
offensive.
Throughout most of history, the trendsetters have come from 
the higher social classes.  The ways that they have dressed and spoken 
have usually established the models for those below them.  Not 
surprisingly, in their desire to improve their situation, the poor have 
emulated what they could.  Yet with the ascendancy of the middle 
class, there has been a partial role reversal.  Today many styles have 
bubbled up from below.  Music, fashions, and even tattoos and 
piercings started among the lower orders have become chic among 
middle class adolescents.  This is partly due to the rebelliousness of 
teenagers, but it also to the dynamics of social class politics.  Amazingly 
bobos have been instrumental in spreading styles that are inimical to 
their interests, or, at least, to the interests of their children.  They too 
have enthusiastically ratified lower class over upper class practices.
As cultural specialists, liberals control most of the companies 
that market communal fashions.  Were they, in fact, opposed to 
vulgar sexuality or defiant rebelliousness, these would not show up 
in the magazines, television programs, or college classrooms they 
command.  Yet they do provide them a social imprimatur.  Instead of 
condemning graffiti as vandalism, it is encouraged as “street art.”146 
Instead of rejecting pornography as exploitive, it is promoted as free 
speech.  The reason for this counter-intuitive behavior is as old as the 
belief that “the enemy of my enemy is my friend.”  In seeking allies 
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against the traditional middle class, bobos have courted those below 
them in the pecking order.  Because, like the bourgeois politicians 
who sponsored Adolf Hitler,147 they are convinced they can manage 
the antics of their inferiors, they advance activities detrimental to 
social mobility.  But since most of their own children only dabble in 
this sort of raucous rebellion, they are not seriously hurt, whereas the 
children of the poor take these adventures seriously.  They believe that 
becoming tattoo billboards identifies them as sophisticates.  Much to 
their surprise they will one day discover that they have been excluded 
from positions of authority.  The victims of another group’s assault 
on the bastions of conventional middle class supremacy, they are apt 
to be the last to recognize it.  The bobos, the ones who support 
the institutionalization of this folly, may be the only winners—if 
only temporarily.  They gain the profits and the political capital, but 
perhaps at the expense of their own long-term security.
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Chapter 10
The Family
MARRIAGE, n. The state or condition of a community 
consisting of a master, a mistress and two slaves, making in 
all, two. (Ambrose Bierce, The Devil’s Dictionary)
Accidents will occur in the best-regulated families.  
(Charles Dickens, Dombey and Son)
As powerful as government is, it can only do so much by 
itself.  Government can never take the place of parents in 
raising children.  Government can never take the place of 
families and churches and synagogues in teaching values.  
(Zell Miller, A National Party No More)
A Bridge to the Future
When he was running for re-election as President, Bill Clinton 
promised to build a bridge to the 21st century.1  He would introduce 
the reforms necessary to deal with the emerging challenges of 
postmodernity and lay the foundation for a nearly utopian future. 
These improvements would, to be sure, be liberal in nature.  Those 
championed by his wife were particularly so.  Hillary Clinton2 had 
earlier acquired notice for, among other things, arguing that it takes 
a village to raise a child.  Paraphrasing an old African adage, she 
contended that it was now up to the government to protect the 
interests of the very young.  Only government-sponsored programs 
could provide the education and security children deserved.  In this, 
neither of the Clintons believed that they were doing damage to the 
family.  Both took it for granted that domesticity in its customary 
format was outdated.  As good bobos,3 they were certain that federal 
regulations were inherently more moral than potentially abusive 
nuclear families.
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For some time now, those who proclaim themselves to be the 
wave of the future have placed their confidence in the quasireligious 
institutions of liberalism.  They have concluded that schools, media, 
entertainment industry, social-work establishments, and law-
enforcement agencies can be trusted to do a better job of raising 
children than the men and women who brought them into the world. 
Because the members of these civil bodies are open to rationalization 
in a way that emotionally biased parents are not,4 they can be perfected 
to a degree impossible for nuclear families.  It is certainly true that 
liberals are more alarmed by private, as opposed to, public abuses. 
They can barely envisage the family as crucial in helping individuals 
adjust to the Great Middle-Class Revolution.  Committed to niceness 
and centralization, they find it inconceivable that unfettered parents 
might do better jobs than the enlightened autocracy they propose. 
Nevertheless, the familial changes presently underway point in the 
direction of an improved management of the professionalism and 
affluence so characteristic of the modern world.  Contrary to the 
faith of its devotees, liberalism is riven with so many contradictions, 
that it cannot overcome the challenges of a complex marketplace or 
individual self-direction.  Families, in contrast, possess an elasticity 
that enables them to adjust to varying demands.5  Though imperfect, 
they can provide more than governments ever will.
Liberals, in their discomfort with the dislocations of the middle-
class ascendancy, have insisted upon absolute solutions.6  In quest 
of intellectual and aesthetic control, they confuse a yearning for 
emotionally infused rationality with insights into how to achieve this. 
Authentically desirous of a better world, they mistake their shared 
fantasies for what is feasible.  That which is actually possible is, in fact, 
in the process of evolving.  Contrary to what they imagine, no single 
person or group of persons, however, has total control over these 
emerging realities because no individual or collection of individuals 
is that formidable.  Discoveries are constantly being made as billions 
of mortals stumble along attempting to deal with their private issues, 
all the while influencing others engaged in similar attempts.  This 
interlocking web of social negotiations is hammering out the shape 
of future families.  Mistakes have been made and will continue 
to be made, but a combination of instinctive longings, combined 
with external pressures, is pushing us toward better answers.  These 
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responses become more rational as people learn more, but they are 
never as pure as are quasireligious visions.  Nevertheless, they are 
bona fide solutions, which are, in addition, emotionally authentic. 
Derived from experience, they are lived rather than speculative.
To begin with, it must be recognized that liberalism has 
inherited a hostility toward the family.  From both its Marxist7 and 
hippie antecedents, it acquires a suspicion of the emotional crucible 
in which organic relationships materialize.  Though both of these 
ideological precursors romanticize a loving family of all humankind, 
they have difficulty with the genuine article.  Like many reformers, 
they tend to be more comfortable with people in the abstract than 
with particular human beings.  For their part, the Marxists equate the 
family with capitalist exploitation.  The bourgeois male is depicted 
as a greedy tyrant who dominates his household for his personal 
glory.  His wife and children are said to be extensions of himself 
who either display his fortune or are groomed to enlarge it.  Since 
both are essentially conceived of as his property, they are his to do 
with as he pleased.  This converts women into sexual objects whose 
central tasks are childrearing and conspicuous consumption.8  His 
children, though loved, are potential heirs whose primary purpose 
is to mirror his personal achievements after he is gone.  Unless they 
liberate themselves from this suffocating hegemony, they are doomed 
never to have independent lives.  The best they can hope is to become 
pampered slaves lashed to the service of his needs.
The Marxists, when they came to power in the Soviet Union, were 
passionate advocates of free love.9  Eager to see the bourgeois family 
consigned to the dustbin of history, they urged women to rebel against 
commodification by participating in sexual relationships solely from 
personal desire.  Children too were soon redefined as the property 
of the state.  Its preservation was where their first loyalty belonged. 
In this, their fidelity would be to all mankind rather than to private 
privilege.  As time passed, this orientation became enshrined in 
schoolrooms where cooperation as opposed to competition is taught. 
Among today’s unacknowledged neo-Marxists, radical feminists 
remain equally distrustful of heterosexual intimacy and filial piety.10 
They, as Engels11 taught, perceive women as having been enslaved by 
men in the wake of the Agricultural Revolution.  Marriage, which 
was designed to hold them in bondage through threats of rape, is 
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regarded as a means of enforcing this tyranny.12  It provides the legal 
chains that enable men to implement their diabolical threats.  Only 
when women recognize this as maltreatment and take charge of 
their lives will they ever be truly free.13  Only by choosing to live 
independently will they become the coequals of men. 
Nor should women be shackled to childrearing.  Anatomy 
must not be allowed to be destiny.14  Just because men want women 
barefoot, pregnant, and in the kitchen does not mean they have 
to comply.  Much more honorable is breaking out to become the 
CEO of a corporation.15  As for children, they, too, will benefit from 
having liberated mothers.  This will provide a model for their own 
manumission and bestow permission to seek independent success.16 
In the feminist universe, loyalty to the family becomes secondary to 
loyalty to oneself.17  This same outlook infused hippie sensibilities. 
Perceiving themselves as eternal children, their primary objective was 
to engage in recreation for its own sake.  They would never settle 
down to become sellouts like the over-thirty crowd.  They would 
certainly never voluntarily assume the responsibility of starting their 
own families.  Having been tutored in the arts of consumption within 
households now interpreted as having purloined their souls, they 
exulted in an autonomous egotism.  Not for them commitments 
to spouses.  Such choices were often mistakes that were later 
transformed into penal relationships.  Nor for them the humdrum 
jobs of those bound to servitude by a need to support children.  The 
hippies18 preferred the pseudofamily of the crash pad.  It allowed 
them to come and go as they pleased, with the illusion that anyone 
in momentary proximity could and would provide as much love as 
might be needed.
Contrasted with this was the misery of the traditional family.19 
Its apotheosis during the Victorian20 era ushered in a sexual repression 
that mirrored the more extensive repression of industrialization. 
Cooped up in isolated households, its victims perforce lived 
cramped, parochial lives.21  Contemporary religious people who 
recommended a return to committed domesticity were thereby 
championing the imposition of a narrow-minded bondage.  Worse 
still, these pious hypocrites wanted to impose families grounded in 
antediluvian platitudes.22  They literally sought to go back to the 
Bible for inspiration about how men and women should treat one 
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another.  Although this text was written thousands of years ago, they 
intended to utilize it as a model for contemporary relationships. 
This was absurd.  Modern Westerners were no longer shepherds.  It 
made no sense for women to walk a step behind their husbands or 
to fawn over them as if they were reincarnations of ancient despots. 
Liberated women neither could nor should be subservient to men 
who were neither smarter nor more moral than they.
What the critics of traditional family values faile to appreciate 
is that the fundamentalists23 are not advocating a literal return to 
the past.  The words might be derived from ancient sources, but the 
sentiments have been adapted to modern conditions.  When these 
religious defenders of the family speak about preserving the institution, 
they are concerned about issues such as personal commitment.  They 
want husbands and wives to be faithful to one another and their 
children.  Although there might be disputes among family members, 
they urge them to work things through without resort to physical 
or emotional desertion.  The parties are to respect one another and 
their mutual pledges.24  Thus, when wives are asked to honor their 
husbands, they are not being asked to become doormats.  They are 
merely expected to treat their spouses with the respect that intimacy 
requires.  Nor was this to be a respect; they, too, are entitled to 
have their needs valued.  The traditionalists further insist that men 
and women are different25 and that, therefore, their responsibilities 
within the family differ, and in this they come closer to reality than 
did those feminists who argue that there are no biological differences 
between the genders—at least, none that matter.  Furthermore, in 
encouraging women to concentrate on being good mothers and 
men on being competent providers, they come nearer to the realities 
of contemporary domestic relations, even taking into account the 
sexual and Middle Class Revolutions.
A bridge to the future is, therefore, unlikely to be structurally 
sound if it does not pay attention to family values.26  Though these 
standards are not liable to be what they once were, neither are they apt 
to be totally different.  The Marxist-inspired and bohemian augmented 
immaturity that captures the bobo imagination, because it totally 
disregards both human nature and social imperatives, cannot provide 
viable answers.  The idea of totally independent human beings who 
can meet their needs for love and their children’s requirements for 
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social support, without stable attachments, is a chimera.27  So is the 
notion that government bureaucrats or impersonal transfer payments 
can substitute for long-term interpersonal commitments.  These are 
ideological fantasies utterly detached from human experience.  Even 
liberals, it is safe to say, have begun to realize these fairy tales are 
inadequate.
Tradition, however, is not unconditional.28  What existed in the 
past was never perfect, nor can it be the final word for all eternity. 
Modifications have been made right along and will continue to be 
made.  The importance of tradition is as a starting point.  The rules 
people once lived by, in their time, undoubtedly served significant 
purposes, even if their functions have been misunderstood.  Jettisoning 
them without qualms would, therefore, be unwise.  More prudent 
is experimenting with reasonable modifications.  Small changes 
that are re-evaluated as people push ahead can avoid catastrophic 
readjustments.  The trouble, of course, is that no one possesses a 
consistent objectivity.  Human beings are always confused by the 
small slice of reality they personally glimpse.  Imagining that each 
slice is the whole, they generally project it past its the breaking point. 
They are also hampered by intellectual and emotional boundaries 
they cannot overcome.  No one is as smart as he or she supposes. 
This produces an inevitable irrationality that is compounded by 
the turbulence introduced via other people’s irrationalities.  Being 
churned in a world of competing demands is inherently disorienting. 
Often, the best that can be done is to look back upon past social 
negotiations in order to discern how they evolved.  With luck, it 
may be possible to recognize what people have been dealing with 
and why.
The Post-Liberal Way of Life
In chapter 3 much was made of the middle class way of life.  People 
are said to be coping with a commercial world in which the division 
of labor has subdivided to a perplexing degree.  Required by technical 
and social circumstances to adapt to unprecedented complexities, 
they create a decentralized and professionalized lifestyle contingent 
upon self-direction and internalized disciplines.  They thereby learn 
to make independent decisions in a fluid environment fraught with 
uncertainties.  This is no mean task, one ultimately betrayed by the 
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normal human tendency toward cultural lag.29  People who grow up 
with the customs and social relationships of one way of life find it 
difficult to convert to another.  Frequently, they do not even recognize 
the pressures they are sustaining.  As a consequence, when attempting 
to adapt to what they think is happening, they revert to reactionary 
solutions.  This is the irony of liberalism.  Touted as a progressive 
development, it is actually retrogressive.  Bound to an absolutism and 
a naïve familism, it depends upon quasireligious alliances to enforce 
its dictates.  When it comes to the family, although it propounds an 
extended domesticity of all humanity, in practice it seeks to dismantle 
nuclear families in favor of a government-sponsored hegemony.30
This, almost certainly, cannot be the shape of things to come. 
Interlaced with contradictions and institutionalized falsehoods too 
unstable to provide a sound foundation, it must collapse.  What seems 
more likely is the establishment of a post-liberal way of life centered 
on professionalism.  Liberalism does offer hope for improvements, 
and this hope cannot be abandoned, but neither can it be allowed 
to explode due to romantic idealism.  An optimistic, yet realistic, 
alternative must be found.  Fortunately, this transformation is in the 
process of materializing.  Families are being revamped as this is being 
written.  As important, these modifications are not apt to result in 
its termination.  The nuclear family is decidedly not dead.31  Despite 
the ravages of divorce and extramarital affairs, an overwhelming 
majority of people choose.  They still dream of finding soul mates 
and of raising a passel of tow-headed children.  What they participate 
in differs from what their parents knew, but its dimensions would 
nevertheless be recognizable to earlier generations.
The family emerging from the Middle Class Revolution is one 
that has been amended to fit the needs of developing circumstances.32 
To begin with, this remains a hierarchical world.  It has not become 
suffused with a quixotic egalitarianism.  Social class continues to be 
a crucial organizing principle, with some individuals winning and 
others losing.  Successful families are, therefore, those capable of 
promoting social mobility.  This means the marital partners must 
receive the interpersonal support they need in order to win tests of 
strength.33  Though the criteria required to come out on top have 
changed, some couples continue to achieve greater power than 
others.  The family must, as a consequence, keep up with these 
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advances.  It has to furnish the resources to meet emerging standards 
of success.  Husbands and wives have to encourage their respective 
professionalization and, as parents, must collaborate in preparing 
their children to achieve self-directed futures.34  All must acquire the 
skills and emotional reserves to enter and sustain productive alliances 
in a world full of strangers.35
Liberalism fosters a quasireligious orientation toward the family. 
Its simple faith is in disembodied love and centralized altruism.36 
Yet, upon a closer inspection, it reflects a flaccid immaturity.  Parents 
are asked to be indulgent, friends to their children, and spouses 
are asked to be open-minded regarding the partner’s infidelities. 
Even single parenthood is celebrated as evidence of multicultural 
tolerance.  None of this, however, has been well thought through. 
Advocates have not considered the implications of their proposals. 
What, for instance, would happen to youngsters who did not have 
parents capable of consistent discipline or marital partners who 
were continually betrayed by irresponsible mates?  Love and good 
intentions may be alleged to conquer all, but among normal human 
beings they never do.  In fact, the liberal family is about denying the 
validity of the traditional family, rather than offering a blueprint for 
a viable alternative.  It is an act of defiance, not a prudent effort at 
innovation.
Not too surprisingly, the professionalizing family is apt to have 
more in common with professionalized occupations than with 
colliding billiard balls.    and lawyers and their ilk are trusted to 
make important decisions because they have demonstrated the 
expertise and motivation to do so effectively.  The same must apply 
to the family.  It has to provide its members with the expertise and 
motivation to live successful lives.  This means its core cannot be 
bound together by flower power or mindless tolerance.  Nor can it be 
about total independence.  Although its members are self-directed and 
self-disciplined, they must also be committed to a common mission. 
Individually, they need to know a great deal and to be a great deal. 
They, likewise, have to possess significant people skills, technical 
skills, and emotional maturity.  Beyond this, they benefit from being 
committed to middle class values and virtues.  The job of the family, 
as a group, is to inculcate and perpetuate these factors.37  Both for 
the marital partners and their children, the family must facilitate 
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the sorts of strength necessary for its members to make independent 
decisions in an indeterminate world of shifting alliances.  An ability 
to be successfully assertive under these circumstances derives, in part, 
from biology.  Some people are born smarter and more energetic 
than others.  Nevertheless, much of the family comes from the social 
structure and culture in which a person is embedded.  The family 
is at the center of this infrastructure.  It is the framework that gives 
people their start, in life and that keeps them going in moments of 
stress.
For a husband and a wife, the family has been described as a 
haven in a heartless world.38  It is a place to which they can retreat 
to lick their wounds and receive aid and comfort from individuals 
who care about them.  Those who do not have such succor face the 
daunting challenges of fending off the pressures of social competition 
in isolation.  Without someone to love, the individual must find the 
courage to persist somewhere deep inside.  For children, the family 
can also be a safe home base.39  It is a place where they, too, can 
receive acceptance and encouragement.  But, it is also their primary 
source of socialization.  It is where lessons are taught in how to cope 
with what is eventually to come.  It is also the starting point for social 
networking.  The child who does not have a supportive family is, as 
a result, deprived of a ticket into the middle classes.  The child will 
have to scramble to learn how and with whom upward mobility can 
be accomplished.
The family is critical for instilling and reinforcing people skills, 
emotional maturity,40 and middle-class values and virtues.41  Less 
focal in teaching technical skills, it may nevertheless be significant 
in directing children toward the schools and jobs where these can 
be acquired.  Social propaganda to the contrary, formal education 
is inept at teaching personal competence.  If someone wants to 
study the mathematics of civil engineering, there is no better place 
than an accredited university.  If one wants to discover how to be 
a responsive role-taker, however, it is virtually useless.  One of the 
reasons liberalism cannot fulfill its promises is that public institutions 
are dismal at dealing with emotional tasks.42  As is well known, 
massive bureaucracies and formal regulations are notorious for 
impersonality.43  They may advertise themselves as caring about the 
little person, but they, in fact, incorporate few individuals assigned 
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to do the caring.  Genuine emotional concern occurs among people 
who know one another and who, typically, have previously bonded. 
Massive organizations specialize in an interchangeability of 
personnel that is inimical to intimate emotional support.  No sooner 
do those who belong get to know one another than they are whisked 
away to other assignments.  They, thus, find themselves subject to 
rules enforced by individuals who do not know or care about them. 
This is true even in elementary-school classrooms.  Many teachers44 
assume that they will be able to compensate for the love their charges 
are not getting at home, but this is a vain hope.  They can never 
know most of their students well enough to achieve this, but, what is 
worse, they can never commit to them for the long haul.  However 
well things go during this school year, their charges will be passed 
along to someone else next term.  And the children know this.  They 
understand that they cannot depend on the long-term availability of 
the best-intentioned teacher.  Their parents, in contrast, will be there 
next year and the year after that.  Parents are the ones children have 
to worry about and the ones upon whom their fate depends.  For 
better or worse, they are the persons with whom emotional bonding 
is possible.
With respect to people skills, the intimate intensity of the 
nuclear family is decisive.45  A father, a mother, and their children 
interact regularly and familiarly.  They have access to one another 
when they are at their most vulnerable and most open to influence. 
Take the issue of communication.  Family members converse with 
one another both verbally and non-verbally.  For the young, these 
dialogues are the place where they learn language and where they 
discover how to be persuasive.  If their parents are inarticulate, it 
is not likely they will be much different.  Members of the middle 
class, it must be remembered, are cultural specialists.46  Their jobs 
typically entail the manipulation of symbols.  They are, therefore, 
well equipped to demonstrate how this is done.  This may not be 
fair, but it is the way it is.  If one’s parents are not orally expressive 
or do not value expressivity, they are unlikely to encourage it in 
their offspring.  Middle class mothers and fathers, to the contrary, 
encourage communication by filling their houses with high-quality 
books and sophisticated cultural artifacts.  The poor generally do 
not.
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Similar considerations apply to role-taking and responsiveness.47 
Parents who are self-involved make it difficult to learn how to see 
things through the eyes of others.  Not only are they inadequate 
models, but their selfishness tends to elicit defensive counter-measures. 
This, in turn, makes it difficult to develop subtle negotiation skills. 
Individuals who do not recognize the needs and goals of their role 
partners fail to recognize solutions that might meet their concerns.48 
Instead of engaging in problem-solving efforts where both parties 
emerge as winners, they arouse suspicion and resistance.  Should 
this sort of conflict arise, the chances of building effective alliances 
are reduced.  Since the family is the place where a person’s first 
interpersonal negotiations occur, it is where basic training in deal 
making occurs.  As should be evident, middle-class parents, because 
they are apt to be better practiced at this skill, make better tutors. 
Although deal-making routinely occurs among school-yard peers, it 
is remarkable how closely this follows patterns instituted earlier.
There are also the closely related competencies of self-knowledge 
and other-knowledge.  Because learning to see what is taking place 
inside dissimilar individuals begins with being able to look inside 
oneself, children of self-aware parents get a head start over those 
never exposed to parental introspection.  Knowing oneself takes 
courage.  All human beings are more fragile than they would prefer; 
hence, they can be discouraged from making unwelcome discoveries. 
If these discoveries are also turned into weapons against a child by 
insecure parents, the message is obvious.  The youngster is thereby 
instructed on the virtue of becoming an opaque fortress, opaque even 
to himself.  If, on the other hand, parents are sympathetic toward 
their own and their offspring’s mistakes, they can point toward 
methods for overcoming these.  They can instill an honest acceptance 
of normal human frailties
Once more, middle-class children have an advantage.  Because 
their parents will probably have developed personal insights in their 
quests for social mobility, they are better able to teach these.49  They 
will also have learned more about what makes others tick.  People- and 
data-oriented occupations demand a cosmopolitan sophistication. 
They force individuals to discover that blindness to cultural and 
situational differences produces an ignorance that is not conducive 
to sensitive leadership or valid decision-making.  Self-absorbed social 
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organizers virtually beg to be challenged by subordinates who may be 
required perform what they are not equipped to perform.  Such bosses 
inadvertently violate Chester Barnard’s50 injunction that a manager 
should only lead where others are already headed, or, at least, where 
they are willing to head.  Parents who deliver this understanding must 
perforce possess an accurate comprehension of social arrangements. 
As a consequence, their children will be less naïve than their more 
sheltered rivals and, therefore, less apt to inspire insurrections by 
being authoritarian.
People skills can also be reinforced within the marital union. 
A husband and wife who are both middle class can supplement 
each other’s abilities.  Since both are apt to possess independent 
competences, they can pool their resources such that both are better 
off than either would be, alone.51  A woman may, for example, share 
her superior ability to read emotions by interpreting subtle social 
cues for her husband, whereas a man may share his more aggressive 
problem-solving style.  As important, in getting to know each 
other, they can acquire a better understanding of themselves and 
of outsiders. The mutual responsiveness and role-taking52 required 
of them hones their dexterity in dealing with others.  Similarly, 
engaging in the negotiations inherent in an intimate relationship can 
improve bargaining skills.  People who learn to accommodate one 
another, in the intensity of private liaisons, can productively transfer 
this forbearance to other circumstances.  In learning to get along 
with one another, they obtain an advantage in getting along with 
strangers.
Many family-nurtured people skills are closely bound to the 
emotional maturity that is a product of certain kinds of intimacy. 
Emotional maturity,53 that is, an ability to control and utilize strong 
emotions, is of enormous import.  To be emotionally immature is to 
be a social weakling easily intimidated by others.54  Those who are 
overwhelmed by their own feelings are prone to having these used 
against them.  Yet, emotional strengths do not come automatically. 
All human beings enter the world equipped with roughly the same 
affective toolbox.  Some may perhaps be more passionate than others, 
but all are imbued with a capacity for anger,55 fear, love, etc.  How 
to employ these interpersonally must, however, be learned.  The 
primitive emotions of children—the crying, the lashing out, etc.—
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come naturally, whereas control and appropriate communication 
do not.56  These must be socialized, that is, they must be taught 
and practiced.  Once more, the family, as the locus of interpersonal 
intimacy,57 is where this best occurs.  It is the place adults who have 
learned to manage their own feelings can instruct the young on how 
to manage theirs.
The school, the work site, and the welfare office cannot substitute 
for the family.58  They provide neither the continuity nor the intensity 
to do the task.  What goes on behind a family’s closed doors is usually 
supposed to stay there because much of it would be embarrassing in 
front of outsiders.  Most people want to appear more mature and 
in better control than they are.  They, therefore, lack candor with 
strangers.  It is only in the let-it-all-hang-out environment of the 
private household that they are truly themselves.  As a consequence, 
only some tasks are possible.  Learning to deal with strong emotions is 
impracticable in places where they rarely go wild.  Unless passions are 
sometimes too powerful to be contained, there can be no rehearsal in 
containing them.  Childhood tantrums, to cite one familiar case, must 
be managed in situ.  The toddler rolling around the floor in despair 
discovers during his agony that this condition is not fatal.  If parents 
who are not unhinged by the display immediately confront the child 
with its vapidity, the child may also learn that this demonstration 
is ineffective.  This should prompt seeking more advanced means 
of making a point.  Were emotions only talked about or indirectly 
referred to in socially acceptable charades, they could never be 
successfully resolved.  Public pretense is occasionally required, but it 
does not allow for experiential learning.  Family crises, for all their 
sturm und drang, are, therefore, essential.
Among the emotions with which families deal are anger, fear, and 
love.  Individuals who never learn to deal with rage never find the 
means to overcome their frustrations.  Those for whom terror is more 
than they can handle never learn to cope with social intimidation. 
And those for whom intense love is an ineluctable mystery may be 
swept away by a desire to be cared for by the perfect other.  Yet, all 
of these feelings occur in every family.  Some individuals suppress 
them in an attempt to deny their presence, but no normal child ever 
escapes their clutches.  All that hiding from them achieves is sending 
the message that they are beyond control.  This strategy, for that 
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reason, perpetuates immaturity instead of confronting it.  To resort 
to what has become a familiar mantra, middle-class status can once 
more make the difference.  Because most people- and data-oriented 
jobs cannot be navigated without emotional maturity, middle-class 
parents are less likely to feel overmatched by a child’s emotionality. 
Their own work-forged courage comes into play at home and enables 
them to convey the dependable love that converts passion from an 
enemy into a friend.
Marital partners may correspondingly find that marriage increases 
their emotional maturity.  Small children often require an adult to 
mediate their disputes.  On their own, the violence of their anger can 
escalate to insupportable levels.  A husband and wife cannot afford to 
permit this to happen when they disagree.  They must independently 
find the means to restrain their passions.  They must learn that, 
although they will fight,59 they are capable of resolving these quarrels 
without inflicting emotional injuries.60  What is more, if they love 
each other, they can become allies in increasing each other’s internal 
reserves.  Instead of engaging in emotional assaults, they can provide 
the loving tolerance within which an overexcited partner is allowed to 
regain control.  Couples who establish a reliable domestic anchorage 
within which both can find safety, thereby, furnish the conditions 
for further emotional growth.  This sort of learning is not something 
confined to childhood.  Fresh dangers, frustrations, and yearnings 
must continually be confronted and mastered by adults.  An intimate 
friend, i.e., a spouse, who cares and who is present during moments 
of stress can be crucial in providing the collaboration that makes the 
difference.
The family is also the place where values and virtues are inculcated 
into children.61  Parents instruct their young on which goals are 
important.  As significant, they provide both models of propriety 
and of negotiating partners for deciding what is acceptable.  Because 
morality is socially constructed, it must be passed along from one 
generation to the next.  One of the ways children learn to be decent 
human beings is by observing paradigms of moral behavior.  Parents 
who live out these patterns provide the best lessons on virtue.  Honest 
parents are thus unsurpassed at demonstrating that honesty is both 
valuable and possible.  They also offer examples of how truth can be 
employed.  By the same token, they may function as sounding boards 
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against which the young can test variations on moral standards.  Since 
each generation confronts different challenges, its members will need 
to modify their patrimony.  Some sorts of falsehoods, for instance, 
become less morally acceptable under emerging circumstances. 
But, which ones in particular need to be altered is determined in 
negotiations with authority figures.  This process occurs within 
families when parents and children differ on what is appropriate, as 
they regularly do about such matters as staying out late on dates or 
experimenting with psychoactive substances.
Among the most important moral traditions transmitted are 
those entailing personal responsibility,62 individual merit, and self-
discipline.  Children, who are rewarded for exercising initiative and 
for accepting blame, are more likely to take chances and to learn 
from these experiences.  Likewise, when they are praised for their 
successes and honored for their individuality, they are more apt to 
value personal achievement.  Perhaps as important, children who are 
loved for themselves are likely to grow into loving adults.63  Having 
been raised in a trustworthy emotional environment, they develop 
into trustworthy role partners, partners who can be relied upon by 
intimate strangers.  Nor need they be naïve in placing their confidence 
in others.  Those who experience trust early on learn to distinguish 
between genuine reliability and the counterfeit variety.
Finally, marital intimacy can promote moral behavior in a 
husband and wife.64  Sociology has taught us that partners who 
share crucial values have successful heterosexual relationships.  If one 
believes in honesty and the other does not, their interchanges are likely 
to be fraught with conflict.  On the other hand, if both are honest, 
they reinforce this disposition.  Although external forces will batter 
them with contradictory messages, they can validate their shared 
commitments and hold fast despite periodic disappointments.  They 
can also discuss their reactions to evolving circumstances.  Since they, 
like their children, continue to negotiate their moral obligations, they 
can, as well-disposed allies, do so with greater confidence.  Because 
they stand with each other, they are more likely to stand up to those 
who disagree and, in the process, contribute to social bargains in 
accord with their own needs.
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Feminist (etc.) Lessons
Because the middle-class way of life could not have been foreseen, 
the way the family developed has been misunderstood.  Would-
be prophets regularly denounced the institution as antiquated and 
confining.65  Later, feminists pinned most of the blame for their 
personal disillusionments on men.66  They lambasted males as gender 
bullies who intentionally imprisoned women in gilded suburban 
cages.  Neither of these perspectives was accurate.67  Marriage has 
demonstrated a continuing utility for men, women, and children,68 
whereas most men have been unfairly castigated as protorapists. 
Nevertheless, there are lessons to be learned from the Marxist and 
feminist missteps.  In their efforts to persuade people of their utopian 
fantasies, they convinced many of the unwary to pursue their visions. 
These did not succeed, but their failures revealed what was left out. 
In this, they also highlighted what the professionalized family of the 
future must include.
One of the more painful lessons has been provided by divorce.69 
Traditionally, marriages were considered everlasting.  After a couple 
said its “I do’s,” they expected to live happily ever after, or at least 
until one of them died.  With the advent of widespread prosperity, 
all this changed.  Because the availability of market-oriented jobs 
enabled both men70 and women to live independently,71 many came 
to the conclusion that it made no sense to remain bound in a loveless 
union.  Divorce became common and even normal, once the laws 
were changed to facilitate marital dissolution.  In the midst of this 
instability, opinions about divorce underwent a sea change.  What 
was previously regarded as sinful was reevaluated to be beneficial. 
Dissolving a bad relationship was said to give each partner an 
opportunity to find a better match and their children a chance to 
grow up within a loving family.  Rather than suffer from emotional 
or physical abuse, all would be resilient enough to embrace the 
transformation.
This turned out to be wishful thinking.72  Most divorces do not 
produce the expected gains.73  Ideological promises of a bright future 
are not redeemed because they are not based on a sound understanding 
of human-attachment behavior.  Those who propounded them 
believed that people could rationally move from one relationship to 
another without undue upset.  What they failed to reckon with was 
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the emotional aspects of personal bonds.  When people get married, 
they do not merely sign a piece of paper; they also undergo a courtship 
process that rearranges their internal motivations.  Falling in love 
rewires their brains so that they cannot move on with impunity. 
Once a relationship has been forged, it can only be torn asunder 
with difficulty.  Almost everyone wants love to be perpetual; hence, 
when it is not, individuals experience disappointment.  They become 
furiously angry at the partners who, they feel, betrayed them and 
eventually fall into deep depressions.  Divorce is an unhappy event 
even when the ex-spouse is a miserable human being.  The agony 
of detaching from a former lover takes several years, at minimum. 
But even then, the acceptance of this catastrophe does not prepare 
either party for something better.  An individuals who has chosen a 
partner poorly often utilizes the newfound freedom to make another 
appalling choice.  Nor may that person have learned much about 
how to make intimacy work.74  There is no guarantee that the person 
will not make the same mistakes in a new marriage.
One of the discoveries that emerged from the explosion in the 
rate of divorce is that marriages must be worked at.  Love does not 
automatically exclude conflict.  No matter how well suited two 
individuals may be, they are never a perfect match.  They must, 
therefore, learn how to negotiate their differences.  This means they 
must be committed to hammering their disagreements out.  If they 
are not, if they look for quick exits once they hit a rough patch, they 
will never salvage a strong bond.  During the hippie interregnum, 
trial marriages, often without benefit of clergy, came into vogue. 
Couples lived together in sexual cohabitation without agreements 
to formalize their relationships.  This was rationalized as providing 
information upon which a solid association could arise.  If individuals 
saw firsthand what their partners were like, they could presumably 
unite their fortunes once they had confirmed their worth.  As a result, 
they would be less likely to divorce.  But this is not how it turned out. 
Partners who lived together for extended periods before marriage 
are more apt to divorce.  This might appear nonsensical, but what 
researchers found was that those who shacked up before tying the 
knot tended to be less committed to the institution of marriage.  As 
a result, when things went wrong they invested less effort in working 
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them out.  More traditional couples who viewed marriage as sacred 
stayed together long enough to find solutions.
This said, the greatest victims of precipitous divorce turn out to 
be the children.75  These innocents are the most affected by ruptures 
over which they have almost no say.  Before the divorce craze, 
conventional wisdom urged unhappy spouses to stay together for 
the sake of the children.  Afterwards, it was equally well understood 
that children were resilient enough to bounce back from the worst 
breakup.  Indeed, they would benefit by being freed from an 
atmosphere saturated by parental conflict.  For a while, the experts 
agreed with this claim.  Unfortunately, they did not have the benefit 
of longitudinal studies.  It took years for the children of divorce to 
reach maturity and for the hidden injuries of their conditions to come 
to light.  Eventually, social scientists recognized that in almost every 
measurable category these children are at a disadvantage.  Persons 
whose parents had separated are themselves more likely to divorce. 
They are also less apt to be well educated or to achieve economic 
success.  Even their health suffers relative to that of their peers. 
Divorce, it seems, leaves children emotionally isolated and financially 
at risk.  Parents distracted by the pain of their own troubles have less 
time to recognize or alleviate those of their youngsters.  Instead, these 
children have to suppress their pain lest they further distress their 
parents.  Frequently blaming themselves for what has gone wrong, 
they have to wait until adulthood to work through losses incurred 
when they were small.  In the meantime, they endure relative 
impoverishment and a father who is at best an infrequent visitor. 
Moreover, because so many men remarried, they were also unlikely 
to provide assistance in funding college educations.
Perhaps worst off are the children of unmarried parents.76  As 
divorce becomes more frequent, many conclude that marriage is 
an unnecessary frill.  As a result, illegitimacy rates have exploded. 
Feminists argue that a woman alone, unencumbered by masculine 
oppression, can provide better parenting by herself.77  Not diverted 
by a need to ward off abuse, she can offer maternal love in its 
purest form.   In their view, a heterosexual commitment is not only 
superfluous, it was positively harmful.  Yet, the research on the 
children of illegitimacy is even more discouraging than that for those 
of divorce.78  They, too, suffer personal and professional disabilities 
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from which they find it difficult to extricate themselves.  Far from 
being the happy recipients of freedom, they tend to be insecure and 
unsuccessful.  Frequently afflicted by mental disorders and inclined 
to indulge in deviant behaviors, the absence of two loving parents 
handicaps them by denying them the emotional, financial, and 
socialization supports that might prepare them to hold their own in 
a dynamic commercial society.
Marriage has been misconstrued.79  Visions of unencumbered 
lust as a practical alternative are always a false ideal.  Simply having 
sex for the mere pleasure of the experience has unanticipated 
consequences, consequences that leave its practitioners bereft of the 
expected payoffs.  In contrast, marriage, though it ties people down, 
provides compensation for this restriction.  The Great Middle-
Class Revolution has not reduced the relevance of the family.  To 
the contrary, it has enhanced it.  Both men and women profit 
from the companionship of stable marriages; both derive comforts 
from the material rewards of their partnerships; and both can draw 
pleasure from raising children who will one day grow to be happy, 
self-sufficient individuals.  Far from being the seedbed of despotism, 
the successful middle-class family provides refuges within which all 
can pursue their private dreams.  While the institution is not an 
unruffled sanctuary, it is superior to the alternatives.
Nor has feminist male-bashing been productive.  Men have never 
been the despots they have been portrayed to be.  Most are certainly 
not rapists.80  Indeed, isolating and demonizing them has had 
disconcerting effects.  Ironically, though males have been maligned, 
those most seriously damaged are not the intended targets.  Relieving 
men of their marital and parental duties does not bankrupt them, 
nor reduce their power, nor even deprive them of sexual outlets. 
What it does is to force women into uncomfortable roles and to 
deprive children of their fathers.81  Furthermore, because marriages 
are adversely affected, men, women, and children are denied the 
benefits of the emotional and financial supports these can provide.  
For the moment, let us focus on the damage done the father 
role.  The feminist indictment of men includes their alleged abuse 
of their children.  Said to be inherently violent, the blows they 
direct at their offspring supposedly harm them more than would 
living without them.  This is demonstrably wrong.  Children need 
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their fathers.82  The limits they set, the goals they encourage, and 
the models they provide are of inestimable value.  Fathers are critical 
in inculcating the strengths needed to succeed in a competitive 
society.  Even the roughhousing in which they specialize has the 
effect of making competition fun.  If this sometimes frightens the 
young, it is more than compensated for by the protective buffer they 
furnish.  Should this be doubted, sociologists have established that 
the children of strong, available fathers do better than those without 
them.  They tend to feel better about themselves and hence are more 
confident when they strike out on their own.  They also have a better 
understanding of what it is to be a man, both within a family and 
out in the marketplace.  This is better for boys who will become men, 
and also for girls who may one day want to interact with one.
Feminists, in stark contrast, mistakenly contend that there 
are virtually no differences between men and women.83  They find 
men unnecessary because in their androgynous universe women 
can perform any service that males can.84  Women are told that 
they can have it all.  They can simultaneously be lovers, mothers, 
corporate presidents, and, if necessary, surrogate fathers.  All that has 
to happen is for men to relinquish their hegemony so that women 
can demonstrate their worth.  This transformation is supposed to 
be utterly democratic and pacifically cooperative.  Men are urged 
to oblige because after they denounce their macho posturing, they 
too will find solace in the liberation of their own feminine qualities. 
Equality, in the final analysis, is said to be the ultimate form of 
freedom.  Yet, this prediction has not been fulfilled.  Men and women 
have not become carbon copies of one another.  Feminists typically 
blamed this on male obstructionism, but most people, including 
women, realize that there are fundamental differences between the 
genders.  Females may want equal pay for equal work,85 but they 
do not want to be men.86  Nor did they want to be superwomen 
once they realize that this entails the expenditure of more energy 
than anyone has to spare.  If they have to choose where to apply 
themselves, many decide that being a mother counts for more than 
running a corporation.
The most fundamental error of feminists, one that has amply 
been confirmed by modern science, is their assertion that the only 
differences between the genders are in their sexual plumbing.87  Some 
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sociology texts88 persist in making this claim, but psychologists and 
biologists have demonstrated numerous behavioral and biological 
discrepancies in this thinking.  Whatever the radicals say, men do 
tend to be more aggressive than women.  From infancy, they are 
predisposed to be more assertive.  This is not a matter of learning but 
of genetic heritage.  Similarly, women are more nurturing toward 
young children.  Strongly drawn toward babies and toddlers and 
gentler in manner, women find this reciprocated by their being 
preferred as sources of emotional comfort.  These differences are not 
absolute.  Were they graphed, they would show up as overlapping 
normal curves.  Just as it is accurate to say the men are taller than 
women because on average there is a more than five-inch difference, 
so men are on average more aggressive than women.  In particular 
cases, it might be the woman who is taller or more aggressive, but 
this does not alter the overall distribution.
Other differences have been revealed in terms of brain structure.89 
Women are verbally more able than men.  They have more neurons 
in the part of the brain that organizes speech.  They also have a larger 
corpus callosum.  This means that the communication between their 
right and left hemispheres is better than in male brains.  Magnetic 
resonance imaging discloses that, when given identical problems to 
solve, women utilize more areas in different parts of the brain.  On a 
macro level, this is expressed in the intuitive and multitasking abilities 
in which women have long excelled.90  Men, on the other hand, tend 
to be more precise in their orientation, a style that has generally been 
depicted as logical.  For many decades, sociologists, and more recently 
linguists, 91 have noted that men tend to be instrumental in style, 
whereas women are expressive.92  What this means is that men are 
more intent on getting tasks accomplished, whereas women are more 
concerned with maintaining tranquil relationships.  Closely related 
to this is the fact that men are more occupied with competition and 
women with cooperation.  Though the genders belong to the same 
species and, hence, are both enormously competitive and cooperative, 
the energies they devote to desired ends are not the identical.
Few serious observers today dispute these disparities.  To do so, 
as many feminists continue to do, is to encourage men and women 
to seek jobs they are unlikely to find satisfying.93  The feminist ideal, 
namely androgyny, would have eliminated the gender division of 
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labor.94  All jobs would be divided 50/50, with women working in 
equal numbers as machinists and men as primary school teachers.  It 
would not matter that men are better at spatial relationships or that 
women are superior with young children.  To the gender reformers, 
democracy means not freedom of choice, but absolute equality, even 
if artificially enforced.  Unwilling to allow the chips to fall where they 
may, they even insist on reorganizing the military to put women on 
the front lines.  Though this requires that the standards of physical 
training be lowered to accommodate women whose upper body 
strength does not match that of men, they forge ahead, irrespective 
of the consequences for national security.
The question naturally arises as to why feminists have made so 
palpable an error.  Paradoxically, the reason seems to be connected 
with of the Middle-Class Revolution.  Once the Industrial 
Revolution95 moved into high gear, men transferred their work from 
behind the plow onto the factory floor.  Women stayed behind to 
take care of the house and children, yet, as technology advanced, 
much of their work was taken over by labor-saving machinery.  For 
middle-class women, this eventually reduced their status to that 
of an indolent symbol of family prosperity.  This, however, was 
boring and unappreciated.  By the 1950s, suburban housewives 
began to feel more useless than is good for anyone’s ego.96  From 
their perspective, men were monopolizing the fun and glory.  Into 
this void marched the feminists with their hyperegalitarian solution. 
Since the male jobs were more rewarding, feminists would rectify 
the imbalance by opening them to women.  The women, in short, 
would do everything their husbands did—and vice versa.  What did 
not occur to these social engineers was that the traditional differences 
might be transferred to the workplace.  Transfixed by an egalitarian 
Marxist ideology,97 they could not conceive of a world in which 
males continued their competitive/instrumental ways, whereas 
females dominated the expressive roles.  Yet, this seems to be what 
has happened.  Women continue to preside over elementary-school 
education,98 while men rule the construction trades.  This, however, 
is a matter of choice and divergent skills, not of male hegemony. 
Men intent on cheating women out of their just heritage have not 
imposed it on them.
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A failure to recognize the differences between the genders has also 
had untoward outcomes with respect to heterosexual relationships. 
In as simple an issue as dating,99 a refusal to admit that male and 
female sexualities are different has confused how people make contact. 
When Freud100 suggested that anatomy is destiny, the feminists 
scoffed.101  As far as they were concerned, there did not need to be a 
double standard.  If men could play around, why couldn’t they?  If 
their brothers could call women to ask them out, why should they 
have to wait passively by the phone?  Nevertheless, when women did 
not react as aggressively as was hoped, the reformers did not revise 
their understanding of the causes.  Ideologically prevented from 
acknowledging the truth, they could not confess that women had 
more of an investment in pregnancy than men and that, therefore, 
they needed to be more careful about whom they admitted into their 
bedrooms.  Nor could they recognize that men are more interested 
in physical beauty because this is a biological sign of female fertility, 
whereas women are more concerned with male finances because this 
represents evidence of an ability to protect them and their children. 
Instead they condemned men for admiring female pulchritude. 
Against all history, an appreciative glance became evidence of sexual 
harassment and could get a culpable male fired from his job.  Though 
many women enjoyed being visually prized, those who did not were 
allowed to define what was unlawful.
All of this amounts to a radical reversal of Victorian standards.102 
Then, it was women who were by common consent seductive hussies. 
In their lust, they distracted men from their duties.  For the feminists, 
the opposite has been true.  It is men who in their lust have terrified 
women into submission.  Threats of rape, rather than feminine wiles, 
poisoned gender relations.103  Both of these theories are, of course, 
absurd caricatures.  Men and women are simultaneously different 
and similar.  Though one or the other may specialize in a particular 
quality, both share enough to understand where the other is coming 
from.  They are also both complex compounds of good and bad. 
Neither has a monopoly on virtue or vice.  Nevertheless, for a while 
the gender warfare was out of hand, with accusations of perfidy rising 
to comedic heights.  Thankfully, sanity seems to be returning.  More 
people have come to realize that individual men and women need 
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to be appreciated for what they are and not for how they fit into an 
artificial morality game.
This has happened none too soon because successful families 
depend on men and women who both understand and approve of 
their respective uniquenesses.  Raising children well begins with 
parents who not only like, but love, one another.  This, however, 
is difficult in an atmosphere where the partners are encouraged to 
be suspicious.  The gender libels they propagated are probably the 
worst contribution of the feminists.  These have made it difficult for 
men and women to achieve an accurate assessment of each other. 
An accomplishment that is inherently difficult is made more so by 
suggestions that men are devils and women, innocent victims.  This 
encourages, not honest and egalitarian communications, but gender-
based posturing.  It makes each side feel that it has been wronged and 
that this injustice might be irreversible.
Voluntary Intimacy
These are serious errors.  Heated gender misunderstandings make 
it seem as if the family is beyond redemption.  Nevertheless, under 
this smokescreen of contempt, a new sort of family has been arising 
on the foundations of the traditional model.  This is a family that is 
more isolated than its predecessors but, for that very reason, more 
flexible.  The new middle-class family has to be nimble on its feet.  A 
highly commercialized and technologically integrated society is one 
in which change has become endemic.  From moment to moment, 
the skills demanded have mutated at a dizzying tempo.  So have the 
locations where these are required.  Those who cannot keep up, those 
whose professionalization is stuck in an obsolescent mode, pay the 
price by falling behind.  Families, therefore, have to be supportive of 
adaptability.  They need to help their members stay abreast of changing 
jobs, postgraduate education, and transcontinental relocations.  As a 
result, they have to be small and self-sufficient.
In former years, extended families were the archetype.104  If aunts 
and uncles did not reside under the same roof, they usually lived 
within walking distance.  Nowadays, economic fragmentation has 
become so routine that families have tendrils in remote locations. 
Formerly, relatives could drop by one another’s homes, but now they 
rely on long-distance telephone conversations to remain in contact. 
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This has made the nuclear family the primary focus of allegiance. 
A man, a woman, and their children have become the center of 
their own universe.  In a decentralized market society, they are the 
molecules that must be rearranged to make for an efficient whole.  As 
a consequence, there is more stress on the pair bond of the marital 
couple.  Where once their respective families and friends pressured 
them to dwell together, the responsibility for doing so now falls on 
their shoulders.  Despite the ease of divorce, if they are to remain 
together, it is because they voluntarily choose to do so.
In this, the family has itself become professionalized.  It members, 
and more particularly the spouses, must possess the expertise and 
motivation to make their relationships work.105  Because they reside 
in a self-sufficient home, making their own decisions about how 
to live, it is up to them if this is to be done satisfactorily.  While 
they may receive advice from those close to them, their economic 
and social independence provides the room to act as they desire. 
Nevertheless, the intimacy and interdependence of this arrangement 
holds dangers.106  Unregulated intimacy is fraught with hazards. 
Adult human beings (whether hetero- or homosexual) who dwell 
under the same roof, and often sleep in the same bed, hold each 
other’s fate in their hands.  Behind closed doors, unsupervised by 
outside authorities, they can inflict injuries of unparalleled ferocity. 
Because they are physically close, they have the opportunity to 
do material harm.  They can, if they desire, murder one another. 
Though this does not occur often, propinquity provides a setting for 
emotional violence.  People who dwell together for extended periods 
get to know one another’s deepest secrets.  They observe where their 
buttons are, and because they are regularly in each other’s presence, 
find the occasion to push them.  Those who love one another can 
utilize intimacy to be mutually supportive, but when they get angry 
may take advantage of it to gain revenge.  If they are emotionally 
immature, uncontrolled rage can cause inestimable hurt.
If a man and a woman are to collaborate for their own and their 
children’s advantages, they must guard against these hazards.  If they 
are to adjust to shifting circumstances, they must be individually 
and jointly flexible.  To begin with, they need to trust one another. 
This trust is so important that it is a central feature of the courtship 
processes that bring them together.  Love is not like a faucet that 
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can be turned off and on.  It takes time to cultivate and time to 
be torn asunder.  During its development, when a couple is getting 
acquainted, a crucial duty is assessing their respective trustworthiness. 
They need to fathom who this previous stranger is and how he or 
she might react under adverse circumstances.  When upset, might 
this other’s fury become destructive?  Individuals who are not honest 
in their appraisals are in for some nasty surprises.  If their own 
immaturity prevents them from obtaining an accurate reading; i.e., 
if their neurotic needs attract them to dangerous partners, trouble is 
likely to ensue.
One of the reasons why feminism has been so destructive is that 
it tarred everyone with the same brush.  All men were condemned 
as vicious rapists and all women exalted as innocent victims.107 
Acceptance of this fantasy made it more difficult to recognize 
individual differences.  In real-life intimacy, two people must open 
their souls to one another.  They must be able to see each other, warts 
and all, and accept what they see.  This, however, is not easy.  It takes 
skill and effort.  As the modern family evolves, it becomes essential 
to pierce the romantic myths of bygone eras.  For starters, the 
parties must understand that men and women are different.  If their 
expectations are out of line with what is possible or if they imagine 
that they can reconstruct their partners in their own images, they are 
in for disappointment.  Once the feminist or Victorian mythologies 
are out of the way, it becomes possible to evaluate the other as an 
individual.  This is where knowledge of the self and of other human 
beings comes in handy.  Those who understand themselves and what 
it is to be human have head starts on determining whether they are 
apt to mesh with particular partners.  They can determine whether 
their respective goals and values are compatible and what sorts of 
adjustment might be necessary to make them so.108
This perceptiveness does not come automatically, but it comes 
most naturally to those who are personally mature.  Individuals 
whose socialization has prepared them to control their emotions and 
to recognize their distinct limitations are not only better equipped to 
perceive the emotions and limitations of others, they are also better 
equipped to deal with them.  One of life’s greater ironies is that persons 
who grow up within loving families are more able to give and receive 
love.  Less in need of affection, they are better prepared to participate 
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in it.  In other words, those who are raised within stable middle-class 
families are better situated to create their own stable middle-class 
families.  They are more competent in making allowances for other’s 
failures and in reacting to these resiliently.  They are also more likely 
to be constant in their commitments.  People who grow up feeling 
good about themselves have less of a need to pursue emotional 
balm outside committed relationships.  During the height of the 
hippie efflorescence, sexual fidelity was regarded as old-fashioned. 
Physical love was deemed fungible.  Yet, this was never true.  The 
traditions that lauded sexual commitment have proven remarkably 
durable.  Especially under conditions of voluntary intimacy, marital 
partners need to trust each other on multiple levels.  One of these 
is the sexual.109  After they pledge each other their troth, should this 
not be taken seriously, that is, should they stray, they are engaging 
in emotional betrayal.  They are breaking promises and dishonoring 
bonds.  In direct opposition to the sophisticated philandering of 
open-minded liberals, the middle-class marriage seeks to maintain 
its integrity in many dimensions.  In this, if not in their naïve sexual 
fairy tales,110 the Victorians got it right.
Also fundamental to middle-class intimacy is a secure division 
of labor.111  The feminist fable extols gender interchangeability. 
Total equality is supposed to bleach out all task differences. This 
has proven inaccurate vis-à-vis the marketplace but also within the 
family.  Contemporary couples rarely divide their domestic duties 
as did their grandparents, but neither have they established an 
amorphous egalitarianism.  No longer may the woman be the sole 
cook nor the male the exclusive repairman, but together they decide 
who will specialize in what.  Not all reach the same settlement, but 
almost all have some settlement.  The reason is simple.  Intimacy 
is about cooperation, not competition.  If a man and a woman are 
pursuing exactly the same goals, one is apt to do better in something 
than the other, and this is bound to elicit envy.  If, however, they are 
pursuing separate but compatible objectives, when one wins, so does 
the other.  This enables them to root for each other.  They can be 
allies, both with respect to the jobs they hold outside the household 
and the tasks performed within it.  In dividing their responsibilities, 
each obtains authority within a personal sphere of influence, thereby 
reducing the issues over which they come into conflict.
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This, however, leaves open the question of how to arrive at an 
agreement about what each will do.  Voluntary intimacy, if it is to 
work, requires a mechanism for resolving differences.  Because no 
two individuals are ever in complete accord, there must be a give-
and-take that results in concurrence.  To put the matter plainly, we 
can say that they must be good negotiators.  Lasting bonds depend 
in equal measure on shared commitments and shared bargaining 
skills.  Indeed, these aptitudes depend on each other.  Individuals 
who do not work at staying together will not work at resolving their 
differences, whereas those who do not resolve their differences will 
have their steadfastness severely tested.  Nevertheless, negotiating is 
a skill.  The parties need to be motivated to engage in it, and they 
need to know how to do it.  When they enter into their various 
wrangles, they must possess a dual-concern attitude; that is, they 
must be committed to meeting the needs of both parties.  If either or 
both are excessively selfish, the resultant bargain will be too skewed 
to be durable.  The loser will leave, nursing a grievance that is bound 
to upset the agreement later on.
Beyond this, the negotiators must be competent problem 
solvers.112  Their personal professionalism must encompass an ability 
to be creative in pursuing their aims.  The word usually used to 
express how spouses can come to an agreement is “compromise,” 
but this is inadequate to many circumstances.  Obviously, the 
baby cannot be divided in half.  Intimate partners, if they are of 
good will, collaborate in coming up with ideas that neither would 
have entertained alone.  Instead of agreeing to take their vacation 
halfway between the mountains and the seashore, they discover a 
Caribbean island that has a mountain at its center.  This ability to 
envision solutions that allow both to win becomes exceptionally 
valuable when children enter the scene.  With more than two parties 
to be satisfied, all concerned need the patience of Job to consider 
unforeseen answers.  Life is full of surprises; hence, those with the 
courage to embrace the unexpected tend to come out ahead.
One of the preeminent qualities of the emergent middle-class 
family is the complementarity at its heart.113  The companionate 
marriage is a relatively new invention.  Husbands and wives talking 
to one another as friendly partners in the same enterprise is a recent 
innovation.  Spouses, to be sure, have always communicated, but 
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the degree of voluntary integration has not always been as great.  In 
the past, the domestic division of labor was laid down along precise 
cultural lines.  Both parties knew what was expected even before 
they crossed a common threshold.  Now, in our commercialized 
technological world, many of these inherited patterns are obsolete. 
The invention of the cell phone, for instance, revolutionized how 
family members keep track of their whereabouts.  Who is expected 
to call whom could not follow previous guidelines because there were 
none.
Contrary to the feminists or the free-love mavens, the differences 
between men and women do not need to be a handicap or a 
source of perpetual discord.  Heterosexual intimacy can generate 
forms of expertise that neither party could manage apart.  Gender 
complementarity is not an empty boast.  The father who roughhouses 
with his children is not necessarily opposed to the mother who worries 
about an eye being poked out.114  Their children benefit from both of 
these attitudes.  Their youngsters are simultaneously tutored in risk 
taking and in prudence, each of which is desirable for a successful 
life.  Men do not need to become more like women, nor women 
more like men, for them to act in concert.  Despite their periodic 
frictions, the expertise and motivations built into their respective 
frames can contribute to a whole that is more than the sum of its 
parts.  Furthermore, the full benefits of voluntary intimacy accrue 
only if innate differences are understood, respected, and exploited. 
To this end, mythologies that blame one or the other are of less value 
than clear-eyed acknowledgements of complex truths.
The Children
If the emerging middle-class family esteems and is dependent 
upon gender differences, it must also acknowledge the nature of 
children and childhood.115  Responsible for socializing the young so 
that they can succeed in a competitive and uncertain environment, it 
must take advantage of who they are and how they develop to shape 
them into self-directed adults.116   Kohn suggests that middle-class 
parents want their children to be considerate of others, to be interested 
in how and why things happen, and to exercise self-control.117  He 
also indicates that they are less concerned over whether they have 
good manners, are neat and clean, and obey their parents.  In this, 
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they seek to prepare them to strike out on their own.  Aware that the 
most substantial legacy they can provide is not financial but personal, 
they intend to make them strong and self-reliant.  The aim, in short, 
is to groom the next generation for a professional lifestyle.  Both on 
the job and at home, they attempt to instill the skills and motives 
to organize complex tasks—both independently and in partnership 
with reliable allies.
The self-direction and self-discipline to which Kohn refers are 
not implanted via the obedience that working-class parents prefer, 
but by more subtle means.118  Were middle-class parents to assert 
absolute control over their young, they would prevent them from 
internalizing controls.119  Mothers and fathers can inspire, can guide, 
and can direct their children, but they cannot dictate to them.  To 
do so would arouse oppositionalism, not a desire to acquire personal 
strengths.  Parents who want these to emerge seek to establish the 
conditions in which they can.  They know that they surface only 
through a child’s own efforts.  Adult supervision establishes limits, 
i.e., boundaries beyond which the young are not allowed to go, but 
not initiatives that, by definition, come from inside.  Children can 
be required to respect the rights of others or to avoid extravagant 
risks but not to be creative.  Because there are dangers adults can 
anticipate, but children cannot, it is imperative for the former to set 
terminal points.  Yet because of the inevitable novelties, everything 
can never be completely foreseen.
Middle-class parents explain things to their children and 
encourage them to think, but they also allow them to internalize 
their own conclusions.  The paradigm for this is found in childhood 
discipline.  In former times, parents were expected to beat the devil 
out of their offspring.120  Spare the rod and spoil the child was not 
an empty phrase; it was a prescription for action.  Children were 
considered inherently sinful and, therefore, in dire need of having 
their willfulness expunged.  Paradoxically, a controlled willfulness is 
at the core of self-direction.  Those who are spanked on the grounds 
that independent thinking is selfish are thereby instructed not 
to make autonomous decisions.  As a result, spankings, and, ever 
stronger whippings, have gone out of style.  Contemporary discipline 
is more apt to consist of a stern discussion of what is appropriate or, 
in extremes, of a time out.  Children are sent to their rooms, told 
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to think about what they did, and asked not to emerge until they 
understand what is right.  The objective is not behavior elicited from 
fear of punishment but internal commitments that operate without 
parental intervention.
This sort of regime permits children to make mistakes.121  In 
the traditional working-class family, a mistake was tantamount to 
disobedience.  Children were expected to get things right the first 
time and, if they did not, were subjected to corporal punishment. 
This, not surprisingly, discouraged experimentation.  If they knew 
what was good for them, the young either kept to the straight and 
narrow or threw over the traces.  In contrast, middle-class parents 
understand that complex lessons entail missteps.  The error is not 
in making a mistake but in failing to learn from it.  They, therefore, 
allow their children to be less self-critical, that is, as long as they 
keep forging ahead.  Because they understand how and why things 
are complicated, they realize these lessons cannot be instantaneously 
absorbed.  Their own experience having demonstrated that the 
acquisition of knowledge is a lifelong affair, they not only allow but 
encourage their children to take their time.  They are also pleased 
when the young exhibit curiosity.122  Getting into things and creating 
a mess may be bothersome, but it is better than a lack of interest. 
Who knows what discoveries a toddler will make.  Lower-class 
parents, in contrast, find unregulated behavior less tolerable.  Theirs 
is a tendency either to allow their children to proceed unattended or 
to demand conformity to strict standards.
Back in the 1920s and ‘30s, the behaviorist psychologist John B. 
Watson123 counseled Americans that the worst thing they could do was 
to spoil their children.  The son of an alcoholic father who deserted 
his family, he believed absolute emotional control was urgent.124  To 
this end, he advised parents to allow their children to cry themselves 
to sleep.  His belief was that, if babies were picked up and comforted, 
they would grow into selfish adults.  This philosophy fit well in a 
working-class world where external discipline was the norm.  It does 
not, however, suit middle-class requirements.  The sort of responsive 
love Watson abhorred is precisely what their families must provide. 
Contrary to the behaviorist model, reacting to a child’s discomfort 
by being warmly solicitous does not create egotism.  It makes a child 
feel important, and also secure.  This imparts the confidence to 
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make independent decisions, despite concurrent uncertainties.  As 
an adult, the individual’s determinations will arise from a personal 
psyche, but need not on that account be selfish.  The apparent 
contradiction Watson did not appreciate is that persons who learn 
to love themselves are also capable of leading others.  Having had 
their own needs attended to, they can better assess and meet external 
needs.
The evolving middle-class family seems to be discovering that 
a collaborative interaction between parents and children is essential 
for the development of the young.125  It was once said that children 
should be seen and not heard, but this interferes with the dialogues 
that build social skills.  Because the middle-class way of life entails 
synergistic alliances, discovering how to negotiate with others is 
crucial.  Practice in this occurs first within the nuclear family.  Parents 
and children of necessity encounter conflicts that must be resolved. 
Dictatorial controls might prevent these from escalating, but they do 
not provide training in coming to reasonable bargains.  The young, 
of course, are less powerful than their parents.  As a consequence, 
adults who desire to impose their will can, but does not allow the 
children to learn how to assert themselves.  What is necessary for two-
sided negotiations is adult restraint.  A parent must be patient with 
the often maddening immaturity of the biologically undeveloped. 
This means that neither empty-headed permissiveness nor obdurate 
authoritarianism is best.  An adult who is thinking about a child’s 
future will seek a moving equilibrium.  The goal is to be as firm 
as is needed to match the child’s developing ability to be assertive. 
To overpower the child would crush a fragile spirit, whereas to be a 
doormat instills a false estimate of the child’s worth.  More useful 
are the energy and coherence needed to ensure an honest exchange 
of ideas, an exchange grounded in a dual-concern model of their 
respective needs and in flexible problem-solving techniques.
These sorts of negotiations do not simply happen; they too are 
an achievement.  In previous centuries, they were not considered 
necessary because they were not a normal part of day-to-day 
functioning.  Peasants did not need to work out the intricate bargains 
characteristic of a commercial environment.  Nor did a preindustrial 
society require the mental dexterity of a technological one.  Today’s 
complex decentralized division of labor has, in essence, forced 
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families to conform to its needs.  Parents who have themselves been 
struggling to attain a self-directed, emotional maturity have assumed 
the supplementary burden of discovering how to pass this along to 
another generation.  After it reached its tipping point, the Middle-Class 
Revolution demanded personal growth from newly professionalized 
individuals, as well as modifications in their parenting skills.  As we 
have seen, there was a cultural lag with regard to the former and 
perhaps a lengthier one with respect to the latter.  Those who were 
actively engaged in the process of ascertaining how to direct their 
vocational lives might be expected to need additional time to apply 
these lessons to their families, especially to their children.
The liberal excursions into no-fault divorce and androgynous 
feminism were time-consuming dead-ends.  Sadly, they diverted 
attention away from exploring better solutions.  First, they interfered 
with developing voluntary intimacy.  In rejecting the past root and 
branch, they made it difficult to build upon evolving family values. 
This, in turn, made it difficult to provide the direction and support 
their children required.  Parents barely able to negotiate fairly with 
one another could scarcely be expected do this with their young.  To 
be committed and yet to allow emotional independence entails an 
apparent inconsistency that was not easy to surmount.  Authoritarian 
models derived from the centuries past certainly did not do the trick. 
Something else was needed, but those entangled in these events did 
not understand what.  They literally could not perceive the utility 
of being flexible.  Worse still, they had not attained the internal 
strengths to live by this standard.  Voluntary intimacy and responsive 
childrearing necessitate insights and emotional controls that are 
themselves achievements.  Irrespective of their conscious intentions, 
individuals who had not mastered their inner environments found it 
difficult to engage in evenhanded negotiations.  Unable to control who 
they were or what they felt, they had to await internal developmental 
processes they could not deliberately engineer.  
The professionalized middle-class family may ultimately change 
this.  As people gain experience on the job, in their marriages, and 
with their children, they can be expected to move forward from 
their mistakes.  In time, the conventional wisdom will surpass the 
reactionary fantasies that seemed to promise salvation.  People will 
nevertheless need to work at what they accomplish, including in 
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their personal lives.  The liberal model has suggested that neutral 
government institutions could protect people from their selfish 
impulses.  It held out the prospect of a nonhierarchical society in 
which the most important decisions would be codified in centralized 
regulations.  This has proven to be a chimera.  There are a variety 
of tasks that no impersonal bureaucracy, however brilliantly 
conceived, can manage.  No corporate entity can substitute for 
intimate love or fair-minded interpersonal negotiations.  Drained 
as they are of emotional responsiveness and localized knowledge, 
these organizations cannot deliver the motivation or expertise to 
do what is best.  The very factors that enabled them to provide the 
broad social controls that were useful for early industrialization 
continue to prevent them from exercising personal concern.  Yet, 
without this concern, no society can supply the emotional supports 
adults require or the guidance the next generation demands.  In its 
rationalistic simplicity, a Big-Brother government can furnish neither 
the happiness nor the self-directed individuals it needs for its own 
perpetuation.  Here, then, is the central irony of initial attempts to 
cope with the dislocations of the Great Middle-Class Revolution. 
The family, which seems so contrary to the large-scale objectification 
of postindustrialized commercialism, may be the linchpin essential 
for its survival.  Only it provides what human beings need in order 
to become decentralized decision makers.
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Chapter 11
Toward a Professionalized Society
Now Art, used collectively for painting, sculpture, 
architecture, and music, is the mediatress between, and 
reconciler of, nature and man.  It is, therefore, the power 
of humanizing nature, of infusing the thoughts and 
passions of man into everything which is the object of his 
contemplation.  (Samuel Taylor Coleridge, On Posey or 
Art)
Science frees us in many ways…from the bodily terror 
which the savage feels.  But she replaces that, in the minds 
of many, by a moral terror which is far more overwhelming.  
(Charles Kingsley, Sermon, The Meteor Shower)
Freedom although it has brought [modern man] 
independence and rationality, has made him isolated and, 
thereby, anxious and powerless.  (Erich Fromm, Escape 
from Freedom)
A Professionalized Humanism
Society is not in the process of becoming one huge family. 
Nor is it about to become an extended village encompassing of 
all humankind, not even in a some fanciful electronic version of 
democracy.  Nor is it likely to revert to a modernized theocracy of 
born-again souls.  Not even a technocratic utopia seems to be in 
the cards, not to mention a nanny state guided by super-educated 
philosopher kings.  As the Middle-Class Revolution continues 
to unfold, it promises to move in directions undreamt of by most 
reformers.  Contrary to the proclamations of the culture wars, 
neither traditional conservatives nor enlightened liberals are apt to 
emerge victorious.  Something else, something neither romantic 
nor trouble-free, seems to be brewing.  In short, we appear to be 
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developing an unprecedented civilization, i.e., a professionalized 
society.1  With expertise and internalized motivation more critical 
than ever before, these, and the conditions that sustain them, are 
becoming more prominent.  Larger numbers of individuals, and the 
institutions upon which they rely, are transforming into something 
genuinely middle class.  Almost despite themselves, and their 
ubiquitous misinterpretations of their circumstances, billions of 
moderns are lurching into a brave new world, not of totalitarianism, 
but of personal growth and responsibility. 
The Great Middle-Class Revolution has been more terrifying 
than the harbingers of progress could have imagined.  Who among 
them would have thought that growing rich and free might impel 
battalions of the best and brightest to rush headlong into what F.
A. Hayek characterized as a renewal of serfdom?2  Hayek, and his 
contemporary Erich Fromm,3 lived through the horrors of Nazism, 
fascism, and international communism.  They learned firsthand 
that individuals could choose to submerge themselves in an 
authoritarian collectivism rather than face the insecurities of coping 
with a triumphant commercialism.   This scared them, as well it 
should have.  Victorian commentators earlier on speculated that art 
or science would provide the keys to surmounting the challenges 
of modernization.  But few of them predicted that a near universal 
prosperity would itself be construed as problematic.4  They would 
surely have been surprised to learn that unequivocal affluence could 
prove more fearsome than poverty or political tyranny.  Had they 
lived to see it, they would have been baffled by calls to dismantle 
the very institutions that delivered unparalleled gains.  Yet, this is 
precisely what bobo liberalism has proposed.  It may do so in muted 
tones, insisting that relief will come by way of the ballot box rather 
than the barricade; nevertheless, were it to get its wish, the world 
would undergo a transformation more radical than any previously 
conceived.
Clearly, the adjustments needed to cope with being middle class 
have proven more wrenching than might have been predicted.  To the 
astonishment of many, a burgeoning ability to control our individual 
circumstances inaugurated uncertainties that, from a distance, might 
seem trivial but which up close appeared insurmountable.  So 
profound did these seem that many would-be saviors recommended 
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a complete social overhaul.  They sought to do away with both the 
marketplace and social hierarchies.  In their utopian cosmos, equality 
and universal love were to become the norm.  As members of the 
same congenial family, everyone would be equivalent.  Although 
their personal experiences were of gesellschaft commercialism and 
social stratification, in their minds’ eyes these crusaders perceived 
perfection.  Thus, without evidence of feasibility, they counseled 
the elimination of personal property and the imposition of radical 
egalitarianism.  Terrified by the lack of organization inherent in 
a decentralized society, they rushed to introduce a comforting 
predictability by forcing everyone to operate on the same plane. 
Sadly, this anticipated equivalence existed only in their imaginations. 
Its alleged fairness derived from their psyches, not from reality.
The liberal ideal is a fantasy.5  It is a chimera summoned up by 
the emotional insecurities of those unsure about how to manage their 
independence.  Were it to be implemented, its universal love would 
prove as ephemeral as a morning mist.  So, too, would the prosperity 
and egalitarianism it is said to augment.  Paradoxically, those frightened 
by the advent of a middle-class society do not allow themselves to 
recognize that both the wealth and liberties they take for granted 
derive from institutions they despise.  They do not understand that 
the efficiencies of the marketplace are the source of their prosperity 
or that decentralized decision-making is the foundation of political 
democracy.  Whatever their glorious conjectures, it is indisputable 
that neither command economies nor anarchistic autonomy have 
been able to make good on their claims.  To the contrary, experience 
has demonstrated their tendencies to devolve into totalitarian scarcity 
or murderous discord.  Hobbes6, long ago, was right about the human 
potential for a war of all against all.  Without the boundaries set by 
the marketplace, people either fail to coordinate their activities or 
do so via brutal repression.  Liberalism, for all its elevated rhetoric, 
because its pedigree derives from a combination of quasireligious 
absolutism and romantic familism, would kill the golden goose in 
order to preserve comforting delusions.  Despite the promises of its 
advocates, their new Zion would halt progress in its tracks.  To quote 
John Hospers,7 its legacy would be “splendidly equalized destitution” 
or a sanguine tyranny.
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Contrary to what the prophets of egalitarian collectivism say 
what is needed is more freedom, not less.  Instead of mandating an 
equality of results, people have to be released to pursue individual 
success.  Despite the skeptics, this is not to recommend a Social 
Darwinism,8 which authorizes losers to perish in isolated misery.  As 
social creatures, humans must be free to create interpersonal alliances 
even as they seek private benefits.  What the old-style eugenists did 
not realize is that, just as people can pursue individual aims, they can 
collaborate on joint ventures.  The central point is that, if the Middle-
Class Revolution is to expand in scope, its evolving institutions must 
facilitate a social mobility based on merit.  This means that an ever 
larger a proportion of the population must contribute its talents to 
furthering the concerns of the majority.  A sort of neo-utilitarianism,9 
based not on conscious calculations, but semiconscious social 
negotiations,10 has to determine, then implement, the greatest 
good for the greatest number.  Both individually and as members 
of competing alliances, the participants must reshuffle their social 
statuses so that superior worth can have the greatest impact.  Put 
another way, we can say that the tests of strength in which people 
engage should be domesticated rather than outlawed.  These contests 
need to be both fair and flexible if they are to result in what is socially 
optimal.  The upshot is that conflict cannot be eliminated.  There will 
still be winners, and therefore losers, but the overall consequences 
can be collectively advantageous.  As significant, most individuals, 
by dint of their effort and expertise, will have a greater opportunity 
to improve their personal lots.
Indeed, complete equality is a procrustean bed.  It slices off the 
legs of those who are exceptional while concurrently stretching those 
who do not measure up.  People are different in both their motives 
and capacities.  They are also hierarchical by nature.  Once these 
facts are put together, efforts to make them otherwise are revealed to 
be inevitably coercive.  Only compulsion can produce a facsimile of 
uniformity when so many of necessity resist homogenization.  More 
suitable is encouraging people to be their best, which entails promoting 
professionalization in all its aspects.  The more expert and dedicated 
people are as they play their individual roles,11 the more they can do 
for themselves, their loved ones, and humanity in general.  Naturally, 
this would not eliminate conflicts, disappointments, or mistakes. 
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It would merely militate toward improvements in an inescapably 
imperfect human condition.  Aiming toward this would demonstrate 
that a greater occupational professionalization allows for more 
control over one’s work,12 while a greater personal professionalization 
facilitates greater fulfillments in the private domain.  In permitting 
decentralization, these, in tandem, maximize the application of local 
knowledge and personal energies to human aspirations.
But to become more professional, people need to become as 
strong as they can get.  They need to maximize their separate abilities. 
This, of course, is not a unique insight.  The modern military long 
ago learned that the best army is composed of the best-trained 
soldiers.  Bitter experience demonstrated that throwing warm bodies 
into machine-gun fire was a prescription for slaughter, not victory. 
The same can be said of civilian pursuits.  Those who do not know 
what they are doing are not apt to do it well.  Untrained minds and 
bodies crumple under pressure.  But even this is not enough.  To 
do well, people need to capitalize on their humanity, not just on an 
abstract rationalism.13  They have to get in touch with their inner 
selves and to reinforce what they find.  
A model regarding what is possible can be drawn from the 
past.  Thus, during the Renaissance newly discovered documents 
arriving from Muslim realms hinted at a world beyond medieval 
scholasticism.14  Greek and Roman manuscripts written in ignorance 
of the Bible argued for a way to understand nature other than that 
expounded by the Doctors of the Church.  To be more precise, 
Greek playwrights revealed a psychological sophistication that 
set literary minds racing.  Their heroes and heroines exhibited 
scandalous impulses outside the purely religious.  Fictional though 
the characters might be, these ancient forms were more completely 
human than their biblical counterparts.  This provided the impetus 
for humanism.15  Suddenly the best and brightest concluded that 
there was more to life than a preparation for heaven.  The here-and-
now realities of flesh and blood also deserved attention.  
This Renaissance humanism inadvertently accelerated a search 
for secular knowledge that proved of inestimable value to a revived 
commercialism.  Those prepared to examine mankind firsthand 
now opened a window on unsuspected truths.  Not only could 
asrtists paint figures that looked like their neighbors, scientists could 
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engage in autopsies to determine human anatomy.  Eventually, this 
expanded enlightenment led academic explorers into virgin territory 
and launched the West on an adventure that has yet to reach a 
conclusion.  Indeed, we are at the threshold of a new humanism16 
or, more precisely, a social humanism.  As social creatures, we are in 
the process of locating ourselves in a social context.  With time and 
experience, it becomes patent that each of us possesses inescapable 
connections to others.  What these are and how they are established 
must therefore be appreciated in multifaceted detail.  The time to 
wallow in mythological storytelling is long gone.  A genuine social 
humanism has to include a social anatomy at least as faithful to the 
ligaments of interpersonal associations as were the renderings of the 
Renaissance anatomists.
What is more, in our convoluted technocommercial world, it 
is essential not to deny unpleasant realities.  The breath of human 
experience has to be accepted for what it is, warts and all.  Nor 
should people aspire to perfection.  Because our natures encompass 
disagreeable elements, the best that can be hoped for are improvements. 
Our aggregate and individual prospects can be enhanced, but not to 
the point where everyone wins.  Like it or not, pain and loss are 
integral to the human condition.  These may be unwelcome, but 
they are fundamental to the mechanisms that make people people. 
Paradoxically, they are also crucial to what has made our species 
successful.  This being so, we cannot be rescued by romanticized 
aesthetics.  While art can furnish insights into the human situation, 
particularly on an emotional level, by itself, it is insufficient.  More 
regretful, its idealized simplifications tend to produce false hope.  This 
is especially true of quasireligious idealizations.  Mysticism banishes 
too many facts to be a reliable guide.  Nor can an enlightenment-
style physical science provide all the answers.  People are more than 
assemblages of atoms, molecules, and cells.  Physics, chemistry, 
and biology have demonstrated their worth yet, by themselves, are 
incapable of explicating the social aspects of human existence.17
A new professionalism,18 a humanistic professionalism must, 
therefore, emerge from the demands of a budding middle-class 
society.  The need to coordinate the complex activities of self-
directed individuals, if permitted, will elicit the tools necessary to 
decipher what is occurring.  Just as the need for sailing ships to pilot 
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themselves on trackless oceans once brought forth the chronometer, 
so a gesellschaft social order can summon the reflexivity needed to 
determine the combined location of its members.  Since the social 
is human and vice versa, this process can be aided by a social science 
that provides honest, nonideological accounts of its subject.  By 
candidly examining the mechanisms through which interpersonal 
associations are created, maintained, and modified, it can strengthen 
the base of knowledge available for those planning their private and 
social activities.  In illuminating limitations as well as opportunities, 
ordinary men and women may thereby direct their energies where they 
can have the greatest effect.  As such, the socially well informed can 
become professional with respect to their personal circumstances.
The enemy in this is an immature romanticism.  Good intentions 
cloaked in a breathless, emotional utopianism venture into the 
world unclothed.  Winston Churchill19 said that some truths are 
so important that they deserve to be guarded by a cordon of lies. 
This was certainly true for allied military secrets.  But it is not the 
case for social realities.  Self-deception here is the height of folly. 
Yet, people habitually fool themselves about their social situations 
in order to protect against the pain of failure.20  They would rather 
bask in the glory of phony triumphs than recognize that they are 
not sitting atop the hierarchical heap.  On an individual level some 
such balm may be indispensable, but collectively it is a disaster in 
waiting.  A single person walking off a cliff is one thing; an entire 
society doing so is quite another.  This being the case, reorganizing 
gender roles to conform to feminist mythologies would have been 
more than a private tragedy.  Taken literally, it might have resulted 
in the sort of communal suicide that overtook the Shakers.  These 
religious zealots thought celibacy provided a route to heaven; and 
separately it may have, but for an organized community it ushered 
in their extinction.
Nor was Hobbes, despite his central insight, right about the 
solution to a war of all against all.  He believed a Leviathan who 
could compel obedience was necessary to curb private ambitions.  A 
man of his times, he conceived this as a monarch with the centralized 
power to command submission.  Yet, such a consolidated authority 
cannot work in a middle-class society.21  Notwithstanding the fact 
that human beings are no more altruistic today than they were during 
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his era, given the upsurge in social complexities, many more of them 
must partake in controlling their destinies.  To do so, however, they 
must become stronger and more knowledgeable than their ancestors. 
Instead of relying exclusively on associations based on hierarchical 
organizers, they must become expert in making role-based decisions. 
Rather than reflexively defer to one-size-fits-all ideological principles, 
they must participate in shaping the rules that guide their personal 
actions.  To be succinct, they must become skilled interpersonal role 
players.  This said, an evolving commercialized division of labor 
must not be rejected from fear of its ambiguities.  Indeed, it must 
be embraced as an honored part of the human condition, then 
implemented with intelligence and dexterity.  This, however, requires 
that the skills needed to execute it be internalized. 
Unfortunately, the data and the internal controls necessary to 
craft workable role relations are not instinctive.  People must today 
prepare themselves to assume the responsibilities to which they have 
become heir.  They cannot afford to react impulsively in a landscape 
littered with hidden snares.  Effort is, therefore, needed to allocate 
their respective positions with intelligence, as well as to obtain practice 
in performing these satisfactorily.  The answer to complexity is not 
an all-powerful genius at the helm; it is informed competence at the 
periphery.  An apt analogy would be a network of billions of personal 
computers. The introduction of a multitude of interlinked desktops, 
in place of a single super-mainframe, surprised the experts with its 
dispersed intellect.  A professionalized distribution of specialized 
roles should do no less.  Profoundly human in its architecture, if 
appropriately expert and flexible, it possesses the potential to handle 
matters no unified authority ever could.
The Division of Labor Revisited
The power of integrated social roles has been profoundly 
underestimated.  As surprising as it may sound, history seems to be 
pointing us toward this conclusion.  Nevertheless, the hubris of the 
Marxists in assuming they understood the arrow of history provides a 
useful caution.22  Despite what we have learned, the future is not ours 
to master.  Still, an overview of what has already happened suggests 
where things might be headed.  The progression of society from the 
Symbolic Revolution23 that set our hunter-gatherer ancestors on a 
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global trek, through the Agricultural Revolution that sent populations 
soaring, to the Commercial Revolution that drastically improved 
efficiencies and led to the intricacies of the Industrial and Middle 
Class Revolutions points to an evolution in organizing principles and 
sources of interpersonal power.  Where once personal relations and 
face-to-face hierarchies dominated the scene, they have receded in 
influence.  And while religiously inspired structures previously rose 
to prominence because they could assimilate the swelling numbers 
in protocivilizations,24 more empirical principles have taken over. 
Commercialization has also dictated that social-role configurations 
become more focal.  A complex, yet decentralized, division of labor 
proved necessary to keep pace with complications too byzantine to 
be dealt with any other way.  What did not occur, however, was 
the wholesale replacement of one form of organization by another. 
That which came later built upon what came before, albeit with 
appropriate modifications to account for altered circumstances.  Old 
traditions and old mechanisms were not abandoned so much as 
adjusted to meet unanticipated needs.
To reiterate, personal relations and hierarchical command 
structures did not disappear with the advent of commercial/
technological societies.  They merely assumed new forms.  Where 
huntergatherers depended almost exclusively on family relations, 
members of the contemporary middle class rely more on friends and 
colleagues.  Common activities, rather than biological ties, cement 
their alliances as they navigate novel occupational and avocational 
crosscurrents.  This is not to say that family ties have evaporated. 
As was explained in the previous chapter, the nuclear family has 
increased in salience, especially for the middle classes.  Though more 
voluntary than its predecessors, its assigned tasks are no less crucial. 
As a haven in a heartless world and as the incubator of future self-
directed generations, it remains unsurpassed.  Even the fingerprints 
of more extended family relations remain detectable.  These are more 
attenuated than those of former times but are still called upon to 
solemnize rites of passage and to provide succor in times of crisis. 
The relatives may gather only for family holidays such as Christmas 
and Thanksgiving or for weddings, funerals, and graduations, but 
their incipient presence continues to be a source of security.
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A parallel transformation has overtaken social hierarchies.25 
When foraging bands represented the norm, determining which 
individual was dominant occurred in tests of strength among persons 
who knew one another.  The victory of one and the defeat of the other 
resulted in inarguable reputations with observable consequences. 
After societies became too large for these contests to be universal, less 
personal means for determining precedence developed.  Ultimately, 
social class structures evolved.  These relied more upon commercial 
success but also upon the symbols of this success.  Winners and losers 
remained a part of the scene even though the means of deciding who 
was who had drastically altered.  Today, the distinction between the 
dominant and the submissive remains significant.  Commercialization 
may have increased social mobility, but it has not eliminated the 
perquisites of power.  Nor will it.  
A hierarchical species must continue to generate hierarchical 
differentiations.  It is the shape and the mechanisms of these rankings 
that have been modified.  Clearly social classes and, more particularly, 
the middle classes have swelled in bulk and prestige.  Similarly, 
what counts as a form of strength has been adjusted, e.g., economic 
expertise now carries more clout than does physical prowess.  So, too, 
have the abilities to assemble alliances in mass communities torn by 
a myriad of divisions.  Most significantly in their quest of power, the 
roles individuals occupy and the connections these engender with 
other players are more critical than in simpler times.  Nowadays, 
the nature of someone’s expertise and how it intersects with that of 
role partners can determine how individually powerful the person is 
and/or how effective in organizing the activities of others.  Moreover, 
it is not merely the nature of these roles but how nimbly they can be 
revised that often proves decisive.
Meanwhile, this obligation to manage mounting complexities 
has also affected religious configurations.  Once societies became 
too large for everyone to be familiar with everyone else, the 
emerging impersonality of shared systems of faith allowed strangers 
to coordinate their pursuits.  A commitment to common gods 
and communal myths permitted united fronts when confronting 
external challenges.26  Members of the same normative group 
could rely on the steadfast beliefs of others to enforce a joint set of 
standards.  Indeed, when this normative consensus was grounded in 
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supernatural phenomena, it could achieve a resilience that enabled 
it to withstand considerable stress.  This was an enormous advantage 
during periods of strife.  Thus at the height of the Middle Ages, 
marauding bands of Vikings might come and go and ambitious 
aristocrats might scour the countryside for wealth, but the Church 
and its teachings remained intact.  The problem with this form of 
social integration, however, was that it could also be rigid.  Religious 
beliefs and later political ideologies have undergone more change 
than most of their adherents imagine; nevertheless their viewpoints 
are jealously guarded against heresy.  The result can be an inability 
to meet unsuspected difficulties.  A Church may, for instance, 
decree that charging interest is usury and therefore a sin at the very 
moment when commercial transactions require impersonal forms of 
financing.  By the same token, an ideological social movement can 
insist that gender differences are a myth, just when isolated nuclear 
families demand a greater tolerance of gender disparities.
One of the worst consequences of normative rigidity, of course, 
has been caste systems.  When religions declare that particular forms 
of stratification are sacred, these become virtually impossible to 
modify.  The strengths and abilities of individuals count for little 
when the weight of the entire community is recruited to prevent 
organizational innovation.  This, as we have seen, runs directly 
contrary to the requirements of social class systems.  These are 
dependent upon frameworks that stimulate social mobility.  Once 
a religion unbendingly prohibits economic fluctuation, this sort of 
flexibility cannot exist.  The same applies to legal frameworks that 
attempt to institutionalize fairness too precisely.  Mechanisms such as 
rent-and-price controls typically have side effects that their sponsors 
do not anticipate.  Nevertheless, rigidity can be beneficial in some 
moral contexts.  Murder is an activity that must be unwaveringly 
prohibited.   Religious bans, therefore, make sense in demanding 
that it be proscribed.  Less functional are political ideologies. 
Refusing even to consider welfare reforms because one insists that 
transfer payments are rights can bind a commercialized community 
to counterproductive policies and condemn many of its citizens to 
blighted dependencies.  
What is indispensable within a middle-class society is adaptable 
moral negotiations.27  Romantic relativism28 goes too far in 
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sanctioning normative fluidity, yet a critical relativism that allows 
rules to be adjusted to novel conditions is also conceivable.  In the 
latter, individuals realistically assess the impact of specific regulations, 
then work out their differences with others to promote diverse 
interests or perspectives.  In this way, values and virtues are modified 
to provide support for evolving patterns of interaction.  As a result, 
middle-class societies have been characterized by dizzying debates 
about values.  Politically and socially rent by disputes about what 
is right or wrong, everyone seems to have a unique opinion about 
what to do.   Eager to vent these in public, they are often hawked as 
a form of media entertainment.  It may sometimes seem that these 
controversies proceed without purpose, but, viewed longitudinally 
they are akin to a problem-solving mechanism.  Thanks to them, 
modern societies need not be constrained by behavioral tenets more 
suitable to their preindustrial precursors.  Nor need they renounce 
the communal standards essential to interpersonal trust.  They can 
have both stability and flexibility owing to bargaining processes that 
fluctuate between agreement and discord.
Still, of central import to the advent of modernism has been the 
proliferation of social roles and the evolution of their complexity.29 
More than ever, people occupy highly personalized sets of tasks 
within an extended, impersonal infrastructure.  Despite the apparent 
contradictions of pursuing individualized activities within a system 
that treats the players interchangeably, this is what seems to be 
occurring.30  The dramatis personae are becoming highly skilled at 
occupations with which they personally identify even though most of 
those who rely on their contributions do not recognize their humanity. 
To compound this irony, the power of these persons and of the 
societies to which they belong are augmented by this circumstance. 
As members of cohesive communities, these individuals benefit from 
the effectiveness inherent in an extremely specialized but nonetheless 
responsive division of labor.  For one thing, their separate needs 
are more efficiently met by role partners who possess the ramified 
competences to do so.  For another, the community itself becomes 
more powerful thanks to the integration of roles.  Because the various 
parts mesh to facilitate amazingly intricate activities, the whole is 
able to achieve complex goals, goals that allow it to prevail vis-à-vis 
competing societies.
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Perhaps unexpectedly, the participants in these complex role 
structures31 also gain hierarchical power from being personally crucial 
to the attainment of specific ends.  Though they are theoretically 
regarded as expendable, once ensconced in particular positions, they 
may not easily be replaced.  This permits them to exercise control 
over critical uncertainties and therefore over others dependent on 
having these performed.  As the linchpins of particular activities, 
they can demand personal deference by threatening to withhold 
their services.  In making crucial decisions, they thus require others 
to alter their behaviors.  This is so even though these others may not 
be consciously aware that their conduct has been manipulated.  The 
secret of how this sort of power is allocated lies in the dynamics of 
role negotiations32 and in the conservative nature of role scripts.  In 
essence, the means whereby a social division of labor is created and 
maintained provide the key to how authority is exercised and why 
some role players become more powerful than others.
Social roles33 may not completely replace either social hierarchies 
or normative standards, but they frequently trump both.  In rearranging 
how these other mechanisms are organized, they permit personalized 
controls that would not otherwise be available.  More particularly, 
the existence of detailed roles in which some individuals develop 
an expertise, but others do not, dramatically modifies how ranking 
systems operate.  One of the ways in which hierarchies and divisions 
of labor intersect is in methods the latter utilize to define power.  A 
simple way to understand what is involved is through bureaucratic 
offices.34  A person appointed to a position within a bureaucracy35 is 
not only delegated a precise task but also the authority with which 
to accomplish it.36  Along with the role assignment to fabricate a 
circumscribed item comes the right—nay the requirement—to direct 
specific others in creating it.  One is hired not merely as an engineer 
but as the boss of a particular task group.  Others, who also possess 
assigned roles, roles that Weber37 called defined offices, become one’s 
designated subordinates.  They are, thereby, directed to defer to orders 
emanating from their superior.  The boss, as part of her role, makes 
identifiable decisions and then oversees their performance.  Indeed, 
the might of the entire organization will come to her aid should an 
underling defy this arrangement.
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What differs between hierarchical power that grows out of face-
to-face tests of strength and power mediated by roles is that the latter 
is more restricted.  Roles, which include leadership imperatives, also 
specify limitations on this authority.  They define the perquisites of 
the boss more clearly than does an unfocused ability to intimidate 
others.  An organizational role might, for instance, demand that a 
superior set the schedule for his subordinates, but it will be equally 
definite in precluding his meddling in their home life.  Rational-
legal power, such as that discussed by Weber, prevents what would 
today be considered abuses by endorsing some orders, but not others. 
By the same token, subordinates facilitate role-based authority by 
recognizing the legitimacy of some commands but not others.  The 
former are accepted as part of the leader’s task assignment, whereas 
the latter are not.
These role arrangements also facilitate power by defining networks 
of relationships.  Oftentimes the allies a would-be decision-maker can 
call upon are motivated to help because of the roles they occupy.  As 
direct or indirect role partners, they engage in activities which tend 
to be dependent upon his.  Just as parents support one another in 
disciplining their young because they know that, if they do not, they 
will soon be open to challenge, so may one bureaucratic boss support 
the claims of another.  This assistance is typically built into the role 
and is not a matter of conscious choice.  Police officers, to cite an 
important instance, do not ask for the identity of the victim when 
their radio blares a call to assist an officer in distress—they simply 
come to his aid as expeditiously as they can.  From this point of view, 
this is what one does if one is a police officer.  Less dramatical, one 
student will disapprove of another who arbitrarily refuses to take a 
scheduled examination.  This is part of what it means to be a student. 
This predisposition may not be intended to strengthen the teacher’s 
hand, but it has this effect.  Indeed, it is so predictable that few 
students consider challenging this phalanx of intersecting roles.
These phenomena have the consequence of making the exercise 
of power less arbitrary.  In a world populated by millions of strangers, 
such clarity is essential.38  Were individuals with few personal 
relationships unrestrained by internal role structures, an impatience 
to achieve dominance might lead to the escalation of tests of strength 
to fatal endpoints.  Absent the inhibitions of personal sympathy, 
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some might callously torture those they do not individually know. 
This is no mere academic possibility.  It is the stock-in-trade of 
tyrants and has been for millennia.  Thus, well-defined roles not 
only permit extensive alliances among strangers, they also temper 
potential extremism.  Indeed, democratic institutions are contingent 
upon such highly ramified roles structures.  They do this, in part, by 
investing some decisions in their less powerful members by way of 
the ballot box.  Universal suffrage,39 by endowing ordinary citizens 
with the right to vote upon their leaders, provides a brake on the 
more powerful.  Elected officials get to make decisions ordinary 
people do not, but they must make these with an eye to future polls. 
The same is true within corporations where capricious bosses find 
that their reputations and, therefore, their promotions, suffer if their 
subordinates bridle at being manipulated into working outside their 
job descriptions.
There is also a consequential intersection between norms and 
social roles.  Just as roles help to shape hierarchies, so norms help 
mold roles.  Both personal and interpersonal rules contribute to 
determining the sorts of tasks particular individuals perform.  On 
a society-wide level, moral standards define how social roles will be 
negotiated.40  The sorts of demands that role partners make of one 
another and how these are pursued are regulated by broadly held 
commitments.  Parents, for instance, are not allowed to impose 
violent strictures on their children.  It may be their responsibility to 
shape their young into law-abiding citizens, but they are not allowed 
to do this by beating them with bullwhips.  Nor do contemporary 
communities countenance parents forcing offspring into unwanted 
marriages.  What were once acceptable forms of influence have 
categorically gone out of style.  That which is now permissible has 
slowly evolved to meet the needs of a socially mobile and frequently 
self-directed society.  Almost second nature, these rules are today 
considered coterminous with civilization.
Other rules are found within role scripts.41  These are a part of 
the machinery that guides role performances.  Unlike moral rules, 
however, these norms and values can be highly specific.  More precise, 
that which is considered moral derives much of its force from a social 
consensus.  Indeed, it would not be considered moral were it not 
enforced by a significant proportion of the community.  Individual 
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roles, in contrast, vary too dramatically for the same parameters to 
be applicable.  To cite one example, the conventions that make for an 
ethical dogcatcher are not the same as those that make for an ethical 
politician.  Few, except other dogcatchers, would be familiar with 
the standards appropriate to a humane animal capture.  Likewise, 
few, except other politicians, understand the constraints under which 
elected officials must operate.  This lack of inter-role visibility is 
on display in recent social disputes over police brutality.  Outside 
observers, who have never had to subdue lawbreakers, are frequently 
scandalized by the physical restraints professional law officers 
understand as essential.  Never having been personally attacked nor 
ever having been tutored in what constitutes going too far, countless 
laypeople find even defensive force too brutal.  Fortunately, within 
a particular role, there may exist internalized directives that keep 
power within bounds.  Law officers really do commit to standards of 
restraint that are known within their role set, although not beyond 
it.  Matched to local conditions, these imperatives make for greater 
flexibility than would universal imperatives.  At once responsive to 
restricted circumstances and bounded by suitable constraints, they 
are derived from generations of street experience.  In other words, the 
rules that apply to particular roles allow for decentralized variation 
without succumbing to anarchistic license.  They are the equivalent of 
the physician’s Hippocratic oath, albeit with less historical fanfare.
When all of this is synthesized, it becomes apparent that 
the evolution of a social-class society is intimately linked to the 
evolution of highly diversified yet closely integrated social roles.  It 
is these, grafted onto earlier hierarchical and normative structures, 
that make middle-class lifestyles possible.  They permit people to 
be both mobile and self-directed within the larger communities 
upon which they have become dependent.  Had they not arrived 
on the scene, neither the specialized competences necessary within 
a technocommercial society nor their intelligent combination would 
have been feasible.  Their validity, however, is contingent upon a 
growing professionalization.42  These roles would be useless without 
a concurrent evolution in the expertise and motivation necessary for 
those performing them.  Individuals who have not internalized the 
skills and commitments to make them work would be placeholders 
in a pathetic charade.  To invoke a familiar Texan cliché, they would 
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be all sizzle and no steak.  What is more, the society to which they 
belonged, to further mix metaphors, would be a house of cards.  It 
is, therefore, vital to understand how proficient roles are created and 
maintained.  Comprehending this is a first step toward facilitating 
their continued proliferation.  Since role negotiations and roles 
scripts are key, they must be our next area of focus.
Role Negotiations and Role Scripts
Emile Durkheim43 in confronting the conundrum of why mass 
societies have remained stable postulated what he called “organic 
solidarity.”  People cooperated with one another not because they 
were relatives or were imperatively compelled to do so or feared 
eternal damnation but because it was in their interest.  Conversely, 
members of foraging bands were mutually sympathetic as a result of 
an intimate familiarity with each other’s situations.  The latter could be 
reciprocally compassionate because they were able to put themselves 
in one another’s shoes.  Members of contemporary nation-states, in 
contrast, work harmoniously because they recognize their mutual 
interdependence.  Since each receives essential services that only 
others can provide, they are sensitive to the utility of these exchanges. 
Moreover, since their own services require consumers, they are alert 
to the reactions of their patrons, however remote these may be.  Their 
partners in such transactions might be strangers; they might even be 
unsympathetic personalities; yet it is to their own advantage to be 
civil and accommodating.  Since all benefit from partaking in this 
division of labor, all profit from maintaining its integrity.  They are, 
in Durkheim’s powerful analogy, like the organs of a single body that 
cannot survive without their joint contributions.
In the century since Durkheim presented this thesis, the division 
of labor has proceeded apace.  The proliferation of specialized roles 
has become so extensive that direct observation rarely confirms the 
efficacy of interpersonal collaboration.  People know their own jobs 
and those of their immediate role partners, but the contributions of 
most others are a blur.  They make regular trips to supermarkets to 
purchase provisions, yet they do not make the mental connection 
between prepackaged chicken breasts and bib-overalled chicken 
farmers.  How then are they to feel gratitude toward these others? 
How can they care about their welfare?  Worse still, the efficiency 
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of modern institutions has exacerbated an impersonality already 
evident at the beginning of the Industrial Revolution.44  This suggests 
that individuals who never participate in face-to-face exchanges may 
not literally recognize the value of their interdependence.  It may 
be virtually impossible for them to feel indebted to specific others 
for services not identified as such.  From this, it follows that few are 
likely to feel solidarity with strangers out of a rational appreciation 
of their mutual reliance.  
Nevertheless, people continue to cooperate.  They do so almost as 
if this were a conditioned reflex.  Society has managed to maintain its 
integration, partly because it continues to incorporate personal and 
hierarchical relations, partly because it carries forward a normative 
order, but also because it has evolved a network of detailed and 
highly personalized role structures.  Since these roles could not exist 
without being reciprocal, they must be mutually obliging.   But this is 
not from a conscious awareness that this is collectively functional.  It 
is the very nature of how social roles are created and maintained that 
provides their stability.  Durkheim did not pay sufficient attention 
to the mechanisms through which this occurs, but they are of crucial 
import.  They dictate what is possible and what is not.  Likewise, 
they determine how societies can be integrated and who will hold 
which positions within them.
Just as it is impossible to understand how families function 
without recognizing the sorts of negotiations that occur between 
spouses, so it is impossible to appreciate the connections joining 
less intimate individuals without recognizing the negotiations, 
some of which are indirect, that occur between them.  In the same 
way that tests of strength were fundamental to understanding how 
hierarchies are constructed, it is essential to recognize that social 
roles typically come in pairs.  A division of labor implies that tasks 
will be divided among different individuals and also that these will 
be linked together in larger social operations.  If, as Adam Smith 
said,45 in manufacturing pins, one person draws out lengths of wire, 
another cuts these into pin-sized pieces, and a third sharpens the 
points, they must all coordinate their actions to make the desired 
end product.  The ultimate goal of each player would be incomplete 
without the contributions of the others—and indeed of many others 
besides these.  The same is true of husbands who require wives and 
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vice versa and of teachers who require students and vice versa.  More 
than this, these role partners are involved in chains of interlinking 
partnerships.  Spouses have children, children have teachers, teachers 
have administrators, and so on and so forth.  Every person has many 
role partners, who themselves have multiple partners.  Sometimes, 
these individuals interact with only one at a time, but, at other times, 
they are simultaneously torn among completing claims.  In any event, 
to be a role player is to be subject to the demands of multiple players 
who have vested interests in how one acts one’s parts.
Furthermore, it is these intersecting demands between multiple 
partners that constitute the core of role negotiations.46  For the sake 
of simplicity, consider the situation of two partners—let us say a 
pair of spouses.  Each has desires about how the other should fulfill 
assigned tasks.  In the traditional household, a husband may have 
ideas about what he wants his wife to fix for dinner, and she about 
the domestic repairs on her honey-do list.  These will influence what 
gets done and, more specifically, how the husband decides to be a 
husband or the wife a wife.  But this is a negotiation; hence, each 
will have ideas about role performances—some of which may have 
derived from previous role partners and some from personal desires. 
It is from this complicated give-and-take that relatively well-settled 
behavior patterns evolve.  Despite numerous altercations, eventually 
a series of compromises is reached.  Each party then makes an 
internalized commitment that more or less stabilizes the partnership. 
Because each player knows what is expected and is in more or less 
agreement with this expectation, it can be performed with reasonable 
regularity.
These internalized compromises become institutionalized as 
role scripts.47  When people decide that they will voluntarily execute 
certain tasks, they do not need constant reminders from their partners. 
Their interior attitudes are transformed so that they are disposed to 
act in accord with the designated behavioral patterns.  During role 
negotiations, each party is exposed to demands to think, feel, and act 
in particular ways.  Each will be directed to understand the world in 
specified dimensions, to react to it with appropriate emotions, and to 
conduct oneself in accord with identifiable norms and values.  These 
are, respectively, the cognitive, emotional, and volitional aspects of 
their individual roles.  In time, these elements are adopted as personal 
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commitments.  They, then, become role scripts in the sense that how 
the person now thinks, feels, and believes guides future activities 
without direct consultation with role partners.  The person need 
only consult these inner guidelines before deciding how to behave. 
Although role partners may continue to provide input, this is not 
always as decisive as are the internal traces of prior demands. 
Much of how people are prepared to behave typically derives 
from interactions with previous role partners.48  Those who helped 
inculcate an earlier repertoire of predispositions retain an influence 
that expresses itself in subsequent interactions.  This is because role 
scripts tend to be conservative.  The ways that people have learned 
to think, feel, and behave become part of their identities and cannot 
be altered by the mere expedient of deciding to do so.  Central to 
this conformity are emotions.  When these are intense, they can 
perpetuate themselves for a lifetime.  Antique fears, outdated angers, 
and historic loves frequently continue almost unabated over decades. 
And since the clashes that occur during role negotiations can be 
quite passionate, they are ideal for instilling these role-preserving 
attitudes.  Furthermore, since primitive emotions tend to be at their 
zenith when a person is young, role patterns established in childhood 
can set the template for adult relationships.
Role conservation via role scripts is thus a two-edged sword. 
On the one hand, its ability to maintain a division of labor 
without constant reminders provides for social stability.  People can 
confidently predict that others will uphold their ends of the division 
of labor because of who they have become.  This enables them to 
plan their activities with confidence.  On the other hand, roles can 
be so constrained that they fail to adjust to altered circumstances.49 
People inflexibly perform actions that are no longer appropriate to 
their own or their partners’ situations.  Given the fluidity of modern 
market societies, this can be a serious drawback.  Instead of becoming 
expert in their specialties, the players continue in their loyalties to 
ineffective tactics.  They can, in a sense, be hobbled by personalized 
cultural lags.
As commercialization has produced a society that is at once more 
complex and mobile, the requisite professionalization of roles can 
be obviated by a reactionary allegiance to obsolete practices.  Both 
individually and institutionally, people can persist in attempting to 
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do things the way they learned they were supposed to long after this 
is counterproductive.  They can literally seek to retain organizational 
arrangements that hark back to former times.  Although they find 
themselves in a gesellschaft world, they long for intimate communal 
ties that cannot be revived.  Romanticism50 takes over, and they 
dream either of a universal extended family or an absolutistic father 
figure.  More particularly, though a dynamic market economy 
means that businesses grow and contract and that jobs come and go, 
they fantasize about the security of lifelong employment within a 
doting familial corporation.  On a personal level, they may likewise 
remain dedicated to archaic skills.  Instead of professionalizing, 
they learn just enough to get by.  Rather than dedicate themselves 
to expanded expertises, they reject challenging innovations.  Worst 
of all, in preference to pursuing emotional maturity, they idealize 
childish spontaneity.  The goal is to be forever young based on the 
rationalization that this means being forever happy.
What these rigid souls fail to realize is that these practices 
condemn them to comparative impotence.  In a middle-class society, 
power is usually tied to occupying a middle-class niche.51  But in a 
modern market economy, the best decision-making slots are normally 
allocated to those with the expertise to perform them.  Who will get 
to fill authoritative positions is supposed to depend on who possesses 
the motivation and abilities to execute them.  Not unexpectedly, 
because some roles are more rewarding than others, disputes arise 
as to who is appointed to what.  Just as with hierarchical priority, 
people butt heads to determine who will prevail.  This means that, as 
with raw power, role conflicts can be decided by assembling potent 
alliances.  Given that there is no rule obliging role negotiations to be 
one on one, powerful supporters can give one person’s demands more 
weight than another’s.  But a major reason why those who exercise 
clout choose one side over another is that they believe their choice 
is potentially more competent than the one rejected.  Those who 
demonstrate the skills and inclinations to accomplish the relevant 
tasks, therefore, elicit the support of those with an interest in having 
these accomplished satisfactorily.  A boss who wants greater profits 
will, assuming he is rational, favor the applicant for promotion who 
has demonstrated the best track record.  This puts a premium on 
professionalization for those who are ambitious.  They know, or 
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should know, that they can improve their chances to obtain more 
potent roles by pursuing the appropriate education and personal 
qualities.
In the end, the marketplace usually determines who rises to the 
top.52  What constitutes expertise is not merely a matter of prejudice. 
Efficiencies in production, distribution, and social organization 
decide who will have the most power and, in the rawest terms, who 
will be able to defeat whom.  Those who believe in the superiority of 
cultural appearances essentially commit themselves to the potency of 
detached interpersonal reputations.  On one level, they understand 
that in the same way that tests of strength are generalized through 
the reputations earned in victory, symbols of competence can, per se, 
persuade others to support their role aspirations.  Should they articulate 
popular indicators of role dexterity, they expect to be rewarded with 
a confidence in their ability to deliver on their promises.  In this, they 
are not totally wrong.  People often confuse seductive appearances 
with underlying substances.  Indeed, politicians depend upon this 
propensity when they appeal for public support.  In telling others 
that they feel their pain or that they have a compelling solution to 
their problems,53 politicians rely on a conventional wisdom that can 
be deceptive.  But eventually many of these charlatans are found out. 
When their schemes fail, they are turned out of office.  Substance 
does matter, and in the long run appearances that outrun their 
ability to come through tend to be replaced by understandings more 
in conformity with emerging realities.  It may take centuries for this 
sort of realignment to occur, but that which works is liable at some 
point to be recognized.
Besides eventually endorsing efficiency, the marketplace 
tends to reward flexibility.  Caste systems54 were replaced by class 
systems precisely because of the latter’s superior ability to adjust 
to unforeseen circumstances.  The same applies on an individual 
level.  People who can modify their roles to fit emerging conditions 
have an advantage over those wedded to obsolete methods.  One of 
liberalism’s great failings was its attempt to control social behavior 
through a proliferation of centralized rules.  Whether these were 
the price controls of the New Deal55 or the political correctness of 
diversity-based labor regulations, they attempted to coerce people 
into conforming to utopian visions.  In essence, the populace was 
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to be frozen into theoretical versions of perfection.  Yet, in their 
hubris, their advocates overestimated their own levels of expertise. 
They believed that centralized planning would be more rational than 
private greed, whereas their inability to assimilate local deviations 
doomed their decisions to irrelevance.  Dedicated more to uniformity 
than to efficiency, they could not imagine that decentralized role 
players might make better decisions than they.  This, however, has 
turned out to be the usual state of affairs.  Individual role players, 
in their ability to react to here-and-now discrepancies, have an 
advantage in suppleness.  Operating in accord with role scripts that 
have a narrower purview than do the absolute imperatives of the 
centralizers, they can make modifications without throwing entire 
societies off-kilter.  Such individuals must, to be sure, contend with 
their own inclinations toward role conservation, but these are easier 
to manage than are the simple-minded prescriptions of large-scale 
social reforms—and they are less coercive to boot.
Critical Relativism
If role negotiations and role scripts are to live up to their promise, 
they must occur within a framework of rules that facilitate flexibility 
and responsiveness.  What counts as a strength and what is considered 
fair must enable people to create divisions of labor that meet individual 
and collective needs.  Those who get to make the decisions should be 
the ones best suited to do so, as determined by appropriate forms of 
conflict and association.  Adaptable competence is essential in a mass 
technocommercial society; hence, such communities must possess a 
moral framework that encourages decentralized and socially mobile 
self-direction.  This framework, however, is not a given.  Despite the 
historically near universal belief that morality should be absolute, it 
is constantly adjusted to accommodate nascent conditions.  Yet, the 
recent faith in ethical relativism is equally flawed.56  Moral rules, if 
they are to mean anything, cannot be so plastic that they are alterable 
at anyone’s whim.  These regulations may be subject to modification, 
but this will be via moral negotiations over which no single person 
has total control.  The consensus that emerges and that provides the 
clout to impose shared standards will have been tediously hammered 
out by millions of contributors over what may be centuries of 
development.57
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The Great Middle-Class Revolution has been a major incentive 
toward moral reform.  Liberalism58 has, in fact, been a response to 
this impetus.  So has the reaction of the social conservatives.  Together 
they have participated in Culture Wars59 that are, in reality, a massive 
renegotiation of the operative rules.  Though the romantic relativists 
favor a do-your-own-thing philosophy and religious conservatives 
appeal to divine authority, more appropriate than either of these 
viewpoints is a critical, that is to say, a realistic relativism.  Moral 
rules need to be evaluated according to their potential impact. 
Surprisingly, this is what many of the participants are in the process 
of doing.  From their private perspectives they are reacting to the 
world they, and their associates, experience to demand adjustments 
that seem to address their concerns.  As a result, although often 
unconsciously achieved and all too often by way of a series of dead-
ends that announce their unsuitability in unexpected failures, all sorts 
of constraints get factored into the final product.  People compare 
evolving alternatives and gradually settle on those that seem the most 
efficacious.
In the case of the rules guiding role negotiations, this process 
is ongoing.  The very passions that permeate contemporary politics 
testify to their unsettled status.  When liberals accuse conservatives of 
being fascists or conservatives counter by labeling liberals communists, 
the resulting anger is a sign of how far they are from agreement.  One 
of the pivotal areas of contention has been society’s master values. 
Since its inception, the United States has been torn by disputes 
over the relative importance of freedom and equality.60  Both have 
been deemed important, as is reflected in the last line of the Pledge 
of Allegiance.  Schoolchildren know that it concludes by praising 
the nation as standing for “liberty and justice for all.”  Liberty is 
obviously synonymous with freedom, whereas justice implies fairness 
for all.  The problem is that the meanings of these commitments have 
been transformed over the centuries.  The language is never stable, 
and its applications are always in flux.
Equality once meant an equality of rights.61  People were supposed 
to be equivalent before the law.  This, however, has transmuted 
into an equality of results.  Liberals, under the unacknowledged 
sway of neo-Marxists, have insisted that a mass society cannot be 
fair unless everyone participates equally in its rewards.62  They deny 
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the validity of hierarchy and demand that resources and power be 
evenly distributed.  This dispersal is supposed to be across the board. 
Thus, they would use the federal government to ensure that jobs 
are doled out in proportion to the representation of various groups 
within the larger population.  Women, African Americans, and 
the disabled, according to this program, are all entitled to what is 
deemed their rightful shares of the spoils.  This proportionality even 
extends to schoolrooms where grades are to be inflated so that no 
one feels slighted and also to Little League ballparks where no one is 
allowed to lose.  Conservatives, of course, demur.  Where once their 
forebears distrusted democracy as dangerously egalitarian, today 
they vigorously defend the principle of one person, one vote, and 
are as scandalized as any libertarian by pretensions of noble birth. 
Nevertheless, they continue to believe in an equality of opportunity, 
rather than of results.  They want people be given a comparable 
chance to prove themselves, not to have the game cancelled by a 
premature determination to award trophies to all.  They know that 
this will result in an inequality of success, but consider this both fair 
and essential for social competence.
Beyond this, conservatives place a greater emphasis on 
freedom.63  They demand a reduction in government regulations 
to permit people more control over their lives.  Their antecedents 
among the American Founding Fathers had less to say about these 
matters because, for them, liberty was still about being released from 
the indignities of feudal serfdom.  Jefferson, Adams,64 and their 
contemporaries worried about a reemergence of royalism, not about 
imperious federal regulators or imperialistic judges.  What troubles 
modern conservatives is the lack of respect liberals display toward 
personal liberties.  Although left-leaning reformers continue to 
express an allegiance to freedom, in favoring government imposed 
economic and social regulations, they have redefined the significance 
of personal autonomy.  As a case in point, where once individuals 
were thought completely free to enter or leave employment, present-
day labor lawyers argue for strict limitations on how this is achieved. 
Similarly, where once free speech implied an ability to engage in 
casual insults, these have been proscribed on the grounds that they 
create a hostile work environment.65  Liberals also continue to endorse 
legacies like academic freedom, whereas in practice they deny right-
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wing dissenters tenure.  One Duke University philosophy professor 
went so far as to insist that his university did not hire conservatives 
because they were not sufficiently bright.  To this, the conservatives 
again strenuously dissent.  They insist that true freedom must contain 
the ability to express out-of-favor opinions, even boorish ones.  They 
also insist that the ability to adjust to unpredictable contingencies 
depends on people being allowed to follow their private inclinations. 
They would agree with Walter Olson,66 who concluded in his book 
on labor law that, “for all its risks and disappointments, liberty—the 
simple policy of refusing to force others to deal with us against their 
will and without their consent—turns out to be the best method to 
elicit the greatest willingness and enthusiasm to cooperate from those 
who might do us good.”  This would certainly apply to the ability to 
construct competent social roles, including those with hierarchical 
implications.
Besides the master values applicable to contemporary 
conditions, a myriad of subsidiary values are in dispute.  There 
are genuine disagreements about the goals and norms that should 
apply to embryonic roles and role negotiations.  Liberals have either 
disparaged or profoundly modified the traditional commitments 
on the grounds that they are no longer relevant within diverse 
democracies.  Conservatives, in contrast, find many time-honored 
standards still viable.  Indeed, they strongly commend them as 
sustaining the competence and flexibility essential for a mass-market-
based civilization.  One of these old-fashioned values is merit.  Some 
personal and social qualities are deemed superior to others and, 
therefore, deserving of encouragement.  These traits are literally 
thought to be better than others and hence worthy of respect.  To 
this, the liberals demur.  They find merit to be either fraudulent67 
or situationally dependent.  According to them, elites arbitrarily 
decide what is best so that this favors their own strengths.  Either 
that, or superior performances are called forth by the demands of 
individual circumstances and consequently can come from anyone 
having these.  Tests or evaluations that purport to measure merit 
are, accordingly, illegitimate.  They are spurned as excluding the 
powerless and, therefore, as in need of being superseded by a random 
selection of jobholders.  Let chance, not elite bias, decide who gets 
the plum assignments.
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To this, the conservatives shudder in horror.68  They do not 
believe that abilities and skills are randomly distributed.  Nor do 
they agree that everyone will be equally competent when thrown 
into identical circumstances.   For them, knowledge, talent, and 
motivation have uneven outcomes.  For a job to be done right, 
it is vital to support the processes that increase the probability of 
competence.  This conviction, it should be noted, is crucial to the 
notion of professionalism.69  If professionals are those with greater 
expertise and motivation, then it must be possible for them to 
exhibit superior proficiency in practice.70  Support for a complete 
interchangeability among individuals suggests that skill is automatic, 
whereas history indicates that this is not the case.  Some people are 
indeed smarter, more diligent, or more insightful than others.  If 
anything, a failure to recognize that some role performances, and 
individuals, are more accomplished than others provides evidence of 
an inability to make sound judgments.  It suggests that one cannot 
distinguish quality from rubbish.  It also implies an unwillingness 
to encourage the personal dedication needed for self-improvement. 
Why try to be better if there is no better?  The sad fact is that, were 
everything as good as everything else, in the end nothing, and no 
one, would be very good at anything.
This divergence in attitudes has expressed itself in related 
attitudes toward education.  Nowadays, everyone, whether on the left 
or the right, believes that education is important.  The conflicts come 
from an inability to define education the same way.  Because liberals 
are committed to equality, they are dismayed by manifestations of 
intellectual superiority.  They, therefore, favor curricula that, while 
universal, are not especially demanding.71  Learning, they declare, 
must be fun.  It must also be relevant to the student’s personal 
concerns.  That which does not come easily is for that reason 
dismissed as elitist and scorned as beside the point.  Conservatives, 
in contrast, value rigorous standards.72  They shudder when teachers 
boast that they learn more from their students than the other way 
around.  Nor are they moved by pleas that a poor grade will ruin a 
student’s chances in life.  For them, education is not equivalent to the 
number of years spent in the classroom or to the credentials amassed 
but to lessons mastered.
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For the traditionalists, education and merit are intimately 
related to personal responsibility.  If people are to be self-directed, 
if they are to be given the authority to make important decisions, 
they are expected to be internally motivated to do their best.  If they 
are to manage decentralized roles, they must likewise be prepared to 
defend their choices and to take the blame when things go wrong.73 
Liberals, too, believe in responsibility74 but apparently not with the 
conventional trappings.  Since they believe in niceness, they want 
everyone—with the exception of articulate conservatives—to be 
rewarded.  They are even more adamant that no one be punished. 
All individuals must be instructed that they are beautiful just the way 
they are, irrespective of what they may ever achieve.75  Nor should 
individuals be held responsible for their personal welfare.  This is 
the bailiwick of the central government.  Because the state, in its 
disembodied wisdom, always knows what is best and everlastingly 
commands the necessary resources, it is accountable for protecting 
its citizens from themselves and from almost any potential threat. 
To this, the traditionalists respond that the fundamental spring of 
professional motivation is personalized responsibility.  They claim 
that individuals are best situated to know what they need.  Were they 
not to assume responsibility for their decisions, but instead to hide 
under a mantle of victimization,76 they would not work hard to get 
things right.  Nor would the results be nearly as good.
This attitude, in its turn, is related to an exaltation of American 
individualism.77  Ever since the days of the frontier, a sturdy sense 
of independence has been admired on the western shores of the 
Atlantic.  People have seen themselves as being in control of their 
destinies and hence as responsible for their success.  This facilitated 
efforts at innovation and entrepreneurship from which the society as 
whole gained.  Liberals, however, tend to confuse self-determination 
with greed.78  They declare it selfish when people wish to stand out 
from the crowd.  Their ideal is cooperation,79 not free enterprise. 
People are supposed to submerge their egos in shared endeavors that 
extol loving relationships over private ambition.  The part of this that 
is on target is that coordination is essential for large-scale activities. 
Common goals cannot be attained unless the participants are 
willing to accommodate to joint plans.  Nevertheless, the originality 
that animates these undertakings rarely derives from committees. 
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Individuals can be obnoxious in the manner in which they stir 
the pot, yet without provocation they can provide inertia to slow 
progress to a crawl.  For better or worse, market-oriented, social-
role-dominated communities could not forge ahead without a fair 
number of individualists.
By now, also, customary to capitalism is an emphasis on 
interpersonal trust.80  Though often honored in the breach, honesty 
and integrity continue to be widely respected.  People understand 
that, if they are to survive within a community of strangers,81 they 
must have confidence in most others most of the time.  Yet, if this 
trust is to endure, they cannot shrug off public untruths as indicative 
of a culture of deceit.  Political expediency has led some to defend 
lying as the norm, but, were this true, no one could leave his or 
her back undefended.  On the other hand, tolerance is a liberal 
value that has become more useful as social migrations bring diverse 
populations into contact.  People need to understand the world from 
one another’s point of view if they are to reduce the numbers of 
superfluous conflicts.82  Nevertheless, they cannot take this insight 
to the romantic extent of declaring that no value is superior to any 
other and no cultural artifact preferable to potential alternatives. 
This would invite anarchy.
Lastly, family values matter.83  Standards that uphold intimate 
relationships and parental obligations are more necessary than ever, 
given the impersonality and mobility of a middle-class-dominated 
society.  Changes in how families are organized are inevitable, but that 
families are preferable to a pandemic of promiscuity is irrefutable.  In 
general, it seems certain that the culture wars will terminate in a 
moral consensus that is closer to the time-honored values than to 
their liberal replacements.84  Traditional values may sometimes be 
too rigid for contemporary purposes, but their provenance bespeaks 
a different interpretation.  Though dismissed as conservative, these 
tenets have undergone an evolution in conjunction with the spread 
of commercialization.  The evaluation of merit, for instance, has been 
continually modified to reflect alterations in technology and social 
organization.  Similarly, the estimation of personal responsibility has 
grown as decentralization forced decision-making to become more 
widespread.
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This said liberalism, too, has contributed essential revisions.85 
Social rules could neither be as flexible nor as professional as they 
need to be were they not responsive to progressive critiques.  Even 
when they are misguided, these observations introduce elements that 
require examination.  Such has been the case with feminism.86  Its 
notions of gender equality are self-indulgent, but they call attention 
to legitimate gender problems.  This has obliged people to expand 
their knowledge of gender differences and to incorporate this into 
evolving gender norms.  Men and women have been discovered to 
vary; hence, this must be factored into an updated gender of division 
labor more in harmony with contemporary requirements.  In any 
event, proposed moral adjustments can be compared with one 
another to evaluate their implications.  An expanded professionalism 
with respect to social role and hierarchical arrangements depends 
on achieving an expertise in this sort of moralism.  People need to 
understand how ethical negotiations operate.  They must similarly be 
prepared to examine the consequences of particular norms and values, 
whether proposed by themselves or their rivals.  Facts matter—as do 
honest appraisals of where these lead.
The Professionalized Self
None of this, however, can be socially constructive without the 
active participation of a growing segment of the population.  As 
more individuals become middle class, it is incumbent upon them to 
become professionalized, not just at work, but also in the rest of their 
lives.  As has already been commented upon, middle-class society, 
because it is decentralized and mobile, distributes decision making 
ever more broadly.  People must, therefore, be prepared to make the 
requisite choices and to make them wisely.  They must develop the 
expertise and the motivation to assemble determinations about their 
family life, their civic responsibilities, and their private amusements. 
It is up to them to choose their own occupations, religious 
commitments, and friendship patterns.  If they do not possess the 
knowledge and personal qualities to do this well, it is unlikely to be 
done to their satisfaction—or that of their neighbors.  Their personal 
roles, how these relate to those of their role partners, including in 
terms of relative power, are more than ever in their hands.  If they do 
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not commit themselves to growing into these tasks, they only have 
themselves to blame for their frustrated ambitions.
A professionalized self, as opposed to a professional career, is not 
acquired through a professional education.  There are no credentials 
for managing one’s own life, no college degrees in choosing a 
livelihood, a wife, or a residential lifestyle.  Plans for raising one’s 
children, techniques for maneuvering through the political shoals of 
career advancement, or methods for controlling intense emotions in 
moments of stress do not come neatly packaged in self-help books or 
university courses.  To the contrary, these must be individually crafted 
to meet unique circumstances.  Role players must themselves decide 
to grow up and, having done so, to turn what they have learned 
into reality.  They need, in sum, to take charge of their futures. 
Unless they summon the courage to confront life’s uncertainties and 
make preparations to meet its challenges, they, of necessity, consign 
themselves to exogenous domination.  Much to their chagrin, they 
will find that there are always some individuals eager to govern the 
timid or the ignorant, and if they qualify as one of the governors, 
they will one day encounter these others.
Potentially self-directed people need to learn how to participate 
in isolated nuclear families.87  They must be able to make good 
choices about potential spouses and then discover how to live in 
comfortable intimacy with them and their offspring.  This clearly 
requires competence in role negotiations, and also a knowledge of 
the potential resolution of private divisions of labor.  As significant, 
those who wish to start families must understand the needs of 
children and how to prepare them for disciplined, self-directed 
futures.  Negotiating roles with dependent youngsters requires 
both firmness and restraint.  Though these qualities are ostensibly 
incompatible, they must nevertheless be mastered if children are to 
internalize a capacity for independent decision-making.  Life never 
offers total satisfaction, but those who know how to love and how 
to compromise dramatically improve their chances of achieving 
contentment.
Another skill advantageous for the professionalized self is 
organizational competence.88  Successful members of the emerging 
middle class need to be able to answer questions about what they 
want to be when the grow up, then realistically to implement their 
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conclusions.  Since so much contemporary work is performed within 
large, impersonal organizations, most will need to understand how 
bureaucracies operate.  Unless they recognize the parameters of the 
functional divisions of labor, defined offices, hierarchies of authority, 
rules and procedures, and files and records within these, they will feel 
adrift in apparently irrational and hopelessly rigid morasses.  Once 
they perceive what is happening, however, they can join the political 
fray to recruit allies in their quests to negotiate the best possible 
deals consistent with their personal goals.  Moreover, if they wish 
to be leaders, they will need to understand how power is exercised. 
If they do not, they are apt to display an aura of weakness precisely 
when a test of strength requires the opposite.  Clearly, those who aim 
to be influential require the ability to develop authentic strengths. 
Furthermore, those who would exercise interpersonal control need 
to incorporate qualities that facilitate authority within the contexts 
in which they will operate.  They have to be able to do something 
that others value and are willing to exchange for their collaboration 
or compliance.
Needless to say, in a world where so many alliances depend on 
coordination through shared norms and values, professional selves 
have to be capable moral negotiators.89  They must understand that 
important social rules are neither absolute nor romantically relative. 
Many of their commitments will have been acquired during the 
moral negotiations of their youth, yet many of others will derive 
from their current living and working conditions.  If they are to 
contribute to the evolution of universalistic standards, they will have 
to speak up when things seem out of whack and must do so in a 
manner calculated to recruit the enthusiastic support of people with 
different points of view.  This will require emotional and cognitive 
flexibility, combined with an appropriate firmness of purpose when 
they are contradicted.  Truly moral individuals possess both personal 
commitments and the ability to adjust when confronted with 
evidence that their commitments are counterproductive.
All of this suggests that those who would be professional in 
their personal lives have to be emotionally mature.90  They cannot be 
terrified by the challenges of ordinary living.  Nor can they become 
unyieldingly furious over grievances that should have been overcome 
in the distant past.  They cannot even afford to be so ravenous for 
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love that they will sell their souls for the proverbial mess of pottage. 
Those who would be strong enough to master the demands of a 
mutable and confusing technocommercial society must be able 
to deal with their own fears, rages, and emotional longings.  They 
must, likewise, be able to cope with their personal guilt, shame, 
and disgust.  Individuals who cannot, who are instead swept away 
in the bewilderment inherent in intense passion, are vulnerable 
to manipulation by the more clear-headed.  They may wish to be 
strong but are more likely to revert to infantile spontaneity when 
overwhelmed.
In the end, people who wish to be self-controlled experts in 
surviving within a middle class environment must be capable 
of personal growth.91  Everyone begins life as a frail child, but 
not everyone learns to overcome the barriers this engenders.92 
Many become fixated in juvenile patterns thanks to severe losses 
encountered along the way.  Having ineffectually sought to assert 
themselves in hierarchical, social role, attachment relationships, they 
are thrown back into defensive postures from which they have not 
discovered the means to extricate themselves.  More concerned with 
getting revenge or with preventing further losses, they are not able 
to let go of what went wrong in order to move forward to something 
better.  Frequently conceiving of themselves as victims, they do not 
understand what they must do to get on with their lives.  Filled 
with self-pity, they blame others—or what they may refer to as the 
system—for weaknesses over which as adults only they have the most 
control.
Many of these limitations have been rationalized as mental 
disorders.93  People are encouraged by the mental-health establishment 
to interpret their unhappiness as a sign of a functional disease 
and, then, to ingest medication in order to feel better.  Anxieties 
and depressions that result from the wear and tear of interpersonal 
conflict are attributed to chemical imbalances and, hence, are never 
directly dealt with.  This is unfortunate because many individuals 
would be capable of personal growth if they realized what was 
happening to them.  If they understood, for instance, that they were 
trapped in dysfunctional roles whose point of origination was in 
childhood, they might choose to engage in role change.  They would 
then comprehend their need to let go of the unsatisfying patterns 
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to which they are emotionally committed to adopt more satisfying 
ones.  They would, in short, decide to engage in resocialization.
Thanks to the dominance of medical ways of thinking,94 few 
people appreciate the conservative power of role scripts.95  When 
coerced into dysfunctional patterns of behavior, they do not choose 
to renegotiate them because they do not recognize what is holding 
them back.  Tossed about by strong feelings, they perceive themselves 
as defective precisely because they cannot voluntarily turn these off.96 
Having never been instructed that the anxiety and depression they 
are experiencing are normal parts of the processes of attempting to 
change, they seek to suppress them through chemical means.  Their 
discomforts, rather than their dysfunctional roles, are perceived as 
problems, and efforts are, therefore, made to eliminate them.  In fact, 
resocialization operates by inducing a mourning process whereby a 
person reactivates a dysfunctional role, determines that it represents 
an irretrievable loss, then grieves this defeat.97  Only then can the role 
script be modified to meet the present exigencies.  Only then can the 
person adopt patterns of living that are competent and sustainable. 
Ironically, individuals who are forever sabotaging their life chances 
rarely realize that they are not allowing themselves to succeed for the 
very reason that they hate the roles in which they are confined.  They 
do not even perceive these as dysfunctional.  Because their energies are 
being directed toward conquering long departed role partners, they 
cannot accurately discern the here and now.  As a result, they do not 
recognize that they are neither fully using their brains nor applying 
their best efforts.   Nevertheless, were they to disengage emotionally 
via resocialization, they would find this potential liberated.
As a bonus, society too would benefit from their liberation.  A 
middle-class world that is dependent upon decentralized decision-
making works best when its members are able to respond to their 
personal circumstances.  The whole becomes more flexible when its 
separate elements are free to adapt to their diverse situations.  Since 
people trapped in dysfunctional roles are unthinkingly conservative; 
once freed from these, they can apply their intelligence to solving 
problems that may affect the lives of others beside themselves.  Also, 
once released to meet their own needs, they are apt to be more 
productive, thereby increasing the size of the pie from which all 
share.  Professionalization has worked well in the economic domain; 
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it can do the same on other fronts.  The more people are able to 
be themselves, competently, the more likely they are to realize the 
utilitarian ideal of the greatest happiness for the greatest number.
A genuine social science,98 rather than one engaged in ideological 
posturing, is apt to be useful to achieving this end.  The answers to the 
problems generated by an increasingly commercialized, middle-class 
society are better served by knowledge than by comforting fantasies. 
Most empty promises are eventually exposed, whereas hard truths, no 
matter how difficult, can elicit improved coping mechanisms.  Life is 
not fair and never will be, but it can be less unjust the better people 
understand what is happening.  This will permit them to unleash their 
ingenuity and to pool their resources on joint ventures.  Egalitarian 
collectivism is a chimera, but intelligence and cooperation are not. 
Conflict and inequality are ineluctable aspects of our social nature; 
nevertheless, they are not implacably at odds with collaborative 
ventures.  As previously indicated, predicting the future is a fool’s 
errand, but we can still learn from history.  A middle-class future 
need not be resisted.  It is not automatically barren or conformist. 
If we are up to the challenge of adjusting to its many capricious 
twists, a significant proportion of these may prove exciting and even 
productive.
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